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Preface
The United Nations Mandate on Human Rights  
and the Environment
John H. Knox
United Nations Special Rapporteur on human 
rights and the environment
In March 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Council (Council) decided for the first 
time to create a new mandate on human rights and the environment. Later that year, I had 
the honor of being appointed to carry out the mandate. In this foreword, I will describe the 
evolution of the mandate, and how it is helping to clarify the relationship between human 
rights and environmental protection. 
The Council often appoints special rapporteurs to investigate and report on specific 
human rights issues. Usually, the norms are clear and the focus of the special rapporteur 
is to monitor and encourage their compliance, either in a particular thematic area or by 
a particular country.   
Occasionally, however, the Council appoints independent experts to clarify the application 
of human rights obligations to a specific field. For example, in 2005, the Human Rights 
Commission (which was replaced by the Council in 2006) requested the United Nations 
Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative to examine human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises. The Secretary-General 
appointed John Ruggie, who issued a series of reports culminating in Guiding Principles 
on business and human rights, which were endorsed by the Council in 2011. Similarly, in 
2008 the Council appointed Catarina de Albuquerque as its first Independent Expert on 
the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation. She helped to establish the basis 
for the rights to water and sanitation, and to explore their scope and content.       
The decision of the Council to establish a mandate on human rights and the environment 
was in line with these precedents. Specifically, the Council decided to appoint an 
independent expert with a three-year mandate: 
15
(a)  To study the human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, 
healthy and sustainable environment; [and]
(b)  To identify, promote and exchange views on best practices relating to the use 
of human rights obligations to inform, support and strengthen environmental 
policymaking.1   
The relationship between human rights and the environment needed clarification largely 
because environmental human rights – that is, human rights related to environmental 
protection – are late arrivals to the body of human rights law. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 does not mention the environment. Nor, in the 1940s, did 
the national constitutions to which the drafters of the Universal Declaration looked 
for inspiration. The silence was understandable.  Although human beings have always 
known of our dependence on the environment, we were only beginning to realize how 
much damage our activities could cause to the environment and, as a result, to ourselves. 
Efforts to mitigate environmental degradation were then still in their infancy. 
As the environmental movement grew, from the 1960s on, there began to be calls 
for human rights law to recognize the importance of environmental protection. The 
recognition of the close relationship between human rights and the environment took 
two forms.  
The first was the adoption of an explicit new right to an environment characterized 
in terms such as healthy, safe, satisfactory or sustainable. In 1976, Portugal became 
the first country to adopt a constitutional “right to a healthy and ecologically balanced 
human environment”. Since then, about 100 States have adopted similar rights in their 
national constitutions. Regional human rights agreements drafted after the 1970s have 
also recognized a stand-alone right to a healthy, or satisfactory, environment. Examples 
include the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 1988 Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, and the 2004 Arab Charter on 
Human Rights.  
But despite repeated efforts, no global instrument sets out an explicit right to a healthy 
(or satisfactory, safe or sustainable) environment. Instead, United Nations human rights 
bodies, including the Human Rights Council, the special procedures, and the treaty 
bodies charged with overseeing international treaties, have concentrated on “greening” 
existing human rights – that is, they have applied a wide range of recognized human 
rights, including rights to life, health, food, water, and housing, to environmental issues. 
1 Human Rights Council Res. 19/10, para. 2 (22 March 2012).  
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Regional human rights tribunals, including the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have done likewise. As a result, these human 
rights bodies have created environmental human rights jurisprudence.  
By the time the Human Rights Council created its mandate on human rights and the 
environment, this jurisprudence was quite extensive. However, it had developed in many 
different forums, and it was not obvious whether it was coherent enough to give rise 
to a set of human rights norms relating to the environment. Therefore, my first task 
as the Independent Expert was to study this developing field of law. To that end, I held 
consultations in every region of the world, in cooperation with UN Environment. I heard 
from hundreds of people working to bring human rights norms to bear on environmental 
issues. And, with the assistance of attorneys and academics working pro bono, I 
researched what human rights tribunals, international bodies, and domestic courts had 
said about the relationship. 
In 2014, I published 14 reports compiling the statements of human rights bodies on 
how the rights within their purview applied to environmental issues.2 Each of these 
“mapping” reports was devoted to a particular human rights body or set of bodies. Five 
reports examined global human rights treaties, as they had been interpreted by the 
treaty bodies charged with their oversight. Other reports described the jurisprudence 
of regional human rights tribunals, including the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. Still other reports looked at statements by UN human rights 
mechanisms, including special rapporteurs and the Human Rights Council itself. Finally, 
one set of reports examined international environmental instruments, including the Rio 
Declaration, the Aarhus Convention, and a number of other multilateral environmental 
agreements.  
Despite the differences in scope and jurisdiction of these sources, they have reached 
remarkably similar conclusions about the relationship of human rights and the 
environment.
First, they have made clear that environmental harm can and does interfere with the full 
enjoyment of a vast range of human rights. This may seem obvious. It is well understood, 
for example, that pollution causes the deaths of millions of people every year, and that 
climate change threatens the lives of millions more over the coming decades. Nevertheless, 
even 15 years ago, many governments were reluctant to accept the conclusion that 
2 The reports are available at http://srenvironment.org/mapping-report-2014-2/ and http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/MappingReport.aspx.  
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naturally follows – that environmental harm interferes with the enjoyment of rights to 
life and health, among many others. That has changed. Not only human rights bodies, 
but also governments, have accepted the basic idea that environmental harm threatens 
and often infringes so many human rights.    
In addition, human rights bodies have emphasized that human rights law requires States 
to take steps to protect people from such environmental harm. Specifically, they have 
identified three categories of obligations: procedural obligations, substantive obligations, 
and the heightened obligations States owe to those who are especially vulnerable to 
environmental harm.3  
Procedural obligations include obligations: (a) to assess environmental impacts and make 
environmental information public; (b) to facilitate public participation in environmental 
decision-making, including by protecting the rights of expression and association; and 
(c) to provide access to effective remedies for environmental harm. These obligations 
are often considered to correspond to civil and political rights, but in the environmental 
context they have been derived from the full range of human rights whose enjoyment is 
threatened by environmental harm, including rights to health, food, and water.    
The obligation to facilitate public participation includes the obligations to respect and 
protect the rights of freedom of expression and association. Individuals have rights to 
speak out against or in favor of proposed policies that would affect the environment on 
which they depend. Human rights tribunals have emphasized that governments must 
protect environmental defenders when they are subject to threats, refrain from placing 
restrictions that would hinder the performance of their work, and conduct serious and 
effective investigations of any violations against them.4 Unfortunately, governments 
often fail to comply with these obligations. Environmental human rights defenders are at 
great risk of harassment, violence, and even murder.  On the basis of a comprehensive 
investigation, the human rights organization Global Witness found that at least 908 
environmental and land defenders were murdered between 2002 and 2013, and that the 
problem was growing worse.5   
3 The following paragraphs follow the language of the summary mapping report presented to the Human Rights 
Council in March 2014.  See Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to 
the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, John H. Knox: Mapping report, UN Doc. No. A/
HRC/25/53 (30 December 2013).  
4 See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Kawas-Fernandez v. Honduras, ¶ 145 (2009).  
5 Global Witness, Deadly Environment (2014), available at https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/
environmental-activists/deadly-environment/.  Its most recent report found that in 2015, at least 185 environment 
and land defenders were killed, an average of more than three a week.  Global Witness, On Dangerous Ground (2016), 
available at https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/dangerous-ground/. 
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States also have substantive obligations to protect against environmental harm that 
interferes with the enjoyment of human rights. Specifically, every State has a duty to 
adopt a legal framework that protects against such environmental harm. This obligation 
includes a duty to protect against such harm when it is caused by corporations and 
other non-State actors, as well as by State agencies. The obligation to protect human 
rights from environmental harm does not require the cessation of all activities that may 
cause any environmental degradation. States have discretion to strike a balance between 
environmental protection and other issues of societal importance, such as economic 
development and the rights of others. However, the balance cannot be unreasonable, or 
result in unjustified, foreseeable infringements of human rights. In determining whether 
an environmental law has struck a reasonable balance, relevant factors include whether 
it meets national and international health standards, and whether it is non-retrogressive. 
There is a strong presumption that retrogressive measures are not permissible. Moreover, 
once a State has adopted environmental standards into its law, it must implement and 
comply with those standards.
Finally, States must take into account the situation of groups particularly vulnerable 
to environmental harm. States must not discriminate against groups on prohibited 
grounds in the application of their environmental laws and policies. And they must 
take additional steps to protect certain groups. These obligations are developed in 
most detail with respect to indigenous peoples who, because of their close relationship 
with the environment, are particularly vulnerable to impairment of their rights through 
environmental harm. Those duties include obligations of States to recognize the rights of 
indigenous peoples in the territories they have traditionally occupied, to allow extractive 
activities within those territories only with their free, prior and informed consent, and to 
ensure that they receive a reasonable benefit from any development in their territories.  
In response, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution in March 2014 recognizing 
that “human rights law sets out certain obligations on States that are relevant to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, and that the enjoyment 
of the corresponding human rights and fundamental freedoms can be facilitated by 
assessing environmental impact, making environmental information public and enabling 
effective participation in environmental decision-making processes, and that in that 
regard a good practice includes adopting, strengthening and implementing laws and 
other measures to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the context of environmental legislation and policies.”6  The Council urged States to 
6 Human Rights Council Res. 25/21, para. 4 (28 March 2014).  
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“comply with their human rights obligations when developing and implementing their 
environmental policies.”7
The following year, I presented a report to the Council compiling good practices in the use 
of the human rights obligations identified in the mapping report.8 Through the regional 
consultations and through responses to a questionnaire, I identified more than 100 good 
practices. The largest conference, which represented the culmination of the process, 
was at Yale University in September 2014. It was hosted by Yale and the United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), with assistance from a number of other 
partners, including UN Environment and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). It brought together more than 150 scholars and policy experts, who presented 
and commented on papers concerning the relationship between human rights and 
environmental protection.  
A one-page summary of each good practice is available at the website of the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),9  and at a dedicated website, http://
environmentalrightsdatabase.org, which allows the practices to be easily searched by 
type and region. The summary of each practice includes its implementing actors and 
location, a brief description of the practice, and links to websites where further information 
about the practice may be found. 
Several of the examples of good practices in the implementation of the right to 
environmental information involve the use of online databases or notification systems. 
For example, the AKOBEN program adopted by the Ghanaian Environmental Protection 
Agency (GEPA) uses a five color rating scheme to assess the performance of mining 
and manufacturing operations. GEPA annually discloses the ratings to the general 
public and the media, and makes the disclosures available on the GEPA website.10  Other 
examples include annual reports on environmental monitoring activities. For example, 
the South African Department of Environmental Affairs publishes an annual report on 
all enforcement-related activities. This report provides information on statistics for 
enforcement, including administrative citations and fines issued, criminal cases brought, 
number of convictions, number of facilities inspected, and number of staff working 
on compliance monitoring and enforcement.11 According to the Executive Director of 
7 Id. para. 8.  
8 Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, 
clean, healthy and sustainable environment, John H. Knox: Compilation of good practices, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/61 (3 
February 2015).  
9 The OHCHR page on the good practices is: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/
GoodPractices.aspx. 
10 See http://www.epaghanaakoben.org/. 
11 The reports are available at the website of the Department of Environmental Affairs, https://www.environment.gov.
za/mediarelease/necer_201213report. 
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the Centre for Environmental rights, a South African environmental NGO, the annual 
compliance and enforcement report “gives incredibly valuable information to civil society 
to use to empower it to take legal action and to use as softer advocacy tools, such as to 
criticize companies engaged in illegal activities.”
Other good practices include reduced barriers to standing in environmental cases, which 
enable plaintiffs to have easier access to effective remedies for environmental harm. 
For example, the Supreme Court of the Philippines has enacted Rules of Procedure for 
Environmental Cases that include many mechanisms that assist petitioners. The Rules, 
which list as an objective “[t]o protect and advance the constitutional right of the people 
to a balanced and healthful ecology,” include a broad standing provision. They state, “Any 
Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, 
may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.” For such 
citizen suits, the Court will also defer the payment of any filing or other legal fees until 
after the Court issues a judgment.12   
Another way to enable access to justice in environmental matters is to create dedicated 
“green tribunals” to address environmental harms. There are now hundreds of these 
environmental courts around the world. A recent notable example is the National Green 
Tribunal of India, which has been operating since July 2011. It provides relief and 
compensation to victims of pollution and other environmental damage, for restitution of 
property damaged, and for restitution of the environment. As another benefit, it helps to 
reduce the burden of litigation in other Indian courts.13 
Another type of good practice is the facilitation of information-sharing between judges 
who may face issues concerning human rights and the environment. For example, in July 
2010, the Asian Development Bank hosted the first of three Asian Judges Symposiums 
on Environmental Decision Making, the Rule of Law, and Environmental Justice. Around 
120 senior judges, environment ministry officials, members of civil society, and experts in 
environmental law discussed ways to promote environment protection through effective 
environmental adjudication and law enforcement. One of the main conclusions from the 
Symposium was agreement on the need for a judicial network on the environment, which 
resulted in the creation of the Asian Judges Network on Environment (AJNE). The AJNE 
serves as an information and experience sharing arrangement among senior judges of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC).14 
12 Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court, Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, 29 April 
2010, http://www.law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/IJIEA/Rules_of_Procedure_for_Environmental_Cases.pdf.   
13 The website of the tribunal is http://www.greentribunal.gov.in/. 
14 The website is: http://www.asianjudges.org/. The final outcome document from the 2010 Symposium is available at: 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29631/symposium-environmental-decisions-law-justice.pdf. 
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In March 2015, at the conclusion of the first three-year term of the mandate, the Human 
Rights Council decided to renew it for another three years.15 It changed the title of the 
mandate-holder from Independent Expert to Special Rapporteur, and it asked him to 
promote and report on the realization of the human rights obligations relating to the 
environment, and to identify challenges and obstacles to their full realization. In this respect, 
it aligned the mandate more with other thematic mandates, by shifting its focus more to 
compliance. At the same time, the Council requested the Special Rapporteur to continue to 
study the human rights obligations relating to the environment, and to continue to identify, 
promote and exchange views on good practices in their use.16    
In accordance with this revised mandate, I have proceeded along two tracks since 
2015.  I have tried to promote implementation of the human rights obligations relating 
to enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment by, among other 
things, undertaking country visits and receiving communications alleging human rights 
violations, as other special rapporteurs do.  On the basis of an expert meeting and a 
questionnaire in 2015, I presented a report to the Council in March 2016 setting out a 
large number of methods of implementing environmental human rights obligations.17  
The Council adopted a resolution encouraging States to adopt many of the suggested 
methods, including: 
  facilitating “the exchange of knowledge and experiences between experts in the 
environmental and human rights fields, and to promote coherence among different 
policy areas”;
  exploring “ways to incorporate information on human rights and the environment, 
including climate change, in school curricula, in order to teach the next generations 
to act as agents of change, including by taking into account indigenous knowledge”;
  seeking “to ensure that projects supported by environmental finance mechanisms 
respect all human rights”;
  collecting “disaggregated data on the effects of environmental harm on vulnerable 
groups, as appropriate”;
  building “capacity for the judicial sector to understand the relationship between 
human rights and the environment”; and
  fostering “a responsible private business sector and to encourage corporate 
sustainability reporting while protecting environmental standards in accordance 
with relevant international standards and agreements and other ongoing initiatives 
in this regard”.18   
15 Human Rights Council Res. 28/11 (26 March 2015).  
16 Ibid. para. 5. 
17 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, 
 clean, healthy and sustainable environment, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/53 (28 December 2015).  
18 Human Rights Council Res. 31/8, para. 5 (23 March 2016).  
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I have also worked with UNITAR to develop an online course on human rights and the 
environment, which enrolled its first students in the summer of 2016.  And I have worked 
with UN Environment and other partners to initiate a joint global effort to sensitize the 
judiciary on constitutional environmental rights and to evaluate the impact of these 
rights. The first workshop was held in South Africa in April 2016 and brought together 
judges from South and West Africa. We plan later workshops in other regions of the 
world, including Latin America and the Caribbean. 
At the same time, I continue to work to clarify the application of human rights law to 
specific areas.  In 2015, I focused on climate change. I issued a report describing the 
adverse effects on human rights that would follow from even a two-degree increase 
in global average temperature19  and, together with other special rapporteurs and 
independent experts; I urged the negotiators of the new climate agreement to take 
human rights into account.20  The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 does 
include a strong reference to human rights in the preamble, which makes it the first 
global environmental agreement to do so. I reported on the relationship of human rights 
and climate change to the Human Rights Council at its March 2016 session.21  
I prepared a report on another thematic area: the relationship of human rights and the 
conservation of biological diversity. I presented this report to the Council in March 2017. 
One of the great benefits of my work on the UN mandate has been the opportunity to 
meet some of the many people who are working on human rights and the environment all 
over the world, in governments, civil society organizations, international institutions, and 
academia. We have a long way to go to ensure that everyone is able to enjoy a healthy 
environment and the human rights that depend on it, but I am always encouraged and 
inspired by the examples of the people who are working so hard to bring that day nearer. 
This excellent collection of papers and research was first presented at a Symposium in 
April 2016 titled New Frontiers in Global Environmental Constitutionalism. The collection 
examines how human and environmental rights are being implemented in global 
contexts, and the extent to which constitutional and other rights-based approaches, 
including international and regional human rights, promote environmental protection. 
19 The report was prepared for the Climate Vulnerable Forum, and it is available at http://www.thecvf.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/05/humanrightsSRHRE.pdf. 
20 See Joint statement by UN Special Procedures on the occasion of World Environment Day (5 June 2015): 
Climate Change and Human Rights, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=16049&LangID=E. 
21 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, 
 clean, healthy and sustainable environment, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (1 February 2016). 
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We hope that this publication will help to further the global conversation on comparative 
environmental rights-based approaches among policy-makers and governments, 
practitioners, non-governmental organizations, civil society, scholars, educators, and 
post-graduate students. Finally, we are most grateful to all our contributors from all over 
the world for sharing their research and work with us. Without them, this publication 
would not have been possible. 
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New Frontiers in Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism
Arnold Kreilhuber
UN Environment
The late Nigerian environment activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa is quoted as saying ‘The 
environment is man’s first right. Without a clean environment, man cannot exist to claim 
other rights, be they political, social, or economic.’  I believe it is the growing realization 
that a liveable, a healthy, a sustainable environment is indeed at the core of humanity’s 
aspirations for a better, healthier, more peaceful future for all, that drives the new frontiers 
of global environmental constitutionalism.
When I left my home in Nairobi for the airport to attend the Symposium on New Frontiers 
in Global Environmental Constitutionalism, the city had just started to awake from its 
slumber and began filling with life. People on all imaginable modes of transport setting 
out to make a living, to improve their daily lives and the lives of their loved ones. Goods on 
offer everywhere, congested roads; the hustle and bustle of this African metropolis was 
already in full swing by the time I made it, luckily on time, to Jomo Kenyatta International 
Airport. I didn’t think much more about the courageous shortcuts my driver took through 
Nairobi’s industrial area and other hotspots for commercial activity to get me to the 
airport on time – until later when, already on the plane, I saw a notice on the airline’s on-
board magazine that discouraged the reckless disposal of used oil, its consequences for 
safe water supply, and warned that offenders could face lengthy prison terms if caught by 
the authorities. Only two simple pictures and a few lines of text on a single page of paper. 
But this was a powerful illustration of an environmental crime and a good illustration 
of how much havoc the violation of environmental laws and environmental rights can 
wreak on the aspirations of millions of people who, like people in Nairobi, set out every 
morning with the goal to better their lives.
The new frontiers for environmental constitutionalism will play out in this very context: 
the relationship to human rights, climate change as the emblematic environmental 
challenge of our time, and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda which aims to 
leave no one behind on the path to a better and more sustainable future. 
The protection of the environment and the promotion and protection of fundamental rights, 
including human rights are increasingly recognized as intertwined and complementary. 
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Ecosystems and the services they provide, including food, water, disease management, 
climate regulation, spiritual fulfilment and aesthetic enjoyment, are the foundations 
for the full enjoyment of human rights, such as the right to life, health, food and safe 
drinking water. At the same time, human rights are instrumental in fostering sustainable 
development and environmental objectives. In 2013, at the occasion of the first ever 
universal session of UN Environment’s Governing Body following the Rio+20 Conference, 
the world’s Governments “welcomed the important contributions made to sustainable 
development by environmental law and constitutional provisions and rights of some 
countries related to nature”. 
Success going forward will depend on our ability to operationalize these linkages, 
advance environmental rights and make them felt in the daily lives of people. Let me give 
an example: At the second session of the United Nations Environment Assembly, UN 
Environment presented a report on legal limits for lead in paint. Lead in paint is a good 
indication of some of the tests environmental constitutionalism will face going forward 
and why it is so vital to push forward with a strong resolve. Despite many constitutional 
provisions and the clear human rights implications, millions of people – and especially 
children – continue to be poisoned by lead in decorative and other paints. New York 
University has estimated that the developmental and societal costs associated with this 
go into billions of dollars. In some countries, the costs amount to 3% of GDP. In times 
where many countries struggle to grow their GDP at all, this is very significant.
The topic of human rights and the environment, and constitutional environmental rights, 
has particular relevance in Africa. There was a time, not that long ago, when it might 
have been thought strange to suggest that the rest of the world stood to learn from an 
examination of human rights law in Africa. However, so much has changed in recent 
years, both on the ground in Africa, and in received views about the continent.
The inspirational power of African human rights movements arises from, amongst other 
things, the directness with which the African human rights documents address issues.  As 
is well known, among the human rights treaties, only the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights proclaims environmental rights in broadly qualitative terms. It protects 
both the right of peoples to ‘the best attainable standard of health’ and their right to ‘a 
general satisfactory environment favorable to their development’. In contrast, such a 
right, if it is to be found in most ‘developed’ states’ constitutions, has to be discovered 
through legal interpretation.
Meanwhile, some important, trailblazing litigation has come out of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights over the last 15 years, including the widely 
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heralded Ogoniland decision - the first decision by an international human rights body 
dealing directly with the violation of economic, social, and cultural rights. This decision 
goes further than any previous human rights case in the substantive environmental 
obligations it places on states.
It is of note too that some ‘Western’ courts have already made reference to the African 
Charter in their decisions. This is not surprising as this instrument has introduced some 
innovations to the international human rights scene.
In addition to its unique enforcement mechanism, the African Charter is the only regional 
human rights instrument that incorporates economic, social and cultural rights as well as 
civil and political rights in one document, and subjects them all to the same complaints 
procedure. This is very significant because these rights (including to health, water and 
food, for example) clearly have a strong environmental overlap and therefore allow people 
to bring environment related cases to the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights and the African Court. The human rights protection body under the African Charter 
is therefore the very first human rights body capable of deciding on multiple breaches of 
both first and second-generation human rights in one decision.
South Africa, where the chapters of this volume were originally presented at the New 
Frontiers conference in April 2016, has been a leader on the continent, and indeed the 
world, in terms of advanced environmental constitutionalism. South Africa has both a 
progressive Constitution that guarantees environmental rights and an interesting and 
exciting suite of comprehensive environmental legislation that makes extensive provision 
for public participation in environmental policy and decision-making. To add to that, the 
country has an incredibly strong and alive civil society culture, always prepared to challenge 
gross environmental injustice. Isn’t this what it is all about at the end of the day? Justice 
and fairness. This, I believe, must be the end goal for environmental constitutionalism.
Let me take you back to UN Environment Governing Council Decision 27/9 for a moment. 
After recognizing the positive contribution that environmental constitutionalism has 
played, the decision went on to say that the violation of environmental law has the 
potential to undermine sustainable development and the implementation of agreed 
environmental goals and objectives at all levels and that the rule of law and effective 
governance play an essential role in reducing such violations.
Decision 27/9 is the first inter-governmentally-negotiated document to establish the 
term environmental rule of law. Why is this important in the context of environmental 
constitutionalism?
27
Environmental rule of law is central to sustainable development and the success of 
environmental constitutionalism. The ever increasing environmental pressures from 
climate change, biodiversity loss, water scarcity, air and water pollution, soil degradation, 
among others, have far reaching economic and social consequences. They contribute 
to poverty and to growing social inequalities. Conflicts over natural resources and 
environmental crimes exacerbate the problems. At least 40 percent of internal conflicts 
over the last 60 years have a link to natural resources. The risks of violent conflict 
increase when exploitation of natural resources causes environmental damage, loss of 
livelihood, or unequal distribution of benefits. Poor people are especially vulnerable, as 
are women and girls.
However, natural resources that are managed sustainably, transparently, and on the 
basis of rights and the rule of law can be the engine for sustainable development as well 
as a platform for peace and justice.
To be effective, environmental rule of law entails:
1. Fair, clear and implementable environmental laws;
2. Public participation in decision-making, and access to justice and information in 
environmental matters, in accordance with Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration;
3. Accountability and integrity of institutions and decision-makers, including through 
the active engagements of environmental auditing and enforcement;
4. Accessible, fair, impartial, timely, and responsive dispute resolution mechanisms, 
including developing specialized expertise in environmental adjudication, and 
innovative environmental procedures and remedies.
5. Recognition of the mutually reinforcing relationship between human rights and the 
environment; and
6. Specific criteria for the interpretation of environmental law.
The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) provide a unique opportunity to advance environmental rule of law by 
ensuring sustainable development is based on rights and affords all people equality in 
environmental protection. They also provide a vehicle for translating the hundreds of 
existing environmental commitments into action – including the many constitutional 
provisions the world over.
A rights-based approach to guide decision-making will lead to better results in 
implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the SDGs and in 
addressing the impact of environmental degradation generally and in particular its impact 
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on the world’s poorest and most vulnerable populations. It will encourage economic 
development that recognizes that healthy ecosystems are a precondition for reducing 
poverty and an opportunity for development and economic growth.
To this end, legal and practical means to increase transparency, strengthen access 
to information and enhance public participation in environmental decision-making 
processes will be needed. We need to increase the capacity of those critical to 
implementing environmental rule of law. This includes in particular courts and other 
tribunals, law enforcement agencies, auditing institutions and other stakeholders at the 
national, sub-regional, regional, and international levels.
Globally, courts and tribunals now address environmental issues in a variety of settings. 
More than 50 states have established specialized environmental courts and tribunals. 
Yet, citizen access to justice in environmental matters differs greatly from country to 
country and is far from being barrier-free. These barriers must be removed and the 
capacity of courts and tribunals to dispose of environmental cases must be strengthened 
to ensure the full reach of environmental constitutionalism. Effective environmental 
constitutionalism without the rule of law seems unthinkable.
This is why this volume is so important: it offers us an opportunity to exchange and 
learn from each other as to how we can move environmental constitutionalism forward 
to ensure the achievement of these global aspirations and goals, combat the violation 
of these rights through civil, administrative and criminal enforcement, and safeguard 
against the regression on existing rights.
Going forward, this effort will need all of us working together, academic institutions -- 
and the work of many eminent representatives of some of the world’s finest institutions 
are included in this volume, – business, and civil society, governments, and the entire UN 
family.
UN Environment was very proud to be associated with the conference in South Africa and 
with this publication which collects and makes permanent the scholarly contributions to 
this event. UN Environment has been involved in several important developments in this 
area, to integrate human rights and environment linkages in UN system-wide strategies, 
as well as moving the agenda ahead among Governments. In collaboration with the UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights and the Environment, Prof. John Knox, UN Environment has produced a 
large number of informational tools on Human Rights and the Environment linkages, 
including reports, compendia, and online resources, all of which are available on a 
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dedicated Human Rights and Environment section of the UN Environment website, as 
well as on the websites of partner institutions. Among these is a compendium of best 
practices in environmental rights. 
We have also already begun to team up with partners to develop a training programme 
for the judiciary to be rolled out globally, to promote the utilization of constitutional 
environmental rights in the broader sustainability agenda – something we are very excited 
about. The first step in this project was a Workshop associated with the New Frontiers 
conference sponsored by connected North-West University and Widener University 
Delaware Law School in which African judges critically engaged on constitutional 
environmental rights themes from a comparative perspective. The outcomes of that 
workshop fed into the development of training materials for the judiciary.
As Thomas Paine said: A Constitution is not the act of a Government, but of a people 
constituting a government and a government without a constitution is a power without a 
right. In the age of the Anthropocene, constitutionalism – and especially environmental 
constitutionalism – will be measured even more rigorously by the ability it creates to 
achieve just and sustainable development outcomes.
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Introduction to Environmental Constitutionalism
Erin Daly, Louis Kotzé, James R. May
Environmental constitutionalism examines the development, implementation and 
effectiveness of incorporating environmental rights, procedures, and policies into 
constitutions around the globe. Through alchemy of international engagement, 
constitutional reform, legislative implementation, and jurisprudential vindication 
– informed by legal scholars and civil society change agents – environmental 
constitutionalism is undeniably an influential and growing field of law and public policy 
with potential to advance and improve environmental outcomes in ways that only outright 
constitutionalism can. 
Environmental constitutionalism’s emergence is nothing short of astonishing. Arguably 
owing its genesis to the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and 1966’s twin 
international covenants on Civil and Political and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it 
entered the lexicon at 1972’s Stockholm Convention on the Human Environment, which 
is widely considered to be the global impetus that sparked the exponential growth of 
international, regional and national environmental law regimes, including their rights-
related aspects.  It included the following intertwining of human and environmental rights: 
In the long and tortuous evolution of the human race on this planet a stage has 
been reached when, through the rapid acceleration of science and technology, 
man has acquired the power to transform his environment in countless 
ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both aspects of man’s environment, 
the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the 
enjoyment of basic human rights the right to life itself.22 
While it is difficult to determine exactly when the first environmental provision of any 
kind was incorporated into a constitution23  the current wave began on the heels of 
Stockholm.24 From there, constitutional incorporation was slow but steady through 
the 1970’s and 1980’s, persistent in the 1990’s, and pervasive ever since. Now, about 
22 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972 Preamble, para 1. See also its 
Principle 1. 
23 One estimation is that this occurred in 1866 in the Romanian Constitution Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James 
Melton “Comparative Constitutions Project Characteristics of National Constitutions” 2014 version 2.0, available 
at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp2015/download-data/.  The first of the modern constitutional 
environmental provisions is seen in the state constitution of Pennsylvania, whose Environmental Rights Amendment 
was adopted by statewide referendum in 1971, the year before the Stockholm Convention. 
24 Joshua Gellers “Explaining the Emergence of Constitutional Environmental Rights: A Global Quantitative Analysis” 
2015 6(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 75-97. 
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one-half of all constitutions on the planet expressly or implicitly recognize a right to 
the environment as a fundamental right. About a third of those also contain procedural 
environmental rights provisions explicitly asserting rights to information, participation, 
and access to justice in environmental matters. Some provisions are common – such 
as those expressly recognizing a right to a beneficial or healthful environment – while 
others are less so, such as those recognizing the rights of nature, requiring environmental 
education, advancing sustainability, or incorporating human dignity as essential to 
environmental protection. Whether or not countries are intentionally copying each other, 
they are aware of the currents that are bringing environmental constitutionalism to all 
parts of the world.
In some constitutions, the environmental provisions are directive principles of public 
policy, encouraging governments to care for the environment, while some constitutions 
insist that the government owns environmental resources in trust for the benefit of the 
people and must care for them accordingly for present and future generations; others 
still guarantee environmental rights as in indivisible aspect alongside other rights, such 
as the right to free expression, the right to vote, the right to education, the right to dignity, 
or the right to life. This rights-based approach signals a shift from the conventional 
understanding of environmental protection which has primarily happened at the 
international level of multi-lateral treaties on pollution, biodiversity, climate change, and 
so on, or by domestic statutes that seek to secure clean water or air, for instance. 
From modest beginnings, environmental constitutionalism has become a common if 
not constant consideration at international conferences, constitutional conventions, and 
academic symposia, and in courtrooms, boardrooms, and classrooms. It stands on the 
shoulders of countless conversations and contributors. Whether there is a human right 
to a healthy environment, and if so, how that notion ought to be reflected in international 
instruments and national and subnational constitutions and laws has been fertile field 
for thought. A robust body of scholarship exists that tracks trends in environmental 
constitutionalism, advocates for constitutional incorporation of substantive and 
procedural environmental rights, identifies correlations to related concepts like human 
rights and human dignity, contextualizes it to challenges such as climate change, and 
acknowledges its potential as a saving grace in the Age of the Anthropocene. 
The growing recognition of the need for constitutional institutions, provisions and 
processes to embrace environmental care and to extend constitutionalism into 
the environmental domain confirms the entrenchment of global environmental 
constitutionalism, in all its aspects and throughout the world. While some have called 
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for “a wider range of options [and] a new paradigm”25  in this respect, others suggest 
that in addition to legitimate and accountable government, judicial review, democracy, 
and respect for human rights, “the constitutionalism of the future” must as a result of 
contemporary threats and challenges, embrace notions such as human solidarity for the 
preservation of the planet and its resources and equitable principles in the allocation of 
scarce resources within and among people and countries.26  Thus, the need to consider 
where environmental constitutionalism is headed next – that is, its new frontiers.
Focusing on “new frontiers” represents a certain audacity of both descriptive and 
normative dimensions. For a discipline so young – the first wave of scholarly engagements 
with the topic having appeared within the last 10 years – the invitation to explore new 
frontiers signals that knowledge and understanding in this field are developing quickly, 
with continual transnational conversations taking place within and across communities 
of scholars and practitioners. But it also calls upon contributors to reckon creatively 
and seriously with the challenges of environmental constitutionalism: how should 
constitutional provisions be written so as to maximize their effectiveness? What is 
the relationship between environmental rights and other constitutional rights? How 
can environmental rights be used to protect human interests as well as environmental 
interests? And, perhaps most importantly, how can courts be encouraged to take up the 
challenge of vindicating constitutional environmental rights? These difficult and urgent 
questions are materializing against the backdrop of the Anthropocene, when humans 
are facing unprecedented environmental threats, but also have more resources than 
ever before to combat those threats. The promise, and challenge, of environmental 
constitutionalism is to make those guarantees matter.  This collection invites scholars 
to explore how to do that.
One of the hallmarks of environmental constitutionalism is that it has always been 
part of a transnational conversation – countries look to each other in developing 
their constitutional texts and as their courts seek to interpret and apply them. Indeed, 
constitutional environmental drafters, interpreters, and scholars are in a continual 
dialogue, learning from each other and adapting norms and practices evolved in one 
place to their unique local conditions. It is thus entirely apt to bring together some of the 
leading voices in this global dialogue and to present those contributions in the form of 
this book for others to consider and adapt to their own thinking. 
25 Brain Gareau “Global Environmental Constitutionalism” 2013 40(4) Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 
403-408 at 408. 
26 Bertrand Ramcharan “Constitutionalism in an Age of Globalisation and Global Threats” in Morly Frishman and Sam 
Muller (eds) The Dynamics of Constitutionalism in the Age of Globalisation (Hague Academic Press, 2010) 18-19. 
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We are therefore delighted to present the contributions to this volume, the fruits of 
a stimulating symposium that took place in 2016 at the North-West University in 
Potchefstroom, South Africa. The symposium was a joint collaboration between the 
Faculty of Law, North-West University; Widener University, Delaware Law School; the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment; the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation; and the United Nations Environment Programme. We hope that 
you find this volume to be helpful in contributing to the conversation about new frontiers 
in environmental constitutionalism. 
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New Frontiers: Europe, Human Rights, and the 
Environment - The Continuing Need for Innovation
Karen Morrow 
1. Introduction
Europe tends to pride itself on its record on human rights, though nowadays this is 
perhaps more the product of a tendency to rest on former glories than a reflection of 
reality. Arguably there is no area in which the limitations in Europe’s track record on 
human rights are more apparent than in the vexed relationship between the environment 
and human rights, in particular where substantive (in marked contrast with procedural27) 
environmental rights are concerned. This chapter briefly considers the innovative 
coverage for environmental concerns crafted from applying a patchwork of established 
human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights 195028  (ECHR) to 
emerging human rights claims raising environmental concerns. It discusses some of 
the necessary limitations of this approach and argues that it may have reached the limit 
of its potential. The chapter briefly outlines a number of ways in which the fabric of the 
human rights protection that is offered in environmental contexts under the ECHR may 
be further developed. The chapter concludes by considering the potential of European 
Union (EU) accession to the ECHR and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFREU)29  as future means of addressing environmental human rights 
claims.     
27 Europe can legitimately claim to be innovative in regard to applying procedural rights in environmental contexts 
– see the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters at <http://www.unece.org/
fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf> accessed 21 March 2016.
28 Online at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 21 March 2016.
29 OJ 2012/C 326/02, 26/10/2012.
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2. The ECHR Regime and 
Environment-Based 
Rights Claims – Making 
the Best of a Difficult 
Situation?
The absence of coverage for environmental 
rights in the main body of the ECHR is of 
course entirely understandable given its 
vintage. The subsequent failure to add 
discrete coverage of environmental rights 
to the Convention regime is less explicable, 
however, and presents an ongoing practical 
and jurisprudential challenge. While (as 
we shall see below) the ECHR’s signatory 
states have been at best dilatory in 
engaging with the human rights concerns 
arising from environmental issues, the 
same cannot be said of the European 
Commission for Human Rights30  and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
By the early 1990s, applicants under the 
Convention were beginning to attempt 
to raise human rights claims founded 
on environmental concerns, as adverse 
conditions in respect of the ECtHR were 
increasingly seen to act to the detriment 
of the ECHR. While this development 
offered potential opportunities to 
pursue redress to applicants and for 
the Convention machinery to further 
augment its jurisdiction,31 in the first 
instance the practicalities of making 
an environment-based claim under the 
ECHR in the absence of any coverage of 
environmental issues in the Convention 
had to be engaged with. Given the raw 
material at hand, with the Convention’s 
coverage being focused primarily on “first 
generation” civil and political rights, with 
“second generation” social and economic 
rights playing a subsidiary role; the fit with 
environmental rights claims, commonly 
deemed to invoke “third generation”32 
rights, was not immediately apparent. 
Nonetheless the Convention machinery 
rose to the challenge by exploiting the 
latitude available to it under the “living 
instrument”33 approach to interpreting the 
ECHR.   
Figure 1: Between a rock and a hard place, 
Llanberis, Wales
30 This body was abolished on the entry into force of Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby 1994, in 1998 online at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_Collection_P11_ETS155E_ENG.pdf> accessed 21 March 2016. The 
Commission initiated the regime’s engagement with environment-based claims by finding them admissible to the 
ECtHR in S v France App no 13728/88 (ECHR, 23 January 1990).
31 Guerra and others v. Italy App no 14967/89 (ECHR, 19 February 1998) para 43, which outlines the Court’s definitive 
role in determining its jurisdiction.
32 Employing, for the sake of convenience, the commonly used (if contentious) terminology proposed in K. Vasak: 
‘Human rights: A thirty-year struggle. The sustained efforts to give force of law to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’, UNESCO Courier, 30:11.
33 A. Mowbray: ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) Human Rights Law Review 57.
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2.1. The ECtHR and Environment-
based Human Rights Claims 
– the Patchwork Approach
In order to accommodate environmental 
claims under the ECHR, what may 
be termed a “patchwork”34  approach 
was adopted, fashioning coverage for 
environment-based claims by piecing 
together the application of established 
Convention rights in a novel context.  Both 
procedural and substantive Convention 
rights were pressed into service in this 
way in adjudicating environment-based 
claims, the key procedural rights invoked 
being Article 6 - the right to a fair hearing, 
and Article 13 – the right to a remedy 
in domestic law. The main substantive 
rights that tend to be litigated are Article 
8 - the right to privacy and family life; 
Article 10 – freedom of expression (which 
includes the right to receive information); 
Article 1 to the First Protocol - the right 
to enjoyment of property; and ultimately, 
though infrequently, Article 2 - the right to 
life. Although these Convention rights are 
expressed in broad terms, none of them is 
absolute and they can therefore be subject 
to legitimate interference by States if 
certain conditions are met. In evaluating 
what qualifies as such, the Court employs 
concepts such as the need to arrive at a 
“fair balance” between the interests of 
affected individuals and society more 
generally, and the “margin of appreciation”, 
which is rooted in the fundamentally 
subsidiary nature of the Convention35 
and founded on the understanding that 
states are better placed than the ECtHR 
to make decisions, given their knowledge 
of domestic conditions. Both of these 
concepts feature prominently in the case 
law on environment-based human rights 
claims, unsurprisingly, given the need for a 
somewhat circumspect judicial approach 
necessitated by the lack of specific 
Convention coverage for environmental 
issues and the fact that in this area, 
perhaps above all others, knowledge of 
prevailing conditions on the ground is of 
central importance.
What began as an ad hoc endeavor rapidly 
developed jurisprudential critical mass, as 
the ECtHR capitalized on the opportunities 
presented to it by multiple claims in this 
newly modish sphere, and numerous 
landmark cases emerged in fairly short 
order, with Lopez Ostra v Spain App no 
16798/90 (ECHR 9 December 1994) 
leading the way. In this case the Court 
found that the state’s failure to protect an 
individual’s home from “serious” pollution 
emanating from a waste treatment plant 
violated Article 8, in failing to respect her 
home, privacy, and family life. 
In Taskin v Turkey App no 46117/99 
(ECHR, 8 April 2005), the Court stressed 
the states’ obligations extended not only to 
setting up appropriate regulatory regimes 
but also to securing their enforcement. 
34 K. Morrow: ‘After the Honeymoon: The Uneasy Marriage of Human Rights and the Environment Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and in UK Law Under the Human Rights Act 1998’, (2013) 43 Revue générale de droit 
317  
35 Hatton and others v. United Kingdom, App no 360022/97 (ECHR, 8 July 2003).
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Here, a gold mine that had been operating 
under a state permit was unlawfully 
emitting cyanide. Eventually the domestic 
courts ruled that it should be closed, but 
this was not done. The state’s failure to 
comply with its own regulatory law was 
found to be in breach of Articles 8 and 6.
Further, Hamer v Belgium App no 21861/03 
(ECHR, 27 February 2008) took further 
important steps in recognizing the societal 
significance of the environment. While 
the Court pointed once again to the wide 
margin of appreciation enjoyed by States 
in regard to environmental affairs,36  it 
also declared that: “… in today’s society 
the protection of the environment is an 
increasingly important consideration”.37 
Furthermore the Court stated that: 
The environment is a cause whose 
defense arouses the constant and 
sustained interest of the public, and 
consequently the public authorities. 
Financial imperatives and even 
certain fundamental rights, such as 
ownership, should not be afforded 
priority over environmental protection 
considerations, in particular when 
the State has legislated in this 
regard.38 
This articulation of the public interest in 
environmental regulation and the question 
of the potential qualification of individual 
rights in light of it (in the instant case under 
Article 1 to the First Protocol) - subject to 
satisfying the requirement of fair balance 
– is of considerable interest. Whilst the 
focus adopted by the Court here remains 
anthropocentric, the range of human 
impacts considered explicitly brings 
collective, as well as individual interests, 
into the equation, adding substance to 
the content of the margin of appreciation 
and the concept of fair balance. That said, 
the collective nature of environmental 
interests and their relationship to 
individual rights remains the conceptually 
fraught centre to ECHR claims based on 
environmental concerns.39 
In terms of conflicting interests, Bacila 
v Romania App no 19234/04 (ECHR, 30 
March 2010), an Article 8 claim on a failure 
to regulate adequately saw the ECtHR take 
the view that the economic need to keep 
the offending plant open should not have 
been allowed to prevail over the locals’ 
“right to enjoy a healthy environment”.40 
This approach was reiterated – and 
arguably augmented - in the Article 13 
case of Di Sarno and others v Italy App no 
30765/08 (ECHR, 10 January 2012). 
36 Online at <hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id.> accessed 22 March 2016, at para 78.
37 ibid at, para 79.
38 ibid.
39 F. Francioni: ‘International human rights in an environmental horizon’ (2010) European Journal of International Law 41.
40 Para 70-71.
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Kania v Poland App no 12605/03 (ECHR, 
21 October 2009) was also significant in 
that the ECtHR reiterated its commitment 
to the use of Article 8 as a means of 
disposing of environment-based claims, 
despite the continuing absence of 
coverage a right to “a clean and quiet 
environment” in the Convention. 
Another significant development in the 
ECtHR’s case law has seen it tap into 
broader environmental jurisprudence, 
making increasing reference to more 
generally established environmental law 
concepts to support its approach with, 
for example, risk assessment and the 
precautionary principle featuring in Tatar 
v Romania App no 657021/01 (ECHR, 27 
January 2009). 
2.2. Some Limitations in the 
ECtHR’s Patchwork Approach 
to Environment-based 
Human Rights Claims
The immediate and pragmatic appeal 
of the patchwork approach is obvious, 
though in the longer term the problems 
of principle that it raises and their 
ramifications have become more 
apparent.  Thus while considerable 
progress has been forged by the ECtHR 
in a comparatively short time, particularly 
given relatively unpromising beginnings, 
it is also the case that development has 
inevitably been piecemeal, dependent 
as it is on the happenstance of case 
law, and the need to respond to specific 
fact scenarios; the very nature of which 
impedes the development of a coherent 
over-arching approach. One result of this 
is that the Court’s attempts at a judicial 
formulation of an environmental human 
right necessarily lack the comparative 
uniformity (at least in terms of framing) 
that a clear and coherent treaty base for 
an environmental right would give. That 
said, there is discernible at the core of 
the Court’s decisions a strong shared 
emphasis on securing human welfare. 
This is, however, at best a rather narrow 
interpretation of an environmental right 
and could just as easily be adequately 
encapsulated in a human right to public 
health - indeed the latter would sit much 
more comfortably and coherently in the 
ECHR’s fairly narrow conception of human 
rights.
More fundamentally, being based on 
extrapolating jurisdiction from extant 
human rights and essentially repurposing 
them to address environment-based 
claims, the patchwork approach inevitably 
encounters conceptual limitations in 
attempting to incarnate an environmental 
human right. This is apparent in Kyratos v 
Greece App no 41666/98 (ECHR, 22 May 
2003), in which a tourist development had 
destroyed a swamp area that had hosted 
protected species, eroding its scenic and 
habitat value. The applicants’ argument 
that this had interfered with their Article 
8 rights failed as they had not shown 
that they were directly affected by these 
environmental changes. This approach, 
more explicitly than in previous cases, 
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represents a narrow view of environment-
based human rights claims, focusing 
coverage tightly on adverse effects on 
individual human beings. Indeed, when 
Kyratos is read in conjunction with Bacila 
and Di Sarno the scope of protection 
offered to human interests may be 
narrowing to threats to an individual’s 
physical well-being – broader welfare-
based claims failing to gain traction with 
the Court. 
Furthermore, Kyratos, in brushing aside 
an attempt to claim predicated on “pure” 
environmental degradation, gives cause 
for concern in two ways: first in its 
unequivocally and exclusively instrumental 
approach to the environment; and 
second, in precluding another avenue41 
to “representative” suits to protect the 
environment under the ECHR regime, in 
cases where individuals were minded to 
attempt to use a rights route to attempt to 
advance environmental protection.  
To sum up, while much has been achieved 
by the ECtHR regime using the patchwork 
approach, it is arguable that this route to 
canvassing environment-based human 
rights claims has progressed as far as it is 
likely be able to. The patchwork approach 
is looking increasingly hard-pressed in 
light of the unprecedented, even existential 
challenges posed by environmental 
threats. This then begs the question: how, 
given prevailing political considerations 
and institutional constraints, might the 
ECHR regime engage with human rights 
claims related to the environment in the 
future?   
3. How Might the ECHR 
Better Engage with 
Environment-Based 
Human Rights Claims?
In an ideal world, acknowledging the extent 
of our ecological crisis would prompt us to 
develop a jurisprudence that places value 
on the natural world in its own right in order 
to better inform our consideration of how 
the relationship between human rights and 
the environment ought to be understood. 
Unfortunately, in the real world such an 
environmental enlightenment is not a 
realistic prospect. Nevertheless, even if we 
stop well short of such a radical approach, 
there is still much that can be done to re-
41 NGO claims already being precluded in the absence of individual ‘victim’ status – see Asselbourg and others v 
Luxembourg App no 29121/95 (ECHR, 29 June 1999).
Figure 2: Contemplating the “Ghost Forest” - 
Llanarthne, Wales
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frame the nature of the nexus between 
human rights and the environment more 
credibly under the ECHR. 
3.1. Adopting a Human Right 
to a (Variously Defined) 
Environment?
Superficially, extending protected human 
rights under the ECHR to include an 
environmental human right would be the 
most attractive option of those available. 
There are, however, real (and perhaps 
even intractable) problems with this. 
Most fundamentally, agreeing on what 
an “environmental human right” might 
entail is fraught with difficulty,42  as 
evidenced by the now notable continued 
absence of a general, substantive, hard 
law right of this type in the global human 
rights canon. Nonetheless this difficulty 
is surmountable as is apparent from 
the proliferation of variously defined 
environmental human rights in domestic 
constitutions,43 and in other regional 
international law instruments.44 There 
has been considerable support for the 
idea of developing the ECHR’s coverage 
in this way from a wide range of sources, 
not least the United Nations,45  and the 
non-governmental organization (NGO) 
community.46 Within the Convention 
regime, however, the picture is somewhat 
less sanguine. While, as we have seen, 
the ECtHR has forged ahead with some 
success, a more strategic approach is not 
within its gift – this falls to the Convention’s 
political machinery, principally the 
Committee of Ministers (CoM) (the 
regime’s prime decision-making organ), 
and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) (with powers 
to investigate, make recommendations, 
and advise), and here there is marked 
division. The PACE has been particularly 
active on environmental concerns, 
persistently advocating the addition of 
an “environmental right” (albeit variously 
defined) to the Convention for many years. 
None of the PACE’s proposals have found 
favor with the CoM, however, and there 
seems to be no realistic prospect of their 
doing so. It is therefore unsurprising that 
discussion of the issue appears to have 
dropped from prominence within the 
regime of late. 
3.2. Considering Individual 
Rights, Collective Rights, and 
the Environment 
Even if an environmental human right 
were to be agreed upon and adopted 
under the ECHR, this would raise further 
questions. One concern that would need to 
be addressed would be the extent to which 
42 A. Boyle: ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23.3 European Journal of International Law 613. 
43 C. Jeffords, Constitutional Environmental Human Rights: A Descriptive Analysis of 142 National Constitutions, (2013) 
online at <http://www.christopherjeffords.com/Constitutions_Jeffords.pdf> accessed 23 March 2016.
44 See, Article 24 of The African Charter of Human and People’s Rights 1981 at <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/z1afchar.htm> accessed 23 March 2016 and Article 11 of the additional protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1988 at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
treaties/a-52.html> accessed 23 March 2016.
45 UN GA Res 64/157, 08/03/2010.
46 Notably the broad-based NGO Stand Up For Your Rights Initiative, see <http://standupforyourrights.org/ip/uploads/
downloads/SUFYR%20QA%20on%20Right%20to%20Environment.pdf> accessed 24 March 2016. 
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it is actually appropriate to individuate 
human rights insofar as we apply them to 
the environment. Individual human rights 
claims may, and often do, conflict with one 
another and with the interests of the public 
at large – and such conflicts inevitably 
feature prominently in environment-based 
cases. In light of the inevitable importance 
of the broader interests implicated in 
such cases, a more nuanced approach 
to rights is required. The ECtHR already 
gives a degree of credence to the need for 
such an approach, even if in a somewhat 
attenuated fashion, by deploying the 
general Convention jurisprudence on “fair 
balance” and the “margin of appreciation” 
in its environmental case law. The 
central question here, and arguably the 
prime question for human rights-based 
approaches to environmental issues 
is a profound one: Can the essentially 
individualistic approach normally applied 
in a human rights context ever really work 
where collective environmental concerns 
are involved? The application of the 
aforementioned concepts suggests that 
this is not viable – at least in its pure form. 
Property rights in particular raise huge 
moral and practical questions in this regard 
– and these need to become the subject 
of renewed legal inquiry as we seek to 
render the incorporation of environmental 
considerations   meaningful. Reflection 
may ultimately lead to the conclusion 
that it would be worth canvassing a 
rather more principled approach than that 
currently in use under the ECHR in order 
to dispose of this issue more effectively. 
The United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)47 
offers potentially interesting insights in this 
regard, reflecting (in common with some 
emerging domestic law regimes, notably 
in South America) cosmologies that differ 
significantly from those that currently 
prevail in much of the world. While UNDRIP 
recognizes a species of environmental 
right, it does so in the form of the right of 
indigenous peoples to “... the conservation 
and protection of the environment and 
the productive capacity of their lands or 
territories and resources”, invoking host 
state obligations in this regard. Crucially, 
this right is collective rather than individual 
in its focus.48 While such an approach is 
novel (or even alien) to mainstream human 
rights law, it is arguably highly appropriate in 
environmental contexts, in accommodating 
the limitations of individuation is respect of 
environmental rights claims. Incorporating 
an explicitly collective dimension as a 
qualifier to an individual environmental 
right could therefore be a useful addition to 
the ECHR approach.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, it 
remains the case that while adding an 
environmental right however defined to 
the Convention is legally possible, it is 
not at present politically viable – which 
prompts the consideration of potential 
alternative courses of action.
47 United Nations General Assembly (2007) Resolution 61/295 ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf> accessed 23 March 2016.
48 ibid, Article 29.
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3.3. Re-visiting our 
Understanding of the 
Patchwork Approach as a 
Starting Point
Given political reality, alternatives to 
adopting an environmental right must also 
be considered. Revising how the patchwork 
approach is viewed, characterizing it not 
as an unsatisfactory judicial fabrication, 
but rather as recognizing (albeit from 
a pragmatic rather than a principled 
perspective) the foundational importance 
of environmental conditions to the 
enjoyment of the specific rights that the 
Convention guarantees would be one 
place to start such an exercise. In fact, 
the patchwork approach arguably situates 
environmental considerations much more 
accurately than would the attempt to 
develop an environmental human right, 
as it recognizes that no human right – 
or indeed human activity - is sustainable 
in the long term in the absence of viable 
environmental conditions. Thus the 
patchwork approach could continue to 
be viable if it is viewed as being grounded 
on the understanding that a viable 
environment is a precursor to the effective 
realisation of human rights. While 
the case law of the ECtHR effectively 
already recognizes this approach to a 
marked degree for certain rights, a more 
thoroughgoing approach is required to 
fully encapsulate it – ideally one grounded 
in the Convention itself.  
There are a number of avenues worth 
exploring whereby this might be 
achieved, notably through invoking the 
jurisprudentially credible use of the 
preamble to the ECHR as an interpretative 
tool. The preamble manifests a number 
of characteristics that offer potential 
inroads for a change of orientation in 
the Convention regime. First, while not 
part of the binding text, the preamble 
identifies the conceptual and practical 
underpinnings of the provisions contained 
in the body of the agreement (invoking, 
amongst other things, justice, peace, and 
democracy, underpinned by “… a common 
understanding and observance of the 
Human Rights upon which they depend”,49 
which could potentially be interpreted as 
requiring viable environmental conditions 
to sustain them). Second, it points to 
the broader legal context within which 
the Convention is located (specifically 
making reference to the UNHR, and 
facilitating the importation of the now 
common understanding that many of the 
rights contained therein can be frustrated 
by adverse environmental conditions). 
Third, it can articulate issues that are 
not deemed appropriate for substantive 
coverage but which are nonetheless 
central to the prospects of success of 
the treaty regime (which could again 
include recognition of the need to secure 
sustainable environmental conditions 
as a prerequisite to realizing the rights 
guaranteed in the body of the Convention). 
49 ECHR, n2, Preamble, paragraph 4. 
45
Alternatively, rather than trying to infer 
environmental credentials into a preamble 
that never envisaged them, with all of 
the challenges that this could entail, the 
possibility of amending the preamble could 
be considered. This is not unprecedented 
in the Convention regime,50  though there 
would of course be difficulties as both 
political will and cross-regime support 
would be required to promote such a 
development. Past experience suggests 
that the CoM would likely present the 
most prominent obstacle, though this 
less direct course of action may offer a 
more attractive option, by authoritatively 
altering the interpretive environment, 
rather than creating a binding, substantive 
environmental right. If the Convention 
regime adopted this approach, it would 
go a considerable way towards solving 
the key problem of viably reflecting in law 
the factual relationship between human 
rights and the environment – and could 
legitimately claim to be at the cutting edge 
of legal science in doing so.  
4. European Union 
Accession to the ECHR?
Although there has been a lengthy history 
of interaction between the ECHR and 
EU law, the EU’s Court of Justice (CJEU) 
Opinion 2/1351 appears to have derailed 
(perhaps permanently) the prospect of 
any closer relationship between the two 
regimes by effectively scuppering the 
most recent, painstakingly negotiated 
attempt to secure the EU’s accession to the 
Convention. This development has hugely 
negative ramifications for the protection 
of human rights in Europe generally and 
also represents a missed opportunity to 
interweave the established ECHR regime, 
with its marked degree of functional 
coverage for environment-based human 
rights claims, and EU law with its extensive 
substantive environmental law credentials. 
The stronger legal fusion envisaged could, 
as far as it goes, have provided a firmer 
underpinning for judicial intervention in 
both regimes52 and possibly remedied at 
least some of the deficiencies of each, 
enabling them to amount to rather more 
than the sum of their parts.  
50 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report: Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 213) online at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_15_
explanatory_report_ENG.pdf> accessed 27 July 2016.
51 Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU - Draft international agreement - Accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Compatibility of the draft 
agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties. Opinion 2/13 online at <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=c-2/13> 
accessed 31 March 2016. 
52 There is a common misconception that accession to the ECHR is a prerequisite for EU membership. This is not in 
fact the case, though all 28 member states have in fact acceded to the ECHR regime. EU states comprise just over 
half of the 47 signatories to the ECHR.
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5. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union 
(CFREU)
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (CFREU) is also now 
in play in protecting human rights in 
Europe. Disappointingly, although created 
in 2000, the CFREU adopts a conservative 
approach to human rights and offers only 
limited engagement with environmental 
concerns. These appear under Title IV 
on “Solidarity” (which covers a range of 
collective concerns) in Article 37, which 
states that: 
A high level of environmental 
protection and the improvement of 
the quality of the environment must 
be integrated into the policies of the 
Union and ensured in accordance 
with the principle of sustainable 
development. 
Thus the coverage offered, despite its 
location in the CFREU, is not in fact clearly 
rights based; instead it merely restates 
the need for Member States to adhere to 
their treaty obligations with regard to the 
environment. Nonetheless, Article 37 may 
serve to provide explicit underpinning 
for another example of the patchwork 
approach to addressing human rights-
based environmental concerns when read 
alongside, for example, Articles: 2 (Right 
to Life); 7 (Respect for Private and Family 
Life); 11 (Freedom of Expression and 
Information); 12 (Freedom of assembly 
and Association) and 17 (Right to Property) 
-  all of which are rights already contained 
in the ECHR and, distinctively, Article 1 (the 
Right to Human Dignity).
6. What Next?
While EU accession to the ECHR is 
no longer, in the short term at least, a 
realistic prospect, this does not preclude 
further development of the EU’s human 
rights agenda. Indeed, this may be an 
area ripe with possibility with the CJEU’s 
evident ambition for its own position in 
tandem with its zeal to augment the role 
and importance of the CFREU53 offering 
opportunities for innovative development. 
Not for the first time, a court’s 
jurisdictional acquisitiveness may have 
useful by-products – and human rights-
based claims generally (in the EU itself) 
and those triggered by environmental 
considerations (in the ECHR regime) have 
form for providing just this sort of self-
aggrandizing opportunity for institutional 
adjudicatory machinery. That said, 
such an uber-instrumental approach 
to the issues, particularly when viewed 
against the background of the CJEU’s 
signal failure most recently expressed 
on Opinion 2/13 to grasp the necessity 
and import of human rights protection 
53 A. Lazowski and R. A. Wessel: ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European Union to 
the ECHR’ (2015) 16 German LJ 179.
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as a necessary curb on the undesirable 
effects of unalloyed legal supremacy 
on the citizenry, should be regarded 
with considerable caution. Nonetheless, 
environmental lawyers are rarely purists – 
we will use such tools as are available to 
us to attempt to forge progress – and the 
current context certainly offers potentially 
innovative ways forward to explore and 
exploit.
Photo credit: © Peter John Maridable
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1. Introduction
In 2017, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal Session on the Human Rights Impacts of 
Fracking will ask its judges to apply the standards of international human rights law to 
six subcases addressing the experiences of individuals and communities around the 
world who are being impacted by unconventional oil and gas extraction and usage, and 
by its resulting climate effects.
An additional day of tribunal hearings will be devoted to arguing the subcases on the 
grounds of the rights of nature as expressed in national constitutions such as Ecuador’s, 
case law based on those constitutions and in formal statements such as the Universal 
Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth presented to the United Nations in April 2011.55 
These human and environmental rights, whether expressed in national and international 
law or in national and sub-national constitutions, are often insufficiently brought to bear 
or protected by standard, state-based enforcement mechanisms. This failure of states to 
respect and enforce environmental rights can open the door for intervention by non-state 
actors such as the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (the Tribunal) and other civil society 
institutions. The decisions and actions by these bodies, less influenced by the pressures 
of national politics and economic interests, can articulate and stand up for environmental 
human rights standards when states and international bodies fail to do so.
This Tribunal Session on the Human Rights Impacts of Fracking and Climate Change is 
intended to serve exactly that purpose. Firstly, it will collect, vet, and organize relevant 
expert and personal testimony. Secondly, it will provide prosecutors the opportunity to 
rehearse arguments grounded in human rights law and in environmental and constitutional 
An International Tribunal on the Human Rights 
Impacts of Fracking: Structure, Grounding and 
Purposes
Tom Kerns
“Barbarism is the absence of standards  to which appeal can be made.” 
- José Ortega y Gasset54 
54 The Revolt of the Masses, chapter 8, 1929. 
55 https://pwccc.wordpress.com/programa/ 
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a proposal petitioning the Tribunal to 
schedule a Session on the human rights 
dimensions of hydraulic fracturing and 
other unconventional methods of oil and 
gas extraction and their consequences. In 
January 2015 we submitted a petition to 
indict a list of oil and gas corporations on 
charges of human rights abuses related to 
their fracking practices. 
After some deliberation, though, we 
decided to indict states rather than 
corporations because states are the clear 
duty bearers in international human rights 
law. Whether non-state actors such as 
corporations have any clear human rights 
obligations is not as well established as 
the obligations of states. Moreover, we 
decided that rather than indicting the 
states directly, we would ask the panel 
of judges to determine whether sufficient 
evidence exists to indict states. That is 
the formal question on which the panel of 
judges will be asked to rule. The petition 
was thus modified in those two ways, 
submitted to the Tribunal Secretariat and 
was formally approved in May of 2015. 
One month later we launched our Tribunal 
website,58  issued press releases, and sent 
announcements to a variety of media 
outlets and relevant non-governmental 
organizations.
law. Finally, it will result in findings and 
recommendations that can provide a quasi-
legal precedent useful as an interpretive aid 
in future human rights, environmental and 
constitutionally-based legal actions.
2. Beginnings
In 2011 the Tribunal held a Session in 
Bangalore, India indicting the six largest 
transnational agrichemical corporations 
on charges of human rights abuses 
related to their manufacture, marketing, 
distribution and use of pesticides, 
fertilizers and other agricultural 
chemicals.56  That session was held over a 
period of several days and was streamed 
live so that anyone anywhere in the world 
could watch it, and I did. 
Two years later when a group of us 
was preparing a Human Rights Impact 
Assessment of Fracking in the United 
Kingdom,57 we asked the Tribunal if they 
would be interested in holding a Session 
on human rights and fracking. In January 
2014 Dr. Gianni Tognoni, Secretary General 
of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal in 
Rome, confirmed that the Tribunal was 
indeed interested in such a Session. 
He explained the petition process to us 
and indicated that he thought our team 
would be well positioned to initiate such 
a petition and to help organize a Session. 
Anna Grear, Damien Short and I developed 
56 http://www.agricorporateaccountability.net/en/page/ppt/2 
57 A Human Rights Impact Assessment of Hydraulic Fracturing and other Unconventional Gas Development in the UK, 
commissioned by the Bianca Jagger Human Rights Foundation and prepared by the Global Network for the Study of 
Human Rights and the Environment, Environment and Human Rights Advisory, and the Human Rights Consortium, 
Grear, A; Grant, E; Kerns, T; Morrow, K; Short, D, 2014
58 https://www.tribunalonfracking.org 
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3. The Tribunal, Vietnam 
and two philosophers
Today’s Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, 
headquartered in Rome is a descendant 
of the 1966 Bertrand Russell-Jean-Paul 
Sartre Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal,59 
which was also international in scope and 
held sessions in Stockholm, Sweden and 
Denmark.
Following that tribunal, and two or three 
subsequent international tribunals on 
similar human rights issues,60  it was 
decided in 1979 that the world needed a 
Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal. The goal 
of this Tribunal would be “Recovering the 
authority of the Peoples when States and 
international bodies have failed to protect 
the rights of the Peoples.”61  The Tribunal 
was founded in Bologna, Italy, under the 
auspices of the Lelio Basso International 
Foundation for the Rights and Liberation 
of Peoples,62 with the engagement of a 
range of legal experts, writers and leaders 
in civil society, including five Nobel Prize 
laureates. The Tribunal headquarters are 
now in Rome and it has, since 1979, held 
over forty Sessions on a variety of human 
rights situations.
The Tribunal, as it stands now, is an 
internationally recognized public opinion 
tribunal functioning independently of state 
authorities, national politics and vested 
economic interests. It hears cases based 
on the broadly recognized standards 
of international human rights law and, 
increasingly, on human rights standards 
embodied in national constitutions.
As Jayan Nayar, lecturer in the Law in 
Development program at the University of 
Warwick, has said, 
“It is true that the Tribunal has no 
power to compel the ‘accused’ to 
appear before it, nor to enforce its 
judgment, [but] rather, it serves as 
a legitimating forum. Its judgments 
stand as a public record of the truth - 
and of the crime of denial. The doing 
of law for the Tribunal is essentially 
a process of listening, giving to the 
narratives of suffering the dignity 
denied them elsewhere.”63 
59 Bertrand Russell / Jean-Paul Sartre Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, 1966  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell_
Tribunal accessed 21 April 2016
60 In one subsequent Tribunal, for example, the Russell Tribunal II on Repression in Brazil, in Chile and in Latin America, 
two public sessions were held, the first in Rome (March 30-April 6, 1974) and the second in Brussels (January 11-18, 
1975). http://dlib.nyu.edu/findingaids/html/tamwag/tam_098/bioghist.html  accessed 21 April 2016
61 http://www.tribunalonfracking.org/permanent-peoples-tribunal 
62 http://www.fondazionebasso.it  accessed 23 April 2016
63 http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33066-permanent-peoples-tribunal-highlights-fracking-s-threat-to-human-
rights  accessed 25 April 2016
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4. This Trial
The Tribunal’s normal procedure is to 
impanel a selection of nine, eleven or 
thirteen judges, about half of whom 
are human rights jurists from around 
the world, and about half of whom are 
“respected members of civil society.” The 
initiating organizations have no say in 
who those judges are or how many will 
be selected for the panel; the Tribunal 
arranges that independently.
When the selection of judges is impanelled, 
and when the Tribunal hearings begin, the 
formal question the judges will be asked 
to consider is:
“Does sufficient evidence exist, as 
measured against international 
human rights law and as embodied 
in national constitutions, to indict 
certain named States64 on charges 
of failing to adequately respect the 
human rights of citizens as a result 
of their allowing hydraulic fracturing 
and other unconventional oil and gas 
extraction techniques within their 
jurisdictions?”65 
The overarching question is thus: Does 
sufficient evidence exist to indict these 
named states? 
Legal standards to be applied include 
both international human rights law and 
environmental and human rights norms 
embodied in national and subnational 
constitutions. For example, this would 
include the public trust standard expressed 
in the Pennsylvania state constitution,66 
and in a handful of other national 
constitutions and state constitutions in 
the United States of America (US).67 
While this appears to be only one question 
that will be put to the judges - is there 
sufficient evidence to indict? — since 
fracking has such a wide range of impacts 
on so many different dimensions of human 
concern, we have broken that overarching 
question down into six subcases. The 
prosecuting team will thus be arguing 
the following six subcases, all on human 
rights grounds.
64 In this case so far, that includes the US and the UK, perhaps also Australia and Canada, and maybe others that may 
come on board as the Tribunal gets closer.
65 For purposes of this Tribunal the term “fracking” will refer to the extraction of shale gas, coal-bed methane/coal seam 
gas (CBM/CSG) and “tight oil.” A scaled-up form of hydraulic fracturing (high volume), involving injecting fluids under 
high pressure to crack the rock, is often used to release hydrocarbons during unconventional oil and gas extraction 
(UCG). UCG is a complex process, involving pad construction, well drilling, casing, stimulation (often including but 
not limited to hydraulic fracturing), extraction, waste disposal, well plugging (or failure to do so) and abandonment, 
as well as associated infrastructures such as pipelines, storage facilities, compressor stations and export terminals. 
The Tribunal will examine evidence on the full range of impacts of all forms of unconventional gas and oil production 
including, but not limited to, “fracking.” 
66 Article 1, Section 27 reads “The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, 
scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common 
property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.” 
67 English, A and Carroll, JJ, “State Constitutions and Environmental Bills of Rights,” chapter 1, pp 18-22. The Book of the 
States 2015, The Council of State Governments, 2015
52
PART I: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES
5. Six subcases
1) The human health subcase 
will examine the human rights 
implications of fracking – both acute 
and chronic, especially for vulnerable 
groups – resulting from exposures to, 
inter alia, endocrine disruptors, known 
and probable carcinogens, radon gas, 
neuro- and developmental toxicants, 
ozone, and noise. 
2) The climate subcase will examine 
the human rights implications, for 
both present and future generations, 
of fracking on the climate system 
which may result from a CO2-
intensive extraction process, fugitive 
and intentional methane emissions 
and releases, fostering a continued 
reliance on fossil fuels, and so on.
3) The ecosystems case will examine 
the human rights implications of 
fracking on, inter alia, ecosystems, 
oceans, wildlife, on contamination 
and depletion of ground and surface 
waters, and on the contribution to 
earthquake swarms. 
4) The social costs case will address, 
amongst others, the human rights 
impacts of fracking on communities, 
social services, roads, housing, 
property values, and relations among 
neighbors. Both economic cycles of 
boom and bust trigger a wide range of 
human rights concerns. 
5) The public participation case 
will examine the human rights 
implications of a lack of opportunities 
for public participation in decision-
making about fracking. 
6) And finally, the fuels infrastructure 
case will examine human rights 
impacts resulting from fracking 
infrastructure, such as pipelines, 
compressor stations, export facilities, 
Liquid Natural Gas facilities and 
storage facilities.
The prosecuting team will argue that there 
are human rights concerns in a wide range 
of dimensions for each of the above six 
subcases.
6. Elements of the Trial
The main elements in this Tribunal will be 
the same as the main elements in many 
other trials. There will be a panel of judges 
and a prosecuting team that brings to 
bear evidence of various kinds. This will 
include expert evidence on the processes, 
impacts and consequences of fracking, 
biomedical and public health research, 
greenhouse gas and climate research, 
as well as ecological and social science 
research. Several hundred government 
and industry reports, investigative reports 
and peer reviewed studies on these 
issues have been summarized, annotated 
and referenced in the Compendium of 
Scientific, Medical, and Media Findings 
Demonstrating Risks and Harms of 
Fracking.68 This Compendium has 
been prepared by Physicians for Social 
68 Available at <http://concernedhealthny.org/compendium/>
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Responsibility and by Concerned Health 
Professionals of New York.69 Its most 
recent edition is readily available on 
several websites.
Absolutely key in human rights trials 
is personal testimony – the personal 
narratives of individuals, families and 
communities who have been impacted by 
fracking.
Prosecutors will bring to bear on all the 
subcases both international and domestic 
human rights law and relevant human and 
environmental rights provisions in state 
constitutions.
A trial requires a defense team too, of 
course, so at some point the Tribunal will 
send out a summons to the indicted states 
explaining the details of the Tribunal and 
the rights, duties, and obligations of the 
indicted states. The states will be invited 
to provide defense attorneys to represent 
their interests. If they choose to ignore 
the summons, as they might, then the 
Tribunal provides defense attorneys for 
them, much as a domestic court would 
provide public defenders.
The Tribunal’s plenary hearings are 
scheduled to take place in late 2017. After 
those hearings have been completed, 
the judges will retire to deliberate for 
some period of time and eventually issue 
findings and recommendations.
7. Mini-tribunals and Fact 
Finding Hearings
In anticipation of the plenary hearings, 
activists or interested parties anywhere in 
the world are invited to schedule and hold 
preliminary Mini-tribunals70 and/or Fact 
Finding Hearings.
  The format of a Mini-tribunal  would 
simply be as a smaller version of the 
large plenary sessions. That is, the 
same question would be posed to 
the judge or judges and attorneys, 
hopefully both prosecution and 
defense, would then present evidence 
and argue the law before those judges.
The findings and recommendations 
of the Mini-tribunals would later 
be submitted for use during the 
main plenary hearings.71 One such 
69 “The Compendium of Scientific, Medical, and Media Findings Demonstrating Risks and Harms of Fracking (the 
Compendium) is a fully referenced compilation of the evidence outlining the risks and harms of fracking. Bringing 
together findings from the scientific and medical literature, government and industry reports, and journalistic 
investigation, it is a public, open-access document that is housed on the websites of Concerned Health Professionals 
of New York (www.concernedhealthny.org) and Physicians for Social Responsibility (www.psr.org).”
70 <https://www.tribunalonfracking.org/preliminary-mini-tribunals/> accessed 23 April 2016
71 The more legally robust a mini-tribunal, the more powerful and relevant its findings will be. Elements of robustness 
include the heft and quality of submitted evidence; including defense attorneys in the process in addition to 
prosecutors; the reliability of personal testimony; including more than one judge, and judges familiar with human 
rights law; civil society representatives held in high regard for their character and wisdom; employing a structure, 
venue and procedures approved by the Tribunal; and so on.
54
PART I: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES
preliminary tribunal, sponsored by 
the Australian Earth Laws Alliance, 
the Social Justice Commission 
Toowoomba, the Sisters Of Mercy, 
the Lock the Gate Alliance, the 
Western Downs Alliance and others, is 
scheduled to take place in Brisbane in 
February 2017.
  Fact Finding Hearings72 would be a 
much simpler, local event that might 
cost very little to put on, maybe 
nothing at all. It would simply require 
an announcement of the date and 
location, and an invitation to people 
to share their story and submit their 
testimony about the impacts that 
fracking has had on them and their 
community, so it can be recorded. It 
should be made especially clear that 
that testimony can be presented in 
whatever form people are comfortable 
with. It could be presented orally in 
person, streamed live from elsewhere 
or submitted in written form or as an 
audio or video recording. Testimony 
could also be submitted by proxy 
and either with identification or 
anonymously. There are numerous 
obvious problems with anonymous 
testimony, but there is so much 
justifiable fear around standing up 
against the industry that a Fact-
finding Hearing will want to make it as 
easy as possible for affected persons 
to submit their story.
8. Pre-tribunal 
developments
Quite a significant range of pre-Tribunal 
human rights work on fracking and climate 
change has already been completed. 
  A 2011 Human Rights Impact 
Assessment of Fracking in New 
York State73 was commissioned 
by Earthworks in Washington DC, 
prepared by Environment and Human 
Rights Advisory and submitted to 
the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation. 
  A Human Rights Impact Assessment 
of Fracking in the United Kingdom74 
was commissioned by the Bianca 
Jagger Human Rights Foundation,75 
co-authored by members of our team 
and hand-delivered by Bianca and 
some of the authors to Ten Downing 
Street. 
  The Sisters of Mercy and Mercy 
International put together a third 
Human Rights Impact Assessment 
of Fracking titled A Guide to Rights-
based Advocacy: International Human 
Rights Law and Fracking.76 
  The 2013 Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court findings in Robinson Township 
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
held that major parts of Pennsylvania’s 
72 <https://www.tribunalonfracking.org/preliminary-mini-hearings/>
73 A Human Rights Assessment of Hydraulic Fracturing for Natural Gas, commissioned by Earthworks, prepared for the 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, prepared by Environment and Human Rights Advisory, 
Kerns, T, 2011
74 op.cit.
75 <http://www.biancajagger.org> 
76 Prepared by the Sisters of Mercy, Mercy International (NGO), O’Connor, A, RSM, et al, 2015.
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Act 13 (a statute enacted to facilitate 
fracking) were unconstitutional based 
largely on the public trust doctrine 
expressed in the state constitution’s 
Article 1, Section 27.77 
  In December 2015 the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights issued 
a report on extraction industry impacts 
on indigenous and Afro-Descendant 
communities, titled Understanding 
Human Rights and Climate Change.78  
  The Earth Law Center’s 2015 report, 
Fighting for Our Shared Future: 
Protecting Both Human Rights and 
Nature’s Rights, examines 100 cases 
from around the world involving co-
violations of both human rights and 
rights of nature. 
  Two United Nations reports on the 
human rights impacts of climate 
change were issued in 2015, one from 
the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Human Rights79 
and one by the United Nations 
Environment Programme.80 
  In November 2015, just prior to 
the Conference of Parties (COP21) 
meetings in Paris, a team of scholars 
with the Global Network for the Study 
of Human Rights and the Environment 
issued a Draft Declaration on Human 
Rights and Climate Change.81 That 
document, after soliciting and 
receiving extensive feedback and 
review from all over the world, has 
now been issued in final form.82 
  And, of course, the papal encyclical, 
Laudato Si83 issued in mid-2015 
should not be ignored, since it too looks 
at climate change and unconventional 
fossil fuel extraction as moral issues. 
In addition to those pre-Tribunal 
documents, the preliminary Mini-tribunals 
and Fact Finding Hearings mentioned 
above are also being planned in various 
countries. The responsibility of these 
preliminary events will be to collect 
personal and local testimony about 
the impacts of fracking, and to explore 
and develop legal and moral human 
and environmental rights arguments 
applicable to that testimony. These 
testimonies will then be submitted for use 
in the plenary hearings.
77 Dernbach, John C. and May, James and Kristl, Kenneth, Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: 
Examination and Implications (March 1, 2014). Rutgers U. L. Rev. Vol. 67, 2015; Widener Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 14-10, <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2412657>
78 Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the Context 
of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities, prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, December 31, 2015.
79 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, prepared for the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 26 November 2015.
80 Report on Human Rights and Climate Change, United Nations Environment Programme, December 2015.
81 <http://gnhre.org/tag/declaration/>
82 http://gnhre.org/declaration-human-rights-climate-change/ 
83 Laudato Si: On Care for our Common Home, Pope Francis, 2015.
 <http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-
si.html> accessed 21 April 2016
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9. The Actors
The actors so far in this Tribunal are: 
  The Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal in 
Rome;
  The three initiating organizations: 
  The Global Network for the 
Study of Human Rights and the 
Environment;84  
  The Environment and Human 
Rights Advisory,85  
  The Human Rights Consortium;86  
  The Steering Group, with members in 
the US and in the UK, is composed of 
Initiators, researchers and directors 
of supporting non-governmental 
organizations; and
  The Kentucky Environmental 
Foundation87 is fiscal sponsor.
10. Roles and 
responsibilities
It is the responsibility of the Tribunal itself 
to identify, select and impanel judges to 
hear the cases, provide defense attorneys 
if the indicted states fail to send their own, 
call the court to order, and support the 
judges in their deliberations and issuance 
of findings.
It is the responsibility of the Kentucky 
Environmental Foundation, as fiscal 
sponsor, to accept funds and to hold and 
disburse them as needed.
In their role as Initiators, it is the 
responsibility of the three initiating 
organizations to petition the Tribunal, on 
behalf of complainants who have been 
affected by fracking and its consequences, 
to accept their case. This responsibility 
has now been completed.
The Steering Group, in their role as 
researchers testing an hypothesis 
about fracking and human rights, has a 
responsibility not unlike that of a Principle 
Investigator who is conducting a research 
trial.
In the sciences, a researcher who has a 
question about something, formulates 
that question into a testable hypothesis, 
designs a research protocol to test that 
hypothesis and then conducts the trial. 
Standard trial protocols vary widely 
among the different sciences, of course. 
The design of an astrophysics protocol to 
test whether light waves are affected by 
gravity, for example, will be very different 
than the design of a biomedical protocol 
to test whether a new drug is safer or 
more effective than a previous drug. 
That in turn will differ from the design 
of a political science protocol to test an 
hypothesis about the effect of natural 
resource extraction on the representative-
ness of governments. 
84 http://gnhre.org. Anna Grear (Cardiff Law School) is the Director. She is also the editor in chief of the Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment. 
85 http://www.environmentandhumanrights.org. Tom Kerns, Director, in the US.
86 http://www.sas.ac.uk/hrc, Damien Short, Director, in the School of Advanced Study at the University of London
87 <http://www.kyenvironmentalfoundation.org>
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The standard protocol for testing an 
hypothesis about the impacts of a 
fossil fuel extraction method on human 
rights norms is the “trial.” That is, the 
system of contending advocacy before a 
disinterested judiciary following standard 
rules of evidence with appropriate 
application of relevant law. In this role, 
the Steering Group serves as the Principal 
Investigator who is using a standard 
protocol in the field to test the hypothesis 
that human rights norms are at issue in 
fracking.
Finally, in their role as organizers, the 
Steering Group’s responsibility is to 
organize the trial. Not to directly conduct 
the trial, but to set the groundwork and 
establish the conditions necessary for 
conducting the trial. Just as it is the 
responsibility of a Principal Investigator 
in the physical or social sciences to put 
in place the requirements, structures 
and financing to ensure that their trial 
is conducted according to standards, 
so too is that the responsibility of the 
Steering Group. This responsibility 
includes providing communication before, 
during and after the trial, identifying 
suitable venues, securing funding, 
selecting a prosecuting team, assisting 
the prosecuting team in locating expert 
evidence and personal testimony, and 
promulgating the Tribunal’s eventual 
findings and recommendations.
11. Why human rights?
Human rights norms have a uniquely 
moral grounding that underpins their 
legal and policy force, and it is that moral 
grounding to which people impacted by 
fracking normally appeal. So a trial that 
addresses those moral concerns and 
frames them in human rights terms will be 
best suited to this situation.
In addition there are practical and legal 
considerations that differentiate human 
rights law from other kinds of law and 
may make it more amenable to people and 
communities impacted by fracking and its 
consequences.
The importance of personal 
narratives
One is the recognition of the special 
importance of personal narratives 
describing what has been directly 
experienced. Simple, clear personal 
accounts of direct impacts that fracking 
processes have had on individuals, 
families and communities, rooted in the 
“situated knowing” of personally impacted 
witnesses, are considered a priority in 
human rights law. They are also essential 
for awakening the moral imagination and 
evoking the compassion necessary for 
systemic change.88 
88 Claims of injury in such narratives may need to be substantiated by reference to scientific studies or expert 
testimony, just as the moral intuitions about right and wrong will need to be substantiated by reference to human 
rights norms.
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Standing
Every individual person is considered to 
have legal standing in international human 
rights courts, which eliminates one of the 
larger obstacles to having a case heard.89 
Standards of proof
Standards of proof in international human 
rights courts favor the plaintiff over the 
state. As Picolotti and Taillant explain in 
their book, Linking Human Rights and the 
Environment, “Unlike most national courts, 
the [Inter-American] Commission and Court 
have low standards of proof,”90  sometimes 
admitting circumstantial evidence. This 
can benefit plaintiffs who often have less 
than perfect evidence to support claims of 
causality and health effects.
Burden of proof
The burden of proof in human rights courts 
is on the state in such an action, rather 
than on the plaintiff, even though the state 
would be the defendant.91  This means that 
facts presented by the claimant would be 
presumed true unless proven otherwise 
by the state.92 
Transnational
One significant problem has been that 
many bodies of law that could be seen 
as relevant to fracking are domestic and 
have efficacy only within the bounds of a 
given state. Human rights norms and law, 
however, are to some extent transnational, 
transcending the boundaries of individual 
states. This means that the findings and 
recommendations of a human rights 
tribunal are more likely to have bearing in 
jurisdictions elsewhere in the world than 
findings resulting from other kinds of law.93 
Those are the basics of this Tribunal’s 
history, structure, pre-tribunal work, 
actors, responsibilities and standards.
The section below outlines the purposes 
and anticipated benefits of this Tribunal. 
The subsequent section then mentions 
the Tribunal’s current needs.
89 “One of the most important successes of international human rights law is that it has given victims direct access 
to international human rights fora. Thus in international human rights law, individuals are subjects of law and can 
legally claim against human rights abuses perpetrated by states.” Picolotti, R and Taillant, JD, Linking Human Rights 
and the Environment, University of Arizona Press, 2003, p 120.
90 Ibid. p 133.
91 “That is... the facts reported in the petition shall be presumed to be true if, during the maximum period set by the 
Commission, the government of the State in question has not provided pertinent information to the contrary.... If the 
State denies the evidence, it must specifically prove that the evidence is not valid.” Ibid.
92 These last three apply at least in the Inter-American human rights system, and perhaps in some other regions as well.
93 Taking a human rights approach may have disadvantages as well since corporations, considered as legal persons, 
have been making the claim that courts should treat them as holders of human rights as well, a claim which is 
closely examined in Grear, A, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010. On the other hand, this Tribunal process could also serve as an opportunity for testing those 
corporate claims.
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12. Purposes and benefits
One of the Tribunal’s key purposes is to 
provide opportunity for those who have 
been personally affected by fracking to 
share their experience, to have it be heard, 
taken seriously94  and documented. It will 
then be entered into the public record so 
it can be made available for this Tribunal 
and for any future legal actions anywhere 
in the world (if individuals give permission 
for that). Kathleen Dean Moore has 
said this especially well in her article for 
Truthout explaining why this Tribunal is so 
important. One of its goals, she says there, 
is to give voice to those whose voices 
have been 
“…actively silenced by industry, 
pressured into silence by neighbors, 
frightened into silence by possible 
repercussions, or battered into 
silence by poverty, social situation, 
and distance from resources - 
marginalized and ignored by industry 
and government alike.”95  
One of the Tribunal’s primary goals is to 
give voice to the marginalized, the poor, 
children, indigenous communities, and 
future generations and, as Bertrand Russell 
said, to “expose the crime of silence.” And 
most important, Moore continues, it will 
offer a voice to those who have no voice 
at all - “future generations of people, 
plants, and animals, all the young and 
hopeful ones. They are the ones who will 
pay the price of hydraulic fracturing in the 
currency of their health and prospects.”96  
As such, one of the Tribunal’s main 
purposes is to provide opportunity for 
impacted persons to tell their story and 
make it part of the public record.
A second key purpose is to foreground 
human rights standards as part of the 
conversation about fracking and its 
consequences. Human rights have not 
been a significant part of the conversation 
thus far, and the hope is that this Tribunal, 
and the events leading up to it, will 
promote an appreciation of those moral 
and legal dimensions of the conversation. 
Impacted persons already have a clear, 
if inchoate, sense of outrage97  that 
something is fundamentally wrong with 
what industry has been allowed to do to 
people and communities. However, they 
do not yet have an adequate language for 
articulating that outrage. We think that 
human rights language can help serve 
that purpose.98 
A third purpose is to have expert and 
personal testimony formally and publicly 
94 Many impacted persons feel as if they have told their story multiple times but that it has not been heard, or has not 
been taken seriously or has been dismissed altogether.
95 Kathleen Dean Moore, ‘Fracking Goes on Trial for Human Rights Violations’ Truthout, 14 November 2015. http://
www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/33588-fracking-goes-on-trial-for-human-rights-violations accessed 21 April 2016 
96 ibid
97 Tom Kerns, ‘Schopenhauer’s Mitleid, environmental outrage and human rights’ in Anna Grear and Evadne Grant (eds), 
Thought, Law, Rights and Action in the Age of Environmental Crisis (Edward Elgar 2015) pp 220-248
98 Kerns, T, Ten Practical Advantages of a Human Rights Approach to Environmental Advocacy, Journal of 
Environmental Studies and Sciences: Vol 3, Issue 4 (2013), Page 416-420.
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presented and vetted against defense 
attorneys and judges so it can be made 
available for use in future legal cases.
A fourth purpose is to provide prosecuting 
attorneys an opportunity to rehearse 
legal arguments and explore precedent in 
the Tribunal, which may later be used in 
national and international courts if actions 
are brought.
A fifth purpose is for the Tribunal’s findings 
and recommendations to provide a quasi-
legal precedent that could be referenced 
as interpretive “soft law” in the event of 
future legal actions.
A sixth purpose is to provide grounding 
and support for the growing movement 
to instantiate human environmental 
norms within national and subnational 
constitutions.
The final purpose is to simply show those 
who might like to bring a future action 
what a legal action against unconventional 
oil and gas extraction might look like. The 
section below describes some of the 
Tribunal’s current needs.
13. Current needs
As David Bollier, policy strategist and 
co-founder of the Commons Strategies 
Group, reminds us in his blog post of July 
29, 2015:
“Like any commons, the Tribunal 
does not go of itself; it relies upon 
people’s active participation and 
help. People are invited to submit 
witness statements, donate to help 
fund the proceedings (travel, lodging, 
office services); conduct mini-
tribunals in their countries; and to 
endorse the Tribunal.”99 
In addition, the Tribunal’s Steering Group 
needs to finish assembling the legal 
team100  which consists of legal advisors, 
litigators for each of the six subcases and 
legal researchers to help the litigators 
develop their cases. The expectation 
is that the researchers will primarily be 
law students and law clinics, and there 
will be a further need for a research-
volunteer coordinator. Assistance in 
collecting evidence, including organizing 
and conducting fact-finding hearings and 
mini-tribunals, will also be required.
99 David Bollier, ‘’ ‘People’s Tribunal to Assess Fracking and Human Rights’ (News and Perspectives on the Commons, 
29 July 2015) http://bollier.org/blog/people’s-tribunal-assess-fracking-and-human-rights accessed 26 April 2016
100 Our legal Advisors to date include Mary Christina Wood, Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, author of 
Nature’s Trust; Evadné Grant, Associate Head, Department of Law, University of the West of England: Editor, Journal 
of Human Rights and the Environment; Evan Hamman, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, 
Brisbane, Australia; Burns Weston served as legal Advisor and Steering Group member until his untimely death in the 
fall of 2015. Current Litigators include Don Anton, Professor of International Law at Griffith University Law School in 
Brisbane, Barrister & Solicitor, Victoria and High Court of Australia and Attorney & Counselor of the Supreme Court 
of the US; Benedict Coyne, President of the Australian Lawyers for Human Rights; and Linda Sheehan, Director and 
Attorney at the Earth Law Center, who will argue the cases from a Rights of Nature perspective.
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Truthout, the alternative news outlet, 
has offered eighteen articles on the 
Tribunal. Two of those have already been 
published101  and authors will be needed 
for the next sixteen. What those articles 
would cover has already been outlined and 
experts identified who could be contacted 
for each. 
This Tribunal has real potential and it 
would be important to have a record of it 
and to know how it came to be. To that 
end, the services of an historian will be 
required. Kathleen Dean Moore102  will be 
covering the hearings live as a reporter 
and analyst, so if the Tribunal were to be 
the subject of a book or a dissertation, her 
reporting could serve as important source 
material.
14. Conclusion
One of the purposes of human rights 
law is similar to a purpose for which the 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (1754 
BCE) was enacted. This was, according to 
its introduction, “so that the strong should 
not harm the weak.”103 
The Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal does not 
enjoy state sanctioned power to compel 
enforcement of its findings. However, 
according to Kathleen Dean Moore, it does 
still matter “to tell the truth in a public place. 
It matters to affirm universal standards of 
right and wrong, to clearly say, ‘There are 
things that ethical people do not do to one 
another and to the Earth.’”104 
“Business-as-usual,” she continues, “has 
a terrible power.” If people do not stand 
up and say “These things are wrong,” then 
those wrongs become simply “stuff that 
happens.”
Silence normalizes iniquity; silence 
normalizes the violation of human 
rights. The violation becomes, in 
the popular expression, “the new 
normal.” The result is a sliding 
baseline of morality as people expect 
less and less of their corporations 
and governments, and hold them 
less and less to account.105 
This Tribunal will ask whether fracking 
should be accepted as “the new normal.” 
It will also encourage people to not expect 
less of their governments, but instead 
to hold their governments accountable 
to the legal standards embodied in their 
constitutions and to the moral standards 
they have publicly espoused.
101 http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33066-permanent-peoples-tribunal-highlights-fracking-s-threat-to-human-
rights and http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/33588-fracking-goes-on-trial-for-human-rights-violations 
accessed 15 July 2016
102 Kathleen Dean Moore is professor emerita of environmental philosophy at Oregon State University, co-editor of Moral 
Ground: Ethical Action for a Planet in Peril, and author of Great Tide Rising: Toward Clarity and Moral Courage in a 
Time of Planetary Change.
103 < http://www.constitution.org/ime/hammurabi.htm> 
104 < http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/33588-fracking-goes-on-trial-for-human-rights-violations> 
105 ibid.
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We entered the 21st century more than a decade ago, and we are witnessing unprecedented 
anthropocentric environmental degradation that brings a new challenge to international 
law, and particularly to human rights and environmental rights legitimacy. Following the 
publication in 2014 of the report on the International Bar Association (IBA) Task Force on 
Climate Change Justice and Human Rights’ (the ‘Task Force’) report - Achieving Justice 
and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption106 – it is clear that climate change 
justice cannot be achieved if concrete solutions are not implemented. 
The report adopts a justice oriented approach for current climate change policies on 
mitigation and adaptation, while it provides a comprehensive study of environmental 
law, human rights law, trade law and state responsibility, including the difficulties of 
relying on any or all of these laws under international, regional and national regimes 
addressing climate change issues. Thus, the Task Force recommends short-, medium- 
and long-term practical solutions for each of the current legal challenges hindering 
the achievement of climate change justice. Of particular relevance are the calls on the 
international community to recognize a free-standing right to a safe, clean, healthy and 
sustainable environment in addition to ‘greening’ existing rights in existing treaties and, 
outlining a minimum core of rights and duties inherent in those ‘greened’ rights. These 
recommendations are extremely welcome.
Even so, the call for a free-standing right to environment faces challenges. The report does 
not address the interface between society, the environment, and nature. And such debate 
is strongly needed given that food security, for example, and the realisation of the right to 
food is adversely affected by climate change.107 The global conversation about comparative 
environmental rights-based approaches cannot continue to ignore the interdependence 
Can an Ecocentric Approach Open New Frontiers for a 
Legally Binding International Environmental Right? A 
Study of Norway’s Environmental Constitutional Right
Adriana Giunta
106 IBA Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report, ‘Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of 
Climate Disruption’, London July 2014.
107 FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and World Food Programme (WFP), ‘The State of Food 
Insecurity in the World 2015: Meeting the 2015 International Hunger Targets: Taking Stock of Uneven Progress’, 
(Rome, 2015).
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‘Gateway to the Arctic’- Tromsø, Norway
between human rights and the environment 
and, the climate change justice implications 
for the natural environment itself. The 
need for environmental protection of flora, 
fauna and water - all elements essential 
to the fulfilment of global food security 
and for the protection of the right to 
food and human security – solidify the 
debate for the recognition of a legally 
binding environmental right having an 
anthropocentric as well as an ecocentric 
perspective on environmental protection 
from environmental-climate change 
degradation.108  
108 A Giunta, BOOK REVIEW: International Bar Association Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report, 
2014: Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption, (2016) Journal of Human Rights and the 
Environment, Vol. 7. 1.
64
PART I: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Further scope for debate comes 
from new insights into the cause-
effect relationship between the global 
population growth and greater worldwide 
demand for food which appears to have 
weighed most heavily on the protection 
of the natural environment. Ecocentric 
and anthropocentric approaches are 
not always complementary when 
environmental degradation is caused by 
‘Intensive Livestock Operations’ (ILOs),109 
deforestation and loss of habitats due in 
part to a rising need of using land for food 
production, as has happened in developing 
countries like Madagascar.110 Thus, 
sometimes the protection of the right to 
food can conflict with the protection of the 
environment. 
As recommended in the report, concrete 
solutions are needed now more than 
ever. It is time for global leaders 
and the international community in 
general to realize that a free-standing 
environmental right cannot have an 
anthropocentric approach only. A free-
standing environmental right should have 
an ecocentric-anthropocentric approach 
in order to tackle environmental-climate 
change degradation and at the same 
time to provide a legal framework that 
will deliver climate change justice. A 
close examination of current international 
law highlights that an ecocentric-
anthropocentric approach was already 
recognized more than forty-years ago. 
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration adopts 
a human rights language and sets the 
foundation for an ecocentric approach. 
In fact, Principle 1 of the Stockholm 
Declaration affirms that ‘Man is both 
creature and moulder of his environment 
[…].’ This Principle aims at developing 
proposals for incorporating non-
conventional subjects as rights-holders, 
including defending rights of non-humans. 
Hence, Principle 1 of the Stockholm 
Declaration recognizes that ‘both aspects 
of man’s environment, the natural and the 
man-made, are essential to his well-being 
and to the enjoyment of basic human 
rights such as the right to life itself.’ The 
ecocentric approach contained in the 
Stockholm Declaration is expanded into 
the principle of sustainable development 
adopted in Principle 1 of the 1992 Rio 
the Declaration which places ‘Human 
beings [...] at the centre of concerns 
for sustainable development. They are 
entitled to a healthy and productive life in 
harmony with nature.’ 
Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration in 
the first paragraph adopts a clear 
anthropocentric approach, but then it 
embraces an ecocentric approach when 
it affirms that human being life has to 
be in harmony with nature. Moreover, 
the ecocentric approach adopted in the 
second paragraph of Principle 1 is further 
affirmed and expanded in Principle 7 of 
the Rio Declaration which establishes 
109 CW Abdalla, The Industrialization of Agriculture: Implications for Public Concern and Environmental Consequences of 
Intensive Livestock Operations, (2002) 10 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 175.
110 USAID, ‘Madagascar – Environmental and Climate Change’, at https://www.usaid.gov/madagascar/environment [last 
accessed 26th August 2016]
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that ‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of 
global partnership to conserve, protect 
and restore the health and integrity of the 
Earth’s ecosystem.’ This means that the 
protection of environmental rights is aimed 
not only at humans but also at the natural 
environment itself in order to guarantee 
the integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. 
Similarly, article 8 (d) of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity stipulates the need to 
‘Promote the protection of ecosystems, 
natural habitats and the maintenance of 
viable populations of species in natural 
surroundings.’  
In fact, the 1992 Rio Conference did not 
only produce the Rio Declaration, it also 
directed public attention towards climate 
change and protection of biodiversity. 
It further led to the ratification of the 
legally binding UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Both 
conventions, together with the 2003 
Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (Aarhus Convention), for 
instance, have all influenced Norway’s 
environmental-climate change policies 
and protection of biodiversity to a large 
extent.
We have a strong example of how, from 
a practical perspective to environmental 
governance, the Stockholm Declaration’s 
ecocentric-anthropocentric approach to 
human rights protection is translated in 
other international instruments and several 
constitutional environmental rights. 
Interestingly the Stockholm Declaration 
and the Rio Declaration, both non-legally 
binding sources of international law, have 
paved the way to create legally binding 
international law and constitutional rights 
having an ecocentric-anthropocentric 
approach. The lex superior contained in 
article 110b of the Norway Constitution 
(Grunnloven) provides a solid example 
of how non-legally binding international 
instruments can be used as sources of 
national law and, arguably vice-versa 
– how constitutional environmental 
rights good practice can lead the way to 
develop an international free-standing 
environmental right. 
Indeed, article 110b of the Constitution 
of Norway combines a substantive and 
a procedural environmental right. In 
addition, it offers the opportunity for 
discussion for an international legally 
binding environmental right having an 
ecocentric as well as an anthropocentric 
approach to global environmental rights 
protection. However, this debate should not 
simply be reduced to the responsibility of 
States. It requires joint efforts and shared 
responsibilities of States, and non-state 
actors to correct environmental protection 
failures and shape global environmental 
governance. This should be done in a way 
that enables the effective implementation 
of a free-standing environmental right 
whilst assuring environmental, social, and 
economic sustainable development and, 
ultimately climate change justice. 
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Such an environmental governance 
model has already been developed 
in Norway and has been fairly well 
implemented for the past few decades. 
Undoubtedly, Norway is in a privileged 
economic situation due to its rich natural 
resources - hydropower production and 
offshore petroleum activities. However, 
Norway’s inspiration from the Stockholm 
Declaration and Rio Declaration is the 
driving force behind article 110b and the 
development of its strong environmental 
governance model. On the one hand, the 
Stockholm Declaration inspired Norway 
to establish the Ministry of Environment 
in 1972. This Ministry is responsible 
for Norway’s environmental policy and 
management system as a whole, including 
pollution sources (CO2 emissions and 
other greenhouse gas emissions), nature 
conservation measures and management 
of biological diversity and protected 
areas. On the other hand, the Norwegian 
Government set up the Government 
Pension Fund - Global (GPFG) in 1990. It is 
a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) to ensure 
that the country’s oil wealth can benefit all 
generations of Norwegians while fulfilling 
an important ethical obligation in line with 
the principle of intergenerational equity, 
exercising good corporate governance 
and promoting sustainable development 
in economic, social and environmental 
terms.111  
With a Ministry of Environment and an 
active environmental policy since 1972, 
Norway has considerably reduced some 
environmental problems, such as industrial 
pollution, chemicals and urban waste 
discharge into watercourses and fjords. 
It has also established several protected 
areas and natural reserves, and cleaned 
up the mentioned watercourses and 
fjords over the last few decades. Despite 
the fact that Norway’s energy production 
is based on hydropower, and therefore a 
‘clean energy source’, Norway has a high 
level of energy consumption in general 
and the highest consumption of electricity 
per capita in the world. In fact, the average 
emission of a Norwegian person amount to 
nearly 11 tons CO2 equivalent.
112 As a result, 
other problems have increased, such as car 
traffic and energy consumption.
Nevertheless, the total CO2 emission in 
Norway has been steady since 1996 in 
spite of a considerable economic and 
population growth. Norway is also in a 
rather exceptional situation when it comes 
to reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions because Norway is among the 
largest net exporters of natural gas and oil 
in the world, which means that Norwegian 
gas export contribute to a reduction of 
CO2 in European and other countries. 
With the increase of gas export though, 
there has also been an increase over the 
past decades of road, rail, air and sea 
111 AM Halvorssen, ‘Addressing Climate Change Through the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) - Using 
Responsible Investments to Encourage Corporations to Take ESG Issues into Account in their Decision-Making’ 
(University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2010-06). file:///C:/Users/Adriana/
Downloads/SSRN-id1712799.pdf [last accessed 26th August 2016]
112 HC Bugge, ‘Environmental Law in Norway’ (2nd ed. Kluwel Law International, The Netherlands, 2014) 117.
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transport within Norway and, around 32% 
of Norway’s CO2 emissions now come 
from the transport sector. Consequently, 
Norway has received criticism for this. 
There is also a legitimate question to 
ask: to what extent should Norway aim 
to reduce its own emission ‘at home’ 
versus through the use of the flexible 
mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol and the 
EU Emission Trading System (EU-ETS)?113 
In some respect, Norway’s contribution 
to international CO2 emissions reduction 
is appreciated in spite of their increased 
CO2 emissions at home. Ironically, 
Norway’s CO2 emissions obligations 
were even 10% below Kyoto’s emission 
obligations requirement for the first Kyoto 
period under Kyoto Protocol. This issue 
clearly challenges the effectiveness of 
the CO2 trading credit system, rather 
than the effectiveness of the Norwegian 
constitutional environmental norm. This 
brief comment draws attention to one 
of the many environmental concerns 
highlighted by the Task Force report’s 
examination of the credit trading systems 
which to some extent is hindering 
the achievement of climate change 
justice. Still, Norway’s environmental 
constitutional right can play an important 
role in shaping an international legally 
binding environmental right. In fact, 
Norway’s inspiration from the Stockholm 
and Rio Declarations’ long term policies 
have been reached in accordance with 
the principle of sustainable development 
113 Ibid 118.
114 Although, Norway is not member of the European Union, it joined the European Economic Area in 1992.
taking into account environmental, social 
and economic concerns. No other human 
right has a closer interrelation to the core 
of sustainable development than the right 
to a healthy environment. 
Therefore, in order to understand the 
significance of article 110b of the 
Constitution of Norway, it is relevant 
to provide a brief background about 
the development of the Norway’s 
environmental constitutional right and 
other domestic environmental law.114 
From a legal perspective, Norway is party 
to all the most significant international 
agreements in the field of environmental 
and human rights law at both the regional 
and global level. As a consequence, the 
European environmental legislation has 
also contributed to the development of 
Norway’s environmental law. Hence, 
Norwegian law is based on the principle 
of presumption. This means that 
Norwegian law is presumed to comply 
with international law and the national rule 
should, as far as possible, be interpreted 
in accordance with the European and 
international norm. Furthermore, in May 
2014 the Parliament reformed a new 
article 92 Norwegian Constitution stating 
that all governmental bodies shall respect 
and secure the rights and freedoms 
stemming from any international human 
rights treaty to which Norway is party. 
This reform has strengthened the right of 
individuals to challenge state actions on 
the basis of human rights.
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The Constitution of Norway was adopted 
on 17 May 1814. A constitutional 
environmental right amendment was first 
proposed in 1972 at the time of the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment 
in Stockholm. However, the Parliament 
unanimously adopted article 110b on 
environmental protection after twenty 
years of discussion, following the opening 
of the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 
May 1992. Article 110b is, therefore, a lex 
superior to other domestic laws and the 
principle of integration will be applied. 
Again, this means that the decision-
making must integrate its environmental 
constitutional right into other Norwegian 
laws, and that public authorities have a 
duty to assess environmental effects in all 
sectors of Norwegian’s society.  
The unique nature of Norway’s lex 
superior contained in article 110b 
lies in recognizing a substantive and 
a procedural environmental right 
having an anthropocentric-ecocentric 
approach, which focuses on sustainable 
development. In fact, article 110b 
recognizes:
‘Every person has a right to an 
environment that is conducive to 
health and to a natural environment 
whose productivity and diversity are 
maintained.
Natural resources should be managed 
on the basis of comprehensive long-
term considerations whereby this 
right will be safeguarded for future 
generations as well.
In order to safeguard their right 
in accordance with the foregoing 
paragraph, citizens are entitled to 
information on the state of the natural 
environment and on the effects of 
any encroachment on nature that is 
planned or carried out.
The authorities of the State shall 
issue specific provisions for the 
implementation of these principles.’
If we analyse the content of each 
paragraph in article 110b, we will identify 
that the first sentence in the first paragraph 
of article 110b - Every person has a right 
to an environment that is conducive to 
health and to natural surroundings […] - 
adopts a clear anthropocentric approach. 
But in the second sentence of the same 
paragraph it embraces an ecocentric 
approach when it continues [...] and to a 
natural environment whose productivity 
and diversity are maintained. Thus, the 
first paragraph of article 110b wording 
of right for the individual indicates 
an anthropocentric approach, a clear 
protection of the environment as a public 
good, as well as the inherent value of the 
natural environment.115 
115 HC Bugge, ‘Environmental Law in Norway’ (Kluwel Law International, The Netherlands, 2011) 31-32.
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This same first paragraph contains a 
substantive environmental right for 
Norwegian citizens which goes beyond 
the health aspect to environmental rights. 
In fact, it goes further to recognize citizens’ 
right to a natural environment whose 
productivity and diversity are preserved. 
This means that the protection of 
environmental rights is aimed not only at 
humans but also at the natural environment 
itself in order to preserve the productivity 
and diversity of the natural environment. 
Furthermore, the second paragraph 
of article 110b affirms the objectives 
and values of sustainable development 
‘Natural resources should be managed 
on the basis of comprehensive long-term 
considerations whereby this right will 
be safeguarded for future generations 
as well’. Clearly, Norway’s substantive 
environmental constitutional right’s focus 
on sustainable development is aimed not 
only at the protection of humans but also 
to preserve the productivity and diversity of 
the natural environment so that this right 
will be safeguarded for future generations 
as well.
Arguably, the significance of Norway’s 
substantive environmental right having 
an ecocentric-anthropocentric approach 
goes further than the important ethical 
obligation in line with the principles 
of sustainable development and 
intergenerational equity. Article 110b 
gives the ethical obligations of sustainable 
development and intergenerational equity 
a legal status, although in a general form, 
to fulfil legal obligations in line with both 
the principles of sustainable development 
and intergenerational equity. Moreover, 
the third paragraph of article 110b - 
citizens are entitled to information on 
the state of the natural environment and 
on the effects of any encroachment on 
nature that is planned or carried out - 
explicitly laid down the procedural right 
to environmental information and gives 
constitutional status to the principle of 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). 
Thus, citizens have the right to access all 
the relevant information about the status 
of the natural environment and the health 
risk of environmental quality, including 
pollution levels, biodiversity loss, and other 
important environmental concerns. The 
final sentence in article 110b calls on the 
authorities of the State [to] issue specific 
provisions for the implementation of these 
principles, from which the special Act on 
the Right to Environmental Information 
and Participation in Decision-making in 
Environmental Matters (Environmental 
Information Act) was enforced in 2003. 
The Environmental Information Act 
clarifies the various rights and duties 
that follow from the above general right 
to information found in article 110b. This 
paragraph clearly puts a duty on the State 
– through the legislative and executive 
powers – to take the necessary steps 
to fulfil the substantive and procedural 
environmental right enshrined in article 
110b of the Constitution. 
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Before turning to the Environmental 
Information Act and other Norwegian 
environmental laws developed 
from article 110b, it is important to 
emphasize the fundamental importance 
of the three pillars of the principle of 
sustainable development under Norway’s 
constitutional environmental right. The 
principle of sustainable development 
contained in article 110b has subsequently 
been adopted in all Norwegian 
environmental law and it can be seen to 
be the most fundamental objective of 
Norwegian environmental laws, policies 
and governance. 
In the travaux préparatoires116  there is 
clear reference to the 1987 Brundtland 
Report, in which ’sustainable development 
is development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs’.  If we analyse the 
use of sustainable development under 
Norwegian legislation, it is apparent 
that sustainable development means 
sustainable use or sustainable resources 
management, as expressed for example 
in the Municipal Act (1992), the Act on 
Genetically Modified Organisms (1993), 
the Farmland Act (1995), the Marine and 
Resources Act (2008), the Planning and 
Building Act (2008) or the Nature Diversity 
Act (2009). 
Surprisingly, the Norwegian legislation 
does not contain a legal definition of 
sustainable development. Nonetheless, it 
is fair to say that here the core meaning of 
the principle of sustainable development 
is environmental sustainability, as any 
activity on the environment and natural 
resources must be assessed in all sectors 
of society under Norwegian law. Such 
meaning is directly taken from the third 
paragraph of article 110b, from which 
natural resources should be managed on 
the basis of comprehensive long-term 
considerations whereby this right will be 
safeguarded for future generations as well 
and, the authorities of the State shall issue 
specific provisions for the implementation 
of these principles. It is evident from this 
paragraph that there exists, under article 
110b of the Constitution of Norway, 
a strong emphasis on sustainable 
development. This means that the three 
pillars of sustainable development under 
Norway’s constitutional environmental 
right is - in its core  - first, environmental 
sustainable development, second social 
sustainable development and third 
economic sustainable development, rather 
than economic first, social second and 
environmental sustainable development 
last.
As mentioned above, there are two very 
important Acts originating from article 
110b that are worth discussing: the 
2009 Nature Diversity Act, and the 2003 
Environmental Information Act. Both 
Acts originated from article 110b and 
were influenced by to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and the Aarhus 
Convention respectively. Hence, they are 
116 Also known as the preparatory works or the official negotiation record.
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both based on the principle of integration 
and the principle of presumption. The 
first Nature Protection Act (NPA) was 
adopted in 1910, followed by a new NPA 
in 1954 and subsequently by the 1970 
Nature Conservation Act. The 2009 
Nature Diversity Act introduced two new 
categories of protected areas – habitat 
management areas and marine protected 
areas – in addition to the previous 
protection of landscapes, natural reserves, 
national parks and natural monuments. 
The purpose of the 2009 Nature Diversity 
Act is ‘to protect biological, geological 
and landscape diversity and ecological 
processes through conservation and 
sustainable use, and in such a way that the 
environment provides a basis for human 
activity, culture, health and wellbeing, now 
and in the future, including a basis for 
Sami culture.’117  In application with the 
principle of integration with article 110b 
and presumption with article 8 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Section 
1 draws a very important balance between 
conservation of biological diversity, 
from which environmental protection is 
sought and the sustainable use of natural 
resources in order to achieve also other 
social and economic objectives. This point 
is further emphasized in Section 14 of the 
Act which states that ‘measures [...] shall 
be weighed against other important public 
interests’.118 
Thus, the Nature Diversity Act lays down 
important management objectives for 
habitat types, ecosystems and species, 
besides providing a clear definition of each 
of those species, habitats or ecosystems. 
Perhaps three sections are particularly 
relevant in fulfilling a strong sustainable 
development and climate change justice. 
Section 6 provides a general duty of care, 
which applies to any person, including 
individuals in their private capacity as well 
in their professional work. It also applies 
to corporate enterprises, institutions and 
public bodies. Everybody is required to 
have a general knowledge of the value of 
nature because ‘if there is a risk of serious 
or irreversible damage to biological, 
geological or landscape diversity, lack 
of knowledge shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing or not introducing 
management measures.’  
Interestingly, Section 10 states that 
‘any pressure on an ecosystem shall be 
assessed on the basis of the cumulative 
environmental effects on the ecosystem 
now or in the future.’ This is a very 
innovative approach with the potential 
to tackle climate change. The aim of the 
Act is to avoid many small actions with 
insignificant effects per se that might 
sum up leading to serious environmental 
harm or even to cumulative climate 
change effects. However, it is not clear 
from the Nature Diversity Act itself how 
the ecosystem approach and cumulative 
environmental effects principle can be 
117 Section 1 Act of 19 June 2009 No. 100 Relating to the Management of Biological, Geological and Landscape Diversity 
(Nature Diversity Act).
118 Section 9.
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applied and managed in practice. Perhaps, 
the enforcement of this principle is clearer 
through Norway’s implementation of the 
EU Water Framework Directive, which 
requires that the authorities establish 
water quality objectives with regards to 
fresh water sources and costal water.
The other important legislation that 
originates from article 110b is the 
Environmental Information Act. In 
accordance with article 110b, the purpose 
of the Environmental Information Act is 
to ensure public access to environmental 
information in line with the right of 
individuals to contribute to the protection 
of the environment, to protect themselves 
against injury to health and environmental 
damage, and to influence public and 
private decision-makers in environmental 
matters.119 Thus, every citizen has a 
right to environmental information from 
public authorities, as well from private 
enterprises120 about the condition of 
the environment and environmental 
consequences of the activities carried 
out by public authorities and private 
enterprises. 
The right to information also implies 
the public authorities; as well private 
enterprises have a duty to have 
knowledge about environmental aspects 
of their activities, including effects on 
the environment from production or 
distribution of a product outside Norway’s 
borders, insofar as such information is 
available.121  This means that a farmer, for 
example, must have knowledge of possible 
effects of pesticide used on his/her land, 
and factory owners must have knowledge 
of the environmental risk of their 
production and products. And the public 
must always have access to information 
about pollution that is harmful to health 
or that may cause serious environmental 
damage, in addition to measures to 
prevent or reduce damage, including 
unlawful intervention in or damage to the 
environment.122 The Act also intends to 
promote public participation in decision-
making processes of significance relating 
to the environment. This norm was 
introduced into Norwegian law following 
the adoption of the Aarhus Convention; 
and it is now widely used in practice. 
The brief discussion of these two Acts is 
relevant because, although individuals 
cannot enforce article 110b through a 
court, they can enforce the principles 
and rule of law that originated from the 
lex superior through those Acts before 
an administrative, civil and criminal court 
(depending on the seriousness of the 
violation committed). What might indicate 
a limitation to Norwegian liability law in 
environmental issues, is the little progress 
made to compensate for damages on the 
natural environment, as only economic 
loss may be compensated and, the rule 
on retroactivity. Both limitations are linked 
119 Section 1 Act of 9 May 2003 No.31 Relating to the Right to Environmental Information and Public Participation in 
Decision-making Processes Relating to the Environment.
120 Articles 4, 5 and 10.
121 Article 16(2).
122 Article 12.
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to article 105 and 97 of the Constitution. 
Article 105 of the Constitution 
recognizes that ‘a citizen is entitled to full 
compensation if his property is taken for 
a public purpose.’ This refers explicitly to 
expropriation, but what about citizens’ full 
compensation for economic loss? 
While article 97 of the Constitution states 
that ‘no law may be given retroactive 
effect’, again what about pollution or 
environmental damage committed before 
an Act of parliament was adopted? 
And who will be accountable for such 
environmental damage? These questions, 
and the case-law generating from them, 
raises a number of issues. Interestingly, 
in a case prohibiting building within 
100m from shoreline along the coast, a 
landowner was denied compensation for 
the reduced value of the island, as the 
court did not find a violation because a 
landowner is not entitled to compensation 
for economic loss when competing with a 
general rule protecting the environment.123 
This case highlights possible conflicts 
arising between property rights and 
environmental rights, as well as between 
environmental protection and economic 
development.
Furthermore, what happens if the 
retroactive rule applies for environmental 
damage? The general rule in Norwegian 
law is strict liability for pollution 
damage.124  However, strict liability applies 
to the owner if she/he is the person who 
actually operate, uses or possesses the 
property. This means that if the owner is 
not the one who operates the property, the 
responsibility will fall on the operator, or 
on both if they jointly use the property.125 
For instance, in a case before the Supreme 
Court, it was held that a new Act might 
oblige the operator of a waste pump 
to remove it, even if it was legal when it 
was set up.126  Yet, the question remains: 
What happens when a polluted land has 
changed ownership several times since 
the actual contamination occurred? Who 
is responsible in such cases? The initial 
polluter or the current operator? There 
is no clear rule, but if the strict liability 
rule applies the current operator should 
be liable. Still, the owner’s responsibility 
is also important as the principle of due 
diligence applies to the owner to get the 
buyer or operator to examine his/her 
property before the purchase.127  
These examples show the complexity 
of environmental law in general, and 
Norwegian law in particular. On the 
one hand, Norway’s environmental 
constitutional right represents an 
important example of good practice in the 
protection of environmental rights. On the 
other hand, the retroactive rule contained 
in article 97 and the limitation of article 
105 on article 110b show how those two 
123 Norsk Retstidende 1970, 67.
124 Act of 13 March 1981 No.6 Concerning Protection Against Pollution and Concerning Waste (Pollution Control Act).
125 Article 55.
126 Norsk Retstidende 1979, 1279.
127 Act of 27 June 2008 No. 71 relating to Planning and the Processing of Building Applications (Planning and Building 
Act).
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other constitutional rights can cause lack 
of clarity that may affect the functionality 
of article 110b. This point may be seen as a 
weakness of article 110b of the Norwegian 
Constitution. Furthermore, the question 
of locus standing in civil court cases has 
also been seen as a weakness, because 
plaintiffs must be directly affected by the 
environmental matter to justify the use of 
the court system. However, environmental 
NGOs have recognized a “legal interest” in 
environmental cases.128  And the Supreme 
Court has also accepted locus standing 
for environmental NGOs in cases of 
compensation for pollution damage.129 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that article 
110b of Norway’s Constitution breaks 
new ground on environmental rights 
protection. Not least to mention the 
establishment in 1996 of the State Nature 
Inspectorate in charge of surveillance and 
enforcement of legislation concerning the 
protection of natural and cultural heritage 
values under the Nature Diversity Act, in 
order to safeguard national environmental 
value and prevent environmental crime. 
A police specialist agency and a public 
prosecutor’s office with national authority, 
the National Authority for Investigation 
and Prosecution of Economic and 
Environmental Crime in Norway 
(ØKOKRIM) has also been established.
What are the strengths of article 110b of 
the Norwegian Constitution? Undoubtedly, 
article 110b of the Norwegian Constitution 
is a political and legal statement. It is a 
very important political symbol even if 
individuals cannot enforce article 110b 
directly in a court of law. The adoption 
of article 110b shows the Parliament 
commitment to protect the environment 
and give the constitutional environmental 
right the status of lex superior to any other 
environmental domestic law. Thus, article 
110b is an important tool to interpret other 
legislation, in particular environmental 
legislation. 
Undeniably, article 110b is much more 
than a political symbol and guideline. 
It recognizes legal obligations for the 
institutions of the State to take necessary 
legislative and regulatory measures to 
ensure the proper implementation of the 
constitutional environmental right. Indeed, 
Norway’s environmental constitutional 
right’s anthropocentric-ecocentric 
approach introduces both a substantive 
and a procedural environmental right as 
a lex superior, and it contains a strong 
sustainable development. 
Concluding Observations
From the above analysis it is evident that 
the Stockholm Declaration ecocentric-
anthropocentric approach to human 
rights protection is translated into the 
Rio Declaration, other international 
instruments and several constitutional 
environmental rights. From there, the 
1992 Rio Conference led to the ratification 
128 Norsk Retstidende 1980, 1569 (‘Alta case I’)
129 Norsk Retstidende 1992, 1618.
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of the legally binding UNFCCC and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Therefore, the Stockholm Declaration and 
Rio Declaration, both non-legally binding 
sources of international law, have played 
an important role in creating legally binding 
international law and constitutional rights 
with an ecocentric-anthropocentric 
approach. 
Both declarations together with the 2003 
Aarhus Convention and other international 
instruments have all influenced Norway’s 
constitutional environmental right, 
environmental-climate change policies, 
protection of biodiversity and access to 
information. Article 110b of the Norwegian 
Constitution thus provides an important 
example of how non-legally binding 
international instruments can be used as 
sources of national law.
Subsequently, the adoption of article 110b 
in Norway has led to the development of 
administrative and environmental law, as 
well as environmental policies aimed at 
tackling climate change and reduce CO2 
emissions. In fact, since the 1990s Norway 
has introduced several CO2 taxes, such as 
the CO2 tax part of the general consumer 
tax on petrol, the CO2 tax part of the tax on 
domestic fuel/oil, the CO2 tax on national 
use of gas, the CO2 tax on emissions from 
the burning of oil and gas on the offshore 
petroleum industry and the CO2 heavy-
duty GHGs, HFK and PFK.130  
By way of investigating how article 110b of 
Norway’s Constitution enhances not only 
an anthropocentric but also an ecocentric 
approach to environmental protection, 
it offers the opportunity for discussion 
for an international legally binding 
environmental substantive and procedural 
right that could have an ecocentric as 
well as an anthropocentric approach. 
Furthermore, article 110b is an example of 
good environmental practice that provides 
for strong sustainable development 
- based on environmental, social and 
economic sustainable development. Such 
a hierarchy would eliminate conflicts 
Photo credit: © Savanna Vaun
130 Since the introduction of the emission trading system in Norway, some taxes have been removed or the rate has 
been changed.
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between protection of environmental 
rights and sustainable development. 
It is relevant to mention that the Constitution 
of Norway is not a sporadic example of an 
ecocentric-anthropocentric approach to 
environmental protection influenced by the 
Stockholm and Rio Declarations. Indeed 
many developing and developed countries’ 
constitutions emphasis on the importance 
of an ecocentric-anthropocentric 
approach.131  For instance, in 2008 Ecuador 
amended its 1998 Constitution recognizing 
the right of nature; and an amendment 
to the Constitution of France adopts an 
anthropocentric approach.132  Yet, the way 
different societies value the environment, 
environmental rights and sustainable 
development has caused uncertainty 
because sustainable development is 
often interpreted primarily as economic 
development. 
Understandingly, States have to deal 
with competing issues that need to be 
taken into account when implementing 
environmental policies. Thus, decision-
makers have to strike a balance between 
the need to protect the environment 
and the need to develop, which involves 
allowing activities or industries to operate 
within their territories even if may cause 
environmental harm. However, currently 
there is a gap between environmental 
rights protection and economic 
development. This issue raises two 
questions: whether environmental rights 
protection should trump other rights, 
which at times may compromise the right 
to development; and whether Norway’s 
example can be followed by less energy-
rich and less-developed countries? 
It is clear that climate change is one 
of the main causes of environmental 
disaster and indirectly it contributes 
to basic human rights violations. Not 
prioritizing an ecocentric-anthropocentric 
environmental rights protection will 
compromise all human rights protection 
and the right to development (including 
environmental, social and economic 
development). 
Hence, whether less energy-rich 
and developed countries can follow 
Norway’s example depends: first, in the 
UN and the international community 
support and co-operation; and second 
on individual States willingness to 
adopt an ecocentric-anthropocentric 
environmental right that promotes the 
environmental, social and economic 
sustainable development hierarchy. It 
will take years to follow Norway’s legal 
and structural environmental protection 
level, as shown. Nevertheless, with the 
support of the UN and the international 
community assistance and co-operation 
an environmental protection infrastructure 
should be started to be build based 
131 DR Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment, 
(University of British Columbia Press, 2011).
132 The French Charter for the Environment - Constitution of France, 1958 (amended 2008) – Charter for the 
Environment’ article 1. 
 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179092 [last accessed 26 August 2016] 
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on the recognition of an ecocentric-
anthropocentric environmental right; 
and effective environmental education 
programmes should be used particularly 
to help less energy-rich and developed 
countries to set up an effective 
environmental protection infrastructure. 
The Wild Silk Markets project in 
Madagascar133 is a good example of an 
environmental education programme that 
has connected people and the natural 
environmental in a mutually beneficial 
way. The peoples in the Madagascan 
region where this project is based are 
now engaged in subsistence agriculture 
when before they were contributing to 
desertification created by deforestation 
of the land for agricultural or pastoral 
purpose.
As recommended by the Task Force, 
concrete solutions are much needed at 
a time when climate change is affecting 
the lives of millions of peoples who are 
not protected from the impact of climate 
change under international, regional and 
national law. The Task Force encourages 
actors at all levels of governance to take 
joint bold actions aimed at achieving 
climate change justice. Consequently, the 
UN contribution is paramount in shaping 
the global environmental-climate change 
action plan strategy, including taking bold 
actions aimed at recognizing an ecocentric-
anthropocentric environmental right. 
An example of a successful bold action 
taken by the UN Economic, Social and 
Cultural Committee (the Committee) in 
2002 is the adoption of General Comment 
15, which contains the controversial 
decision to recognize the right to water 
even if it was not explicitly contained in 
the International Bill of Rights.134 The 
Committee was then accused of avoiding 
a political debate with States Parties. 
Perhaps, the avoidance of an international 
political debate was, precisely, the strength 
of General Comment 15 because ten years 
later no State has rejected the recognition 
of a legally binding right to water. 
Therefore, the UN should invest heavily 
(with the support of the international 
community) on environmental education 
programmes, including providing training 
and clear interpretation to the definition 
of sustainable development and, 
implement a legally binding ecocentric-
anthropocentric environmental right.
Arguably, the impact of climate change 
should give impetus to prioritize the 
protection of natural environmental rights 
because without the protection of flora, 
fauna and water first, the protection 
and fulfilment of the right to food, water, 
human dignity and right to life itself 
cannot be guaranteed any longer. Clearly, 
developed countries such as Norway have 
a responsibility to co-operate on climate 
change, including helping developing 
countries to set a similar environmental 
133 FAO, ‘Natural Wild Silk: Making the Most of Madagascar’s Biodiversity’, November 2010. http://www.fao.org/
docrep/013/am036e/am036e09.pdf [latest accessed on 26th August 1016]
134 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15 (The Right to water: arts.11 and 12), 26 
November 2002.
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protection infrastructure present in 
Norway. 
A dramatic step has to be taken to 
respond effectively to this unprecedented 
environmental-climate change 
degradation, loss of biodiversity and food 
shortage. A turning-point for the world goes 
beyond human rights protection because 
climate change justice is a matter of 
environmental and human rights protection. 
It is about sharing responsibilities and 
achieving environmental accountability for 
environmental-climate change degradation 
at the international, national and local level. 
The author wishes to express her 
gratitude to Professor Timo Koivurova for 
his comments on this article.
Photo credit: © Siggy Nowak
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I. Introduction
The expansion and diversification of 
international law has been marked by “the 
rise of specialized rule-systems that have 
no clear relationship to each other”135 , that 
are not subject to coordination or review, 
and that are not based on any hierarchical 
relations. Indeed, the complexity and 
diversification of international law has 
resulted in inevitable overlaps among 
regimes, which are necessary for the effective operation of the international legal system 
as a whole. Contemporary international law is characterized by an “intense process of 
normative cross-fertilization, motivated by the prestige of some sources, and the necessity 
to find solutions for similar problems”.136  Uncontrolled proliferation and the resulting 
overlaps of norms and institutional competencies can present problems for international 
law.137  Conflicts have been known to occur whenever “self-contained regimes”138  collide 
with other regimes. 
A self-contained regime may loosely be defined as a specialized regime within the 
international legal system. It consists of a rule-system laid down in an international 
agreement, or group of agreements, regulating a specific subject matter such as trade law, 
environmental law and the law of the sea, or human rights law. Specialized regimes may 
claim to be autonomous, exceptional or claim primacy over other rules of international 
law. Those claims are strongest when the regimes have set up their own institutions 
The Humanization of International Environmental Law: 
Calming Anxieties over Fragmentation and Reaffirming 
a Rights-Based Approach
Musa Njabulo Shongwe
135 The International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on 
Fragmentation of International Law “Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law” 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) 245 par. 483 (hereafter “ILC Report”).
136 Marcelo D. Varella, “Central Aspects of the Debate on the Complexity of International Law” [2013] Vol. 27 Emory 
International Law Review 5.
137 Ralph Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn, “Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws? Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of Public International Law” [2012] Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 367.
138 See Simma B and Puldowski D “Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law” Vol. 17 
(3) European Journal of International Law (2006) 483-529.
Photo credit: © www.etfovoice.ca
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to regulate and ensure observance of 
their own rules, and they have created 
specialized courts to administer their own 
remedies for breach of the rules.139  But 
specialized regimes are not entirely self-
contained in the strictest sense of the 
term; rather, they may be said to be semi-
isolated. This is because it is inevitable 
that regimes interact with each other, and 
with general international law.
A common problem is that the norms 
upon which specialized regimes are 
established could be interpreted in 
light of the object and purpose of that 
particular regime, and this could result 
in an “autonomous interpretation” of 
treaties.140  That issue is an aspect of a 
larger academic problem referred to as 
‘the fragmentation of international law’. 
In my view, fragmentation is a theory 
that presupposes divergence, disunity 
and incoherence of the international 
legal order. Upon studying the problem of 
fragmentation in 2006, the International 
Law Commission (ILC) foresaw that future 
tensions would exist between different 
branches of international law, and hence 
recommended that “increasing attention 
will have to be given to the collision of 
normative regimes as well as the rules, 
methods and techniques for dealing with 
such collisions”.141  
139 Kuijper R J “Conflicting Rules and Clashing Courts: The Case of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Free Trade 
Agreements and the WTO” International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Issue Paper No. 10 
(2010) at 8 par 3.2.2.
140 Autonomous interpretation means an interpretation driven by the needs of the organization which may not follow the 
normal rules of interpretation of international law. This was observed earlier by Jenks W “The Conflict of Law-Making 
Treaties” Vol. 30 British Yearbook of International Law (1953) 401-453.
141 ILC Report (n 1) par 493.
This chapter aims to advance one such 
technique of responding to fragmentation: 
the reassertion of convergence in 
international law. The discussion advances 
this technique through an assessment 
of the inter-relationship between 
two particular regimes, international 
environmental law and human rights 
law. In light of the fragmentation debate, 
I argue that the intimate relationship 
between these two regimes dispels many 
anxieties about conflicts or divergence. 
Despite some minute differences in 
articulation, the human rights and 
environmental protection regimes share 
many common concerns. The chapter 
also examines the role and impact of 
human rights law in environmental 
protection. The analysis begins with a 
general examination of the pre-eminence 
of human rights in international law, and 
particularly in environmental protection. I 
advance an argument that the legitimate 
linkages between the two regimes justify 
a human rights-based approach to 
environmental protection. I also argue that 
instead of being viewed as autonomous 
or isolated regimes, we must advance the 
ultimate objective of human rights and 
environmental protection laws, which is 
the ultimate preservation of humanity and 
the world. Overall, this paper aims to show 
how the relationship between human 
rights and environmental protection can be 
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taken as a good example of convergence 
and the unity of international law.
II.  The Pre-eminent Role of 
Human Rights Law
International human rights law today 
has extended its reach to many fields of 
international law including environmental 
law. This has been observed by cynical 
scholars as human rights law’s ‘imperial 
ambitions’ which constitute a threat 
to the coherence of international law. 
They argue that a majority of those 
regimes to which human rights law 
has expanded are already governed by 
long-standing specialized regimes and 
may have already developed their own 
frameworks for balancing various rights 
and obligations.142 They therefore view 
human rights law as an unnecessary and 
unwelcome intruder as it sows confusion 
into established law, hence stimulating 
even greater fragmentation of the legal 
order.143  Indeed it is true that human rights 
are increasingly being raised in the context 
of environmental challenges, investment 
disputes,144 in trade law cases145 etc. 
The linkages which are constantly 
established between human rights 
and other substantive areas imply that 
tribunals in different specialized branches 
of international judicial architecture may 
be faced with human rights claims,146 
and those tribunals can possibly render 
conflicting decisions or even exclude 
the applicable law simply because those 
courts are not human rights courts, and 
have different and specific mandates to 
fulfill.  
But it must be noted that the featuring of 
human rights in almost all substantive 
areas is important and necessary today 
because society requires protection of their 
ideal standards of human, civil, economic 
and social interaction. Fragmentation is 
therefore inherent from the human rights 
perspective because the protection of 
human rights is now a legitimate topic 
of inquiry in multiple fora.147 Optimistic 
scholars therefore view the reach of 
human rights law into other areas of 
law as a necessary “humanization”148 of 
international law. They correctly argue 
that “human rights law provides a set 
of unifying rules and principles that can 
stitch together a fragmenting international 
legal system”.149 In that light, one may 
argue that human rights norms have a 
justiciable role at the top of a perceived 
hierarchy of international norms. Though 
international law supposedly features 
a horizontal system of norms enforced 
142 Geoffrey S. Corn, “Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed 
Conflict” [2010] Vol. 1 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 52, 53.
143 Ibid at 54.
144 See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford, 2009) 10.
145 Philippe Sands et al., Principles of Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 801. 
146 Jose E. Alvarez and David W. Leebron, “Linkages” [2002] 96 American Journal of International Law 5.
147 Kristen E. Boon, “The Law of Responsibility: A Response to Fragmentation?” [2012] Vol. 25 Global Business and 
Development Law Journal 397.
148 Ruti Teitel and Robert Howse, “Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Inter-Connected Global Order” 
[2009] Vol. 41 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 959, 964.
149 Ibid at 965.
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through a decentralized system, an 
arguable hierarchy between norms can 
be established. This argument has been 
supported by the ILC when it states that:
“As a legal system, international 
law is not a random collection of 
such norms. There are meaningful 
relationships between them. Norms 
may thus exist at higher and lower 
hierarchical levels”.150 
An important part of human rights practice 
and literature pushes international human 
rights law to the top of the hierarchy of 
international law: a concept also known 
as the primacy of human rights.151 
Judicial practice indicates that when 
conflicts do arise between human rights 
obligations and certain other categories 
of international obligations such as 
immunities, collective security, trade as 
well as environmental law, the resolution 
of such disputes is always carried out 
with the primary goal of protecting or 
consolidating basic human rights.152 There 
is therefore a prevailing view that human 
rights norms have acquired a special 
hierarchical standing vis-à-vis other 
international norms.153 This is also true 
because most of the international norms 
qualifying as jus cogens and/or erga 
omnes norms are human rights norms, 
or are norms which are necessary or a 
corollary to the respect for human rights 
– such as the right to self-determination, 
prohibition of aggression, slavery, and 
genocide. This study considers human 
rights norms154 as being well-placed at the 
top of the hierarchy, and consequently, it 
argues that the elevation of human rights 
law above the environmental protection 
normative framework is desirable. 
There has been a notable shift from the 
approach to environmental protection 
that was previously based on public 
regulation through the imposition of 
duties, to a rather new approach based 
on the recognition of individual rights to 
a certain quality of environment.155 This 
new approach, described below, realizes 
and exploits the legitimate connections 
between environmental protection and 
human rights.
III.  Linkages and 
Convergence
There are significant links between human 
rights and environmental protection. 
Firstly, a healthy and safe environment 
is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of 
rights such as the right to life, health, 
water, food and property rights. States 
150 ILC Report (n 1) par 1.
151 Marianne Lamour, “Are Human Rights Law Rules ‘Special’?: Study on Interactions between Human Rights Law Rules 
and Other International Law Rules” in Norma Weib and Jean-Mark Thouvvenin (eds) The Influence of Human Rights 
on International Law (Springer, 2015) 27.
152 Erika De Wet and Jure Vidmar, Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (Oxford, 2012) 2.
153 See in this regard Erika De Wet, “The Emerging International Constitutional Order: The Implications of Hierarchy in 
International Law for the Coherence and Legitimacy of International Decision-Making” [2007] Vol. 2 PER 3.
154 De Wet and Vidmar (n 18) 7.
155 Dinah Shelton, “Human Rights and the Environment: Problems and Possibilities” [2008] 38 Environmental Policy and 
Law 42.
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parties to environmental treaties have an 
obligation to ensure within their domestic 
law a degree of environmental protection 
required for the full realization of protected 
rights. Secondly, it has become essential 
to regard the right to a healthy and safe 
environment as a human right in itself. 
Thirdly, certain rights must be implemented 
so as to ensure environmental protection, 
including the right to access to 
information, access to justice as well as 
public participation. The three elements 
above have been established through a 
process of recognizing and accepting the 
significance of the links between human 
rights and environmental protection by the 
international community. That process is 
described in greater detail below.
At the 1972 United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment held in Stockholm, 
the international community declared that- 
“Man has the fundamental right 
to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment 
of a quality that permits a life of 
dignity and well-being, and he bears 
a solemn responsibility to protect 
and improve the environment for 
present and future generations”.156 
This declaration provided the basis for 
subsequent elaboration of human rights 
in environmental treaty law and in national 
constitutions.157  It also laid the ground for 
the development of environmental rights. 
It is interesting to note, however, that 
this statement was not repeated in the 
1992 Rio Declaration. The Rio Declaration 
modestly states that human beings 
are “the central concern of sustainable 
development”, and refers to humans as 
being “entitled to a healthy and productive 
life in harmony with nature”.158  According 
to Shelton, the Rio Declaration’s failure to 
give greater emphasis to human rights 
at that time indicated an uncertainty 
about the proper place of human rights 
law in the development of international 
environmental law.159 That uncertainty 
gave rise to academic anxieties over 
fragmentation -- that is, concerns about 
the substantive (in)compatibility of both 
regimes.160  
Fragmentation theory postulates that 
even though environmental rights may 
to a certain extent be compatible with 
human rights, they are not necessarily 
the same as human rights. Environmental 
rights originally did not form part of the 
corpus of human rights law found in some 
important human rights treaties such as 
156 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment Principle 1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (16 June 1972), 11 ILM 
1416.
157 According to David Boyd, the first states to adopt the right to a healthy environment to their constitutions included 
Portugal (1976) and Spain (1978). See David Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of 
Constitutions, Human Rights and the Environment (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2012) 62.
158 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 3 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (14 June 1992).
159 Dinah Shelton, “What Happened in Rio to Human Rights?” [1992] Vol. 3 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
75, 82.
160 See Martti Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law: Postmodern Anxieties” [2002] 
Vol. 15(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 553; and Cinnamon Carlane, “Good Climate Governance: Only a 
Fragmented System of International Law Away [2008] Law and Policy 450.
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the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the ECHR, and the 
IACHR161 (save for the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981). The 
recognition of the right to a healthy and 
safe environment came a bit too late to be 
codified in the major international human 
rights conventions.162 The international 
human rights regime developed 
separately and earlier when compared to 
the international environmental protection 
regime. Therefore, fragmentation theory 
has pointed out a normative difference 
that exists between international human 
rights norms and environmental protection 
norms. On the one hand, human rights 
norms created individual and group rights 
exercisable against the state, and on the 
other hand, environmental protection 
norms in treaty law generally placed 
obligations for states (save for the 1998 
Aarhus Convention). It then became 
important for the international community, 
after 1972, to develop principles of 
environmental law that would be linked 
directly to environmental rights, and that 
those principles be translated into human 
rights law. Examples of such principles 
are the principle of non-discrimination, 
the principle of preventative action, the 
precautionary principle and the polluter 
pays principle. After the Stockholm 
Conference, human rights approaches 
to environmental protection gained 
momentum. There emerged a practice 
known as “greening of rights”,163 according 
to which human rights norms were infused 
with environmental standards through 
progressive interpretation. 
The ICJ first pronounced the existence 
of linkages between the two regimes in 
1997: Judge Weeremantry delivered a 
separate opinion in the Case Concerning 
the Gabąíkovo-Nagymaros Project,164 
recognizing that the enjoyment of 
internationally recognized human 
rights depends upon environmental 
protection. In this case it was stated 
that the protection of the environment 
is a vital part of contemporary human 
rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non 
for numerous human rights such as 
the right to health, and the right to life 
itself.165 Weeremantry’s opinion reﬂected 
what has today become accepted by the 
international community that human 
rights are inseparable from environmental 
quality.166 This kind of approach in which 
a judicial body interpreted environmental 
issues in light of human rights norms can 
be found in the recent jurisprudence of 
the ICJ particularly in the Pulp Mills  and 
Whaling in the Antarctic168 cases. Today 
it is widely recognized that states have 
a duty to refrain from conduct that will 
directly violate the rights of persons.  
161 John H. Knox, “Climate Change and Human Rights Law” [2009] Virginia Journal of International Law 163.
162 John H. Knox, “Human Rights, Environmental Protection, and the Sustainable Development Goals” [2015] Vol. 24 
Washington International Law Journal 517, 520.
163 Alan Boyle, “Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment” [2007] Fordham Environmental Law Review 2. 
164 Case Concerning the Gabąíkovo-Nagymaros Project [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 7.
165 Ibid at 91-92.
166 Klaus Bosselmann, “Environmental and Human Rights in Ethical Context” in Anna Grear and Louis J Kotze (eds) 
Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar, USA 2015) 531, 537.
167 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. V. Uru), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 83.
168 Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. V Japan: N.Z. intervening), 2014 I.C.J. 148 PAR. 45.
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The pursuit of public interest in 
environmental matters was accentuated in 
1998 by the Aarhus Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters. Section 2(4) of this 
Convention entrenched procedural rights. 
In SERAC v. Nigeria, also known as the 
Ogoniland case169, the African Commission 
addressed the element of public interest 
in protecting the environment. The 
Commission stated that the rights to 
environment and health together “obligate 
governments to desist from directly 
threatening the health and environment 
of their citizens”.170  In the analysis of the 
courts’ reasoning, Boyle argued that the 
Commission’s decision could be viewed 
as a challenge to the sustainability of oil 
extraction in Ogoniland.171  This is because 
the emphasis on procedural measures as a 
way to safeguard environmental protection 
may reflect a concern that human rights 
law prohibits states from developing their 
resources. It is my submission, however, 
that such concerns lack merit in the sense 
that the human rights regime sets only 
minimum standards for the protection 
of people’s rights, rather than outright 
proscription of state development. 
In light of the Aarhus Convention, many 
states have accepted and entrenched the 
principle of public participation in their 
national constitutions and legislation. 
The fundamental principles of the Aarhus 
Convention include the recognition by 
states of every person’s right to live in an 
environment adequate to his or her health 
and well-being, and the duty to protect and 
improve the environment for the benefit of 
present and future generations. This kind of 
normative fusion bears out the inextricable 
links between environmental protection 
and human rights, and reinforces e the 
right to a healthy environment for future 
generations. 
New developments also show that the 
UN is adopting an aggressive strategy of 
harmonizing the tensions between the two 
regimes. For example, in 2009 the Office 
of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) sought 
means to promote integrated strategies 
and policies for the protection of human 
rights and the environment. Their Report 
emphasized the key point that:
“While the universal human rights 
treaties do not refer to a specific right 
to a safe and healthy environment, the 
United Nations human rights treaty 
bodies all recognize the intrinsic link 
between the environment and the 
realization of a range of human rights, 
such as the right to life, to health, to 
food, to water, and to housing”.172  
169 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (“SERAC v. 
Nigeria – the Ogoniland Case”) AfCHPR Communication 155/96 (2002) par 52–53.
170 Ibid at par 52.
171 Alan Boyle (n 29) 4-5.
172 UN HRC “Report of the OHCHR on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights” UN Doc.A/
HRC/10/61 (15 January 2009) par 18.
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The 2011 OHCHR Report states 
that “human rights obligations and 
commitments have the potential to 
inform and strengthen international, 
regional and national policy- making in 
the area of environmental protection and 
promoting policy coherence, legitimacy 
and sustainable outcomes”.173 In 2011, 
the Human Rights Council adopted 
a Resolution174 which affirmed that 
human rights obligations, standards, 
and principles have the potential to 
inform and strengthen international 
and national policymaking in the area 
of climate change, promoting policy 
coherence, legitimacy, and sustainable 
outcomes. In 2012 the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development affirmed that 
“democracy, good governance and the 
rule of law ... are essential for sustainable 
development”.175  In the same year, the UN 
Human Rights Council created the office 
of the Independent Expert on the issue 
of human rights obligations relating to 
the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy 
and sustainable environment, whose 
mandate has been extended to 2018. In 
2013, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon stated that “an essential element 
of the sustainable development agenda is 
“a far reaching vision of the future firmly 
anchored in human rights and universally 
accepted values and principles”.176 The 
Rio+20 Conference has produced the most 
recent recognition by the international 
community of the importance of the 
right to a safe and healthy environment 
by reaffirming respect for the rights to 
health, food and safe drinking water.177 
There are also good examples of 
173 OHCHR, Analytical Study on the Relationship between Human Rights and the Environment UN Doc.A/HRC/19/34 (16 
Dec. 2011) par 2.
174 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/18/22 “Human rights and climate change” 17 October 2011.
175 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 20-22, 2012, The Future We 
Want U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/L.1 (June 19, 2012) 9, 10.
176 U.N. Secretary General, A Life of Dignity for All: Accelerating Progress Towards The Millennium Development Goals 
and Advancing the United Nations Development Agenda Beyond 2015: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/202 (July 26, 2013) 74-75.
177 UN, “The Future We Want: Outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development” Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 20–22 June 2012; and “Human Rights and the Environment Rio+20 Joint Report OHCHR and UNEP” 
(2012).
Photo credit: © Oliver Haeusle
87
convergence taken from state practice, 
such as regional conventions178  and state 
constitutions179  affirming and recognizing 
environmental rights a human-rights 
approach to environmental protection, as 
well as the agreeability of national courts. 
The importance of taking into account 
international perspectives in addressing 
similar issues contributes not only to the 
effectiveness of international law as a 
whole, but to its stability.
Through all the above examples, 
the argument that prevails is that 
environmental harm interferes with the 
enjoyment of human rights, specifically, the 
right to life, health, the right to an adequate 
standard of living, the right to food, and 
water.180  It is clear therefore that the above 
developments are a proof of convergence 
rather than fragmentation between the 
two regimes. Without doubt, human 
rights law is progressively dominating the 
international environmental law.
IV.  Advantages of a Rights-
Based Approach
Human rights are the core values of 
humanity that require preservation. 
Because human beings depend on 
the environment, a healthy and safe 
environment is essential to the full 
enjoyment of human rights. Without a 
safe, healthy and sustainable environment, 
the survival and development of humanity 
cannot be guaranteed. It has been 
argued that the human rights approach 
is anthropocentric (human-centered) 
because it focuses on the harmful impact 
of environmental degradation on humans, 
rather than on the environment itself.181 
But according to Boyle, a human rights 
approach to environmental protection 
directly addresses environmental impacts 
on the life, health, and property of 
individuals; it secures higher standards 
of environmental quality based on the 
obligation of states to take measures 
to control pollution affecting health and 
private life; and above all, it promotes 
the rule of law by ensuring the direct 
accountability of governments for 
their failure to regulate and control 
environmental nuisances.182   
178 Examples: The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights article 24; The Arab Charter on Human Rights, article 
38; The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Protocol of San Salvador, article 11; and The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, article 28.
179 According to John Knox, over 90 countries had adopted a constitutional right to a healthy environment in 2012. See 
U.N. Independent Expert, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John H. Knox: Preliminary Report, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/22/43 (Dec. 24, 2012) 12.
180 See generally U.N. Independent Expert, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations 
Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John H Knox: Mapping Report, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/25/53 (Dec. 30, 2013) 17-22.
181 Philippe Sands (n 11) 776.
182 Alan Boyle, “Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?” [2012] Vol. 23 (3) EJIL 613.
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The human rights approach clearly 
departs from fragmentation theory 
in that it reinforces the concept of 
“common concern”183 for mankind and 
“complementarity”.184 Fragmentation 
theory has incorrectly framed the 
relationship between the two regimes in 
terms of irreconcilable tensions. But today, 
we can point out a variety of examples of 
convergence and advantages of a rights-
based approach. For example, the rights to 
life and health can now be used to compel 
governments to regulate environmental 
risks, enforce environmental laws, or even 
disclose environmental information.185 
When national law provides human rights 
guarantees, it also ensures inclusive 
and meaningful public participation 
environmental law-making. Human rights 
guarantees in both international and 
national law give birth to procedural rights 
including the right to access information, 
as well as substantive rights including 
freedom of expression. 
V. Concluding Remarks
It is important to continuously entrench 
the coherence of international law as a 
unitary legal system.187  That aim does not 
mean that actors in international law must 
altogether lose sight of fragmentation, 
for fragmentation is a permanent feature 
of the international law. Methods of 
attaining convergence and unifying the 
international legal system must be given 
more attention. In light of the systemic 
nature of international law, it is no longer 
helpful to view the law as broken up into 
separate specialist fields.188  Instead, we 
must endeavor to explore and exploit the 
concept of “mutual supportiveness”189 
and the different interpretative techniques 
of harmonization of international law such 
as “systemic integration”.190  It remains 
important to maintain the objective 
strengthening the overall coherence 
of international law, by exploiting the 
synergies between different regimes. This 
paper has shown how the interactions 
and linkages between the human 
rights and environmental protection 
regimes facilitate a just international 
legal order. A human rights approach to 
183 Werner Scholtz, “Human Rights and the Environment in the African Union Context” in Anna Grear and Lois Kotze 
(eds) Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar Publishing, UK 2015) 404.
184 Donald Anton and Dinah Shelton, “Environment as a Human Rights Issue” in Donald K Anton and Dinah L Shelton 
(eds) Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, New York 2011) 119.
185 See UN HRC Report of the OHCHR on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights UN Doc. A/
HRC/10/61 at par 18.
186 See for example Principle 10 of The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, 
187 See generally Mads Andenas & Eirik Bjorge, A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
188 Sir Michael Woods, Report of the International Law Commission 64th Session U.N. Doc. A/67/10 (2012) 108.
189 Boisson de Charzournes Laurence and Makane Moise Mbengue, “A ‘Footnote as a Principle’: Mutual Supportiveness 
in an Era of Fragmentation” in Holger Hestermeyer et al (eds), Coexistence Cooperation and Solidarity – Liber 
Amicorum Rudiger Wolfrum (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 1615-1638.
190 Matz-Luck Nele, “Harmonization, Systemic Integration, and Mutual Supportiveness as Conflict-Solution Techniques: 
Different Modes of Interpretation as a Challenge to Negative Effects of Fragmentation” [2006] Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law 39-53.
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environmental protection reasserts unity 
and convergence. The ‘reassertion of 
convergence’191  is a positive and welcome 
191 Mads Andenas, “Reassertion and Transformation: From Fragmentation to Convergence in International Law” [2015] 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 686, 693.
response to fragmentation that can finally 
put the fragmentation debate to rest.
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I. Introduction
The Maastricht Recommendations on Promoting Effective Public Participation 
in Decision-making in Environmental Matters (Maastricht Recommendations 
or Recommendations)192 address the question of an effective and meaningful 
implementation of the second “pillar” of environmental democracy: “public participation”. 
The Recommendations are based on existing good practices and are aimed at being 
a practical, invaluable tool and helpful guideline to improve the implementation of the 
provisions of the international treaties. Such treaties include the seminal Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention).193  
The Recommendations offer innovative approaches for managing problems related 
to the enhancement of the quality of public participation. They address the effective 
implementation of decisions that concern the environment and affect the public. The 
Maastricht Recommendations outline both ideological arrangements (best practice 
principles) and practical arrangements (participatory tools and techniques) for public 
participation in environmental assessments. They encompass the nexus of the Aarhus 
Convention with other international treaties and guidance material. However, for purposes 
of this chapter, the focus will be on participatory tools and techniques, highlighting 
the Maastricht Recommendations as part of a set of global guidelines internationally 
applicable at a national level. 
Rights-based Approaches to Environmental Protection 
in International and Regional European Environmental 
Assessment and Maastricht Recommendations
Leila Neimane
192 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Maastricht Recommendations on Promoting 
Effective Public Participation in Decision-making in Environmental Matters (United Nations 2015) (Maastricht 
Recommendations).
193 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) was adopted in Aarhus, Denmark on 25 June 1998 and entered into 
force on 30 October 2001 <www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html> accessed 15 August 2016
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This chapter is divided into five parts. 
First, it briefly discusses the origins of the 
Maastricht Recommendations and the 
state of the international legal framework 
concerning public participation in 
environmental assessment procedures. 
Second, it considers the specifics of public 
participation in those procedures. Third, it 
presents an analysis of the innovative tools 
and techniques of public participation 
that result from the Maastricht 
Recommendations. Fourth, it provides 
a compact overview of the implications 
of the Maastricht Recommendations on 
national legal frameworks. Finally, the 
conclusion is presented, identifying future 
research needs.
2. Maastricht 
Recommendations and 
their Foundations
Before turning to the specific participatory 
tools and techniques (participatory 
techniques)194 of public participation, it 
is useful to set the scene by outlining 
the legal framework in which public 
participation operates in environmental 
assessment. 
Besides the national legal frameworks 
that stipulate the provisions relating to 
public participation in environmental 
assessments, there are several 
international and regional treaties. 
Among them the most prominent, unique, 
“globally significant example of the legal 
consolidation of measures to enhance 
public participation”195  and, in the words 
of the former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, “the most ambitious venture in 
environmental democracy undertaken 
under the auspices of the United 
Nations,”196  is the Aarhus Convention. The 
Aarhus Convention outlines, and clearly 
incorporates, three interrelated “pillars” of 
procedural environmental rights: access 
to environmental information (right to 
information), participation in decision-
making processes (right to participation) 
and access to courts (right to a fair trial, 
judicial challenging right). In this chapter, the 
Aarhus Convention is placed in the context 
of a discussion of public participation in 
the environmental assessment procedure, 
claiming that the right to participate 
extends beyond the formal obedience of 
procedural requirements, but also means 
the meaningful realisation of the right to 
be heard and the right to affect decisions. 
The interaction between national legal 
frameworks and the Convention is two-
sided. Effective implementation depends 
not only on a high level of awareness of 
the Convention, but also on the national 
instruments that are introduced to enact 
it.197  
194 Author’s remark: For the purpose of this chapter, no distinction between the notions “tools” and “techniques” is 
made.
195 Benjamin J Richardson and Jona Razzaque, ‘Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making’ in Benjamin J 
Richardson and Stepan Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability: A Reader (Hart Publishing 2006) 174.
196 Jonas Ebbesson and others, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (2nd edn, United Nations 2014) 253.
197 Jeremy Wates, ‘The Future of Aarhus Convention. Perspectives Arising from the Third Session of the Meeting of the 
Parties’ in Marc Pallemaerts (ed), The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions between Conventional 
International Law and EU Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing 2011) 394.
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To date, the Aarhus Convention has 47 
parties (including the European Union 
(EU)) represented by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) member states,198 with some 
notable absences (namely: the Russian 
Federation and Turkey).199  
The Convention is open to accession 
by states outside the UNECE region.200 
Although no state from outside this region 
has yet acceded to the Convention, the 
environmental legislation in many countries 
around the globe has been widely inspired 
by this Convention (e.g., in Nigeria, Brazil, 
and Mauritius, to mention just a few; also 
see the Public Participation Strategy201 of 
Organization of American States).202  
Occasionally, the laws and practices of 
public participation in the countries that are 
not parties to the Aarhus Convention might 
align with, and even surpass, best practices; 
in other cases, they may fall short.203 
For example, the South African National 
Environmental Management Act 
(1998) lists principles specific to public 
participation204  and the country’s legal 
provisions on public participation in 
environmental decision-making are 
“comparable with the best practices 
in OECD [Organization for Economic 
Development] member countries and 
with the Aarhus Convention.”205 They 
have “many features in common with 
internationally accepted principles of 
environmental management which can be 
seen when one compares these principles 
Photo credit: © Simon. Creative commons
198 UNECE, ‘Aarhus Convention. Parties to the Aarhus Convention and their dates of ratification’  
<www.unece.org/env/pp/aarhus/map.html> accessed 24 July 2016
199 Wates (n 6) 399-400.
200 “The Convention’s article on signature excludes the possibility for Member States of the United Nations from 
outside the ECE region to sign the Convention (Article 17), but allows them to accede upon approval by the Meeting 
of the Parties (Article 19(3)).” Wates (n 6) 400-401; Maastricht  (n 1) 5. See also - Lucca Declaration, para. 32 
(ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.1); Almaty Declaration, para. 24 (ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.1); Riga Declaration, para. 23 (ECE/
MP.PP/2008/2/Add.1); decision II/9 on accession of non-UNECE member states to the Convention and advancement 
of the principles of the Convention in other regions and at the global level ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.13; decision III/8 
on the strategic plan for 2009-2014, objective II.4 (ECE/MP.PP/2008/Add.16, para. 10 (d)).
201 Inter-American Strategy for the Promotion of Public Participation in Decision-Making for Sustainable Development 
(Organization of American States, 2001). 
202 Uzuazo Etemire, ‘Law and Practice on Public Access to Environmental Information and Participation in Environmental 
Decision-Making: A Comparative Analysis of Nigerian Legal Regime with International Best Practice’ (DPhil thesis, 
University of Strathclyde 2014) ii, 17-18, 21-22.
203 ibid ii.
204 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, s 2(4), (b) (f) - (k), and (o). 
205 Organisation for Economic Development (OECD), Environmental Performance Reviews: South Africa 2013 (OECD 
Publishing 2013) 40.
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with the Rio principles.”206 In addition, 
in 2010, the voluntary United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Bali 
Guidelines were adopted with the purpose 
for providing “general guidance […] to 
States, primarily developing countries, on 
promoting effective implementation of 
their commitments to Principle 10 of the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development within the framework of their 
national legislation and processes.”207 
Published in November 2015, the 
Maastricht Recommendations’ aim is 
to improve the implementation of the 
Aarhus Convention’s provisions on 
public participation in decision-making 
by providing ideas for more innovative 
approaches in practice.208 The Maastricht 
Recommendations profess both 
ideological arrangements and practical 
arrangements for public participation in 
environmental assessment procedure, 
encompassing the nexus of the Aarhus 
Convention with other international 
treaties and guidance material. 
The ideological arrangements of 
the Recommendations could stand 
for the best practice principles of 
public participation (e.g., neutrality of 
the persons or bodies to which the 
organization of public participation is 
delegated, the duty of public authorities to 
consult with existing social science, etc.). 
Many of these arrangements correspond 
with, and could be derived from, those 
declared by professional organizations, 
such as the International Association for 
Public Participation and the International 
Association for Impact Assessment, and 
described in the Implementation Guide 
of the Aarhus Convention.209 Although 
these principles have undeniable 
importance, this chapter focuses on the 
participatory techniques (e.g., informal 
public discussions and seminars, bilateral 
consultations, facilitated group processes, 
consensus conferences, round-table 
discussions, stakeholder dialogues, 
citizens’ juries, and multi-optional 
decision-making, etc.).  
Whether the accession of states from 
other continents to the Aarhus Convention 
will become a political reality remains 
unseen. However, even if a separate 
(global) convention or several regional 
conventions on environmental matters 
are made—counterparts to the Aarhus 
Convention—“it is almost certain the 
Aarhus Convention system (and the Bali 
Guidelines) would form the core framework 
around which such a treaty is built.”210 
Now, along with the Bali Guidelines, the 
Maastricht Recommendations form part 
of a set of global guidelines applicable in 
all countries worldwide.
206 Michael Kidd, Environmental Law (2nd edn, Juta & Company (Pty) Ltd 2011) 38.
207 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Guidelines for the Development of National Legislation on Access 
to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. Adopted by the Governing 
Council of the UNEP in decision SS.XI/5, part A of 26 February 2010 (UNEP 2011) 4. See also Stephen Sec and 
others, Putting Rio Principle 10 into Action: An Implementation Guide (UNEP 2015).
208 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 6.
209 Ebbesson and others (n 5).
210 Etemire (n 11) 22.
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3. Specifics of Public 
Participation in 
Environmental 
Assessment
For this chapter, the author understands 
public participation in the same vein as 
defined by the World Bank: as “a process 
through which stakeholders influence and 
share control over development initiatives, 
and the decisions and resources which 
affect them.”211 
The term “environmental assessment” (in 
the context of “development initiative”) 
is taken to refer to two instruments of 
environmental decision-making that 
are reflected in the Aarhus Convention: 
environmental impact assessment (EIA; 
Article 6) and strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA; Article 7). In conjunction, 
these instruments “result in environmental 
assessments being conducted at all levels 
of decision-making, ranging from policy/
plan/program formulation (SEA212) to 
project management, implementation 
and ultimately operation and 
decommissioning (EIA213).”214  Although 
the Aarhus Convention provides for 
public participation in regulation-making 
Source: Partnership RB LatvijaSource: Ieva Čīka/LETA
A special consultative working group created in April 2015 to discuss the railway route 
alternatives in the Salacgriva region  
(environmental impact assessment project “Rail Baltica”; Latvia)
211 World Bank, The World Bank Participation Sourcebook (World Bank 1996) xi (emphasis added).
212 For example, “water management programmes, urban development plans, regional and local waste management 
plans, national energy strategies and plans,” also - “national biosafety strategies, air management plans, nature 
conservation plans, emergency plans for hazardous activities/installations, or anti-smog programmes,” etc. 
Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 46-47. 
213 Aarhus Convention (n 2) Annex I.
214 Shardul Agrawala and others, Incorporating Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in Environmental Impact 
Assessments: Opportunities and Challenges. 24 OECD Environmental Working Paper (OECD Publishing 2010) 10.
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processes and decision-making regarding 
genetically modified organisms, these 
types of public participation lie outside 
this chapter’s scope.
The other treaties containing explicit 
public participation clauses for 
environmental assessment are the 
Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
(Espoo Convention)215 and the Protocol 
on SEA to the Espoo Convention (SEA 
Protocol).216 The Aarhus Convention,217 
the Espoo Convention218 and the SEA 
Protocol219 reflect the link between 
environmental assessment and public 
participation. However, only the Aarhus 
Convention is exclusively dedicated to 
public participation and remains “the most 
advanced treaty on public participation 
concluded so far.”220  
Environmental assessment is one of 
the mechanisms “for ensuring the 
participation of potentially affected 
persons in the decision-making process.” 
221 Public participation, in conjunction with 
transparency, is one of the foundational 
principles of the environmental 
assessment, as “the process should 
provide appropriate opportunities to 
inform and involve the interested and 
affected publics, and their inputs and 
concerns should be addressed explicitly 
in the documentation and decision 
making,”222 forming part of “more direct 
participation of citizens to supplement 
representative democracy.”223  
Public participation is an integral 
component for attaining sustainable 
development, as it assists with 
integrating environmental, economic, and 
social objectives in the environmental 
assessment,224 and ensures socially 
acceptable environmental results.225 
215 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) was adopted in 
Espoo, Finland on 25 February 1991 and came into force on 10 September 1997 <www.unece.org/env/eia/about/
eia_text.html> accessed 15 August 2016   
216 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in 
Transboundary Context (SEA Protocol) was adopted in Kyiv on 21 May 2003 and entered into force on 11 July 2010 
<www.unece.org/env/eia/about/sea_text.html> accessed 15 August 2016   
217 Aarhus Convention (n 2) Preamble, para. 23, Art. 6, Annex I.
218 Espoo Convention (n 24), see, for example, Arts. 2(2), 2(6), 3(1), 3(8), 4(2). See also Jonas Ebbesson, The Notion of 
Public Participation in International Environmental Law (1997) 8 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 88.
219 SEA Protocol (n 25) Art. 8, Annex V; see also, for example, Preamble, paras. 5, 6, Arts. 1(d), 2(6), 5(3), 6(3), 10(4), 11(2), 
15.
220 Ebbesson (n 27) 96.
221 Philippe Sands and others, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) 
601.
222 Pierre Senécal and others, ‘Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment Best Practice’ (International Association 
for Impact Assessment 1999) <www.iaia.org/uploads/pdf/principlesEA_1.pdf> accessed 24 July 2016
223 Anél du Plessis, ‘Public Participation, Good Environm é ental Governance and Fulfilment of Environmental Rights’ 
(2008) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  <www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2008/12.html> accessed 25 July 
2016
224 Ebbesson (n 27) 53-54; Richardson and Razzaque (n 4) 179.
225 William A Tilleman, ‘Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment Process: A Comparative Study 
of Impact Assessment in Canada, the United States and European Community’ (1995) 33 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 337. Quoted by: Jona Razzaque, ‘Participatory rights in natural resource management: the role of 
communities in South Asia’ in Jonas Ebbesson and Phoebe Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context 
(Cambridge University Press 2009) 124.
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It must be emphasized that public 
participation “does attract wider public 
attention than many other project 
components because of the emotional 
involvement of people, and hence its 
failure will not go unnoticed.”226 The main 
challenge of a meaningful and effective—
or “the most comprehensive, broad, active 
and accessible”227 —public participation is 
to avoid situations where “the participation 
is measured by how many come to 
meetings, take brochures home, or 
answer a questionnaire.”228  “What citizens 
achieve in all this activity is that they have 
‘participated in participation.’ And what 
power-holders achieve is the evidence 
that they have gone through the required 
motions of involving ‘those people.’”229  
In this chapter, there are two main 
assumptions: first, that effective 
public participation is an integral part 
of the environmental assessment’s 
effectiveness; and second, that effective 
environmental assessments are based 
on legislation which has a “clear purpose, 
specific requirements, and prescribed 
responsibilities.”230  This means that public 
participation and the effectiveness of 
environmental assessment are “influenced 
also by the adequacy of the policies and 
laws of the government and how well they 
226 Samuel Paul, Community Participation in Development Projects (World Bank Discussion Papers 6, 1987) 10.
227 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 13.
228 Sherry R Arnstein, ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (1969) 35(1) Journal of the American Institute of Planners 219.
229 ibid.
230 Barry Sadler, Environmental Assessment in a Changing World: Evaluating Practice to Improve Performance (final 
report, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, International Association for Impact Assessment 1996) 21.
Evaluation
Implementation of 
participatory techniques
Stakeholder 
identification
Stakeholder 
characterisation
Choice of participatory 
techniques
Stakeholder structuration Degree of 
involvement definition
Output
Input
Project context
Figure 1. Framework for public participation and scope of this chapter
Source: Vincent Luyet and others, ‘A framework to implement stakeholder participation in environmental 
projects’ (2012) 111 Journal of Environmental Management 214.
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are implemented.”231  For example, “[e]ven 
if governments and donors are persuaded 
that [public participation] is appropriate 
to their projects, they are unlikely to 
incorporate [public participation] in project 
design as long as they have no guidance 
in terms of the relevant methodologies.”232 
In line with the preamble to the 
Aarhus Convention,233 the Maastricht 
Recommendations,234 the comparative 
studies of the Canadian, United States of 
America and European EIA processes,235 
and other academic reviews,236 there 
is a link between the extent of public 
participation and the quality of the 
environmental assessment process, which 
impacts the quality of the decisions and 
the effectiveness of their implementation. 
Thus, the Aarhus Convention’s provisions 
must be valued under their meaningful 
and effective implementation, namely 
the practical, real differences they bring 
about. While public participation is a 
broad concept, one of the preconditions 
for successful public participation is an 
understanding of the project management 
of participatory techniques237  (see Figure 
1, circled in red), which are now set forth 
by the Maastricht Recommendations.
Although a plethora of participatory 
techniques238 has been identified 
in the literature, the Maastricht 
Recommendations offer a unique set of 
the innovative techniques to be used in the 
environmental assessment, specifically 
for institutionalizing the environmental 
democracy.
4. Selected Tools 
and Techniques 
of the Maastricht 
Recommendations
Despite the achievements of the Aarhus 
Convention, there are also several 
criticisms that “[t]he Aarhus Convention 
attempts to mitigate the dominance 
of economic interests by involving 
NGOs, but does little to encourage 
more general public involvement.”239 
Effectively, “the Aarhus Convention 
provides a useful framework for public 
participation along the lines of the liberal-
democratic model.”240 In turn, some of 
the participatory techniques offered 
by the Maastricht Recommendations 
do not fit within the current framework 
231 Paul (35) 28.
232 ibid IX.
233 Aarhus Convention (n 2) Preamble, para. 9.
234 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 12.
235 Tilleman (n 34); Christopher Wood, Environmental impact assessment: A comparative review (2nd edn, Pearson 
Education Limited 2003) 405; John Glasson, Riki Therivel and Andrew Chadwick, Introduction to Environmental 
Impact Assessment (4th edn, Routledge 2012) 392.
236 Maria Lee and Carolyn Abbot, ‘The Usual Suspects? Public Participation Under the Aarhus Convention’ (2003) 66 
The Modern Law Review 82-83; Mark S Reed, ‘Stakeholder participation for environmental management: A literature 
review’ (2008) 141 Biological Conservation 2417; Ebbesson (n 25) 68-69.
237 Vincent Luyet and others, ‘A framework to implement Stakeholder participation in environmental projects’ (2012) 111 
Journal of Environmental Management 216.
238 James L Creighton, The Public Participation Handbook: Making Better Decisions Through Citizen Involvement (John 
Wiley & Sons 2005); Vincent Luyet and others (n 46) 213.
239 Lee and Abbot (n 45) 87.
240 Richardson and Razzaque (n 4) 175.
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established through Articles 6 and 7 of 
the Convention. For example, “[t]he type 
of participation described through Article 
6 of the Convention falls at a particular 
level on the ladder of participation241—
somewhere above pure consultation but 
well below co-decision-making.”242 The 
participatory techniques proffered by the 
Maastricht Recommendations provide the 
opportunity for direct dialogue between the 
public, public bodies (agencies), and the 
private sector in the spirit of participative 
or deliberative democracy, which 
requires more extensive mechanisms 
than traditional consultation243 and 
“emphasizes both participation and the 
creation of mechanisms for informed 
dialogue.”244 
In line with the Maastricht 
Recommendations, the author has 
selected the participatory techniques, 
classifying them into two categories. In this 
chapter, they will be referred to as “indirect 
or corrective participatory techniques” 
and “direct participatory techniques” (see 
Figure 2). Indirect participatory techniques 
are techniques that are not pure 
participatory tools, but rather mechanisms 
that can trigger the application of the 
direct participatory techniques. Direct 
participatory techniques can be applied 
directly to facilitate and organize public 
participation. The participatory techniques 
can be applied simultaneously across both 
types of classification and within each 
category. However, the results deployed 
in Figure 2 were chosen selectively and do 
not represent an exhaustive list of all the 
participatory techniques of the Maastricht 
Recommendations. In the framework of 
this chapter, only a particular part of the 
general recommendations is analyzed.245  
The techniques of the general 
recommendations the author identified 
are depicted in Figure 2. A brief textual 
characterization will be given for some of 
them to exemplify the specifics of both 
types of the participatory techniques 
and their interrelationship. For example, 
the use of tools and techniques that 
are proportional to the complexity 
and potential impact (the corrective 
participatory technique) implies that “for 
activities subject to the Convention of high 
potential environmental significance or 
affecting a large number of people, more 
elaborate procedures may be appropriate 
to ensure effective public participation.”246 
For activities with less significant formal 
environmental effects, it would be enough 
to provide access to relevant information 
and the opportunity to submit written 
comments and to have due account taken 
of them.247 For example, some EU member 
241 Author’s remark - here is meant the well-known Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation: see – Arnstein (n 34) 216.
242 Wates (n 6) 408. See also Jerzy Jendrośka, ‘Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making. Interactions 
Between the Convention and EU Law and Other Key Legal Issues in its Implementation in the Light of the Opinions of 
the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee’, Marc Pallemaerts (ed), The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions 
and Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing 2011) 98.
243 Lee and Abbot (n 45) 86.
244 Creighton (n 47) xvi.
245 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 11-21. 
246 ibid 14. 
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states (such as Austria, Denmark, Sweden, 
Italy, Greece,248  and the Netherlands)249 
have adopted “simplified” environmental 
assessment procedures for projects 
with limited effects on the environment 
and “full-fledged” procedures for more 
complex cases.
The direct participatory technique—
co-decision power (in the form of 
referendums at the national, regional, or 
local levels, as appropriate)250 —is perhaps 
the most contradictory suggestion of the 
Maastricht Recommendations. There are, 
however, possibly some more moderate 
forms, for example, by “enabling members 
of the public concerned to participate 
in the process of generating the set of 
options that will be considered in the 
decision-making process, and thereafter 
expressing  their preferences with respect 
to those options”251  (at the “screening” 
stage or at the “scoping” stage) or using 
advisory referendums (not binding). 
Switzerland offers a notable and relevant 
example of giving citizens the right to 
decide certain environmentally significant 
matters through referendums. 
In most countries with representative 
democracy, the idea of awarding to citizens 
the right to vote on environmental matters 
might be a challenging issue. In Latvia, 
for example, the bill for a “Referendum 
Law in Local Municipalities”252 has been 
discussed for several years. The bill is yet 
to pass the third reading in parliament. 
If the parliament adopts its current 
version, the citizens will have the right to 
initiate voting on a municipal sustainable 
development strategy (an SEA). However, 
the more ambitious proposal on awarding 
voting rights for municipal land plans, 
their amendments, and local plans was 
removed during the second reading. 
The choice of the form of the co-decision 
power, however, largely depends on 
the choice of tools and techniques that 
are proportional to the complexity and 
potential impact. Occasionally, it might be 
enough to involve that portion of the public 
(including NGOs and/or other members 
of the public) with relevant expertise 
in advisory bodies for the decision-
making procedure (through specialized 
commissions and for environmental 
assessment—EIA commissions).253 Such 
an involvement technique resembles the 
so-called national quality committees 
(e.g., independent agency— the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Commission in the Netherlands, or 
internal committees in France, Italy, and 
Greece).254  However, this practice is not in 
line with the suggestions of the Maastricht 
247 ibid. 
248 European Commission. Proposal for a Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment. Brussels, 26 October 2012, SWD(2012) 355 final, 28, see also 38, 144.
249 Act to Modernise Environmental Assessment, came into force on 1 July 2010.
250 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 14. 
251 Wates (n 6) 408.
252 Parliament of the Republic of Latvia (Saeima). Vietējo pašvaldību referendumu likums (Referendum Law in Local 
Municipalities) <http://titania.saeima.lv/LIVS12/SaeimaLIVS12.nsf/webAll?SearchView&Query=([Title]=*Viet%C4%-
93jo+pa%C5%A1vald%C4%ABbu+referendumu+likums*)&SearchMax=0&SearchOrder=4> accessed 31 August 2016
253 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 17. 
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The tools and techniques 
– proportional to the 
complexity and potential 
impact of the decision
Indirect or corrective participatory 
techniques
Figure 2. Indirect or corrective participatory techniques and direct   
 participatory techniques of the  Maastricht Recommendations.
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Source: the author, inspired by United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Maastricht 
Recommendations on Promoting Effective Public Participation in Decision-making in Environmental Matters 
(United Nations 2015) (Maastricht Recommendations).
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Recommendations. They specifically 
reflect on the involvement of the public 
in the work of such commissions and not 
only participation by experts from natural 
and technical sciences, or by those 
exclusively nominated by the government.
Another direct participatory technique is 
tailored mechanisms of timely individual 
notification. These notifications are not 
only given through classical mediums 
such as print and electronic mass media 
(TV, radio, Internet), posting of notices and 
bill-posting, but also by less traditional 
approaches. These approaches include 
“electronic mailing lists and automatic 
notifications connected to electronic 
databases; in regions where significant 
parts of the public lack regular access 
to the Internet, other effective and 
culturally appropriate means of individual 
notification should be used, e.g. by mail 
or even door-to-door notification.”255 
The choice of the mechanism of timely 
individual notification is related to the 
corrective participatory technique; namely, 
considering the needs and abilities of 
the public and identifying vulnerable/
marginalized groups. This includes the 
participation of poor, disadvantaged, and 
rural communities, including women, 
youth, indigenous peoples, and farmers. 
For example, it has been found that these 
groups have been addressed insufficiently 
for EIA procedures in South Africa.256 
It must be acknowledged that the 
participatory techniques reflected in 
the Maastricht Recommendations echo 
the spirit of the reviews of the literature 
on public participation. For example, 
the Maastricht Recommendations’ 
suggesting using tools and techniques 
that are proportional to the complexity 
and potential impact of the decision is 
in-line with the well-known “wheel of 
participation” developed in the literature.257 
However, some of the suggestions made 
in the Recommendations go beyond the 
findings of literature, as some academic 
commentators apply a cautious approach 
to different co-decision power tools (e.g., 
the eventuality of the use of referendums).
5. Implications of 
the Maastricht 
Recommendations 
to National Legal 
Frameworks
It is not possible to agree on a “one-size-
fits-all” approach to public participation in 
all contexts.258 Legal systems vary across 
a wide range of geographical, cultural, 
historical, and institutional settings. For 
example, even at the EU member-state 
level, the contexts in which procedural 
rights of the Aarhus Convention and the 
EU supranational legislation operate “are 
diverse, and reflect differences of legal and 
254 European Commission (n 57) 80, 119.
255 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 17. 
256 OECD (n 14) 64-65.
257 Scott Davidson, ‘Spinning the wheel of empowerment’ (1998) 3 Community Planning 14.
258 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 13-14; Luyet and others (n 46) 214; Ebbesson (n 27) 59; du Plessis (32).
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democratic traditions.”259  Another example 
concerns referendums. The question of 
what of shape this mechanism might take 
in different constitutional contexts is left 
open to future discussion. An obvious 
starting point is an assessment, reflection, 
and where appropriate, further elaboration 
on existing norms and standards in relation 
to public participation in environmental 
assessments. 
Even though several best practice 
principles and elements “can be 
identified that should be reflected in 
participatory processes,”260 the Maastricht 
Recommendations are “neither binding 
nor exhaustive”.261 The presented list 
of the participatory techniques is not 
exhaustive. It is possible to develop and 
use other techniques as well (e.g., the 
active role of the public in monitoring, as 
seen in the “flood protection Linth 2000 
project” in Switzerland262  or in sharing 
project benefits).263  
Against this background, the notion 
of “national legal framework” must be 
interpreted broadly, including all sources 
of national law: constitutional, legislative, 
regulatory, and administrative provisions, 
as well as case law and administrative 
practice.264  Also, “best practice” 
recommendations are considered to be 
a constitutive element of the sources of 
modern legal theory.265 In some cases, 
inflexible national policy and regulations 
might make it difficult to act when 
new and more interactive approaches 
are used and irregular insights and 
agreements gained (reported cases from 
the Netherlands (Meuse basin), England, 
and Wales (Ribble basin)).266 The use 
of the best practice recommendations 
and the need to elaborate existing legal 
provisions are directly correlated. The 
states shall not limit themselves to 
the simple transposition of the formal 
procedural provisions in their national 
legal frameworks, but shall consider the 
most suitable mechanisms, in line with 
“best practice” recommendations.
The first steps towards fulfilling the 
agenda of adopting the Maastricht 
Recommendations in national legal 
frameworks are in translating the 
Recommendations into relevant 
national languages and organizing 
training for officials in applying the 
Recommendations.267 Following this, two 
scenarios are possible: as a minimum, 
to introduce innovative participatory 
259 Richardson and Razzaque (n 4) 177.
260 Ebbesson (n 27) 59.
261 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 6. 
262 HarmoniCOP Project, Public Participation in River Basin Management of Switzerland: “Fighting against Floods” 
(HarmoniCOP 2003) 20-21.
263 Paul (35) 2-3.
264 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 12. 
265 cf. Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, Routledge 1997) 54-55; Michelle 
Everson and Julia Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Law Beyond Constitutive Power 
(Routledge 2007) 214.
266 Erik Mostert and others, Social learning in European river-basin management: barriers and fostering mechanisms 
from 10 river basins (2007) 12(1):19 Ecology and Society <www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art19/> accessed 
15 August 2016
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techniques through guidance; and as 
a maximum, to merge political (voting 
and elections) and organizational 
dimensions of public participation 
through legislation. The provisions 
of these techniques professed by the 
Maastricht Recommendations must be 
complemented by and can be elaborated 
on through constitutions (e.g., the use 
of the referendums) and statutory 
provisions. However, possibly, some of 
the techniques might be associated with 
regulation, while some (e.g., choice of 
the type of referendums) may be left as 
voluntary guidelines.
6. Conclusion
The right to participate in the 
environmental assessment procedure 
extends beyond the formal obedience of 
procedural requirements. It reflects the 
meaningful realisation of the right to be 
heard and the right to affect decisions 
concerning the environment and affecting 
the lives of people. 
Inspired by the Maastricht 
Recommendations, several participatory 
techniques are presented, some of which are 
briefly discussed. The difference between 
direct and indirect or corrective participatory 
techniques has been explained.
The participatory techniques of the 
Maastricht Recommendations provide the 
opportunity for direct dialogue between 
the public, public bodies (agencies), 
and the private sector in the spirit of 
deliberative democracy. They extend 
beyond the framework of the relevant 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention and, 
occasionally, the findings of the literature 
on public participation. 
The techniques of the Maastricht 
Recommendations will favor the 
meaningful public participation in 
environmental assessment procedures, 
eventually becoming an internationally 
recognized standard. However, on 
the national level, the choice of best 
appropriate participatory techniques shall 
be based on joint decision-making (and 
not unilateral action), considering a wide 
range of geographical, cultural, historical, 
and institutional settings.
Future research needs to analyse different 
participatory techniques for diverse 
stages (“screening” and “scoping”) of 
environmental assessment and explore 
all the innovative approaches offered by 
the Maastricht Recommendations. The 
interrelationship between the Aarhus 
Convention and other international treaties, 
and the Maastricht Recommendations 
and other guidance material, must be 
investigated and established. This would 
improve understanding of the most 
suitable participatory techniques in 
environmental assessment procedures 
and favor their legal recognition.
267 Maastricht Recommendations (n 1) 6. 
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I. Introduction
The relationship between dignity rights and environmental rights is historically 
interesting, conceptually complex, and multi-dimensional in practice. Both of them 
attend to life on earth, which is as old as the world itself, and yet both areas of law have 
emerged only within living memory, to address matters that had been previously thought 
unamenable to regulation. And yet both types of rights have proliferated in constitutions 
around the world. Dignity rights emanated from the founding architecture of modern 
international human rights law  while environmental rights grew out of the fusion of 
international environmental law and human rights law,268 now embodied largely in global 
constitutionalism. In the last few decades, both types of rights have become so prevalent 
in domestic constitutional texts that hardly a new constitution is promulgated without 
reference to one or both.  As a result, both dignity rights and environmental rights have 
increasingly gained the attention of domestic constitutional courts, as well as regional 
human rights tribunals, where they have been interpreted and applied in a vast array of 
settings. 
Cases about dignity implicate the entire human experience, from gestation to death and 
everything in between, including our identity, what language we speak, where we live, 
how we learn, what work we do, whom we marry, whether and when we have children, 
what beliefs we hold and express, how we organize our society, how we participate 
in community decisions, and more. Cases about the environment, on the other hand, 
implicate everything outside of the human being: the air we breathe, the soil we walk on 
and plant, and the water we drink, use, and revel in. The two areas together encompass 
the gamut of the human and natural world.
An Environmental Dignity Rights Primer
Erin Daly
268 The International Bill of Rights comprises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: http://www.refworld.org/
docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 4 September 2016]), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 4 September 
2016]) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 
3, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html [accessed 4 September 2016]), all three of which 
root the protection of human rights in the inalienable and equal dignity that is the birthright of every member of the 
human family. 
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Curiously, notwithstanding the 
extraordinary breadth of global dignity 
jurisprudence, dignity cases so far have 
not reached environmental issues. And 
while the environment is increasingly 
seen to affect all manner of human rights, 
few environmental cases so far have 
characterized environmental degradation 
or the impacts of climate change as 
threats to human dignity. Thus, while 
both areas of law are gaining increasing 
attention from jurists and scholars, the 
relationship between the two remains 
underdeveloped.
This paper suggests some ways to 
think about the relationship between 
environmental and dignity rights, to the 
benefit of both.269  In particular, this paper 
– part of a larger project on environmental 
dignity rights – aims to suggest ways in 
which the already robust constitutional 
jurisprudence of dignity might inform our 
understanding of environmental rights as 
that jurisprudence further develops. Part 
I provides an overview of human dignity 
as it is rendered in constitutional case 
law. I use a taxonomy of dignity rights 
derived from the Colombian constitutional 
court as a starting point, develop it a bit 
further from there, and then draw the 
boundaries that delimit what dignity is and 
is not in the case law. In Part II I link this 
understanding to environmental rights and 
their emergent case law. In the final Part, 
I suggest ways in which linking the two 
areas might strengthen our understanding 
of rights-based approaches to dignity 
and environmental law, and show how 
reference to dignity could alleviate some 
of the inherent tensions that have gripped 
this area of law. Ultimately, this approach 
can help deepen our understanding of 
how our environments impact who we are.
I. A taxonomy of dignity 
rights 
Human dignity is a supremely powerful 
concept because it applies equally and 
inherently to every person. And if it applies 
to every member of the human family, it 
can stretch across time (applying to future 
generations as well as to the present one) 
and space (applying to individuals and 
to communities and cultures across the 
globe).270  
Cases involving the right to dignity are by 
now far too numerous to count, and form 
part of the infrastructure, or grundnorm, 
of constitutionalism in Latin America, 
Europe, much of Asia and parts of Africa 
and the Middle East. In the aggregate, 
the cases represent the idea that every 
person has value that is equal and that 
must be respected at least by government 
if not also by private entities.  This simple 
assertion transcends almost every 
aspect of human life and, as a result, 
269 Some of the ideas articulated here have been explored elsewhere, including Daly & May, Bridging Environmental and 
Dignity Rights, 7.2 JHRE 160 (2016).
270 For an overview of dignity cases, see Barak A Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2015); Daly E Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions, and the Worth of the 
Human Person (U. Penn Press Philadelphia 2012); Dupré C The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism 
in Europe (Bloomsbury Publishing London 2015).
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dignity rights cases have arisen in an 
astounding array of factual situations. 
Cases recognizing human dignity have 
implicated the choice of names, access to 
housing and water, information about birth 
control, prison conditions, health-care 
coverage, protection against rape, voting 
and the right to run for office, advertising, 
terrorism, families, and more. Human 
dignity can stand on its own, or it can be 
associated with civil and political rights as 
well as with socio-economic and cultural 
rights. It can be substantive or procedural. 
It can be individual or collective.271  
Among the courts that have been most 
interested in the elucidation of the concept 
of dignity as a constitutional device 
are the German Constitutional Court 
(elucidating dignity as an eternal and 
foundational right),272  the Israeli Supreme 
Court (describing dignity as a “mother 
right,” particularly under the guidance of 
former President Judge Aharon Barak),273 
the South African Constitutional Court 
(since even before the adoption of the 
1996 Constitution),274 and the Colombian 
Constitutional Court.275  The latter court, 
in particular, has applied dignity in a 
dizzying array of cases and has provided 
a taxonomy for its definition that may be 
useful as an organizational tool to illustrate 
the implications of dignity rights for 
environmental protection. It has identified 
three clear and distinct lines of thinking: 
human dignity can be understood (1) as 
autonomy or the possibility of designing a 
Photo credit: © Erin Daly
271 See, e.g., Düwell M et al Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2014) and 
McCrudden C Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press Oxford 2013) for some of the more recent 
contributions to the field.
272 German Basic Law, Art. 1(1): ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state 
authority.’ Also see, e.g., BVerfGE 133, 241 Aviation Security Act case. 
273 See Barak at 156-169, and cases cited therein.
274 See, e.g., S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 
CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (6 June 1995) and see the South Africa Constitution, s. 1: ‘The Republic of South Africa 
is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values:  a. Human dignity, the achievement of equality 
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.’
275 The Hungarian Constitutional Court should also be mentioned for its elucidation of dignity as a general personality 
right having far-reaching applications; this jurisprudence withered in 2011 when the new constitution eliminated the 
foundational value of human dignity and erased the previous case law. See Dupré C Importing the Law in Post-
Communist Transitions: The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity (Hart Publishing 2003).
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life plan and self-determination according 
to one’s own desires; (2) as entailing 
certain concrete material conditions 
of life; and (3) as the intangible value 
of physical and moral integrity.276 As 
shorthand, the court characterizes these 
three dimensions, respectively, as living as 
one wishes, living well, and living without 
humiliation.277  To these three I would add 
procedural rights as a fourth category 
of dignity interests that has particular 
salience for environmental rights practice.
A. Living as one wishes 
The Colombian Court describes this first 
category as “autonomy or the possibility 
of designing one’s life plan and to self-
determination according to one’s own 
characteristics.”278  This corresponds 
most closely with the conception of dignity 
we see in industrially developed countries, 
concerned as such constitutional 
democracies are with the individual ability 
to define the course of one’s own life. 
It resonates strongly with the German 
conception of dignity, which has developed 
largely within a Kantian framework that 
puts the individual as the subject, not the 
object, of the government’s interest.279 In 
the United States, where human dignity 
jurisprudence is incipient, the Supreme 
Court has also viewed dignity as the 
value that protects each person’s control 
over his or her own life.280 Dignity here 
is a matter of agency and control; its 
predominant attributes are individualism 
and rationality – although in the same sex 
marriage cases, the emotive aspects of 
dignity are also recognized.281   
B. Living well
This dimension of dignity rights implicates 
socio-economic interests so as to ensure 
that people live with sufficient material 
comfort as to assure a life of dignity. 
Some constitutions – particularly those in 
wealthy social states – provide for social 
support explicitly. Finland’s constitution, 
for instance, provides that “Those who 
cannot obtain the means necessary for 
a life of dignity have the right to receive 
indispensable subsistence and care.”282   
276 Sentencia T 088/08 at 3.5.5 (Constitutional Court of Colombia): Y es que el contenido de la expresión dignidad 
humana puede presentarse de dos maneras: a partir de su objeto concreto de protección ya partir de su 
funcionalidad normativa. Al respecto, en la sentencia T 881 de 2002 esta Corporación manifestó: Al tener como 
punto de vista el objeto de protección del enunciado normativo dignidad humana, la Sala ha identificado a lo largo 
de la jurisprudencia de la Corte, tres lineamientos claros y diferenciables: (i) La dignidad humana entendida como 
autonomía o como posibilidad de diseñar un plan vital y de determinarse según sus características (vivir como 
quiera ). (ii) La dignidad humana entendida como ciertas condiciones materiales concretas de existencia (vivir bien). 
Y (iii) la dignidad humana entendida como intangibilidad de los bienes no patrimoniales, integridad física e integridad 
moral (vivir sin humillaciones).
277 .Id. Also see Sentencia T-009/09. 
278 Id. 
279 See Dupre C, The Age of Dignity at 70: ‘To paraphrase Article 1 of the draft German Basic Law, individuals do not 
exist for the state, but the state exists for the individual.’
280 See e.g. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
281 See e.g. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1732 - 2015 , Halpern v Canada (AG), [2003] O.J. No. 2268 (Ct. App. Ont.), 
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19; 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); 
2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (1 December 2005).
282 Finland Constitution, sec. 19.
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Where it is not explicit in the text, courts 
have inferred a modicum of comfort as 
indispensable to human dignity. The 
Indian Supreme Court has read the 
constitutionally protected right to life 
as denoting something more than mere 
“animal existence,”283 elaborating that 
to ensure that people “live with human 
dignity and all that goes along with it” 
the government should ensure access 
to “the bare necessaries of life such as 
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter 
over the head and facilities for reading, 
writing and expressing oneself in diverse 
forms, freely moving about and mixing 
and commingling with fellow human 
beings.”284  
Thus, cases involving housing,285 
education,286 pension,287 and health 
care,288 have also been held to implicate 
people’s ability to live with dignity. In 
some cases, the right to live in dignity is 
explicitly a social right, as it is in the Indian 
case quoted above, and in this Israeli case, 
where the Supreme Court said:  “Human 
dignity is violated if a person wishes to 
maintain his life as a human being within 
the society to which he belongs, but finds 
that his means are poor and his strength 
is too weak to do so.”289 These cases 
reinforce the relationship between one’s 
dignity and one’s social environment.
C. Living without humiliation
This aspect of dignity ensures that those 
who are dependent on the state or on 
others for their well-being, whether by 
virtue of their own incapacity or not, are 
treated with sufficient respect for their 
dignity that they are able to live without 
humiliation, even if not independently. 
In the context of prisoners’ rights, the 
Israeli Supreme Court has said, “Prisoners 
should not be crammed like animals into 
inadequate spaces. Even those suspected 
of terrorist activity of the worst kind 
are entitled to conditions of detention 
which satisfy minimal standards of 
Photo credit: © Erin Daly
283 Chairman, Railway Board & Ors v. Chandrima Das & Ors (2000) 2 LRI 273, 33
284 Daly, Dignity Rights at 126-7.
285 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 
(1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (4 October 2000).
286 See e.g. HCJ 5373/08 Abu Levada v. Minister of Education (6.2.2011) (Heb.), cited in Barak, at 299.
287 See e.g. BVerfG, judgment of the First Senate of 09 February, 2010. 1 BvL 1/09 – Rn. (1-220) (Hartz IV).
288 Meza Garcia v. Ministry of Health, Exp.N. 2945-2003—AA/TC, (Apr. 20, 2004) (Peru Constitutional Tribunal), para. 25, 
quoted in Daly, Dignity Rights at 121.
289 HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Society v. Minister of Finance, 60(3) PD 464 [2005] (Isr.), 2617, 
See Daly, Dignity Rights at 119. 
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humane treatment and ensure basic 
human necessities. How could we 
consider ourselves civilized if we did not 
guarantee civilized standards to those 
in our custody?”290 Even for those who 
cannot fully control their surroundings or 
the course of their own lives, these cases 
illustrate the psychic aspect of dignity and 
reinforce the principle that one’s sense of 
self-worth and humanity is impacted by 
one’s surroundings.
D. Participating in a political 
community
To the three dimensions of dignity rights 
proposed by the Colombian Constitutional 
Court, I would add a fourth that would 
recognize the value of living in community 
with others, and particularly the value of 
participating in a political community. 
Courts of several jurisdictions have 
implicitly recognized that, as the African 
concept of Ubuntu says, each of us exists 
only in relation to other people.291  Our 
communal experience is essential to 
human existence and especially to human 
dignity. Thus, courts have recognized not 
just the individual but the social value of 
health, of identity, of reputation, and of 
expression, among many other things.293 
Moreover, philosophers from Aristotle 
to Arendt have recognized the human 
necessity of participating in political 
communities:  exclusion, ostracism, 
denaturalization, statelessness, and other 
forms of political excommunication are all 
violations of human dignity of the most 
serious and fundamental nature. Thus, 
human dignity constitutes a theoretical 
justification for civic and political rights 
and, in particular, for democratic rights of 
participation, including rights associated 
with free speech, freedom of the press, 
rights of association, electoral rights, and 
so on.294  
E. What dignity is and is not
The global jurisprudence of dignity is 
broad, but not infinite; its form is still 
evolving, though it is not formless.  While 
the scope of dignity may be seriously 
debated and while different conclusions 
may be reached, I would propose a 
definition of dignity that is supported 
by the bulk of constitutional cases from 
around the world. The fundamental lesson 
of the dignity cases is that each person 
has value that is inherent (just by virtue 
of being a member of the human family) 
and that is equal to that of every other 
290 HCJ 3278/02 Center for the Defense of the Individual v. Commander of the IDF (2002), 101, quoted in Daly, Dignity 
Rights at 67.
291 See generally, Cornell D, Law and Revolution in South Africa: Ubuntu, Dignity and the Struggle for Constitutional 
Transformation (Fordham U Press 2014).
292 See e.g. ADI 3510 (Brazil, 2008) (a case involving the social health benefits resulting from stem cell research), 
discussed in Daly, Dignity Rights at 119. 
293 See, generally Volk C, Arendtian Constitutionalism: Law, Politics and the Order of Freedom (Bloomsbury 2015). 
Also see Dupre C, The Age of Dignity 72, noting that ‘Kant made the connection between humanity, dignity and 
participation in the making of the universal law,’ and that Arendt ‘derived the “right to have a place in the world” and 
to belong to a political community from human dignity’, citing Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 
Harcourt Brace 1973) 267-304.
294 See e.g. August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others (CCT8/99) [1999] ZACC 3; 1999 (3) SA 1; 1999 (4) 
BCLR 363 (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1 April 1999).
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person; that is, no one’s value may be 
subordinated for the benefit of another, 
whether private or public. 
This has several important implications 
that are particularly salient for 
environmental protection. 
  First, the dignity of which we speak is 
associated with human beings. This 
derives from the characterization of 
dignity in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which attributes 
it to every member of the human 
family.295 Dignity is thus a decidedly 
anthropocentric value. This is an 
important limitation in the context 
of environmental rights because it 
excludes the attribution of dignity 
rights to animals and to nature itself. 
While it need not be denied that 
animals and nature (as a whole or as 
parts thereof) have rights, those rights 
have yet to be identified and defined, 
but for our present purposes they are 
presumed to exclude rights of dignity. 
  Second, dignity rights are associated 
with every human being - past, present, 
and future. Thus, children as well as 
future generations may be assumed 
to have the same dignity as presently 
living adults. Claims to environmental 
dignity would be equally strong 
whether asserted on behalf of present 
or future generations. 
  Third, the concept of human dignity as 
it is rendered in law seeks to define the 
human person not as an unconnected 
atom but as he or she exists within a 
social and natural environment. Thus, 
while some of the cases tether dignity 
to rationality and the decision-making 
process – how we plan the course 
of our lives, how we make political 
decisions about our communities 
– other cases place individuals in 
the environments in which they live, 
Photo credit: © Erin Daly
295 ‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Preamble.
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considering how human beings 
relate to one another in social and 
political settings, as well as to their 
non-human surroundings. Examples 
include dignity cases about access 
to water, or to cultural endowments 
found in nature (including subsistence 
farming and fishing, as well as 
the protection of sacred spaces). 
That human dignity should include 
how people relate to their natural 
environments should be evident as 
a matter of common sense. One’s 
dignity is threatened or diminished 
if one’s natural environment does 
not support at least a subsistence 
level of existence. And as climate 
change threatens the ecosystems on 
which human beings depend for their 
survival, threats to human dignity will 
be commensurately heightened.296 
The environment is therefore critical 
to the full respect for human dignity.
II. Environmental dignity 
rights
The precise relationship between human 
dignity and the natural environment is 
fluid, multivalenced, and complex, though 
the taxonomy suggested above will help 
illustrate how environmental concerns 
affect people’s ability to live with dignity.
Living as one wishes refers to the interest 
in controlling the course of one’s own 
life which, in turn, depends in part on the 
condition of the natural environment in 
which one lives. If the air is polluted, water 
resources are inadequate or unclean, or 
the soil is infertile, one’s ability to design 
and implement one’s life plan is limited. 
Extreme dependence on unyielding natural 
surroundings increases the portion of 
one’s life allocated to collecting water, 
gathering wood for fuel, and harvesting 
productive crops, with attendant burdens 
on people’s health and bodily integrity and 
their psychological well-being. Conversely, 
one’s dignity is more easily protected when 
one’s natural surroundings amply provide 
the necessities of life and one can spend 
one’s residual resources attending to the 
full development of one’s personality.
This aspect of dignity is distinct from but 
clearly related to the second dimension: 
living well. Here, courts have been 
concerned with the quality of life even 
beyond the level of subsistence - a 
concern that just as surely implicates the 
natural environment. Cases involving the 
environmental aspects of living well arise 
out of the construction of dams,297  access 
to clean water,298  impacts on health,299 
and so on. Similar cases also concern 
discrimination in the availability and 
accessibility of the natural environment 
and of its spoliation. In its more extreme 
296 See e.g. Mohammed Jameel Abdulla, ‘This is why extreme weather conditions are an issue of inequality,’   
http://abahlali.org/node/15648/ (visited September 4, 2016).
297 Friends of Lake Turkana Trust v. Attorney General, ELC Suit No. 825 of 2012 (May 19, 2014) Environment and Land 
Court (Nairobi).
298 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) [2009] ZACC 28; 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) ; 2010 
(4) SA 1 (CC) (8 October 2009).
299 General Secretary, West Pakistan Salt Miners Labour Union (CBA) Khewral, Jhelum v. The Director, Industries and 
Mineral Development, Punjab, Lahore, 1994 SCMR 2061 (Supreme Court of Pakistan 1994).
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form, environmental degradation can 
create humiliating conditions that violate 
people’s dignity by forcing them to live in 
substandard housing, or none at all.
Some of the most extreme ways that the 
natural environment can impact human 
dignity is when it in fact threatens the 
very lives of those who seek to protect 
the environment. This implicates human 
dignity as well, as people’s capacity to 
participate in community decision-making 
on environmental matters and to control 
their own and their community’s destiny 
is impacted by difficult environmental 
conditions. International law has for 
nearly two decades recognized the 
critical importance of procedural rights in 
environmental matters as articulated most 
effectively in the Aarhus Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, which 
establishes three pillars of procedural 
justice: the right to information, the right 
to participation, and the right of access 
to justice.300 These principles are now 
entrenched in three dozen constitutions.301 
Insofar as human dignity compels avenues 
for participation in public decision-
making, the Aarhus principles ensure that 
such participation is available in matters 
of environmental concern. Yet the Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights and the 
Environment has highlighted the killing 
of environmental rights defenders as one 
of the major threats to the protection of 
environmental human rights,302 and thus 
to human dignity.  
Photo credit: © Erin Daly
300 2161 UNTS 447; 38 ILM 517 (1999).
301 Boyd, Environmental Rights Revolution 106 (UBC 2012); May and Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism 31, 
236-255 (2015). 
302 See Knox J, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a 
safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, A/HRC/28/61 (3 February 2015) at 11-12.
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III. Transcending 
the tensions in 
environmental human 
rights
Better understanding of the links between 
human dignity and the environment 
would advance both environmental and 
human rights in three important ways. 
First, recognizing the ways in which 
human dignity depends on environmental 
health and sustainability would enrich 
dignity rights jurisprudence. Second, 
environmental rights jurisprudence would 
be strengthened by the recognition that 
environmental health is necessary not only 
for environmental sustainability but also to 
assure human dignity and its associated 
rights. Third, a better understanding of 
the relationship between human dignity 
and the natural environment could 
help transcend some of the conceptual 
obstacles that have stalled the fulfilment 
of the potential of the law of environmental 
human rights. The final part of this essay 
explores these objectives.
Improving the global body of dignity rights 
jurisprudence. Dignity jurisprudence 
has reached almost every aspect of the 
human experience, from our innermost 
thoughts and efforts to forge individual 
and unique identities, to our relations with 
family, friends, and our social, cultural, and 
political communities. The entire range of 
human life is reflected in the dignity cases 
– except for our relationship to the natural 
environment that surrounds us.  Only a few 
cases about the right to water recognize 
that inadequate or unavailable clean water 
is a threat to human dignity,303  but for the 
most part these cases are neither true 
dignity cases – characterizing the lack of 
water as primarily a threat to human life, 
rather than to the experience of human 
dignity – nor true environmental cases, 
as they consider water as a commodity 
for human consumption more than as 
an essential element of any ecosystem. 
This work posits that understanding the 
relationship between one’s environment 
and one’s dignity would extend the depth 
and enhance the relevance of dignity 
rights cases.
Enhancing the developing body of 
environmental human rights law. The 
scholarship proposing the fusion of 
international environmental law and 
human rights law is not new,304 but the 
idea has only recently begun to take 
root and flourish. The 2015 appointment 
of the Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights and the Environment is one 
indication of the seriousness with which 
the international community is beginning 
to address the impact of our imperiled 
environment on human beings around 
the world. His attention has turned in 
some significant part to the large swathes 
of the earth’s population who are most 
303 See Mazibuko, above; and see Abu Masad v. Water Commissioner (Israel Supreme Court 2011)
304 Shelton D ‘Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to the Environment,’ 28 Stanford J. Intl L. 103 (1991). 
Also see Kravchenko S and Bonine J Human Rights and the Environment: Cases, Law and Policy (Carolina Academic 
Press 2008).
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vulnerable to changing climatic and 
environmental conditions, including the 
extremely poor, children, and the politically 
marginalized.305  And yet (perhaps because 
legal jurists and academics are among 
the least vulnerable), it seems as though 
the arguments need repeatedly to be 
made anew, as we continually rediscover 
more ways in which the advancement of 
human rights and the protection of the 
environment for the present and future 
generations are interdependent and 
indeed indivisible.306 
To the extent that some human rights are 
implicated in environmental matters, it 
stands to reason that dignity rights would 
be among them. It is hard to imagine an 
environmental condition that does not 
implicate human dignity. Recognizing 
the salience of human dignity would 
enhance the development of rights-based 
approaches to environmental protection 
at the domestic, regional, and international 
levels. 
Constitutional environmental litigation 
is gradually accepting the idea that 
environmental endowments can be 
protected as assets to human development, 
both individually and socially. This requires 
a rethinking of how environmental 
interests map onto traditional individual 
rights litigation, implicating issues from 
standing to remedies. For instance, in 
environmental constitutional litigation it is 
often quite difficult to prove standing for 
two principal reasons. First, it is difficult 
to prove that environmental degradation 
affects one individual more than any 
other(s) sufficient to show, in American 
jurisprudential parlance, that the injury is 
individualized. Second, it can sometimes 
be difficult to show any injury at all. 
Clearcutting a forest and excessive waste 
305 See e.g. Knox J Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment 
of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (Mapping report) A/HRC/25/53 (30 December 2013).
306 ‘The commitment of European constitutionalism to human dignity is a constant reminder of the principle of 
indivisibility of human rights, and that emerging human rights must arguable be crafted with reference to the 
protection of human beings understood, not just as biological units, but rather as part of the human family, and in 
order to promote constructive and fulfilling interrelationships, including with generations yet to come.’ Dupré, Age of 
Dignity, at 73. Also see Daniel Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights: A History (U. Penn 2010).
Photo credit: © Erin Daly
115
in a river cause real but not necessarily 
calculable or cognizable injury, particularly 
if the actions challenged do not have 
clearly adverse impacts on health. When 
the issues concern climate change, a 
third problem is showing the causal link 
between the defendant’s action (whether 
it be a governmental entity’s failure to 
regulate or a private entity’s emissions 
of greenhouse gases) and the change to 
the climate. Some of these problems may 
be alleviated by focusing on the harm to 
human dignity caused by environmental 
degradation. Poor sanitation, infertile soil, 
excessive smog, ugly empty landscapes 
- all of these impact human beings’ 
personal dignity, even if it is impossible to 
establish a causal link to health or life. 
In terms of interpretation and application, 
dignity rights cases suffer from many of the 
same disabilities as environmental rights 
jurisprudence: courts can be deterred 
from engaging with these provisions 
(even when they are clearly justiciable and 
self-executing) because the language is 
vague and seems unbounded. But courts 
have engaged with dignity rights and 
have developed a sophisticated common 
law from which novice courts can draw 
insights and inspiration as they seek to 
define, delimit, and apply environmental 
rights provisions. 
Lastly, environmental rights remedies 
could benefit from attention to dignity 
interests. An acknowledgment of harm 
done can represent a serious step toward 
remediation that respects the dignity of 
the victims. Compensation for harm done 
and the remediation of injuries caused 
can also be keyed to the demands of 
human dignity as a benchmark. This 
would necessarily entail the participation 
and active engagement of the impacted 
community. 
Better understanding of the relationship 
between people and the environment. 
Finally, better integrating dignity and 
environmental rights could enhance 
not only the development of the law but 
our understanding of how we live in 
relation to nature. While the predominant 
anthropocentric view is one of dominance, 
consumption and exploitation of an 
environment that is unlikely to survive our 
generation, let alone future generations, 
the dignity cases reflect a necessary 
harmony between the individual and his 
or her surroundings, such that threats to 
the environment threaten human dignity, 
and the protection of one advances the 
protection of the other. 
This is evident in the narrative we so 
often see relating to indigenous groups 
and their harmonious relationship with 
nature. The Ecuadorian protection for 
the rights of nature itself is based on 
the concept of sumac kawsay, which 
was how some of the indigenous 
populations of the Andes articulated the 
idea of living in harmony with nature.307 
Under this balanced and interdependent 
view of human and environmental 
307 Constitution of Ecuador, Art. 71-74 (2008).
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nature, sustainable ecological practices 
enhance the dignity of the communities 
as they protect the environment for 
generations to come. Whether this 
mischaracterizes, mythologizes, and 
essentializes indigenous populations is 
a fair question, but even if this attitude is 
not appropriately attributed to any or all 
indigenous populations, the point remains 
valid: it is possible to imagine a version 
of dignity that thrives in conjunction with 
the sustainable protection of the natural 
environment rather than in competition 
with it. 
Photo credit: © Erin Daly
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I. Introduction
Did Lindiwe Mazibuko, the applicant in the Constitutional Court case bearing her name, 
live in an environment not harmful to health or well-being?308  Did the approximately 
seventeen people on the South African Highveld who die from exposure to air pollution 
every year live in an environment not harmful to health or well-being?309  Did the three 
babies who died from drinking contaminated water in Bloemhof, South Africa in 2014 
live in an environment not harmful to health or well-being?311  Are the people in the Tudor 
Shaft informal settlement in Johannesburg living in an environment not harmful to health 
or well-being?  Was Sikhosiphi “Bazooka” Radebe killed because he was trying to protect 
this right for his community?312  Can we describe every South African’s environment 
as not harmful to health or well-being if the law allows valuable catchment areas and 
agricultural land to be mined for coal?313  
It is not difficult to think of countless South Africans, as in the above examples, both dead 
and alive, who are growing up, working, living and often dying in an environment that 
does not appear to meet the requirements of section 24 of South Africa’s constitution. 
This section reads in subsection (a): Everyone has the right to an environment that is 
not harmful to health or well-being. Most people interested in South African debates 
Transformative constitutionalism and the interface 
between environmental justice, human rights and 
sustainable development
Michael Kidd
308 See Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). Ms Mazibuko passed away after the case was concluded.
309 See Sipho Kings ‘How Eskom’s coal kills’ (20 June 2014) Mail & Guardian, available at http://mg.co.za/article/2014-
06-19-power-stations-are-deadly-internal-report-reveals (accessed 29 August 2016).
310 See Melissa Fourie ‘Three infants die from polluted water in NorthWest: Justice must be done’ (9 June 2014) Daily 
Maverick, available at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2014-06-09-three-infants-die-from-polluted-
water-in-northwest-justice-must-be-done/#.V8Pv2TXxGbE (accessed 29 August 2016).
311 See Tracy-Lynn Humby ‘Environmental Justice and Human Rights on the Mining Wastelands of the Witwatersrand 
Gold Fields’ (2013) 43 Revue générale de droit 67.
312 See ENCA ‘Anti-mining leader assassinated’ (23 March 2016), available at https://www.enca.com/south-africa/anti-
mining-leader-assassinated (accessed 29 August 2016).
313 See, for example, Centre for Environmental Rights Zero Hour: Poor governance of mining and the violation of 
environmental rights in Mpumalanga (May 2016); Sipho Kings ‘Mines turning our farms to dust’ (13 March 2015) 
Mail & Guardian, available at http://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-12-mines-turning-our-farms-to-dust (accessed 29 
August 2016).
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about the Constitution and its role in 
improving South African society will 
be familiar with Karl Klare’s notion of 
transformative constitutionalism.314 This 
notion can be summed up in the idea of 
the Constitution’s role in transforming 
South African society into one which 
is more democratic, participatory and 
egalitarian. If we focus the project of 
transformative constitutionalism for our 
present purposes on one particular aspect 
of the Constitution – the environmental 
right (section  24) - the question that 
can legitimately be asked is whether the 
existence of section 24 has provided or 
is providing a positive impetus in lifting 
people out of situations of environmental 
injustice and, if not, why not? In other 
words, why, after more than 20 years of a 
Constitution aimed at improving people’s 
lives and their environments, are so many 
people living in environments that are not 
improving or, in many cases, getting worse 
than they were  5, 10 or 20 years ago?    
The first issue to bear in mind that lawyers 
often ignore (not necessarily consciously) 
is that the Constitution and human rights 
do not operate as a kind of magic spell 
that can wish away poverty, deprivation 
and the unacceptable living and other 
conditions in which many South Africans 
find themselves. All that the Constitution 
does in this context is guide the way in 
which government315 in all its spheres 
and branches acts in addressing these 
concerns. And the courts become involved 
only when it appears as if the government is 
failing, for whatever reason, to follow such 
guidance. The Constitution and the human 
rights it incorporates have a limited (if 
any) direct role in providing the resources, 
human skills, economic and environmental 
conditions that are conducive to achieving 
a better life for many.
In this regard, the second part of section 
24 of the Constitution is relevant in that it 
speaks of everyone having the right to have 
the environment protected, for the benefit 
of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures 
that meet certain stated objectives, which 
are considered in detail below. In this paper 
I will consider both legislative and other 
measures (focusing for the purposes of 
this paper on executive or administrative 
measures) that can foster the section 24 
right, and I reflect on why in many cases 
such measures are not doing so.
Legislative measures
Section 24(b) clearly envisages (as do 
many of the other rights in our Constitution) 
that the legislative branch of government 
314 Described as ‘… a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed (not 
in isolation of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country’s 
political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction’. 
Transformative constitutionalism ‘connotes ‘an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through non-violent 
political processes grounded in law’. Is it ‘possible to achieve this sort of dramatic social change through law-
grounded processes’? (both quotes from Karl Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 
SAJHR 146 at 150)
315 I am emphasizing government here because it is primarily responsible for addressing the kinds of problems I am 
discussing in this paper. This statement must obviously not be interpreted to suggest that the Constitution is not 
binding on non-state entities and individuals.
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(at whatever level, provided it has the 
necessary Constitutional competence) is 
required to enact appropriate legislation 
in order to give effect to the substantive 
right. In cases where such legislation 
exists – and in the environmental context 
there is an admirable set of environmental 
statutes, most of these having been 
enacted in the Constitutional era and 
explicitly giving effect to section 24 – 
the Constitutional principle of avoidance 
requires reliance on that legislation 
before the invocation of a constitutional 
principle (or human right). So in most 
cases involving a legal challenge aimed 
at improving environmental conditions, 
the applicant would more than likely be 
relying on an environmental statutory 
provision rather than directly on the 
Constitution. If he or she were successful 
in invoking the relevant provision, this 
would be likely to improve the situation 
but not necessarily result in an outcome 
where the environmental right would be 
completely fulfilled. In many cases, there 
would still be a substantial gap between 
the reality and the ideal encapsulated in 
section 24.
For example, a person affected by 
exposure to air pollution may apply to a 
court asking for industries in her area to 
be forced to comply with the applicable 
emission standards. If successful, and if 
there were full compliance with the court 
order, she would nevertheless still be 
exposed to air pollution. The reason for 
this is that pollution legislation, whether in 
South Africa or elsewhere, allows a certain 
level of pollution. The law is concerned 
with drawing a line between what is 
an acceptable level and what is not. 
What determines that line? We’ll return 
to that question shortly. To exacerbate 
the situation, South Africa’s legislation 
allows for industry to apply for the right to 
postpone their efforts to comply with the 
law, resulting in some of the most polluting 
industries being allowed, in terms of the 
law, to continue to pollute and, to put it 
bluntly, to kill people.316  
Why does the law allow this and, related 
to this question, is such a law consistent 
with the Constitution? Certain levels of 
pollution - and this is where the “drawing 
the line” issue arises – are inevitable in 
modern life. If the law allowed no pollution 
there would be no industry, no modern 
agriculture, no sewage purification, 
the only transport would be non-fuel-
burning and, with the current technology 
used in South Africa, there would be 
very little electricity. The decision as to 
where this line must be drawn ultimately 
emanates from the idea of sustainable 
development, which is itself an element 
of South Africa’s environmental right. As 
the Constitutional Court observed in the 
Fuel Retailers case: “socio-economic 
316 See reg 6 of listed activities notice GN 248 in GG 33064 of 31 March 2010, issued in terms of s 21 of the National 
Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004; SANews ‘Minister grants reprieve to meet minimum 
emissions standards’ (24 February 2015), available at http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/minister-grants-
reprieve-meet-minimum-emissions-standards (accessed 29 August 2016). Note that the Minister’s announcement 
of over 30 applicants who were granted postponements appears not to have been officially published in the 
Government Gazette.
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development invariably brings risk of 
environmental damage as it puts pressure 
on environmental resources”.317 Not only 
does such development put pressure on 
environmental resources, it also affects 
people’s health and well-being. 
Feris has observed that the idea of a 
healthy environment can be an “elusive” 
concept, one for which there cannot 
“always be a universal standard”, and asks 
“how does one establish some kind of 
threshold of quality below which the right 
may be violated?”318 If this observation 
is accurate, it will assist us in answering 
the questions asked above relating to 
whether laws allowing certain levels of 
pollution are legally and constitutionally 
acceptable. I would argue that the idea 
of a healthy environment is not a difficult 
issue to define and thus would disagree 
with Feris that it is an elusive concept. 
Rather, what is difficult to ascertain is the 
extent to which the law ought to permit 
limitation of the right. Rights in South 
Africa’s Constitution may be limited only 
in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including-
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and 
its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose.319 
What this means is that the right in 
section 24 may be limited by laws that are 
designed to give effect to the very right 
they are limiting. If we look at the National 
Environmental Management: Air Quality 
Act,320  for example, it explicitly refers to 
section 24 in its objectives.321 So at the 
same time as explicitly having the purpose 
of “the prevention [not reduction] of air 
pollution and ecological degradation” and 
to “enhance the quality of ambient air for 
the sake of securing an environment that 
is not harmful to the health and well-being 
of people”, the Act allows continuing air 
pollution at levels that harm or potentially 
harm human health. This is not merely a 
product of inadequate implementation – 
even if the Act were perfectly implemented 
it would still allow air pollution for reasons 
I set out above. This is because the Act 
is also aimed at “promoting justifiable 
economic and social development”. This 
brings us back to the question of where 
317 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) para 58.
318 Loretta Feris ‘Constitutional environmental rights: An underutilised resource’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 29 at 35.
319 Section 36 of the Constitution.
320 Act 39 of 2004.
321 Section 2. Also see the preamble. Section 2 reads ‘The object of this Act is (a) to protect the environment by 
providing reasonable measures for-
(i)  the protection and enhancement of the quality of air in the Republic;
(ii) the prevention of air pollution and ecological degradation; and
(iii)  securing ecologically sustainable development while promoting justifiable economic and social development.
(b)  generally to give effect to section 24(b) of the Constitution in order to enhance the quality of ambient air for the 
sake of securing an environment that is not harmful to the health and well-being of people’.
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to draw the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable pollution (not just in relation 
to the Air Quality Act but all “pollution 
legislation”) and in this regard we need 
to look more closely at sustainable 
development and, in particular, what this 
means in the context of  section 24.
Section 24 provides that everyone has 
the right to “have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that, inter 
alia, secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development”. In order to 
determine how to draw the line between 
acceptable and unacceptable pollution 
in a constitutionally valid manner, it is 
necessary to consider what the purpose 
of development is, because section 24 
requires economic and social development 
to be “justifiable”. 
This is not the place to examine in any 
detail the precise meaning of sustainable 
development (even if that were possible), 
or even its meaning in a South African 
context. What is necessary is to provide 
sufficient meaning to be able to carry out 
the balancing acts that the law provides in 
a coherent and legally justifiable manner. 
If we continue with the example of the 
Air Quality Act, it is clearly not feasible, 
despite its stated aims, for the Act to 
prevent pollution. It therefore has to draw 
a line between the level of acceptable 
pollution and pollution that is not 
acceptable. This clearly has ramifications 
for the economic situation (not only 
economic development, in the sense that 
development connotes moving forward in 
a positive direction, but also the economic 
status quo) in relation to industry, mining 
and, particularly important in the current 
South African context, energy generation. 
Energy is a prerequisite for development 
and this probably means that legislation 
which would have the effect of curtailing 
energy production would be regarded as 
unjustifiable. This appears to be the case 
even where such economically useful 
activity is killing people.
But even if it is not feasible to completely 
prevent economic activity that is harmful 
to people, sustainability surely requires the 
line to be drawn in the way that minimizes 
as far as possible environmental harm 
where that harm is particularly serious? 
It is submitted that human deaths are 
a sufficiently serious consequence of 
economic activity that restrictions on such 
activities ought to receive heightened 
scrutiny in order to ensure minimum harm. 
It would appear, however, that current 
South African priorities emphasize the 
holy grail of development to such an extent 
that negative consequences, even if they 
are considered in the legislative process, 
are regarded as collateral damage.
One of the ways in which this could be 
ameliorated is by focusing increased 
attention on exactly what is required by 
development in the South African context. 
It seems as if “development” is often seen 
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as self-evidently good along the lines of 
the “biggering and biggering” referred to in 
the famous Dr. Seuss book The Lorax.322 
In other words, the concept of economic 
growth is accepted uncritically. The 
National Development Plan, assuming 
it still plays any meaningful policy 
role, has as its “guiding objectives” the 
elimination of poverty and reduction 
of inequality.323 If these objectives are 
accepted as legitimate, then development 
must meet these objectives. “Sustainable 
development” in the South African context 
envisages, to put it simply, development 
that will lead to the elimination of poverty 
and the reduction of inequality while 
minimizing impacts on the environment. It 
is probably in the realm of administrative 
and executive decisions that development 
decisions are most frequently made 
that may have impacts on people’s 
environmental rights, and this will be 
considered further in the next section.
Executive/administrative decisions
In this section we will consider decisions 
made by members of the executive. The 
distinction between administrative and 
executive decisions is not significant for 
the purposes of this paper, but the types 
of decisions we are envisaging include 
environmental authorizations, licensing 
and permitting decisions, exemptions 
and so on. These would also include 
administrative decisions relating to the 
provision of services (such as water 
services) that have environmental 
significance. For the purposes of this paper 
they will be referred to as “administrative 
decisions”.
Some administrative decisions are made 
primarily to improve the environmental 
situation of people. There are not that 
many of this type of decision. Examples 
that spring to mind are decisions relating 
to the setting of ambient air pollution 
standards and other decisions under the 
Air Quality Act, such as the declaration of 
priority areas. Some of these decisions 
are not yet beyond “paper decisions” – 
such as setting broad policy directions 
etc. (the declaration of priority areas, for 
example) – with the result that there is not 
yet any improvement in reality in people’s 
environments. Other examples suffer 
from the same problems as legislative 
decisions discussed above: while there 
may be improvement, there still remains 
a gap between the idea envisaged by 
section 24 and the reality.
The majority of administrative decisions 
that would have a bearing on the 
environmental right are those that involve 
action that would have a negative effect on 
the environment. Let us consider decisions 
in terms of section 24 of the National 
Environmental Management Act – so 
called environmental authorizations. Such 
decisions entail authorizing developments 
(primarily physical projects) having taken 
into account their economic, social and 
322 Dr Seuss The Lorax (1971).
323 National Planning Commission National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 (2011) at 2.
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environmental impacts.324 In most cases, 
the primary thrust would be economic – a 
developer wanting to construct a physical 
structure(s) that would have at least some 
detrimental impact on the environment. 
The purpose (at least, the purpose on 
paper) of the environmental authorization 
would be to ensure that the development 
would have as small an impact on the 
environment as possible, taking into 
account the striking of some sort of 
balance between the economic, social 
and environmental factors in play. In most 
cases, the social and economic factors 
seem to be combined, so the process 
appears to entail striking a balance 
between what is referred to as socio-
economic factors and environmental 
considerations.325 (In passing, it is worth 
observing that the combination of social 
and economic considerations is not 
well-advised, since decisions favoring 
the economic often have negative social 
(as well as environmental) impacts). 
Environmental authorizations are thus 
often seen as trading off employment 
(which is understandably a very important 
goal in the context of poverty reduction) 
and the environment. In most cases, it is 
the latter which usually comes off worse. 
Once again, this is due to subscribing 
to the idea of sustainable development, 
even if the adjective receives short shrift. 
In many cases, the decision favoring the 
economic objectives is justifiable, often 
because there is not much negative impact 
on the environment. There are, however, 
often cases when the environmental 
impacts seem to be underestimated to the 
benefit of somewhat dubious economic 
objectives. Often development seems 
to be regarded as a self-evident good 
when careful analysis of the development 
benefits would reveal that there is little, if 
any, impact on poverty and inequality and 
that the profits from the development are 
repatriated to other countries. 
I am not purporting to provide watertight 
economic analysis in this regard, but 
rather the point that I am attempting to 
make is that the social and economic 
benefits are often put on a pedestal and are 
not subject to the same levels of scrutiny 
as the environmental impacts (such 
scrutiny, in the case of the environmental 
impacts, usually aiming to minimize their 
importance). Ultimately, however, the 
legal justification for the balancing act 
is the primacy of the idea of sustainable 
development in the decision-making 
process, with environmental rights playing 
very much a background role.
Some administrative decisions do not 
explicitly involve consideration of the 
environmental impact or section 24 but 
certainly do have an impact on people’s 
section 24 right. For example, the decision 
of the City of Johannesburg to install 
pre-paid water meters in the Mazibuko 
case had the effect of adversely affecting 
numerous people’s section 24 right, but 
the right was not mentioned in any of the 
324 As was the case in the Fuel Retailers case (note 10 above), for example.
325 See, for example, para 58 in Fuel Retailers (note 10).
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judgments.326 More explicit consideration 
of the right and ideas of environmental 
justice would be beneficial in cases such 
as these.327  
Then there are numerous cases of non-
decisions that affect environmental rights. 
These are instances where government 
bodies are under a constitutional or 
statutory duty (often both) to make 
decisions but fail to do so, with the effect 
that people’s environmental rights (and 
often other rights too) are infringed. 
One of the best examples of this in the 
current South African context is the 
pervasive problem of the failure to treat 
waste water (sewage) evidenced in the 
various Green Drop Reports328,  as well as 
several cases where the water provided 
by municipalities, previously potable, is no 
longer safe to drink, as evidenced in the 
Blue Drop Reports329. There are no direct 
legal impediments to the resolution of 
these problems but they are not simple 
to address in practice. Solutions involve a 
combination of legal, political, economic 
and capacity considerations that are 
almost intractable in some cases.
How would judicial invocation of the section 
24 right in such cases be able to improve 
the situation? Firstly, due to the principle 
of avoidance, the applicants would have to 
rely on the relevant legislation – the Water 
Services Act330  and National Water Act.331 
But even if they were able to rely directly 
on the section 24 right, usual remedies 
may fall short because the problems are 
not simply cases of a negligent (or wilful) 
failure to comply with legislation and 
would often involve spending considerable 
amounts of money in order to make good 
the shortcomings.
Regular judicial remedies would also 
probably be deficient in cases where an 
applicant argues in court that he is living 
in an environment that does not meet the 
standards of section 24. Assume someone 
living in the south Durban basin argued in 
court that the Ethekwini municipality is 
required by section 24 to ensure that he 
does not live in an environment harmful 
to health and well-being.332 Even if the 
court found in his favor, there would 
seem to be only two possible remedies 
(in broad terms): either the causes of the 
pollution in the area would have to be 
closed down or significantly restricted, or 
provision would have to be made for his 
relocation. It is extremely unlikely that the 
former remedy would be feasible because 
326 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg Unreported Case No. 06/13865 (W); City of Johannesburg and Others v Mazibuko 
and Others 2009 (3) SA 592 (SCA); and Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
327 See Melanie Murcott ‘The role of environmental justice in socio-economic rights litigation’ (2015) 132 South African 
Law Journal 875.
328 These reports, produced by the Department of Water and Sanitation, are available at https://www.dwa.gov.za/dir_ws/
gds/Docs/DocsDefault.aspx (accessed 29 August 2016). See Michael Kidd ‘Poisoning the right to water in South 
Africa: What can the law do?’ (2011) International Journal of Rural Law and Policy 17pp available at http://epress.lib.
uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/ijrlp/article/view/2604/2834 (accessed 29 August 2016).
329 Available at https://www.dwa.gov.za/dir%5Fws/DWQR/default.asp (accessed 29 August 2016).
330 Act 108 of 1997.
331 Act 36 of 1998.
332 See Groundwork Slow Poison: Air Pollution, Public Health and Failing Governance (2014) for a description of the air 
quality in the south Durban area (at 27).
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of the significantly adverse economic 
consequences. The problem with the 
second is that persons in such situations 
are often reluctant to relocate, despite the 
negative attributes of their current living 
conditions. 
Conclusion
Thinking out of the box might lead to 
innovative remedies and legal ways 
of ameliorating some of the problems 
outlined in this paper. More critical 
consideration of the objectives of and need 
for development in individual projects may 
also lead to improvements. The bottom 
line, however, is that the environmental 
right in section 24 contains an internal 
modifier – sustainable development 
– that is ultimately inimical to the full 
realisation of the right to an environment 
that is not harmful to health and well-
being (and, consequently, inimical to the 
achievement of environmental justice). 
Not only is sustainable development an 
internal modifier but is also a justification 
for limitation in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution. With the pursuit of 
development seen to be a prerequisite for 
the alleviation of poverty and inequality, 
the priorities in South Africa are such 
that the best that section 24 can achieve 
is the right to an environment that is not 
unreasonably harmful to health and well-
being.  
This paper still leaves many questions 
unanswered, the most obvious of which 
is one that I am not able to answer at 
this juncture but ought to give anyone 
interested in this topic pause for thought. 
And that is whether development can ever 
be sustainable if it leads to people dying? 
From a normative perspective one would 
expect the answer to be no, but what we 
are seeing in reality suggests otherwise.       
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I. Introduction
The human rights impact of involuntary resettlement and displacement as a result of 
development project has long been recognized.333  However, many communities have 
no choice but to live within a natural environment that has been severely degraded and 
polluted as a result of newly developed roads, coal-fired power plant, mines etc. They bear 
the brunt of environmental degradation and pollution. As a result, their lived experience 
and relationship with the environment changes and their sense of place is altered - to 
the point where they feel displaced. This chapter argues that loss of sense of place is 
a form of displacement. Furthermore, that this form of displacement infringes upon 
environmental rights; and, as such, there is room for an environmental rights approach 
to address this form of displacement. 
2. Loss of sense of place as displacement
Literature details the connections between displacement and loss of sense of place quite 
expansively.334  Sense of place can be expressed in a multitude of dimensions. This section 
focuses on three of these dimensions as expressions of sense of place. First, a person 
may experience an emotional bond to a particular space or piece of land.335  This has been 
articulated as ‘the emotional significance that geographic spaces are able to take on in 
human experience that transforms them into places’.336  Fried made the argument that the 
Loss of Sense of Place as Displacement –  
New Frontiers for Environmental Rights
Loretta Feris
333 See C. McDowell, Understanding impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-Induced Displacement, 
Berghahn books, 1996; Robinson, Risks and rights: The causes, consequences, and challenges of development-
induced displacement, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 2003; L. Clark, ‘World Bank and Human Rights: The 
Need for Greater Accountability’ Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 15, 2002: T. Downing, Avoiding New Poverty: 
Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement, vol. 52, London, International Institute for Environment and 
Development, 2002. 
334 See for example J. E. Windsor and J. A. Mcvey ‘Annihilation of Both Place and Sense of Place: The Experience of the 
Cheslatta T’En Canadian First Nation within the Context of Large-Scale Environmental Projects’, The Geographical 
Journal, vol. 171, no. 2, 2005, pp. 146-165; S.M. Low et al, Place Attachment, New York, Springer, 1992; J. Dixon 
and K. Durrheim,‘Dislocating Identity: Desegregation and the Transformation of Place’, Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 455–473. 
335 J. Cross, ‘What is sense of place’, 12th Headwaters Conference, Western State College, 2001, p. 1 in S. Low, 
‘Symbolic ties that bind: Place attachment in the plaza’ in I. Altman & S.Low (eds) Place Attachment: Human 
Behaviour and Environment, 1992.
336 Y.Tuan, Topophilia A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values, New Jersey, 1974 cited in V. Guliani, 
Theories of Attachment, Aldershot, 2003, p. 146. 
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forced transfer of people from their place 
of residence represents an interruption 
in the individuals’ sense of continuity in 
that it involved the fragmentation of two 
essential components of identity – namely 
spatial identity and group identity, which 
are associated with strong emotional 
elements.337  In more recent work, the 
concept of place attachment is directly 
linked to environmental quality allowing for 
an acknowledgment of the psychological 
complexity of individual-environment 
relationship.338  A strong argument is 
made for the recognition of this bond as 
one that goes beyond affection, and as 
a relationship with an enduring quality, 
directed toward a specific place, not 
interchangeable with another with the 
same functional quality.339  Similarly, it 
could be argued that this relationship 
is not interchangeable with one in 
which environmental quality has been 
significantly deteriorated. Furthermore 
when a place’s environmental quality is 
lost or is severely degraded it can sever the 
bond that people have with the affected 
land.
Second, loss of sense of place is also loss 
of place identity.341  In other words a person 
sees his or her identity as intrinsically 
connected to a particular space or place. 
The cultural practices, ancestry, symbolic 
meanings and heritage of a place contribute 
to place identity. Displacement erodes the 
role of sense of place in individual and 
collective identity formation, in the way 
time, history and space are encoded and 
contextualized by way of interpersonal, 
community and intercultural relations342  - 
as expressed in a particular environment. 
The transformation of the physical space 
carries the potential of fracturing these 
cultural identities and community bonds. 
A third facet of sense of place is that of 
place dependence, articulated as the 
‘degree to which occupants perceive 
themselves to be strongly associated with 
337 Study by Fried on the psychological effects of the forced dislocation of the population of a Boston suburb, the West 
End, in the course of a vast programme of urban redevelopment in V. Guliani, Theories of Attachment, Aldershot, 
2003, p.144. 
338 V. Guliani, Theories of Attachment, Aldershot, 2003, p.148.
339 ibid.
340 With permission from Carin Bosman©. 
341 F. Steele, The Sense of Place, New York, CBI Publishing Co, 1981, p.12.
342 A. Smith, ‘Displacement, resistance and the critique of development: from the grass roots’, Report Prepared for 
ESCOR R7644 and the Research Programme on Development Induced Displacement and Resettlement Refugee 
Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2001, p, 64.
Figure 1: Industrial operations in action 340
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and dependent on a particular place’.343 
This association is typically based on 
the fulfilment of a specific need such as 
being close to sources of livelihood.344 
As such, when that place is faced with 
ecosystem change it alters the basis of 
place dependency. Thus when land use is 
altered, water is polluted and biodiversity 
is stripped away, livelihoods are stripped 
away.
3. Displaced while Still at 
Home: The People of 
Mooifontein
The erosion of place attachment, place 
identity and place dependency is vividly 
illustrated in the battle of the people of 
Mooifontein against Optimum Coal Mine. 
As depicted in a documentary on the 
plight of this community,346 the mining 
company contracted with South Africa’s 
power supplier, Eskom to supply coal to 
its Hendrina Power Station until 2018.347 
In order to do deliver on the contract, 
the mining company had to expand its 
operations, which in turn required the 
nearby community of Mooifontein to be 
relocated. While the bulk of the community 
agreed to relocation, approximately twenty 
households rejected the settlement offer 
of the mine and have remained.348 A 
primary reason for staying was to retain 
the pastoral lifestyle these 20 households 
enjoyed in their environment prior to the 
mining. 
But the community was unable to retain 
their previous lifestyle. The rejection of the 
settlement offer means that the community 
now lives with blasting operations which 
requires residents to evacuate on a daily 
Irresponsible coal mining 345
343 R. Moore and A. Graefe, ‘Attachments to recreation settings: The case of rail-trail users’, Journal of Leisure Sciences, 
vol.16, no1. 1994, p19.
344 J. Cross, ‘What is Sense of Place’, Paper prepared for the 12th Headwaters Conference, Western State College, 2001, 
p. 8.
345 With permission from Carin Bosman ©.
346 Checkpoint: The Forgotten People, [online video], 2016,https://www.enca.com/south-africa/checkpoint-forgotten-
people (Last accessed 29 August 2016).
347 J. Eybers, ‘Workers Refuse to Move’, City Press, 25 June 2016, http://city-press.news24.com/News/farm-workers-
refuse-to-move-for-tegeta-20160618 (Last accessed 29 August 2016). 
348 S. Njobeni,’ Optimum Coal fine: Eskom sticks to its guns’, IOL, 12 February 2016,   http://www.iol.co.za/business/
companies/optimum-coal-fine-eskom-sticks-to-its-guns-1983466 (Last accessed 29 August 2016). 
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basis, and produces excessive dust, 
incessant noise disturbance, structural 
damage to housing and loss of agricultural 
and pastoral land. It is a community 
whose group identity has been fractured, 
whose peaceful space has been invaded, 
whose members’ health is in peril from 
dust and noise, and whose environmental 
landscape no longer provides an income. 
It is a community that has been displaced, 
while still at home.
4. New Frontiers for 
Environmental Rights?
The plight of vulnerable communities 
such as the Mooifontein community 
is generally recognized as a form of 
environmental injustice,350 central to which 
is an inextricable connection between the 
environment, race, gender and socio-
economic status. Environmental injustice 
is thus understood as a form of inequity 
that impacts on people disproportionately 
on the basis of race, gender, culture and 
socio-economic status. There is thus a 
link between environmental injustice and 
human rights. In this respect, “the absence 
of certain human rights values (such as 
equality and dignity) can profoundly impact 
on people’s entitlement to environmental 
goods and services – and indeed – that 
if we construct ‘environment’ to the 
exclusion of these values, we succeed in 
sustaining structural disadvantage.”351 
Beyond rights to equality and dignity, this 
form of displacement also impacts on 
the right to live in an environment which 
is not detrimental to one’s health and 
well-being.352 As illustrated in the case 
A home damaged by blasting from a mine 
operation349
349 With permission from Simon Mathebula/Sunday Times ©. See also B. Jordan and K. Ndabeni, ‘Fearless 
granny Poppi takes on a mining giant’, Sunday Times, 14 June 2016, http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/
stnews/2015/06/14/Fearless-granny-Poppi-takes-on-a-mining-giant-Glencore (Last accessed 29 August 2016).
350 See for example R. Doyle and Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, class, and environmental quality, vol.3, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2000; R. Doyle and Bullard, Quest for Environmental Justice, Sierra Club Books, 2005; T.Madihlaba, 
‘The fox in the henhouse. The environmental impact of mining on communities in South Africa’, Environmental 
Justice in South Africa. University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town, South Africa, 2002,pp. 156-167; J. Dugard and A. 
Alcaro ‘Let’s work together: environmental and socio-economic rights in the courts “South African Journal on Human 
Rights 29, 2013,p. 14; C. Soyapi and LJ Kotzé, “Environmental justice and slow violence: Marikana and the post-
apartheid South African mining industry in context”, 2016, p.4; Verfassung und Recht in Übersee/Law and Politics in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, forthcoming. 
351 L. Feris, ‘Equality–Finding Space in the Environmental Discourse’, Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Vol 3.5, 2013, pp.878-
879.
352 See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, sec. 24(a):‘everyone has the right to an environment that is 
not harmful to his or her health or well-being’.
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of the Mooifontein community, the dust 
and noise impacts from the mine clearly 
impacts on the health of the neighboring 
community. But what is also clear from 
the documentary is the sense of loss and 
desolation experienced by the community. 
The community has lost its connection 
to the land and this has had a profound 
impact on its members’ psychological 
wellbeing. As noted above, connections 
to the physical environment correlates 
strongly with environmental well-being. 
As such, loss of sense of place has been 
characterized as “a chronic condition tied 
to the gradual erosion of the sense of 
belonging (identity) to a particular place 
and a feeling of distress (psychological 
desolation) about its transformation (loss 
of wellbeing)”.353  
Glazewski notes that environmental 
well-being encompasses a sense of 
environmental integrity and explains that 
it is ‘a sense that we ought to utilize the 
environment in a morally responsible 
and ethical manner. If we abuse the 
environment we feel a sense of revulsion 
akin to the position where a beautiful 
and unique landscape is destroyed, or 
an animal is cruelly treated.’354  This view 
emphasizes the emotional connections 
that we may hold with respect to the 
biophysical space in which we find 
ourselves, and the ways in which we find 
our identity as part thereof.
Equally important is the relationship 
between structural social inequality and 
well-being. Kidd argues persuasively that 
well-being is a critical component of the 
study of poverty and poverty alleviation and 
that poverty is in fact, the absence of well-
being.355  In this context, three dimensions 
of human well-being are foregrounded; 
material deprivation, relationships and 
subjective experiences.356  As noted above, 
it is often poor communities that are most 
vulnerable with respect to the impacts of a 
polluted environment, in that workers live 
in close proximity to polluting activities 
and are without the financial means to be 
mobile and relocate out of reach of these 
activities or to control the extent of their 
exposure thereto. 
One can also of course not ignore the 
spiritual and cultural dimensions of well-
being357 which correlate strongly with 
place identity. This loss is strongly felt in 
respect of the displacement of indigenous 
communities. In a decision358 in the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
concerned with the displacement of an 
indigenous community in Paraguay from 
lands that formed part of their traditional 
territory, the Court in relation to the Article 
353 G.Albrecht et al., ‘Solastalgia: The distress caused by environmental change’, Journal of Australasian Psychiatry, vol. 
15, 2007, p. 95.
354 J. Glazewski, Environmental Law in South Africa, Durban, Lexis Nexis, 2000 p.86.
355 M. Kidd, ‘Environment’ in I. Currie and J. De Waal (6 ed.), The Bill of Rights Handbook, Cape Town, Juta, 2013, pp. 
516-521.
356 ibid. 
357 L. Feris and D. Tladi , ‘Environmental rights’ in C. Heyns and D. Brand, Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: 
Analysis and Documents, Pretoria, Pretoria University Press, 2005, p. 201.
358 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2005, p. 125.
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21 right to property,359 emphasized “the 
special meaning of communal property 
of ancestral lands for the indigenous 
peoples, including the preservation of 
their cultural identity and its transmission 
to future generations.”360 The Court found 
that property in this context “must take 
into account the close ties of indigenous 
peoples with their traditional territories 
and the natural resources therein 
associated with their culture, as well as 
the components derived from them.”361 
Significantly, the Court noted that property 
includes intangible value.362 This is a very 
important recognition of the relationship 
between communal land ownership and 
indigenous tradition, customs, rituals, 
values, art and relationships with nature.363 
These relationships to land speak to a 
community’s sense of place and the well-
being inherent thereto. 
In essence, any activity or project that leads 
to wide-scale environmental pollution 
and degradation affects people’s ways 
of ‘being’ with the environment, their 
emotional and psychological connections 
with the environment, their livelihood 
connections, their cultural connections 
and their spiritual connections. What 
is important, then, is to consider how 
displacement through loss of sense of 
place can be protected as an environmental 
right.
5. Displacement through 
Loss of Sense of Place 
and Environmental 
Rights 
Environmental rights can be useful in 
the context of displacement through 
loss of sense of place or constructive 
displacement in four material ways. 
Firstly, by way of procedural rights or what 
is known in international environmental 
law as Principle 10 rights.364,365 Indeed, 
these procedural rights have been said 
to be the key to environmental rights.366 
The idea is that if principles of democratic 
governance such as openness, 
359 As set out in the American Convention on Human Rights O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (Nov. 22, 
1969)
360 ibid para. 51.
361 ibid para. 137.
362 ibid.
363 United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP Compendium on Human Rights and the Environment, http://www.
unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/publications/UNEP_Compendium_HRE.pdf (Last accessed 15 June 
2016).
364 This refers to Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, vol. 
I, 1992, 31 ILM 874. The Rio Declaration is one of five agreements coming out of the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (also known as the “Earth Summit”) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. It sets forth 
important principles of international environmental law, especially sustainable development.
365 For a discussion see A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas Economic, social and cultural rights: A textbook (1995) 261 et 
seq. The authors discuss EW and Others v The Netherlands Communication No. 429/1990 as an example of how 
this may be achieved. See also in South African context Van Huyssteen NO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism 1995 9 BCLR 1191 (C) where the court held that opponents to a proposed development had both locus 
standi and the right to access to information.
366 See e.g. the 1990 European Community Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment 
(90/313/EEC). See for further support S. Scott  ‘Environmental rights in the European Union: Participatory democracy 
or democratic deficit?’ in A Boyle & M Anderson (Eds) Human rights approaches to environmental protection 
(Oxford, 1996) and J Cameron & R Mackenzie ‘Access to environmental justice and procedural rights in international 
institutions’ in Boyle & Anderson.
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accountability and civic participation are 
adhered to, then environmental standards 
will be maintained, or at least improved. 
Principle 10 sets out three fundamental 
rights: access to information, access 
to public participation and access to 
justice. These rights play a vital role in 
environmental governance and serve 
to promote transparency, inclusivity 
and accountability in decision-making 
processes. Any process or development 
project that could lead to the virtual 
displacement of communities must 
adhere to these procedural rights.
However, procedural safeguards 
provide at a minimum, adherence to 
processes, but do not necessarily lead 
to substantive outcomes. For example, 
public participation in no way equates to 
participation in or even the influencing of 
the final decision-making with respect 
to the activity that is assessed. Public 
participation is not decision-making in 
consultation with, but decision-making 
after consultation which does not ensure 
that comments of those that are affected 
will play an integral part in the final 
decision. Furthermore public participation 
processes are not implemented in ways 
that acknowledge and address structural 
inequalities of participants and the 
presence of predetermined positions 
of power (social power, political power 
and economic power) that is part of this 
process. The production and perpetuation 
of inequalities remains an important 
part of the inability of law to achieve 
environmental justice. It is the production, 
ownership and use of power in a post-
apartheid South Africa, for example that 
continues to define and weaken opposition 
to activities such as mining. 
Secondly, the recognition of loss of sense 
of place as a form of displacement would 
bring it into the realm of State obligation. 
At present the physical displacement 
of persons and communities engender 
broad State obligations. The UN 
High Commissioner for Refugee’s 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
Development-Based Evictions and 
Displacement addresses displacement 
resulting from environmental destruction 
or degradation367  and makes it clear 
that forced evictions ‘constitute gross 
violations of a range of internationally 
recognized human rights. This includes the 
human rights to adequate housing, food, 
water, health, education, work, security of 
the person, security of the home, freedom 
from cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, and freedom of movement.’368 
Moreover it sets out the duties of States 
with respect to displacement and provide 
inter alia that “States shall: refrain from 
violating human rights domestically and 
extraterritorially; ensure that other parties 
within the State’s jurisdiction and effective 
367 Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development Based Evictions and Displacement Annex 1 of the report of the 
Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living A/HRC/4/18 
at para 9. See also T. Downing, ‘Avoiding new poverty: mining-induced displacement and resettlement’, vol. 52. 
International Institute for Environment and Development, 2002, p 3.
368 Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development Based Evictions and Displacement at para 6.
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control do not violate the human rights of 
others; and take preventive and remedial 
steps to uphold human rights and provide 
assistance to those whose rights have 
been violated.”369 These guidelines 
articulate the three important dimensions 
of State obligations vis-à-vis human 
rights; the obligation to respect (i.e. refrain 
from interfering with the enjoyment of 
the right), to protect (i.e. prevent others 
from interfering with the enjoyment of the 
right) and to fulfil (i.e. adopt appropriate 
measures towards the full realization) of 
the specific right. In view of these duties it 
is important to recognize loss of sense of 
place as a form of displacement that would 
engender State obligations similar to that 
of physical displacement. This means that 
States will need to at a minimum ensure 
that sense of place is addressed through 
processes such as environmental impact 
assessments and that appropriate and 
considered mitigation with respect to 
sense of place is provided for.
Thirdly, an environmental right influences 
the making and implementation of 
policy. It plays a role in the drafting of 
policy, legislation, regulations, plans 
and guidelines. It requires adherence in 
respect of the implementation of these 
policy and regulatory instruments. It 
also offers guidance for the court in 
scrutinizing the regulatory framework 
and/or the implementation thereof. 
There is, for example a growing call 
for mandating a human rights impact 
assessment as part of370 or in addition 
to the EIA process.371  With respect to the 
environmental right, policy and legislation 
mandating an environmental assessment, 
should adhere to the requirements of such 
a right. At the implementation stage an 
overarching standard in the assessment 
process should be whether an activity 
or project may lead to an infringement 
of environmental health and well-being 
including protection of the sense of place. 
Finally, the court as arbiter must ensure 
that this standard is met. 
Fourthly, environmental rights can and 
should be litigated. While substantive 
environmental rights litigations 
remains an under-utilized tool,372  some 
jurisdictions have begun to develop some 
jurisprudence on environmental rights.373 
Furthermore at the level of regional 
tribunals the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights has found oil 
development practices in the Ogoni region 
of Nigeria to be in violation of the right 
to a general satisfactory environment,374 
as guaranteed under article 24 of the 
369 Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development Based Evictions and Displacement at para 21.
370 CIEL EIAS in Practice: Potential Lessons for Human Rights Impact Assessment, June 2010, http://ciel.org/
Publications/EIA_Brief_Jun10.pdf, (accessed August 2016). 
371 D. Olawuyi, ‘Climate justice and corporate responsibility: taking human rights seriously in climate actions and 
projects’, Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, Vol 34, no.1 , 2016, pp. 27-44.
372 L. Feris, ‘Constitutional Environmental Rights: An Under-utilised Resource’, South African Journal on Human Rights, 
vol. 24, no. 1, 2008, pp. 29-49.
373 Examples of this include the Chagra de la Merced case in Argentina.
374 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria, 2001, AHRLR p. 60. See also The African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights v. Kenya, 2012.
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African Charter.375 Litigation has some 
clear advantages, in that it provides a 
remedy for those who feel that their 
voices are not heard and that they are 
disempowered. It furthermore provides an 
opportunity for the courts to engage with 
novel view-points such as the notion of 
virtual displacement posited here and the 
ability to carve out innovative and creative 
remedies. Most profoundly because of 
the system of precedent in common law 
systems it can lead to systemic change. 
6. Conclusion
People can be displaced while still at 
home; any activity or project that creates 
wide-scale environmental pollution and 
degradation has the potential to create an 
emotional disconnect between people and 
their physical location in a way that infringes 
upon their right to environmental health 
and well-being. As such, displacement 
through loss of sense of place can and 
should be protected as an environmental 
right. This notion of “virtual displacement” 
to some extent is unchartered territory 
and as such requires more consideration. 
Regardless, it offers new challenges to 
the field of environmental rights and as 
noted above, it is a challenge that can be 
taken up in a number of ways. Ultimately, 
it should assist communities such as 
the Mooifontein Community to find their 
sense of place.
375 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
I.L.M. 58, 1982, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986.
135Photo credit: © Falkenpost
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Photo credit: © Canadian wilderness376
376 Open access photo by Kalen Emsle downloaded from https://unsplash.com/photos/Bkci_8qcdvQ .
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PART 2: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES
1. Introduction
Environmental Constitutionalism in the Americas
Lynda Collins
Human rights approaches to environmental protection are particularly relevant in the 
Americas as the pressure of resource extraction mounts throughout the region.  Mining, 
logging and petroleum exploitation threaten the environmental rights of indigenous 
peoples and other local communities, while the processing of these resources (for 
example, through oil refining and metallurgical smelting) results in urban pollution 
and related human health effects. And yet, against this backdrop of intensive resource 
extraction and the pressure to expand rather than constrain these activities, this region of 
the world has demonstrated both leadership and innovation in the area of environmental 
human rights. 
2. Latin America
There is little doubt that the leading American nations in the area of environmental 
constitutionalism are those of Latin America.  The majority of Latin American countries 
enjoy constitutional environmental rights and some constitutions in this region actually 
provide detailed provisions fleshing out environmental rights as well as reciprocal 
government duties.377 Others (such as Brazil) also include environmental rights within 
sub-national constitutions.378    
With respect to the impact and efficacy of constitutional environmental rights, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica stand out as leading jurisdictions.379 In these nations, 
substantial and meaningful improvements in environmental legislation, enforcement 
and performance have resulted from the constitutionalization of environmental rights. 
377 See David Richard Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and 
the Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 117 et seq.
378 James R May & Erin Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 
211.
379 Boyd at 117 et seq.
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Simplified, low-cost “writ of protection” 
procedures (variously known as the 
amparo, tutela, and accion de proteccion) 
have allowed individual citizens and non-
governmental organizations to effectuate 
the constitutional right to environment 
through litigation.380 Literally thousands 
of cases have been filed in Latin America 
to vindicate constitutional environmental 
rights and the success rates in such 
litigation have been relatively high.381  
There have also been bold judicial 
remedies in Latin American nations. 
Latin American courts have struck down 
resource extraction permits, required 
the construction of sewage treatment 
plants, and ordered compensation paid 
to victims of pollution. One example is the 
very significant case law of the Argentine 
Supreme Court regarding the clean-up of 
the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin, which 
was historically one of the most polluted 
watersheds in that nation.382 Among other 
things, the Supreme Court required the 
government to conduct a comprehensive 
environmental assessment of the river; to 
inspect all polluting facilities; close illegal 
dumps; clean up the river banks; improve 
the storm-water, sewage and wastewater 
systems; and develop a regional 
environmental health plan.383 Hundreds 
of thousands of people now enjoy access 
to safe drinking water and sanitation as a 
result of these judgments. Problems do 
remain in this area, however, and most 
recently in the fall of 2015, the Supreme 
Court ordered an updated comprehensive 
remediation plan including short-, 
medium- and long-term goals as well as 
indicators for measuring progress.384 
Perhaps the most innovative development 
in Latin America is the recognition of 
rights for Nature, which are now legally 
recognized in both Ecuador and Bolivia. 
The Constitution of Ecuador provides 
that “Nature, or Pachamama, where life 
is reproduced and created, has the right 
to integral respect for her existence, her 
maintenance and for the regeneration of 
her vital cycles, structure, functions and 
evolutionary processes.”385 In Wheeler c. 
Director de la Procuraduria General Del 
Estado de Loja the Ecuadorian court held 
that the precautionary principle applies 
to claims under this provision and there 
is a presumption in favor of the rights of 
Nature:
[U]ntil it can be shown that there is no 
probability or danger to the environment 
of the kind of work that is being done in a 
specific place, it is the duty of constitutional 
judges to immediately guard and to 
give effect to the constitutional right of 
380 Ibid at 69.
381 Ibid 117 et seq.
382 See Beatriz Silvia Mendoza et al. v. National Government et al. (Damages stemming from contamination of the 
Matanza-Riachuelo River), M. 1569, July 8, 2008, Supreme Court of Argentina.
383 Ibid; also see Silvia Coria, Presentacion de un Case Argentino de Acceso a la Justicia Ambiental: Caso ‘Mendoza,’ IJE 
Editores (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.ijeditores.com.ar/articulos.php?idarticulo=62812&print=1.
384 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1837677-riachuelo-la-justicia-ordeno-que-se-haga-un-nuevo-plan-de-limpieza.
385 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, Article 71 found at <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/
english08.html.
140
PART 2: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES
nature, doing what is necessary to avoid 
contamination or to remedy it.386 
In summary, the Latin American 
nations have been high achievers in 
the development of environmental 
constitutionalism.  Major challenges 
nonetheless remain at the domestic 
level in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Economic pressures to continue and 
indeed increase resource extraction 
remain constant; in many countries 
resources available for environmental 
regulation are limited; corruption impedes 
enforcement efforts; and conflicts persist 
between corporate actors and affected 
communities.  These tensions, and the 
potential for human rights violations, 
are particularly acute in indigenous 
communities in the Americas.  In 
response, petitioners have repeatedly 
sought recourse to the Inter-American 
human rights system.    
At the regional level, the Inter-American 
human rights system administers the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
and the 1999 San Salvador Protocol which 
includes in Article 11 the right to a healthy 
environment and the reciprocal state 
duty to protect, preserve and improve the 
environment.  Unfortunately the right to a 
healthy environment in the San Salvador 
Protocol suffers from limited justiciability; it 
is subject to progressive realization and is not 
eligible for the individual petitions process. 
Nevertheless, both the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have 
vindicated indigenous environmental rights 
through the use of related provisions.387 The 
Commission has recognized indigenous 
environmental rights repeatedly through 
reports, recommendations to states, and 
the referral of cases for adjudication by the 
Court.  
As early as in 1985, in its decision 
in Yanomami Indians v. Brazil, the 
Commission found that Brazil had 
violated the Yanomami people’s rights to 
life, liberty and personal security by failing 
to prevent serious environmental damage 
Amazon Rainforest388 
386 Wheeler c. Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja, Juicio No. 11121-2011-0010; Erin Daly, ‘The 
Ecuadorian Exemplar’ (2012) 21:1 RECIEL 63. 
387 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights engages in fact-finding, makes recommendations, and can refer 
cases to the Court, which in turn is the adjudicative body in the Inter-American system and has the power to make 
binding orders to states party.
388 Open Access photo, on-line: <https://pixabay.com/en/amazon-rainforest-brazil-260797/>.
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caused by resource companies.389 In 2000 
the Commission requested that Argentina 
conduct adequate consultation with the 
Lhaka Honhat Aboriginal Communities 
in response to concerns that a highway 
construction project would violate the 
group members’ rights to life and health.390 
In 2004 it found that Belize had violated 
a Mayan indigenous group’s right to 
property through the granting of logging 
and oil concessions.391  
At the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, the right to property under Article 
21 of the American Convention has 
also been viewed as a major locus for 
indigenous environmental rights.  In its 
2001 decision in the matter of Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni v Nicaragua, the 
Court found that the state’s granting of 
logging concessions on the Awas Tingni’s 
traditional territory constituted a violation 
of their communal right to property under 
Article 21.392  The Court ordered Nicaragua 
to demarcate the applicant’s territory 
and to ensure that nothing would “affect 
the existence, value, use or enjoyment 
of the property”.393 In Awas Tingni and 
subsequent cases, the Court recognized an 
“all-encompassing” relationship between 
indigenous peoples and their lands, which 
were necessary for their cultural, spiritual 
and material survival. 
In a trilogy of cases against Paraguay 
involving displaced indigenous peoples 
coping with appalling living conditions 
in temporary settlements, the Inter-
American Court also recognized 
environmental quality (including adequate 
food and water) as an aspect of the right 
to life. More particularly, the Court clarified 
that the right to life encompasses the 
right to a “decent” or “dignified” life – vida 
digna in Spanish. In the Yakye Axa case 
in this trilogy, the Court also specifically 
recognized the “right to cultural identity” as 
a basic right despite its absence from the 
provisions of the American Convention.394 
The famous case of La Oroya illustrates the 
interplay between domestic constitutional 
rights, the Inter-American Commission 
and the Inter-American Court. La Oroya is 
one of the most polluted cities in the world, 
the result of years of toxic emissions 
from heavy metal mining and mineral 
processing.  99% of children in La Oroya 
have unsafe levels of lead in their blood. 
Finding a violation of the applicants’ right 
to a healthy environment, Peru’s Supreme 
Court ordered the Ministry of Health to 
389 Yanomami Case, Case 7615 Inter Amer CHR 24,IACHR no 7615, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights: 1985, on-line: http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/humright/digest/Inter-American/english/
annual/1984_85/res1285.html.
390 Aboriginal Cmty of Lhaka Honhat (“Our Land”) v. Argentina, Petition 12.094, Inter-Am. CHR, Report No. 78/06 (Oct. 
21, 2006).
391 Maya Indigenous Communities of Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/
Ser.L./ V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004).
392 Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (2001), Merits, Reparations and Costs Judgment, 
Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 79.
393 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, Inter-Am Court HR (Ser C) No 79 (31 August 2001).
394 See Thomas M. Antkowiak, ‘Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Court’ 
(2013) 35 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 113 
142
PART 2: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES
declare a health emergency in La Oroya, 
and to put in place an emergency health 
plan for the city. Unfortunately its order 
was not enforced and the applicants 
accordingly petitioned the Inter-American 
Commission alleging, among other 
things, violations of the rights to life, 
privacy and family life, humane treatment, 
access to information, and judicial 
protection. In 2007 the Inter-American 
Commission granted precautionary 
measures, requesting that the Peruvian 
State adopt appropriate measures to 
provide the beneficiaries with specialized 
medical diagnoses; provide appropriate 
specialized medical treatment to those 
persons whose diagnoses indicated that 
there was a danger of irreparable harm 
to their personal well-being or their lives; 
and coordinate implementation with the 
petitioners and the beneficiaries.395 The 
Commission has referred the case to the 
Inter-American Court and it remains in 
process.
The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the national courts of Latin 
America have produced a globally 
important body of jurisprudence on 
environmental rights.  Progress has been 
slower in North America, but there are early 
signs of the emergence of environmental 
constitutionalism in this region.
3. North America
In the North American region, 
environmental constitutionalism is most 
fully expressed at the sub-national level. 
In the United States (US), the federal 
constitution contains no environmental 
right.  In a series of cases beginning in 
the 1970s, litigants tried to convince 
American courts to recognize a right 
to environmental quality within the 
“penumbra” of the Ninth Amendment, a 
provision recognizing (but not exhaustively 
enumerating) fundamental rights.396 The 
American courts consistently rejected 
claims for the recognition of a substantive 
constitutional right to environment at the 
federal level.397  
However, six states (Illinois, Pennsylvania, 
Montana, Massachusetts, Hawaii and 
Rhode Island) have environmental rights 
provisions in their respective state 
constitutions, which have the ability to 
grant rights to citizens over and above 
those contained in the federal constitution. 
All but one mention the public trust 
doctrine and the interests of future 
generations.  Pennsylvania’s constitution, 
for example, provides that 
The people have a right to clean air, pure 
water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic 
values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s 
395 Paula Spieler, ‘The La Oroya Case: The Relationship between Environmental Degradation and Human Rights 
Violations’ (2010) 18 No. 1 Hum. Rts. Brief 19.
396 Carol L. Gallagher, “The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present” 
(1997), 9 Fordham Envtl LJ 107.    
397 Ibid.
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public natural resources are the common 
property of all the people, including 
generations yet to come. As trustee of 
these resources, the Commonwealth 
shall conserve and maintain them for the 
benefit of all the people.398 
When citizens challenged a state law 
exempting oil and gas activities from 
environmental regulations,399 the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania struck down 
these provisions, ruling that “laws of the 
Commonwealth that unreasonably impair 
the right are unconstitutional” and that 
there is “an obligation on the government’s 
behalf to refrain from unduly infringing 
upon or violating the right, including 
by legislative enactment or executive 
action.”400 
Two Canadian provinces and three 
territories recognize the right to a 
healthy environment in their respective 
environmental bills of rights.  The province 
of Quebec has enshrined this right in its 
(provincial) Charter of Human Rights 
and Freedoms, a quasi-constitutional 
statute that binds government actors. 
The remaining provincial/territorial 
environmental rights provisions are found 
within ordinary statutes and are largely 
hortatory rather than substantive. A bill 
currently before the Manitoba provincial 
legislature would provide its citizens 
with a substantive and enforceable right 
to a “healthy and ecologically balanced 
environment”, but this has yet to pass into 
law.  
No court has yet recognized a generalized, 
national right to a healthy environment in 
Canada or the US, but both countries enjoy 
a significant jurisprudence on indigenous 
environmental rights.401  This might seem 
surprising given that both Canada and the 
US owe their existence to the subjugation 
of indigenous peoples and the forcible 
separation of first peoples from their lands 
and resources.402  Perhaps in answer to 
these historical and continuing injustices, 
courts in both the US and Canada have 
recognized indigenous environmental 
rights in a number of significant cases.  
In cases such as Tsawout Indian Band 
v. Saanichton Marina Ltd,403 Halfway 
River First Nation v. British Columbia,404 
and Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada 
(Minister of Canadian Heritage),405 
Canadian courts have recognized that 
398 Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1 (Declaration of Rights), section 27 (Environmental Rights Amendment, 1971).
399 ‘Act 13,’ the 2012 Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act Amendments, 2012 Pa. Laws 87 (Feb. 14, 2012), codified at 58 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2301-3504.
400 Robinson Township et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al. (2013) Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
J-127A-D-2012, Dec. 19, 2013.
401 See eg Lynda Collins, “Safeguarding the Longue Durée: Environmental Rights in the Canadian Constitution” (2015) 71 
Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 519; Carol L. Gallagher, “The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: 
From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present” (1997), 9 Fordham Envtl LJ 107.     
402 See Lynda Collins & Meghan Murtha, “Indigenous Environmental Rights in Canada: the Right to Conservation Implicit 
in Treaty and Aboriginal Rights to Hunt, Fish and Trap” (2010) 47:4 Alberta Law Review 959; Natasha Bakht & Lynda 
Collins, “The Earth is our Mother: Freedom of Religion and the Preservation of Aboriginal Sacred Sites in Canada” 
(2017) McGill Law Journal (forthcoming).
403 Tsawout Indian Band v. Saanichton Marina Ltd (1989), 57 DLR (4th) 161 (BCCA). 
404 Halfway (BCSC).
405 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2001] FCJ No. 1877 (FCTD).
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environmental degradation may violate 
constitutionally protected Aboriginal 
resource rights. Recently, the Federal 
Court of Canada granted an injunction to 
the Haida Nation suspending the 2015 
commercial herring fishery in Haida 
Gwaii406  (the lands and waters of which 
are subject to an Aboriginal title claim). 
Taking a precautionary approach, it held 
that irreparable harm would ensue if 
the government permitted commercial 
fishing in the claimed area. In its most 
recent judgment on Aboriginal title, the 
Supreme Court of Canada also held that 
the environmental rights of Aboriginal 
title-holders include an intergenerational 
component. The Court held that 
“incursions on Aboriginal title cannot 
be justified if they would substantially 
deprive future generations of the benefit 
of the land”407 and further that Aboriginal 
title lands cannot be put to uses that 
would “destroy the ability of the land to 
sustain future generations of Aboriginal 
peoples”.408 
In the US, courts have repeatedly 
recognized that treaty rights to reservation 
lands, hunting and fishing include the right 
to adequate water to sustain the rights in 
question.  For example, American courts 
have protected tribal fishing rights by 
prohibiting the construction of a dam that 
would have flooded a tribal fishery, the 
diversion of water away from spawning 
habitat, and the construction of a road 
culvert that would have interfered with 
salmon migration.409 
Despite the absence of an explicit 
environmental right in the federal 
constitutions of Canada and the US, 
there are signs that environmental 
constitutionalism may be on the rise in 
North America. Two ongoing American 
cases are seeking judicial recognition 
of implicit constitutional environmental 
rights in the US, one arising from 
intergenerational harms caused by 
climate change and one from the massive 
contamination of drinking water in Flint, 
Michigan.411 The United States District 
Court recently rejected a motion to 
dismiss the climate suit, suggesting 
some judicial openness to these kinds 
of arguments. Taken together, these 
suits could catalyze a renaissance in 
environmental constitutionalism at the 
national level in the US.  They represent 
very strong factual foundations on which 
to base calls for the recognition of a 
fundamental environmental right that may 
be found within the “penumbra” of several 
US constitutional provisions.412  
406 Haida Nation v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2015 FC 290.
407 Ibid at para 86.
408 Id at para 121.
409 See generally, Barbara Cosens & Judith Royster, eds, The Future of Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights: The 
Winters Centennial (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2012).
410 Juliana v United States of America, 2016 WL 1442435 (April 8, 2016) .
411 Mays v Snyder available at http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Mays-vs.-Snyder-et-al.-
Complaint-and-Jury-Demand-Final-1.pdf (last visited 28 April 28, 2016).
412 See Gallagher at 11 (summarizing US environmental advocates’ argument that humans have “man [sic] has a 
basic, fundamental right to live a healthy life and to enjoy the environment in which he lives. Therefore, although the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not specifically mention environmental rights, it follows that such rights are 
implicit to, and emanate from, the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.”)
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Similarly, a newly-filed Canadian case 
involving mercury poisoning caused by 
state-permitted clear-cutting has alleged 
environmental violations of the petitioners’ 
constitutional rights to life and security of 
the person.  Both the facts and arguments 
in this case are compelling; it represents the 
most promising opportunity in Canadian 
history for the judicial recognition of an 
implicit right to a healthy environment 
within Canada’s constitutional Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.
4. Conclusion
There is a pervasive tension between 
resource-driven economic development 
and environmental protection throughout 
the Americas.  At the same time, we have 
seen a paradigm-shifting legal evolution 
in environmental human rights in this 
region.  Environmental constitutionalism 
is flourishing at the national and regional 
levels in Latin America and has begun to 
make inroads in North America as well. 
Canada and the US have lagged behind 
their Latin American counterparts, but 
hope remains for the judicial recognition 
of constitutional environmental rights that 
have yet to be expressed explicitly in the 
constitutions of these nations.  Throughout 
the regions environmental human rights 
are perhaps most at risk in indigenous 
communities affected by resource 
extraction, and courts at the domestic and 
regional levels are responding through the 
tool of environmental constitutionalism. 
This pattern reveals the transformative 
potential of constitutional approaches to 
environmental protection, suggesting that 
environmental constitutionalism may be 
one of the most important developments 
in the history of environmental law.
146
PART 2: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES
1. Introduction
Promised by President Chirac during the 2002 campaign for the Presidential elections, 
the Environmental Charter has become the third branch of the French 1958 Constitution. 
It has been incorporated alongside the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen and the Declaration of Economic and Social Rights in the Preamble of the 1946 
Constitution.
France is bound at international and European levels by a number of conventions and 
treaties in favor of sustainable development and French environmental law is well 
developed. Yet, at that time, there was still a common perception that the establishment 
of superior constitutional fundamental principles was lacking. 
The Environmental Charter was primarily adopted in order to:
  respond to and address the concerns of the French civil society;
  bring French law in line with foreign models of ‘constitutionalisation’ of environmental 
protection;
  address the insufficiencies of French environmental law, notably with regard to the 
place held by environmental principles in the hierarchy of French legal norms; and
  give constitutional force to environmental protection as a human right.
Since its adoption by both Houses of Parliament, everyone living in France “…has the right 
to live in an environment which is balanced and respectful of health” (Article 1). Such 
right is not a statutory right but a right that has been attached to the 1958 Constitution. 
It has thus been given equal status and force to the set of rights contained in the 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and in the Preamble to the 1946 
Constitution. These were incorporated into the so-called “bloc de constitutionalité” (the 
The “Constitutionalisation” of French Environmental 
Law under the 2004 Environmental Charter
Christian Dadomo
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block of constitutional provisions) by the 
Constitutional Court in the early 1970s.413 
The Charter provisions are protected, 
interpreted and enforced by the 
Constitutional Court as well as the 
administrative and ordinary courts. It 
applies to all persons, natural and legal, 
private and public, and can be used as 
an instrument for interpretation of all 
international environmental treaties 
and conventions signed by France. This 
chapter examines the process of the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of the Charter and 
discusses its content.
I. Content of the Charter
1.1 The preamble
The preamble has seven paragraphs, or 
considérants, which constitute a series of 
general statements.
The first two paragraphs make a general 
statement on the interdependence of 
mankind and its natural environment. 
They also mention the indissoluble link 
between the environment and the current 
existence and future of the human 
race. The third one recalls the universal 
dimension of environmental protection 
and that the environment is the common 
heritage of all human beings.414 In the 
fourth paragraph, it is acknowledged 
that humans increasingly influence living 
conditions and their own evolution. This 
paragraph constitutes the basis for the 
principle of environmental liability laid 
down in Article 4 of the Charter. 
The fifth one refers to the effects on 
the environment of consumption and 
production patterns and the excessive 
exploitation of natural resources. 
The sixth paragraph states that 
environmental protection is to be granted 
the same importance as other national 
fundamental interests such as France’s 
independence and security, the protection 
of its population, etc. It is therefore up 
to public authorities to take into account 
the environment when defining new 
national policies. Yet, as suggested by the 
wording of this paragraph, environmental 
protection takes no precedence over other 
national interests. It therefore falls on the 
legislator to find the right balance between 
all fundamental national interests.
Finally, the concept of sustainable 
development is given constitutional force 
in the seventh paragraph. It is defined 
as “the choices aimed at addressing 
today’s needs without compromising the 
capacity of future generations and other 
peoples to satisfy their own needs”. The 
emphasis is on the concept of solidarity 
between current and future generations 
and peoples. The Charter is thus designed 
413 See Decision 70-39 of 19 June 1970 and Decision 71-44 of 16 July 1971; see Dadomo & Farran, French Substantive 
Law. Key Elements (Sweet & Maxwell London 1997) at 151-153
414 As opposed to common heritage of mankind, the international law concept applicable to Antarctica and extra-
atmospheric space and which carries legal effects. Here, the concept of heritage is more of an intellectual rather 
than of a legal nature. This concept must be regarded as having universal value only and not one to which the courts 
would give legal force. 
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to establish a balance between economic 
development, social progress and 
environmental protection. And indeed, 
a careful reading of the whole preamble 
shows that the principle of sustainability 
underlies each paragraph, thus giving the 
Charter its overall coherence. 
1.2 The Charter provisions
The Charter consists of ten provisions. 
While Article 1 creates a right for everyone 
to an environment which is balanced and 
respectful of health, Article 2 imposes on 
every person an obligation to take part 
in its protection and improvement. Both 
provisions are of general character and, 
as such, are the foundation of the Charter. 
Their application and effectiveness 
depend on the subsequent provisions: 
Articles 3 (duty of prevention), 4 (duty to 
remedy), 5 (precautionary principle) and 7 
(participation and access to information) 
to provide the necessary means to ensure 
effective environmental protection and 
justice.
The right to live in a balanced 
environment, respectful of health
The scope of Article 1 is rather broad 
as it covers two concepts: a “balanced 
environment” and an “environment 
respectful of health”. The first one 
is understood as covering not only 
balances of ecosystems (conservation 
of biodiversity, low levels of pollution, 
etc.) but also the balance between urban 
and rural areas. The second concept of 
“environment, respectful of health” is 
to be understood as an unpolluted and 
undamaged environment. 
This wording seems to be more neutral 
than that of “healthy environment” or that 
of “environment favorable to one’s health”, 
which was the terminology used in the 
draft Charter of 27 June 2003. Although 
the latter wording was more precise and 
specific than that used in the Charter, it 
was not adopted mainly on the ground 
that it would be unreasonable to expect 
the environment to play a pro-active role 
in human health. In addition, if a damaged 
environment can have adverse effects 
on human health and living conditions, a 
balanced one does not necessarily have a 
noticeable favorable effect on health. For 
that reason, the concept of an environment 
which is respectful of health was preferred 
and adopted in the final draft. 
As a counterpart to the rights created 
under Article 1, Article 2 imposes on every 
person a duty to take part in the protection 
and the improvement of the environment.
The duty to protect and improve the 
environment
This duty is to be understood primarily 
as a moral rather than a legal obligation 
imposed on all natural and legal persons. 
However, this moral obligation has 
constitutional value which cannot be 
ignored in subsequent legislation. Each 
individual has a responsibility to ensure 
the sustainable use of natural resources 
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and the improvement of environmental 
conditions. The expression “take part in” 
implies that this can only be exercised 
within one’s individual limits. What 
matters is that everyone is aware that 
environmental protection is a shared 
responsibility, and a matter of concern 
for all. This moral obligation is further 
re-enforced by a strict legal obligation of 
prevention.
The duty of prevention
Under Article 3, natural, legal, public or 
private persons have an obligation, within 
limits laid down by the law, to prevent 
any damage that they are likely to cause 
to the environment or, failing that, to limit 
the consequences of such damage. The 
prevention principle is already recognized 
and well established under Article L 110-
1-II(2) of the Environmental Code, which 
provides that environmental damage must 
be redressed primarily at its source.415 In 
the Code, the prevention principle is based 
on three components: the distinction 
between preventive action and the 
redressing of the damage at its source, 
the use of the best available techniques, 
and the acceptable economic cost. 
In the Charter, preventive action can only 
be defined in broad terms because of 
the general character of constitutional 
provisions and could not be laid down as 
an absolute principle as it is in the Code. 
The primary role of the Charter is indeed 
to guarantee a general obligation of 
prevention whose conditions of application 
are to be defined further in statutory law 
as Article 3 provides. Furthermore, as 
the Charter’s rights and principles must 
comply with other constitutional principles 
and values and have no precedence over 
them, if given an absolute character, 
preventive action could come up against 
other constitutional principles such as 
entrepreneurial freedom. 
Photo credit: © Jurgen. Creative commons
415 “Principle of preventive action and of the redressing, primarily at its source, of environmental damage, including the 
best available techniques at an economically viable cost.” It is to be noted that in the French version of this provision, 
the word “correction” (best rendered by “redressing” or “correcting”) is used instead of the term “réparation”  (best 
rendered by “remedying”).
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The principle is also defined in broad 
terms with regard to its objective. The 
environmental damage need not be certain 
for the prevention principle to apply as the 
expression “…likely to cause …” suggests. 
The scope of application of the prevention 
obligation extends beyond that of major 
pollution accidents or industrial pollution, 
and includes risks whose existence is 
scientifically established and whose 
probability can be objectively assessed by 
statistical analysis or by logical reasoning 
(calculation of probabilities). 
Defined broadly as to its object, conditions 
of application and its addressees, the 
obligation of prevention was also given 
a realistic objective. Article 3 imposes 
an obligation to prevent any damage to 
the environment or, failing this, to limit 
the consequences of the damage. This 
provision may give the impression that a 
potential polluter has a choice between 
preventing damage and limiting its effects. 
This could be seen as a step backwards 
in comparison to the generally accepted 
definition of the prevention principle. Most 
economic activities are capable of causing, 
directly or indirectly, some damage to the 
environment. To address this, , the duty 
of prevention as set out in the Charter 
encourages methods of production and 
consumption with limited impact on 
natural resources and of producing limited 
waste. Article 3 of the Charter therefore 
seems to offer a realistic definition of the 
duty of prevention, which, as such, cannot 
be deemed to be in contradiction with 
the principle of preventive action as laid 
down in Article L. 110-II(2) of the Code. 
The latter provision does not guarantee 
the prevention of environmental damage 
in absolute terms either. Further, Article 
3 does not prevent the Parliament from 
passing legislation imposing an absolute 
duty of prevention in certain cases. Going 
hand in hand with the obligation to prevent 
environmental damage, the duty to remedy 
it is specified under Article 4.
The duty to remedy environmental 
damage
Article 4 provides that “(w)ithin conditions 
laid down by statute, anyone must 
contribute to the remedying of any 
damage that they have caused to the 
environment.” While the principle of civil 
liability, laid down in Article 1240 of the 
Civil Code (“anyone’s act whatsoever 
which causes harm to another, creates an 
obligation by whose fault it was caused 
to compensate it”) and which applies 
to environmental damage, had already 
been given constitutional force by the 
Constitutional Court, there was no specific 
regime applicable to environmental 
damage.416 
Despite its connection with this duty 
to remedy environmental damage, the 
“polluter-pays” principle is defined in 
Article L 110-1-II(3) of the Environmental 
Code as a principle whereby “the costs 
416 With the exception of cases of dangerous activities where specific regimes of strict liability apply as a result of 
international obligations, such as nuclear accidents (Acts of 1968 and 1990) and maritime transport of petroleum 
products (Article L. 218-1 of the Environmental Code).
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of prevention of, reduction of, and fight 
against pollution must be borne by the 
polluter” and is therefore viewed more 
as an obligation to prevent and reduce 
pollution rather than as an obligation to 
remedy any damage caused. The actual 
inclusion of the “polluter-pays” principle 
in the Charter was open to fierce debate. 
While this principle was viewed by many 
as too ambiguous and interpretable as 
a right to pollute to be included in the 
Charter, others thought that it would have 
been a setback to exclude it from the 
provisions of the Environmental Code. 
The first position prevailed for three 
reasons. Firstly, although the “polluter-
pays” principle is one of efficiency, it can be 
perceived as having little impact.  The fact 
that the financial burden is born primarily 
by the polluter does not prevent the victims 
of pollution from bearing the costs too, 
either as indirect victims or as taxpayers. 
As a principle of financial liability, it is 
not economically efficient. Secondly, the 
principle does not necessarily provide a 
remedy for all environmental damage, 
notably for damage to natural habitats. 
Thirdly, Article 5 of Charter integrates 
this principle in a wider dual dimension 
of prevention and remedying without 
contradicting the Environmental Code 
provision. Although Article 4 establishes 
no specific regime of environmental 
liability, such task being left to Parliament, 
it gives the principle of environmental 
liability constitutional force.
The precautionary principle
Unlike the principle of prevention which is 
of general application, the precautionary 
principle can only be triggered in 
exceptional cases as defined under 
Article 5. The Charter provides that “(w)
hen the occurrence of damage, despite 
being uncertain in the light of scientific 
knowledge, could affect the environment 
in a serious and irreversible manner, 
public authorities must ensure, under 
the precautionary principle and within 
their competences, that risk assessment 
procedures are set out and that provisional 
and proportionate measures are adopted 
in order to avert the occurrence of 
damage.” 
Article 5 is the only provision in the 
Charter to refer expressly to a principle. 
Indeed, it provides a clear and rigorous 
constitutional definition of the principle, 
based on rationality and efficiency. It 
strictly defines its scope of application 
and the procedural rules for its 
implementation. Precautionary measures 
can only be triggered if three conditions 
are simultaneously met. 
First, there must be a threat of damage to 
the environment. Since the precautionary 
principle as established in the Charter 
has constitutional force only in the field of 
environment and does not extend to other 
areas, notably health. -Article 5 cannot thus 
be read in conjunction with Article 1 of the 
Charter which refers to “an environment, 
respectful of health”. This is because 
152
PART 2: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES
the Charter is not one that is focused 
particularly on public health, and the two 
areas remain separate and distinct. Yet 
Article 5 applies to all threats of damage 
to the environment having effects on 
health and its scope of application cannot 
be restricted by an Act of Parliament when 
applied to the environment. 
Lack of scientific certainty regarding the 
damage is the second condition. This 
allows the line to be drawn between the 
scope of application of the precautionary 
principle and that of prevention. While 
the latter applies to a known or even 
potential threat, the former is a “principle 
of methodological action, the activation of 
which is dependent on a legitimate doubt 
about the existence of a threat.”417  
Finally, the threat of damage must have 
serious and irreversible consequences. 
While generally considered alternatively 
in international conventions,418 those two 
criteria are cumulative in the Charter. This 
was viewed as essential to effectively 
assess the threat of damage in the context 
of scientific uncertainty. 
Article 5 of the Charter lays down strict 
procedural rules for the application of 
the principle. While Article L.110-1-
II of the Environmental Code does not 
specify to whom, private or public bodies, 
the principle applies, Article 5 makes it 
clear that it is up to “public authorities 
(to) ensure, […] that risk assessment 
procedures are set up, and that provisional 
and proportionate measures are adopted 
[…]”. In this respect, unlike Articles 2 to 4 
of the Charter, Article 5 does not impose 
obligations on private individuals, yet they 
would have to comply with administrative 
or legislative measures implementing the 
precautionary principle.
The issue as to whether the principle 
should be applied by central government 
authorities only or by all public 
authorities419 was central to the debate 
prior to the adoption of the Charter. 
The second option prevailed in order to 
better reflect the territorial dimension of 
environmental protection and to maintain 
some coherence with the decentralized 
powers in the domain of environmental 
protection exercised by local authorities. 
To avoid the occurrence of damage, public 
authorities have a dual obligation under 
Article 5: setting up risk assessment 
procedures and adopting precautionary 
measures. 
Following an adequate risk assessment 
based on research programmes aimed 
at reducing scientific uncertainty, 
dissemination of information regarding the 
means of preventing damage, the setting 
up of environmental control procedures 
and, above all, scientific expertise, public 
417 Prof. G. Martin as quoted in ‘Historique du Principe de Précaution’ in Annex 1 to Ph. Kourilsky & G. Viney, ‘Le Principe 
de Précaution.  Rapport au  Premier Ministre’ (La Documentation Française, 2000) in fn 224 at 65.
418 See Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and Article 3(3) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
419 The term “public authorities” can be interpreted in the same way as in Article 7 of the Charter on the right of 
information and participation in reference to the 1998 Aarhus Convention.
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authorities can then adopt provisional and 
proportionate precautionary measures. 
Their provisional nature is viewed as 
inherent to the principle of precaution since, 
unlike preventive measures, which are 
usually definitive, precautionary measures 
must be regularly reviewed, amended 
or reversed in the light of new scientific 
knowledge and information available. 
They must also be proportionate to the 
seriousness of the threat of damage and to 
the duration of the research on that threat. 
Although Article 5 does not refer 
specifically to “an economically acceptable 
cost”, it is implied that the proportionality 
of the precautionary measures must also 
be measured in those terms. To verify that 
the cost of precautionary measures does 
not exceed their expected benefit, courts 
will have to analyse the costs and benefits, 
or “bilan coûts-avantages”, which is widely 
used by French administrative courts and 
the European Court of Justice. However, 
its use is made even more difficult by the 
uncertain nature of the threat of damage 
and, therefore, of the expected advantage 
derived from the precautionary measures, 
in the short and long term, as the purpose 
of the precautionary principle is to protect 
future generations. 
Article 5 can thus be seen as having created 
a set of obligations and requirements 
turning the precautionary principle into 
a solid bastion of legal certainty in areas 
where safety is the condition for action. 
This is not the case of Article 6 which is 
designed to define a line of conduct to 
promote sustainable development without 
imposing imperative requirements on 
policy-makers.
Promoting sustainable development and 
integration
Article 6 provides that sustainable 
development must be promoted by 
public policies, which “shall reconcile 
environmental protection and 
improvement, economic development 
and social progress”. Far from being 
innovative, this provision merely lays down 
two principles that are widely recognized 
in international, European and French 
legislation.
It requires that environmental protection 
and improvement, economic development 
and social progress, the three pillars of 
sustainable development, are equitably 
taken into account in public policies.420  
In order to ensure that the objective of 
sustainable development has the widest 
possible impact, Article 6 also provides that 
it shall be integrated not only in policies on 
territories and the environment, but also in 
all public policies as defined in statutory 
laws and regulations. It therefore extends 
the scope of application of the principle of 
integration beyond the limits laid down in 
Article L. 110-1 of the Environmental Code 
and provides a constitutional foundation 
420 The original version of Article 6 provided that public policies “shall take into consideration environmental protection 
and improvement and reconcile them with economic and social development”.
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to existing laws which incorporate the 
integration principle (e.g. Article L. 123-
1 of the Urban Planning Code, Art. 14 of 
the new Public Procurement Code or even 
Article L. 225-102-1 of the Commercial 
Code).
This provision imposes on Parliament a 
constitutional obligation to assess more 
carefully, give more consideration to the 
impact that any public policy may have 
on the environment, and find the right 
balance between all three components of 
sustainable development. Consequently, 
any newly adopted legislation which 
fails to meet those conditions can be 
reviewed or declared unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Court on the ground 
of ‘erreur manifeste d’appréciation’ or 
‘manifest error of assessment (of facts)’.421 
The right to information and participation
Subject to conditions and restrictions as 
defined by law, Article 7 gives “(e)very 
person (…), the right to access information 
relating to the environment held by 
public authorities and to participate in 
the drawing up of public decisions which 
have an effect on the environment.” It 
gives additional constitutional status to 
two rights already fully guaranteed under 
Articles L 110-1(4) and (5)422 and L.124-
1 of the Environmental Code, the 1998 
Aarhus Convention and the two European 
Directives of 2003 on Public Access to 
Environmental Information and on Public 
Participation in respect of the Drawing up 
of certain Plans and Programmes relating 
to the Environment. 
Unlike Article 1 which creates a right to a 
balanced environment for the benefit of 
individuals only (“chacun”), Article 7 is the 
only provision of the Charter that extends 
the benefit of a right to “every person” 
(“toute personne”). Like in Articles 2 to 
4, this expression has to be understood 
as including all natural and legal public 
and private persons. In doing so, the 
provision of Article 7 recognizes the well-
established case-law of the Constitutional 
Court and administrative courts extending 
the benefit of constitutional fundamental 
rights to legal private and public persons.
In the Environmental Code, the two 
principles of access to information and 
of participation were not sufficiently and 
clearly distinguished. Article 7 remedies 
this undesirable situation and defines them 
more neatly. In line with Articles 4 and 5 of 
the Aarhus Convention, the right of access 
to information applies to “information 
relating to the environment held by public 
authorities”. The interpretation of the 
421 This concept is widely used in judicial review by the French Constitutional Court and the Conseil d’Etat (the highest 
administrative court) and also by the Court of Justice of the European Union (see, for instance, Case C-427/12 
Commission v European Parliament and Council EU:C:2014:170, para. 40), the EFTA (European Free Trade 
Association) Court (eg, Case E-15/10 Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 246, paras 
95-102). It can be broadly equated to the English law Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness. The court does not 
substitute its own assessment for that of the public authority (not reviewable) but checks that the assessment by the 
public authority is based on accurate, consistent and complete evidence (reviewable). 
422 As amended by the recent Act 2012-1460 of 27 December 2012 on the application of the principle of public 
participation as defined in Article 7 of the Environmental Charter (Official Journal nr 302 of 28 December 2012). 
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concept of “environmental information” 
which has been traditionally based on 
the concept of access to administrative 
documents and, consequently, that of 
public service, had to be broadened to 
comply with Directive 2003/4 on Public 
Access to Environmental Information. 
With respect to the right of participation 
in the drawing up of public environmental 
decisions, Article 7 simply creates a 
procedural right for the public to be 
appropriately consulted during the 
decision-making process itself as the 
final decision being taken by the public 
authority. Here, the wording of Article 7 was 
significantly different from that of former 
Article L.110-1(4) of the Environmental 
Code: every person can participate in the 
drawing up of public decisions. This is in 
contrast to the provision for “the drawing 
up process of projects.” Moreover, the 
effect of such decisions need no longer 
be “important”.423 The formulation of new 
Article L.110-1(5)has now been aligned on 
Article 7 of the Charter by the 2012 Act.
In order to give this right more substance 
and clarity, some of the detailed provisions 
contained in Article 6 and 8 of the Aarhus 
Convention could have been inserted 
in Article 7. Unfortunately, the French 
legislator did not deem it necessary to 
do so. The reasons behind this are two-
fold: 1) for stylistic purposes, and 2) a 
basic assumption that further legislation 
implementing Article 7, such as the 2012 
Act on the application of the principle of 
public participation as defined in Article 7 
of the Environmental Charter, would have 
to be Convention-compliant anyway. 
Article 3(3) of the Aarhus Convention on 
the promotion of environmental education 
and environmental awareness among the 
public was another provision that had not 
been given effect in French law.
The role of education and training in 
environmental protection
By providing that “education and training 
must contribute to the exercise of the 
rights and duties provided for in the 
Charter”, Article 8 now fills this legal gap 
by establishing a direct link between 
education and the rights and obligations 
that every person has under this Charter. 
While it does not impose a strict obligation 
to change the content of the school 
curriculum, it provides a general objective 
to include environmental education into 
school and university programmes as well 
as in continuing education. 
Research and innovation
Like the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, 
Article 9 of the Charter takes into 
account research and innovation by 
providing that they “…must contribute 
to the protection and improvement of 
423 Originally the principle of participation was strangely defined under the 1995 Barnier Act as a right “...whereby every 
person has access to information relating to the environment…” The 2002 Act on Démocratie de proximité (bringing 
democracy closer to the citizens) amended this provision by adding the right of the “…public (to be) involved in the 
drawing up process of projects which have an important effect on the environment or town and country planning”.
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the environment”. By moving research 
and innovation in environmental matters 
into the constitutional sphere, Article 9 
reinforces the role of existing legislation, 
which already encourages research 
aimed at improving the environment424. 
The objective of Article 9 is not to restrict 
all research to environmental research 
programmes but its wording seems 
to emphasize the pervasive nature 
of environmental research which too 
often suffers from a sectoral approach 
unsuitable for dealing with environmental 
problems in an effective and global way.
The European and international policy of 
France
Article 10 provides that “the present Charter 
shall inspire the European and international 
action of France”. This primarily stresses 
the fact that environmental protection is 
meaningless without international action 
and that France must play a leading role 
at international and European levels.
2. The constitutionalisation 
of the Charter
2.1 The process of 
‘constitutionalisation’
Once adopted in 2004, the Charter had 
to be incorporated into the constitution 
by means of a loi constitutionnelle 
(Constitutional Act). This is an Act of 
constitutional amendment which must be 
adopted according to a special procedure 
under Article 89 of the Constitution. Article 
89 provides that the amending Act must 
be approved in identical terms by both 
houses of Parliament. It must then be 
approved and adopted by referendum, or, 
as in this case – because the proposed 
Act originated from the Government - by 
a majority of three fifth of the votes cast 
in both houses of Parliament convened in 
a Congress. 
The Constitutional Act on the 
environmental Charter was adopted by 
the Congress on 1 March 2005. It consists 
of three provisions, the second of which is 
the Charter itself. The first Article inserts 
into the Preamble to the Constitution 
a reference to “…the rights and duties 
as defined in the 2004 environmental 
Charter”. Under Article 3, protection of the 
environment is added to the legislative 
competence and powers of Parliament as 
defined in Article 34 of the Constitution.  
2.2 Legal force and effect of the 
Charter
The Charter automatically acquires 
constitutional force and value by reason 
of its adoption in a Constitutional Act, 
and because of the reference to it in the 
Preamble to the Constitution. This was 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 
424 See in particular Article L.321-1 of the Environmental Code which provides that policies for the protection of the 
coastal line shall include research and innovation into its resources and distinctive features. Equally, Article L.331-14 
states that national parks authorities must participate in research programmes aimed at the economic, social and 
cultural development of the parks. 
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its GMO (Genetically Modified Organisms) 
law decision (DC 2008-564, 19 June 
2008, JurisData 2008-010652) and by the 
Conseil d’Etat425 in Commune d’Annecy 
ruling (CE Ass, 3 October 2008, JurisData 
2008-074233):  “the rights and obligations 
as defined in the environmental Charter, 
and like all provisions of the preamble of 
the Constitution, have constitutional value”.
Yet a more important issue is that of the 
direct effect of the Charter provisions i.e. 
the extent to which they can be relied 
upon by individuals in French ordinary and 
administrative courts. This can be done 
either in private proceedings or against 
public authorities and, since 1 March 2010, 
in the Constitutional Court by way of the 
question prioritaire de constitutionnalité 
or QPC procedure (a posteriori control 
of constitutionality of legislation)426 
under Articles 61(1) and 62 of the French 
Constitution. 
According to the case-law of the 
Constitutional Court, a constitutional 
provision will have direct effect provided it 
satisfies three criteria: it is a legal norm; it is 
sufficiently precise and it is unconditional. 
This means that it does not require further 
legislative intervention. 
Applying those criteria, the Charter 
provisions can be divided into five 
categories: 
  The Preamble: as it contains general 
statements only, the Preamble can be 
deemed to be of a declaratory nature. 
Apart from the last 2 paragraphs, it is 
rather philosophical and scientifically 
verbose, with little legal value.427 
However, it is always possible for the 
Constitutional Court to infer some 
constitutional principles from its 
interpretation ;
  Provisions with limited direct 
effect: because the effectiveness 
and applicability of Articles 1 and 
2 depend on the application of the 
other Charter provisions, those can 
be relied upon in the Constitutional 
Court, but not directly in ordinary or 
administrative courts. In its decision 
of 8 April 2011 (Michel Z, QPC 2001-
116, JurisData 2001-015527) under 
the QPC procedure, the Constitutional 
Court interpreted Articles 1 and 2 
jointly so as to create a new general 
duty to protect the environment; 
  Provisions with full direct effect: the 
only provision is Article 5, which clearly 
and precisely defines the conditions 
of application of the precautionary 
principle without the requirement for 
further legislation. However, while it 
is not an absolute condition for the 
application of the principle, further 
legislation might be desirable and 
necessary to define in more detail 
certain aspects of its application such 
425 The Conseil d’Etat is the highest French administrative court and has the ultimate authority on administrative law 
cases.
426 The QPC is a French Constitutional Law procedure allowing persons involved in a pending case to ask the 
Constitutional Council to assess the constitutionality of the laws relating to the case at hand.
427 The Constitutional Court did so for instance with the principle of safeguard of the dignity of individuals which it 
inferred from the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution in its decision no 94-343 & 344 of 27 July 1994.
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as the risk assessment procedures, 
the status of the experts, and general 
principles regarding the reviewability, 
reversibility and proportionality of 
precautionary measures to be taken 
by the public authorities;
  Provisions without direct effect: 
Articles 3, 4 and 7 refer to, and 
require further legislation (“subject to 
conditions as defined by law”) and, as 
such, cannot have direct effect428;
  Provisions imposing a line of 
conduct rather than an obligation: 
Article 6 defines a line of conduct to 
promote sustainable development, 
to be followed by public policy-
makers, and does not impose any 
imperative requirement upon them. 
Equally, Article 9 does not require that 
research and innovation contribute 
to environmental protection and 
improvement. The same applies 
to Article 8 on education. Finally, 
Article 10 merely mentions that the 
Charter is supposed to be a source of 
inspiration for the French government 
at international and European levels. 
The legal force of those provisions is 
therefore questionable.
At the time of its adoption, the 
Environmental Charter was presented as 
an instrument to drive the protection and 
enhancement of the environment in French 
law. Has the Charter lived up to these 
expectations? Compared to international 
or European environmental law, the Charter 
adds nothing to the definition of the main 
principles of environmental law, notably 
the precautionary principle, sustainable 
development, and access to information 
and participation. The most innovative 
aspect of the Charter rests rather in 
the new constitutional requirements it 
imposes on the French Parliament when 
legislating in the domain of environmental 
law. As such, Parliament can only pass 
new legislation which complies with the 
new constitutional principles laid down in 
the Charter. As such, the Charter provides 
greater coherence to French environmental 
law and reduces the risks of conflicts, 
albeit limited, between domestic and 
international, and notably, European laws. 
The Charter has also been instrumental in 
the evolution and development of French 
environmental law which had to gradually 
find its place in French law in general, and 
at the top of the hierarchy of French legal 
norms in particular. 
However, like any new constitutional 
norm, the Charter had to be recognized 
as a legal norm capable of interpretation 
and application. Fortunately, it did not 
experience the same fate as the 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen which became prominent in the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
only since the 1970s. Although one can 
state that the main provisions of the Charter 
are interpreted and applied by all French 
courts, and notably the Constitutional 
Court and the Conseil d’Etat, it is clear that 
some have greater legal force and are more 
effective than others. 
428 Article 7 not only mentions “conditions” but also “restrictions as defined by law”.
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The full effectiveness of the Charter 
very much lies in the way the new QPC 
procedure is used and whether it is able to 
develop in the future from a mere control 
of constitutionality of environmental 
legislation into a proper instrument 
of enforcement of constitutional 
environmental rights. It will also depend 
on whether or not the written procedure in 
the Constitutional Court is able to adapt to 
the very technical nature of environmental 
law. As a result, the Constitutional Court 
might need to adopt a new method of 
interpretation and reading of the Charter in 
order to deal with new fundamental issues 
arising at the crossroad of environmental 
protection and the development of a new 
economy.
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1. Introduction
Australia holds the (perhaps dubious) distinction of being the only western democratic 
nation without a national bill of rights.429  It is therefore unsurprising to note that Australia 
is one of only fifteen nations that does “not yet recognize that their citizens possess a 
legal right to a healthy environment”.430  Australia is also yet to recognize the human right 
to water, or the rights of non-human animals and environmental entities.431  Accordingly, 
an important question to consider is why Australia has failed to embrace rights-based 
approaches to environmental protection and governance, and whether and to what extent 
these approaches may be of some utility in the Australian context. Countries around the 
world have begun to integrate versions of the human right to a healthy environment into 
their constitutions, laws, policies and political rhetoric, and Australia is well placed to 
learn from this experience in order to make an informed decision about whether it should 
join the “environmental rights revolution’.432  The aim of this paper is to explore whether 
legal recognition of the human right to a healthy environment in Australia could offer 
potential benefits for environmental protection, or whether legal recognition may in fact 
prove redundant or even dangerous in its operation. 
2.  Understanding Australian Exceptionalism 
Australia is currently one of only fifteen nations (including Canada and the United States of 
America) which does not recognize the human right to a healthy environment at the federal 
level.433  Australia’s premier piece of environmental protection legislation, the Environment 
Legal Recognition of the Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment in Australia:  
Useful, Redundant or Dangerous?
Meg Good
429 Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘How are Human Rights Protected in Australian Law?’ <https://www.
humanrights.gov.au/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law> accessed 10 March 2016.
430 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and the 
Environment (UBC Press 2012) 48.
431 See generally Meg Good, ‘Implementing the Human Right to Water in Australia’ (2011) 30 (2) University of Tasmania 
Law Review 107. 
432 For an excellent summary of the ‘environmental rights revolution’ see generally, Boyd (n 2).
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Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999 (Cth) (the “EPBC Act”), does not 
contain any explicit environmental rights. 
Owing to the absence of a federal bill of 
rights, there is also no scope to recognize 
the right, or other environmental rights 
through the “greening” of existing human 
rights. Similarly, at the state/territory level 
no environmental rights are included 
within bills of rights legislation in the 
Australian Capital Territory and Victoria. 
There have been no legislative attempts 
to introduce environmental rights at 
either level of government, and politically 
the issue has been relatively untouched. 
However, despite this lack of legislative 
implementation, there have been some 
calls for the recognition of environmental 
rights in Australia. 
In particular, support has been expressed 
by various non-governmental entities for 
the legal recognition of the human right 
to water and some form of human right 
to a clean and healthy environment.434 For 
instance, the Environmental Defenders 
Office (New South Wales (NSW)) and 
Environment Defenders Office (Victoria) 
Ltd have recommended “specific 
protection of environmental rights either 
in the form of an encompassing right to 
a clean and healthy environment or a set 
of related environmental rights.”435 It is 
important to consider why Australia has 
failed to follow these recommendations to 
recognize environmental rights, in order to 
identify potential challenges for attempts 
to recognize these rights in the future. 
Arguably, Australian exceptionalism 
can be attributed to three main factors: 
the nature of the Australian legal and 
political system, the nature of Australian 
approaches to the protection of human 
rights and the environment, and the 
perception that current approaches to 
environmental protection are adequate. 
2.1  Australia’s legal and political 
systems and approach to 
rights protection
Due to its foundations as a former 
English colony, Australia has a common 
law legal system characterized by 
observance of the rule of law, respect for 
parliamentary sovereignty, and adherence 
to the concepts of representative and 
responsible government. Interestingly, 
other comparable Commonwealth nations 
with common law legal systems, such as 
Canada and New Zealand, are similarly 
notable exceptions to the environmental 
rights trend.436 In Australia there is a 
longstanding preference for rights to be 
433 ibid 92. 
434 For example, Action for Aboriginal Rights, The Bendigo & District Environment Council Inc, the Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre and the Environment Defenders Office (Victoria) Ltd all advocated the addition of environmental 
rights into Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic): Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations 
Committee (Vic), Review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (2011) 51 <http://www.
parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/sarc/charter_review/report_response/20110914_sarc.
charterreviewreport.pdf> accessed 10 March 2016.
435 Environment Defenders Office (NSW) and Environment Defenders Office (Victoria) Ltd, ‘Protection of Human Rights 
and Environmental Rights in Australia’ (2009) 12 <https://envirojustice.org.au/downloads/files/law_reform/edo_
vicnsw_humanrights_environment.pdf> accessed 10 March 2016. 
436 Boyd (n 2) 92.
162
PART 2: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES
developed gradually over time through 
judicial precedent, rather than through 
broad rights declarations in legislation. 
Although Australia has not passed 
comprehensive legislation recognizing 
the human rights contained within the 
major international human rights treaties 
to which it is a party, it has various 
mechanisms in place for achieving 
human rights protection. This protection 
is achieved through a combination of 
constitutional interpretation, the common 
law, specific human rights legislation, the 
system of parliamentary democracy, and 
government policies intended to create a 
human rights culture. 
At a more general level, there has been 
a traditional reluctance in Australia to 
engage in comprehensive recognition 
of human rights at the federal level. 
Despite significant public support for the 
introduction of a federal statutory bill of 
rights and a 2009 recommendation from 
the National Human Rights Consultation 
Committee supporting the reform,437 the 
federal government has failed to introduce 
a federal bill of rights. Although one state 
and one territory jurisdiction have enacted 
human rights charters,438 Australia is 
yet to join the majority of the world’s 
liberal democracies by declaring a list 
of the fundamental rights of its citizens 
in a codified legislative instrument or 
constitution. 
This reluctance to embrace broad rights 
declarations can be attributed to various 
factors, including (but not limited to): 
   A belief that the most effective way 
to secure rights protection is through 
the gradual development of common 
law precedent and, where relevant, 
the legislative recognition of specific 
rights negotiated through the political 
process; 
   A concern that broad rights protection 
could lead to unintended and 
undesirable consequences; 
   A perception that broad rights 
declarations are inconsistent with the 
nature of Australia’s legal and political 
systems (for example, the notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty);439  
   A concern that providing the legislative 
or constitutional recognition of 
broad human rights would place the 
judiciary in an inappropriate position, 
both in terms of interpretation and 
enforcement; and
   A concern that defining a list of 
comprehensive rights could actually 
serve to limit rights protection.440  
Whilst all of these beliefs, concerns and 
perceptions can be challenged, they 
do play an important role in explaining 
Australia’s exceptionalism in this regard.
437 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, National Human Rights Consultation Report (2009) <http://www.
humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/Report_NationalHumanRightsConsultationReport-
Chapter15#_ftnref9> accessed 10 March 2016.
438 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).
439 George Williams, A Bill of Rights for Australia (University of New South Wales Press 2000) 35-41.
440 ibid.
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Those jurisdictions which have embraced 
rights declarations have restricted their 
recognition to civil and political rights.441  As 
explained by Taylor, the “core concept” of 
civil and political rights is the “liberty of the 
individual, which is to be protected against 
the abuse and misuse of state authority”.442 
Arguably, these rights sit better with the 
underlying foundations of the Australian 
legal and political system, as both are built 
upon “the political philosophy of liberal 
individualism and economic laissez-faire”. 
As civil and political rights are liberty 
rights which grant citizens “freedom 
from” certain treatment but do not entail 
great demands upon the state,444 they are 
better suited to this underlying political 
philosophy. In contrast, economic, social 
and cultural rights operate as “claims to 
social equality” (i.e. positive rights), and 
accordingly, where necessary, aim to 
compel state intervention to achieve their 
fulfilment.445 Economic, social and cultural 
rights, typically the category under which 
environmental rights fall, do not sit as 
well with the Australian legal and political 
system, and for this reason they have 
been consistently denied legal recognition 
at both the federal and state/territory 
levels.446  
As environmental rights are by their 
very nature broad rights, it is perhaps 
unsurprising given the context outlined 
that there has been a reluctance to afford 
them legal recognition.447 One of the 
main reasons for hesitation regarding 
the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural rights in Australia relates to 
the interpretation and enforcement role 
of the judiciary. According to the concept 
of the separation of powers, the judiciary 
is authorized to exercise only judicial 
power and must remain independent from 
the two political arms of government. 
Concerns over the politicization of the 
judiciary have been cited as reasons for 
not recognizing economic, social and 
cultural rights at both the federal and 
state/territory levels.448  
441 With the exception of the right to education (an economic, social and cultural right) recognised under the ACT 
legislation.
442 Prudence E Taylor, ‘From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in International Law?’ (1997-
1998) 10 (2) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 309, 318.
443 ibid 317.
444 ibid 318.
445 ibid 318.
446 Proposals to include ESC rights in rights legislation have been rejected at the national, and state/territory levels. For 
example, in a 2011 review of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, by the Victorian 
Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (‘SARC’), the SARC did not support the Law Institute of Victoria’s 
submission to include social and economic rights in the Charter: Law Institute of Victoria, ‘Lawyers Disappointed at 
Charter Wind Back Proposals by Parliamentary Committee’ (Media Release, 14 September 2011) <http://www.liv.asn.
au> accessed 10 March 2016; Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (Vic), Review of the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (2011) 52 <http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/committees/sarc/
charter_review/report_response/20110914_sasa.charterreviewreport.pdf> accessed 10 March 2016.
447 This conclusion is supported by Boyd’s research, which found that ‘[o]f the twenty-three nations employing 
exclusively common-law systems, only three have environmental provisions in their constitutions’: Boyd (n 2) 51.
448 Helen Irving explains that concerns over the inappropriate politicisation of the judiciary under a national Human 
Rights Act factored into the National Human Rights Consultation Committee’s ultimate decision to recommend 
against the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights in the proposed charter. However, she notes that these 
concerns are also applicable in the context of the recognition of civil and political rights: Helen Irving, ‘The Dilemmas 
in Dialogue: A Constitutional Analysis of the NHRC’s Proposed Human Rights Act’ (2010) 33 (1) UNSW Law Journal 
60, 80. 
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Economic, social and cultural rights often 
concern controversial topics involving 
issues of distributive justice.449 As noted 
by Meyerson, if economic, social and 
cultural rights are made justiciable, “then 
courts are given the power to affect 
the distribution of resources”.450 For 
instance, in regards to environmental 
governance, some critics argue that the 
courts are an inappropriate institution for 
the resolution of complex environmental 
regulation issues.451 In the United States 
(US) the judiciary has been reluctant to 
adjudicate disputes of this nature due in 
part to its “apprehension about playing 
the role of arbiter of … value-laden and 
technical questions”, such as the meaning 
of a “clean and healthy environment”.452 
It is likely that the Australian judiciary 
would demonstrate similar caution over 
engaging in the determination of such 
questions on the grounds that they are 
more appropriately dealt with by the 
democratically elected legislature and 
executive. 
2.2  Australian approach to 
environmental protection
Australia’s approach to environmental 
protection is not characterized by a 
willingness to make broad-sweeping 
guarantees of environmental protection 
through policy or law. The Australian 
Constitution does not contain recognition 
of the importance of environmental 
protection, and in fact contains no specific 
federal head of legislative power to enable 
the federal parliament to legislate directly 
with respect to environmental matters. 
Accordingly, the federal legislature must 
utilize heads of legislative power which do 
not specifically pertain to the environment 
(such as the external affairs power and 
the corporations power) in order to pass 
federal environmental laws. As a result of 
this constitutional lacuna, considerable 
uncertainty, conflict and debate has 
focused on the respective roles of the 
federal and state/territory governments 
in environmental protection and natural 
resources management.453  
Similarly, in the US the “federal government 
has no general plenary authority to enact 
laws”, and has traditionally relied upon the 
commerce clause to achieve the passage of 
environmental legislation.454 Hill, Wolfson 
and Targ argue that the US legislature’s 
failure to embrace environmental rights 
can in part be attributed to this lack of 
direct constitutional power, rather than 
to “any specific objection to the creation 
of an environmental right.”455 It may be 
449 For an exploration of this issue in the South African context, see generally Christopher Mbazira, Litigating Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2009). 
450 Denise Meyerson, Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 2011) 267. 
451 As noted by Boyd, ‘…critics argue [that] courts lack institutional capacity, technical expertise, and resources required 
to address complex environmental issues and are the wrong place for resolving polycentric issues involving 
conflicting values and diverse interests’: Boyd (n 2) 28.
452 ibid 391.
453 Particularly with respect to the management of critical natural resources such as water.
454 Barry E Hill, Steve Wolfson and Nicholas Targ, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some 
Predictions’ (2003-2004) 16 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 359, 390.
455 ibid.
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the case that Australia’s federal division 
of legislative power and environmental 
governance responsibilities has 
similarly influenced attitudes regarding 
the necessity for and desirability of 
environmental rights recognition. There 
are also other aspects of Australia’s 
approach to environmental protection 
which may have influenced the decision 
not to embrace environmental rights. 
Australia has mostly adopted traditional 
command and control approaches to 
environmental protection, situated within 
a broader framework designed to achieve 
the goal of ecologically sustainable 
development.456 A rights-based approach 
would represent a potentially significant 
alteration to the status quo, as it involves a 
different conceptualization of the human/
environment relationship. Rather than 
conceptualizing environmental protection 
as a service that the state chooses to 
provide, rights-based approaches often 
conceive of environmental protection as 
a right owed to the citizenry by the state. 
2.3  Perception of the 
effectiveness of the current 
approaches to environmental 
protection
It is possible that Australia has chosen 
not to adopt a rights-based approach 
to environmental protection due to a 
perceived lack of necessity. Examining the 
context within which other countries have 
embraced environmental rights perhaps 
sheds light on Australia’s decision not to 
follow suit. In many of these jurisdictions, 
environmental rights have been viewed 
as a means of pursuing environmental 
justice and empowering citizens who 
feel that the current law provides them 
with inadequate recourse for public 
participation in environmental decision-
making.457 Some of the most ambitious 
environmental rights declarations have 
occurred in nations with less than ideal 
environmental protection track records. 
In the context of governance systems 
struggling to achieve adequate protection 
of the environment due to broader 
governance issues, the recognition of 
environmental rights may be perceived 
as more necessary. It is possible that 
due to the existence of various functional 
environmental protection systems, laws 
and processes, there is a perception that 
the recognition of environmental rights is 
less of a necessity in Australia. However, 
456 Legislation adopting a command and control approach exists at both the federal level (for instance, the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) contains command and control approaches) and at 
the state/territory level in Australia. For a summary of the relevant state/territory statutes, see Lee Godden and 
Jacqueline Peel, Environmental Law: Scientific, Policy and Regulatory Dimensions (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
159-160.
457 For instance, Boyd’s research found that this particular benefit of the recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment was particularly pronounced in various developing nations: Boyd (n 2) 239.
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it remains that Australia is yet to achieve 
the goal of ecologically sustainable 
development, and therefore there does 
appear to be space to explore new 
approaches to ascertain whether they 
may assist in the achievement of this goal. 
Boyd’s research reveals that 
the constitutional recognition of 
environmental rights results in many of 
the anticipated benefits and few of the 
potential drawbacks forecast by legal 
experts.458 These benefits include but 
are not limited to providing an impetus 
for stronger legislation, bolstering the 
implementation and enforcement of 
existing environmental laws and policies, 
offering a safety net by filling gaps in 
environmental legislation and protecting 
environmental laws and regulations from 
rollbacks under future governments.459 
Whilst the recognition of environmental 
rights does not constitute a “silver-bullet 
for today’s environmental problems”,460 
it is an avenue which Australia should 
consider exploring.  
3.  Constitutional 
Recognition of 
Environmental Rights in 
Australia 
One hundred and fifty countries around 
the world provide for constitutional 
recognition of the human right to a 
healthy environment.461 Australia’s failure 
to follow suit can be explained through 
an examination of Australia’s broader 
constitutional context. The Australian 
Constitution was never intended to act 
as a comprehensive statement of the 
respective roles and duties of each arm 
and level of government, and the individual 
rights of Australian citizens.462 Although 
the framers of the Australian Constitution 
were able to look to the Constitution of 
the United States of America as a model, 
they deliberately chose not to emulate the 
American style of express constitutional 
rights. This was motivated partly by a 
concern that the “judicial interpretation of 
abstract rights could have unpredictable 
and undesirable consequences”.463 Very 
few express rights exist in the text of the 
Constitution, and for various reasons, 
Australians continue to “remain wary of 
constitutionally entrenched rights”.464 In 
addition to this reticence to recognize 
458 ibid 251. 
459 ibid 28. 
460 ibid 42.
461 David R Boyd, ‘Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment: National Approaches’ in Anna Grear and Louis J 
Kotzé (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar, 2015), 170, 172. 
462 As noted by Chief Justice Gleeson in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 at 172 [1]: ‘The Australian 
Constitution was not the product of a legal and political culture, or of historical circumstances, that created 
expectations of extensive limitations upon legislative power for the purpose of protecting the rights of individuals. It 
was not the outcome of a revolution, or a struggle against oppression. It was designed to give effect to an agreement 
for a federal union, under the Crown, of the peoples of formerly self-governing British colonies’. 
463 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Introduction’ in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting 
Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia (Ashgate Publishing 2006) 2, 2. 
464 ibid 3.
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constitutional rights, the framers provided 
minimal express reference to the natural 
environment. Unlike the majority of the 
world’s constitutions,465  the Australian 
Constitution does not contain any 
declaration as to the importance of the 
environment or the values which should 
govern environmental protection. 
Despite the critical importance of 
environmental governance in a land 
characterized by climatic instability, the 
division of governmental responsibility 
for environmental protection and 
regulation is also not directly addressed 
under the Constitution. The failure to 
address this issue was partially due to 
the presumption that such matters would 
generally remain within the ambit of 
state/territory jurisdiction. It can also be 
attributed to the socio-historical context 
of the document’s creation – at the turn 
of the century when the Constitution was 
created, environmental protection was not 
the mainstream governance issue that it 
is today.   
In the absence of express recognition of 
the right, it may be possible to found a 
basis for implication from the text and 
structure of the Constitution. However, it 
is extremely unlikely that the High Court 
would recognize an implied right to a 
healthy environment, for various reasons, 
principally the general reluctance of 
the Court to engage in this interpretive 
exercise, and the fact that there are 
arguably few, if any, grounds which could 
act as the basis for such an implication. 
Unlike the Constitution of India, where 
the Supreme Court has been able to 
derive environmental rights through 
interpretation of the broader “right to 
life”,466 the Australian Constitution does 
not contain any analogous express rights. 
Implied freedoms under the Australian 
Constitution are best characterized as 
“implied freedoms from governmental 
power”.467 The human right to a healthy 
environment can be conceptualized as 
both a negative and positive right (a 
‘freedom from’ and a ‘right to’). Its positive 
elements necessarily involve a demand 
on government resources.468 The High 
Court has not indicated any intention to 
recognize implied rights of this nature. 
As noted by Williams and Hume, “the 
Constitution protects freedoms from, 
rather than freedoms to”.469 The currently 
recognized implied freedom of political 
communication can be justified as a 
necessary implication from the text of 
465 See generally, Christopher Jeffords, ‘Constitutional Environmental Human Rights: A Descriptive Analysis of 142 
National Constitutions’ in Lanse Minkler (ed), The State of Economic and Social Human Rights: A Global Overview 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 329.
466 See Mehta v Union of India et al, 1988 A.I.R. 1115; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, 3 S.C.C. 161 (1984); 
Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar A.I.R. 1991 SC 420. For a discussion of these cases in the broader context of other 
jurisdictions where courts have utilised the right to life as a basis for implication of environmental rights, see: Donald K 
Anton and Dinah L Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2011) 460-463.
467 Patrick Keyzer, Constitutional Law (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths 2005) 303. 
468 Williams and Hume note that even the recognition of negative rights can involve government expenditure. They 
cite the example of the constitutional requirement that states maintain a court system, which ‘clearly has fiscal 
consequences’: George Williams and David Hume, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 154.
469 ibid 153.
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the Constitution (primarily sections 7 and 
24). The High Court has not recognized 
any implied economic, social and cultural 
rights, and it is unlikely that it could or 
would do so in the future. 
3.1  Options for the constitutional 
recognition of the 
human right to a healthy 
environment in Australia 
Despite the foregoing, it is possible 
to provide express recognition of the 
right to a healthy environment under 
the Australian Constitution. However, 
any addition or alteration to the text of 
the Constitution must proceed through 
the amendment procedure outlined 
under section 128. The amendment 
procedure established under section 128 
is notoriously difficult to satisfy, with only 
eight out of 44 proposed changes having 
met the requirements and resulting in 
amendments to the Constitution.470 As a 
result, the Constitution has only undergone 
a few alterations since its creation, despite 
the passage of over a century of important 
social, economic, political and cultural 
developments. Accordingly, achieving any 
form of express inclusion of the right will 
face a significant obstacle in section 128. 
A further issue relates to the location and 
nature of its inclusion in the text of the 
document, which may have implications 
for its operation and effect. 
Various forms of Commonwealth 
constitutional recognition are available, 
including incorporation within the 
broader context of a constitutional 
bill of rights. Providing constitutional 
recognition of an environmental right 
could lead to a potentially increased 
scope for Commonwealth intervention 
in environmental protection, increased 
governmental accountability through 
expanded options for public interest 
environmental litigation, and constitutional 
guidance for environmental legislation.471 
In Chapter Seven of David R Boyd, 
The Right to a Healthy Environment: 
Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution (UBC 
Press, 2012), Boyd explores how benefits 
experienced in other jurisdictions may be 
realised if Canada provided constitutional 
recognition of the right. In particular, 
he considers its ability to strengthen 
environmental laws, improve enforcement 
of environmental laws and prevent 
environmental law rollbacks.
Whilst there may be benefits for 
environmental protection associated 
with constitutional recognition, the fact 
remains that there has never been a 
successful attempt to constitutionalize 
a comprehensive bill of rights under the 
470 As noted by the Parliamentary Education Office, ‘[s]ince 1906, when the first referendum was held, Australia has held 
19 referendums in which 44 separate questions to change the Australian Constitution have been put to the people. 
Only eight changes have been agreed to’: Parliamentary Education Office, ‘How the Constitution Can Be Changed’ 
(2014) <http://www.peo.gov.au/learning/closer-look/the-australian-constitution/how-the-constitution-can-be-
changed.html> accessed 10 March 2016.
471 A number of these benefits have been experienced in other jurisdictions recognising a constitutional right to a 
healthy environment: Boyd (n 2) 233-252.
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Commonwealth Constitution.472 Proposals 
for the recognition of certain rights have 
been put forward and debated and in some 
cases voted upon at referendums. However, 
since federation, no new express rights 
have been introduced into the Australian 
Constitution.473 Most constitutional 
commentators, in the light of this history, 
consider the prospect of a constitutionally 
entrenched bill of rights to be highly 
unlikely. The likelihood of constitutional 
recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment is even lower, due to three 
main factors. 
Firstly, the amendment procedure outlined 
under section 128 creates a significant 
hurdle to reform, as it requires a high 
level of agreement. Achieving this level of 
agreement in relation to such a politically 
contentious reform would most likely 
prove extremely difficult. Secondly, 
there has been a historical reluctance to 
entrench express rights in the Constitution 
via a referendum. Two proposals have 
been taken to referendum involving the 
introduction of express rights into the 
Constitution, and both of them were 
unsuccessful.474 Finally, the potentially 
controversial nature of the right may mean 
that even if a constitutionally entrenched 
bill of rights were to be introduced, the right 
to a healthy environment would not be 
included. It is most likely that only civil and 
political rights would be recognized, and 
that any recognition of economic, social 
and cultural rights would be limited to more 
established rights. 
4.  Legislative Recognition 
of Environmental Rights 
in Australia 
Although constitutional recognition of 
the human right to a healthy environment 
in Australia is highly unlikely at present, 
it is possible to recognize the right under 
federal and/or state/territory legislation. 
Legislative recognition of human rights has 
traditionally been the preferred method of 
legal recognition in Australia.475 However, 
recognition has favored civil and political, 
rather than economic, social and cultural 
rights. For reasons discussed above, as 
an economic, social and cultural right, 
the right to a healthy environment would 
inevitably face various obstacles to its 
recognition, especially if it were deemed 
justiciable. There are three main options 
for the legislative recognition of the 
human right to a healthy environment at 
the Commonwealth level: recognition as 
an independent right under a statutory 
bill of rights, recognition as a derivative 
right under a statutory bill of rights, and 
recognition as an independent right under 
specific legislation.
472 For a summary of Australia’s ‘history of rejection’ in regards to bills of rights proposals, see generally Paul Kildea, 
‘The Bill of Rights Debate in Australian Political Culture’ (2003) 9 (1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 7.  
473 However, in 1977 the existing right to vote in referendums under s 128 was extended to residents of the territories. 
474 Bruce Stone and Nicholas Barry, ‘Constitutional Design and Australian Exceptionalism in the Adoption of National 
Bills of Rights’ (2014) 47 (4) Canadian Journal of Political Science 767, 776. 
475 For example: Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth); Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).
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At the Commonwealth level, arguably the 
preferable form of legislative recognition 
is recognition of an independent human 
right to a healthy environment in a 
statutory bill of rights. Although this is 
an ambitious option, it would provide 
the most comprehensive and secure 
recognition of the right. The other potential 
options for Commonwealth recognition 
are limited for various reasons. Implied 
recognition renders the existence and 
interpretation of the right at the mercy of 
the judiciary, whilst express recognition of 
the right under specific “right to a healthy 
environment” legislation fails to recognize 
the interrelated and indivisible nature of 
economic, social and cultural rights. At the 
state/territory level, for the same reasons, 
introducing the right into existing and 
proposed state/territory rights charters is 
arguably the preferable form of legislative 
recognition. 
Although relying on recognition by 
derivation from other rights is perhaps the 
most politically feasible option at present, 
express recognition of an independent 
right at both levels of government is 
preferable. This is because it bypasses the 
problematic aspects of implied recognition 
and provides stronger protection for the 
right. It is acknowledged, however, that 
any form of legislative recognition of a bill 
of rights generally, or the human right to a 
healthy environment specifically, is unlikely 
to occur in the near future. In terms of the 
appropriate model for recognition, arguably 
the preferable model is implementation of 
the “dialogue model”. The dialogue model 
involves all three arms of government 
engaging in a dialogue, with each assigned 
particular roles in the process of debating 
human rights recognition and protection.476 
This is the preferable model for two main 
reasons. 
Firstly, the dialogue model represents a 
political compromise between increasing 
human rights protection and maintaining 
parliamentary sovereignty. It is unlikely 
that any greater incursion on the scope 
of governmental power would receive 
support in light of the history of political 
reluctance in this regard. Secondly, 
the dialogue model has already been 
successfully adopted in two Australian 
jurisdictions (the Australian Capital 
Territory and Victoria). Accordingly, there 
is precedent for the effective operation of 
this model in the Australian context. If the 
right were recognized under the dialogue 
model, this could have various impacts on 
government decision-making processes 
in Australia which could be characterized 
as beneficial for environmental protection. 
Firstly, during the legislative process, 
proposed legislation would be scrutinized 
for consistency with the right, through the 
issuing of statements of compatibility. This 
could proactively prevent the introduction 
of legislation which jeopardizes the 
government’s ability to protect, respect 
and fulfil the right. Secondly, it could 
require all public authorities to act in a 
way that is compatible with the right. This 
476 National Human Rights Consultation Committee (n 9).
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could have implications for the actions 
of key government agencies involved in 
environmental management. Thirdly, it 
could ensure that the court interprets 
legislation in a manner compatible with 
the right, and in instances where such an 
interpretation is not possible, the court 
could be empowered to issue a declaration 
of inconsistent interpretation. This 
would encourage a dialogue between the 
legislature, executive and judiciary on the 
legislation’s impact on the right. As the right 
would be considered during the creation, 
implementation and interpretation of 
legislation, the government would be better 
able to prevent and respond to breaches 
of the right. This safety net of protection 
would not suffice to address all potential 
and actual breaches of the right, or even 
guarantee the right’s full realisation. 
However, it would ensure that the right 
enters the legal and policy discourse 
on issues concerning environmental 
governance and sustainable development. 
4.1  Limitations of legislative 
recognition
Recognizing a human right to a healthy 
environment under a federal statutory 
bill of rights adopting the dialogue model 
could increase government accountability, 
encourage rights awareness in executive 
decision-making, facilitate proactive 
action on legislation which has the potential 
to breach the obligations imposed by the 
right, and create more avenues for review 
of government decision-making. Whilst 
there are evidently a number of potential 
benefits associated with legislative 
recognition there may, however, be some 
limitations regarding the utility of the right 
as a tool for environmental protection. 
These limitations can be attributed partly 
to the nature of the proposed form of 
recognition, and partly to the broader 
context in which the right must operate. 
Under the proposed model, all three 
arms of government would necessarily 
be restricted in their ability to consider 
and realize the right. As the legislature 
would be obliged only to consider the 
compatibility of proposed legislation with 
the right, the Parliament would retain the 
power to override identified incompatibility 
in order to allow incompatible proposed 
legislation to become law. The judiciary 
would be similarly restricted. Where the 
court identified that it was not possible 
to adopt an interpretation consistent with 
the right, it might issue a declaration of 
inconsistent interpretation. However, such 
declarations do not impact on the validity 
of the law, and whilst the government 
would have to provide a response, it would 
have no duty to amend the law to render 
it consistent with the right. Arguably, 
these limitations represent a necessary 
compromise in a legal system such as 
Australia’s. Granting the judiciary greater 
interpretive scope, or providing the court 
with the ability to invalidate legislation 
on the grounds of incompatibility would 
represent a significant departure from the 
status quo. Similarly, limiting parliamentary 
sovereignty in order to provide better 
protection of the right during the legislative 
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process would be highly controversial. 
Whilst respecting this compromise may be 
the only way to achieve legal recognition 
of the right, it may do so at the expense of 
limiting its effectiveness. 
Another important area of limitation 
relates to the fact that many of the key 
challenges facing the full realisation of the 
right to a healthy environment cannot be 
resolved simply through legal recognition 
of the right. These issues include political 
disagreements over environmental policy, 
competing economic, social and cultural 
interests, sourcing funding for monitoring 
and enforcement, differing social attitudes 
and values, technical challenges, and 
scientific uncertainties. Solutions to these 
varied and significant issues are generally 
beyond the scope of a limited legal tool. 
In many instances, what is required in 
order to improve environmental protection 
is systemic or cultural change. Whilst 
recognition of the right could provide an 
impetus for such change, it could not of 
itself address many of the key problems 
impeding the achievement of sustainable 
environmental management. There 
are inherent constraints limiting the 
effectiveness of environmental protection 
approaches created by the broader social, 
political and legal context. 
Rodriguez-Rivera notes that critics have 
questioned the utility of the human right 
to a healthy environment on the grounds 
that it “may not address the complex and 
technical issues” involved in environmental 
protection, and that it “merely addresses 
the social symptoms and does not solve 
the structural causes of environmental 
degradation…”477 Weston and Bollier argue 
that the operation of the right is limited 
by this context as “our formal/official 
national and international legal orders 
are structurally organized to contribute to 
– and not prevent – the deterioration of 
the natural world”.478 They contend that as 
environmental governance must operate 
within the broader context of the capitalist 
system, “the mainstream economic and 
political paradigm will not take the right to 
environment seriously, and it will remain 
an idiosyncratic influence at best.”479  
Whilst these arguments have merit, it 
is important not to underestimate the 
importance of recognizing environmental 
protection as a human rights issue. 
Duncan argues that it is problematic to 
conceptualize a healthy environment as 
a human right as “the environment needs 
to be protected not for, but from, human 
beings”.480 However, arguably one of the 
most effective ways to improve protection 
from human impacts is to characterize 
environmental protection as a human 
interest. Historically, a lack of appreciation 
of the link between human health and 
environmental health has hindered efforts 
477 Luis E Rodriguez-Rivera, ‘Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under International Law? It Depends on the 
Source’ (2001) 12 (1) Columbia Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 1, 31. 
478 Burns Weston and David Bollier, Regenerating the Human Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment in the Commons 
Renaissance (2011) 24 <http://www.commonslawproject.org/> accessed 10 March 2016.
479 ibid 25.
480 Myrl L Duncan, ‘The Rights of Nature: Triumph for Holism or Pyrrhic Victory?’ (1991) 31 Washburn Law Journal 62, 68. 
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to improve environmental protection. 
For instance, failure to acknowledge 
the inherent interest all human beings 
possess in ensuring the maintenance 
of a healthy natural environment can 
impact on the ability to access justice in 
environmental protection matters. The 
right recognizes that adequate protection 
of the environment and the enforcement 
of environmental protection laws are in the 
interests of all human beings. Accordingly, 
limiting access to justice in this regard to 
individuals and organizations with more 
“direct” interests in matters concerning 
the environment could be viewed as 
contrary to the right. This was recognized 
recently in Australia in response to an 
attempt by the Australian Government to 
remove an extended standing provision 
under Australia’s national environmental 
protection legislation. One aspect of the 
dialogue model is already in operation 
at the federal level in Australia due 
to the creation of a Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights which scrutinizes legislation for 
compatibility with human rights. The 
Committee concluded that the proposed 
amendments “could result in a failure to 
properly enforce the protections” under the 
environmental protection legislation, and 
therefore could “engage and limit the right 
to health and a healthy environment”.481  
They reasoned that, as the United Nations 
Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights has stated that a violation 
of the right to health can occur where 
pollution laws are inadequately enforced, 
limiting the ability of environmental 
protection advocates to enforce those 
laws might “engage and limit” the 
human right to a healthy environment.482 
Accordingly, it can be seen that even 
though the operation of the right may not 
compel a particular outcome, it can create 
an important dialogue on environmental 
protection issues couched in the politically 
powerful language of human rights. Whilst 
under the dialogue model it is open to the 
government to proceed with legislation 
which limits the right, the recognition 
of the human rights dimension helps to 
transform the discussion from one of 
“policy choice” to consideration of human 
rights obligations.483 Moreover, once 
a particular environmental protection 
measure has been deemed necessary 
for fulfilment of these obligations, it may 
be much more difficult to justify any 
“rollbacks” on that protection.484  
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to explore 
whether legal recognition of the human 
right to a healthy environment in 
Australia could offer potential benefits 
for environmental protection. It has been 
481 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twenty-Seventh Report of the 44th Parliament (2015) 4 [1.19].
482 ibid 5 [1.25]-[1.26].
483 As noted by Shelton, rights-based approaches ‘are preferred by many…because human rights are maximum claims 
on society, elevating concern for the environment above a mere policy choice that may be modified or discarded at 
will’: Dinah L Shelton (ed), Human Rights and the Environment Volume I (Edward Elgar 2011) x.
484 Boyd (n 2) 27-32.
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concluded that legal recognition could 
increase government accountability, 
encourage rights awareness in executive 
decision-making, facilitate proactive 
action on legislation which has the potential 
to breach the obligations imposed by the 
right, and create more avenues for review 
of government decision-making. However, 
it is important to recognize that a vast 
range of complicated factors contribute 
to Australia’s environmental protection 
issues, which are beyond the scope of 
redress by a limited legal tool. Many of 
the key challenges facing the protection of 
Australia’s natural environment stem from 
a systemic acceptance of environmental 
harm. Recognition of the human right to a 
healthy environment cannot be expected 
to address the fact that Australia’s 
environmental protection regimes 
operate on the presumption that a certain 
(and sometimes significant) degree of 
environmental harm is legally tolerated. 
The risk of unintended or “dangerous” 
consequences flowing from such 
recognition does not constitute a strong 
argument against recognition. There are 
risks inherent with any legislative change, 
and experience in other jurisdictions and 
with the state/territory human rights 
legislation demonstrates that for the most 
part these concerns are not significant 
issues in practice. Accordingly, this 
paper advocates for consideration of 
the adoption of a statutorily recognized 
human right to a healthy environment 
as an additional tool for improving 
environmental protection in Australia. 
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1. Introduction
Worldwide, the constitutionalization of environmental law has become popular to augment 
juridical environmental protection.485 This is premised on the belief that environmental 
protection at the constitutional level can improve environmental governance regimes and 
can make a positive contribution to the results that environmental law and governance 
seek to achieve.486 Presently, the clearest expression of environmental constitutionalism 
is generally accepted as manifesting itself through human rights and, more particularly, 
through environmental rights. The increased popularity of rights as means to strengthen 
environmental protection is evident from the fact that the environment was not a 
regulatory concern during the first significant global constitutional moment that saw 
the almost universal endorsement, if not the blanket global adoption, by states of an 
impressive catalogue of human rights following the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948.487 Environmental rights began to feature in domestic constitutional 
orders only following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, 
which provided the impetus for couching environmental concerns in rights terms.488 
Thus, over recent decades the rights-based approach to environmental protection 
has grown impressively and has gained traction, both as a field of analytical enquiry 
and as a normative project of constitutional protection of the environment. Nowadays 
approximately three quarters of the world’s constitutions (150 out of 193) contain 
references to environmental rights and/or environmental responsibilities.489 
Environmental constitutionalism and the ecocentric 
rights paradigm:  
the rights of nature in Ecuador and Bolivia
Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla
Louis J. Kotzé
485 For a general discussion see Louis Kotzé Global Environmental Constitutionalism in the Anthropocene (Hart 
Publishing, 2016). 
486 James May and Erin Daly Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Louis Kotzé 
“Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism” 2012 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law 199-233; David Boyd 
The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment (UBC 
Press, 2012); David Boyd “Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment: National Approaches” in Anna Grear 
and Louis Kotzé (eds) Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar, 2015) 170-199.
487 Louis Kotzé “The Anthropocene’s Global Environmental Constitutional Moment” Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 2014 25(1) Yearbook of International Environmental Law 24-60.
488 See Principle 1 of Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972.
489 David Boyd The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the 
Environment (UBC Press, 2012) 47.
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Through the course of these 
developments, environmental rights have, 
however, remained anthropocentric.490 
Anthropocentric law and its incorporated 
juridical constructs of rights are 
regulatory tools that legally create human 
entitlements to nature, that justify and 
legitimize these entitlements, and that 
strengthen them through legitimizing 
claims to nature and its benefits to human 
development as of right. Therefore, in the 
context of anthropocentric rights, nature 
is seen as an “inert machine that exists 
to satisfy the needs, desires (and greed) 
of human beings”.491 The anthropocentric 
orientation of human environmental rights 
in the possible new geological epoch 
called the Anthropocene is considered to 
justify and promote ecological ravaging; to 
aggravate the enclosure of the commons; 
to justify and increase the dispossession 
of indigenous people; to perpetuate 
corporate neo-colonialism; to intensify 
asymmetrically distributed patterns of 
advantage and disadvantage that prevail 
in society; and to deepen inter- and intra-
species hierarchies regarded as systems 
of obedience and command, including 
that of human beings over nature.492 
Two notable state exceptions to the general 
anthropocentricism described above are 
Ecuador and Bolivia. Ecuador bestows 
rights on nature through its Constitution, 
while Bolivia grants rights to nature 
through a statutory law that is based on the 
state’s constitution.493 On paper at least, 
such ground-breaking constitutional and 
subsequent statutory constructions are 
a historical and potentially transcendent 
step towards recognizing the importance 
of nature as a subject of law and a bearer 
of rights, instead of its being relegated 
to being an object of protection for the 
benefit of human beings who, in terms of 
the prevailing anthropocentric paradigm, 
are the only legitimate subjects of law, 
bearers of rights and recipients of law’s 
regulatory protection and benefits. This 
entrenchment is a clear juridical expression 
of an ecocentric rights-orientation that 
invites an ethical acknowledgement of 
nature’s central importance to all life on 
Earth. In this paper we briefly but critically 
reflect on the extent to which Ecuador 
and Bolivia have constitutionally and 
statutorily entrenched the rights of nature. 
Similarly, we provide a brief, but critical, 
appraisal of how the ecocentric rights of 
nature are playing out in practice in both 
countries. 
490 Louis Kotzé “Human Rights and the Environment in the Anthropocene” 2014 1(3) Anthropocene Review 252-275; and 
more generally, Alexander Gillespie International Environmental Law, Policy and Ethics (Oxford University Press 1997) 
4-18. 
491 Peter Burdon “The Earth Community and Ecological Jurisprudence” 2013 3(5) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 815-837, 
818.
492 Anna Grear “Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on ‘Anthropocentric’ Law and Anthropocene 
‘Humanity’” 2015(26) Law and Critique 225-249.
493 Concretely, based on article 33 of the Bolivian Constitution as described later. 
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2. Rights of Nature in 
Ecuador
In 2008 Ecuador was at the forefront 
in terms of promoting and recognizing 
the rights of nature at the constitutional 
level. Its constitution remains the first, 
and still the only, constitution worldwide 
that recognizes enforceable rights of 
nature. By announcing the transition from 
a juridical anthropocentric orientation 
of rights to an ecocentric one, the 
constitution (specifically articles 10, 71-
74) provides an example of how an ethical 
acknowledgment of nature’s rights could 
manifest concretely in the juridical sphere. 
Thus, in the Ecuadorian Constitution 
nature acquires constitutional rights 
representing a novelty, or new frontier, 
in the context of global environmental 
constitutionalism.  
Historical context
During the elections of November 2006 
Rafael Correa won the presidency of 
Ecuador on the strength of advocating 
that the state undertake a wholesale 
transformative process aimed at building 
a new country. Part of Correa’s new vision 
for Ecuador involved the building of a 
state to redefine and harmonize not just 
the fractured relationships between the 
state, society and the economy, but also 
the relationship between human beings 
and nature.494 In April 2007 Correa called 
for the establishment of a Constituent 
Assembly to draft a new constitution that 
was approved during a referendum in 
September 2008. The constitution came 
into force in October 2008.495 
The Constitution of Ecuador confronts the 
prevailing anthropocentric socio-politico-
legal and economic order in Ecuador that 
has been characterized for many years 
by the unbridled exploitation of natural 
resources (especially oil) that caused 
vast environmental destruction.496 It aims 
to prioritize and solidify key concerns 
relating to equity between human beings 
and between human beings and nature, as 
well as to propagate a new understanding 
of nature (or Pacha Mama). In this sense, 
the constitutional protection of rights has 
been extended in favor of nature, which 
is now considered a legal subject and a 
holder of certain enforceable rights.497 
Breaking with the anthropocentric 
paradigm that considers nature as an 
object to be exploited for the benefit of 
human beings and that ignores other 
radical (indigenous) worldviews of the 
relationship between people and nature, 
494 Alianza País. Plan de Gobierno 2007-2013. Un primer gran paso para la transformación radical del Ecuador, 2006, 
8-12.
495 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, Official Registry No. 449, October 20, 2008.
496 An example is the severe environmental damage caused by Chevron-Texaco in the Ecuadorian Amazonia from 1964 
to 1990 as a result of oil extraction. For a more detailed description see Judith Kimerling Amazon Crude (Natural 
Resource Defense Council, 1991). 
497 Patricio Carpio Benalcázar “El Buen Vivir, más allá del desarrollo. La nueva perspectiva Constitucional en Ecuador” in 
Alberto Acosta and Esperanza Martínez (eds) El Buen Vivir. Una vía para el desarrollo (Abya-Yala, 2009) 133.
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the Ecuadorean Constitution provides 
an example of a text in which the ideas 
of the rights of nature and indigenous 
“cosmovisions”498 that recognize the 
inextricable links between human beings 
and nature converge. 
While the proposal for the inclusion of 
the rights of nature in the Ecuadorian 
Constitution was supported mostly by 
those in more mainstream political, 
academic and civil society circles and 
within a western liberal constitutionalism 
paradigm, indigenous peoples managed 
to introduce into the debate the notion 
of Buen Vivir (or Sumak Kawsay in the 
Andean Kichwa language), which means 
“living well”.499  Buen Vivir suggests 
that people should live, exercise their 
rights and fulfill their responsibilities 
within the framework of interculturalism, 
respect for diversity, and in harmony with 
nature.500  As an indigenous world view 
that demolishes hierarchies constructed 
by colonial Western scientific knowledge, 
Buen Vivir starkly contrasts with the deep 
anthropocentric conflict arising between 
dominant human beings and a subservient 
nature. Under the cosmovision of Buen 
Vivir, people have to act as part of 
nature, thus avoiding the nature/society 
dichotomy.501  
The rights of nature
Considering the need to (re)define the 
human-nature dichotomy, and on the basis 
of the Ecuadorian indigenous cosmovision 
described above, the Constitution of 
Ecuador includes various provisions 
on the rights of nature. The Preamble 
provides a contextual and interpretive 
background and motivation for the rest 
of the Constitution’s provisions, showing 
a significant adjustment of the current 
Ecuadorian Amazon region. 
Photo credit: © the authors 
498 See generally Erin Fitz-Henry “Decolonizing Personhood” in Michelle Maloney and Peter Burdon (eds) Wild Law-in 
Practice (Routledge, 2014) 133-148. 
499 Fundación Pachamama “Recognizing Rights for Nature in the Ecuadorian Constitution”, available at http://www.
therightsofnature.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/Recogniting-Rights-for-Nature-in-the-Ecuadorian-Constitution-
Fundacion-Pachamama.pdf [accessed 15 March 2016].
500 Article 275 of the Constitution. 
501 Gordon DiGiacomo Human rights, Current Issues and Controversies (University of Toronto Press, 2016) 425.
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anthropocentric world-view. It celebrates 
“nature, the Pacha Mama (Mother Earth), 
of which we are a part and which is vital to 
our existence,” and reaffirms Ecuadorean 
society’s aim “to build a new form of 
public coexistence, in diversity and in 
harmony with nature, to achieve the good 
way of living, the sumak kawsay”.502 The 
preamble constitutionally legitimizes the 
idea that the relationship between human 
beings and nature is ancient and that 
in this new form of public coexistence, 
in diversity and in harmony with nature, 
people and nature are indivisible.
Building on this introductory statement, 
the first and clearest articulation of the 
rights of nature can be found in article 10, 
which provides that “[n]ature shall be the 
subject of those rights that the Constitution 
recognizes for it”.503  More specifically, 
Title II, Chapter Seven of the Constitution 
refers to the rights of nature.  Under article 
71 “[n]ature, or Pacha Mama … has the 
right to integral respect for its existence 
and for the maintenance and regeneration 
of its life cycles, structure, functions and 
evolutionary processes”. Therefore, in this 
moral and juridical relationship people 
have a duty to treat nature in such a 
way that it can exist, maintain itself and 
regenerate to the fullest extent possible.504 
This provision also offers wide locus 
standi to enable anyone to enforce the 
rights of nature, regardless of whether 
a direct interest exists in invoking and 
protecting these rights or not. Article 72 
goes well beyond traditional duties of 
compensation or remediation to people 
for environmental damage. It states that 
nature has an explicit, independent and 
inherent “right to be restored”, and imposes 
on people the duty to “adopt adequate 
measures to eliminate or mitigate harmful 
environmental consequences”.505 The 
“right to be restored” places positive 
obligations on the state to “establish the 
most effective mechanisms to achieve the 
restoration [and] to eliminate or mitigate 
harmful environmental consequences”. 
Furthermore, article 73 imports the well-
known preventive principle and obliges 
the state to restrict activities that might 
lead to the extinction of species, the 
destruction of ecosystems and the 
permanent alteration of natural cycles. 
Article 74, in terms similar to those in 
which the right to a healthy environment 
is usually expressed, provides people the 
“right to benefit from the environment and 
the natural wealth” through which they 
are enabled to live well. Thus, this article 
recognizes human beings as beneficiaries 
and entitled entities in the human-nature 
relationship. 
The rights of nature that the Ecuadorian 
constitution recognizes are self-executing, 
meaning that they may be invoked without 
the need for legislative embodiment or 
502 Preamble. 
503 In addition to the rights of nature, article 14 of the Constitution recognizes an environmental right that addresses and 
guarantees the usual human-centered issues. 
504 For example see articles 83(6) and 83(13) as well as article 399.
505 Also see article 396.
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implementation. Thus, anyone can revert 
directly to the Constitution to invoke 
protection on behalf of nature.506 In 
addition, article 11(4) provides that “[n]o 
legal regulation can restrict the contents 
of rights or constitutional guarantees.”507 
Theoretically this would mean that, given 
the supremacy of the Constitution508, any 
subsequent law (such as a mineral or 
oil exploitation laws) which may restrict 
or infringe the rights of nature could be 
declared unconstitutional.  Such action 
of unconstitutionality against a norm that 
violates the content of the rights of nature 
can be presented by any person, individually 
or collectively,509 and any person or third 
party can also intervene in the process, 
contributing elements for the resolution of 
the conflict.510 
A critical appraisal 
Although the ground-breaking 
constitutional regime in Ecuador is a 
historical and crucial step taken towards 
recognizing the rights of nature, the 
enforcement and promotion of those 
rights still face significant challenges. 
These include, among others: tensions 
between ecocentric and anthropocentric 
constitutional provisions; the non-existent 
hierarchy among the constitutional 
rights; the adoption of laws, policies and 
governance practices that contradict the 
spirit and purpose of the rights of nature; 
and the politicization of judicial processes 
and judges’ lack of knowledge about the 
nature and extent of these constitutional 
rights. We explore these further below. 
First, not all environment-related 
provisions of the Ecuadorean Constitution 
are ecocentric, a fact which arguably 
highlights a potential tension between 
ecocentrism and anthropocentrism. 
The Constitution details, for example, 
in comprehensive terms and in a 
predominantly anthropocentric narrative, 
several “prime duties” of the state, 
including inter alia the promotion of 
sustainable development and the 
equitable redistribution  of resources and 
wealth to enable access to the good way 
of living (articles 12-34), which is premised 
on resource exploitation (including mining 
and the exploitation of hydrocarbons).511 
506 Article 11(3), notably through the constitutional protection proceeding (called Acción de Protección) provided for in 
article 88 of the Constitution.
507 This blanket prohibition does seem to be qualified, however, by the provision that “[a]ny deed or omission of a 
regressive nature that diminishes, undermines or annuls without justification the exercise of rights shall be deemed 
unconstitutional.” (Article 11 (8)). In other words, it is possible to limit rights as long as the limitation is justified. 
Worryingly, the Constitution is silent on the criteria for justification, which leaves wide open the question as to what a 
justifiable limitation could be.
508 See article 424.
509 See articles 439 of the Constitution and 77 of the Organic Law of Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional 
Control (Ley Orgánica de Garantías Jurisdiccionales y Control Constitucional (LOGJCC), Official Registry No. 52, 
October 22, 2009.
510 See articles 85 and 12 (related to the figure of Amicus Curiae) of the LOGJCC. On this basis, for example, some 
referred to the unconstitutional nature of the new Mining Law discussed elsewhere in this chapter. See Amicus 
Curiae presented by Alberto Acosta to the Constitutional Court within the action of unconstitutionality against the 
Mining Law of Ecuador, Case 0011-09-1 and 0008-09-IN, available at http://www.inredh.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=207:demanda-ley-de-mineria&catid=76:inconstitucionalidad&Itemid=150 [accessed 12 
October 2016]. 
511 See, for example, the National Development Plan (2007-2010).
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Similarly, the provisions related to the 
rights of water (article 12) and a healthy 
environment (article 14) are focused 
on human needs and do not refer to 
the intrinsic rights, value or ecological 
integrity of water or the environment. 
They mostly address and guarantee the 
usual human-centered issues and provide 
little if any foundation or support for the 
rights of nature. Likewise, while article 407 
establishes a prohibition on the extraction 
of non-renewable natural resources in 
protected areas and in areas declared 
intangible assets, it also indicates that 
these resources can be exploited “at the 
substantiated request of the President of 
the Republic and after a declaration of 
national interest issued by the National 
Assembly”. Thus, any potential protective 
guarantees that the Constitution might 
offer to nature are accordingly subject 
to government discretion. These 
contradictions within the Constitution 
are barriers that could inhibit the full 
realization of the rights of nature. 
Second, there is no evidence that the 
rights of nature enjoy any supremacy 
in the Ecuadorean Constitution. The 
Constitution instead explicitly states 
that there is no hierarchy among rights 
and that all rights compete on an equal 
footing (article 11.6). It is therefore clear 
that the Constitution of Ecuador is not 
a “Constitution for Nature” and does 
not create an ecological constitutional 
state, although it presumably creates an 
expectation that it does that. It remains 
unclear whether the rights of nature 
will prevail when they come into conflict 
with other rights that are constitutionally 
enshrined. If nature is indeed “vital to 
[Ecuadorean] existence,” as the preamble 
suggests it is, then one would expect the 
rights of nature to take precedence over all 
other rights in the Constitution, including 
those rights that provide unbridled human 
entitlements to resources. 
Third, the rights of nature do not feature 
in the transitional provisions of the 
Constitution that call for the adoption 
of laws that develop the constitutional 
provisions.512 This omission shows that 
they are considered of lower priority than 
other issues such as communication, 
education, culture and sports, which are 
provided for in the transitional provisions. 
As a result, beyond being self-executing, 
no legislation has yet been created to 
develop and give practical effect to the 
Oil spill incident occurred in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
region (2010) Photo credit: © Diocles Zambrana
512 See “Transitory Provisions One” of the Constitution. 
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rights of nature. This redirects attention 
to the possible lack of any political 
commitment to give full effect to the 
constitutional commitments indicating, 
as it presumably does, that the provision 
of the rights of nature in Ecuador could be 
a window-dressing exercise or “beautiful 
rhetoric used to entice support for Ecuador 
from the international community”513 while 
seeking to expand on the anthropocentric 
and neoliberal logic of development based 
on the exploitation of natural resources. In 
fact, the government has recently adopted 
laws, policies and governance practices 
that contradict, rather than promote, the 
spirit and purport of the rights of nature. 
Examples of these are the new Mining 
Law (Ley de Minería) which, based on 
articles 313514  and 407 of the Ecuadorian 
Constitution discussed above, authorizes 
the extraction of non-renewable natural 
resources in a protected area and 
allows large-scale and open-pit mining 
operations.515 Another is the cancellation 
of the Yasuni-Ishpingo Tambococha 
Tiputini Initiative (ITT), which attempted 
to prevent the exploitation of oil reserves 
located in the Yasuni National Park (a 
UNESCO biosphere reserve and home to 
indigenous people).516 
Fourth, because of the politicization 
of judicial processes and a lack of 
knowledge about the nature and extent of 
the constitutional rights granted to nature, 
the judiciary has been unable to fully 
develop and enforce these rights.517 There 
are examples of lawsuits based on the 
rights of nature, such as the Vilcabamba 
river case.518 In this case, the court settled 
in favor of nature (represented by the 
plaintiffs), and expressed its concern 
about the impacts that the construction 
of a road and the consequent dumping of 
excavation materials into the river have on 
its ecosystems.519 However, in most other 
cases Ecuadorean courts have failed to 
address the conflict that the Constitution 
creates between anthropocentrism 
and ecocentrism. In 2013, for example, 
indigenous and non-governmental 
organizations filed a constitutional 
513 Fitz-Henry (n 14) 142. 
514 Article 313 acknowledges the non-renewable natural resources in Ecuador as strategic sector for the general welfare 
of society.
515 Mining Law, Official Registry No. 517, January 29, 2009, article 25.
516 See, among others, Carlos Larrea & Lavinia Warnars “Ecuador’s Yasuni-ITT Initiative: Avoiding emissions by keeping 
petroleum underground” 2009 (13) Energy for Sustainable Development 219-223; Matthieu Le Quang “El sentido 
político de la Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT: disputa entre capitalismo verde y ecosocialismo” 2015 (32) Revista THEOMAI 75-
95. 
517 For a discussion see Craig Kauffman and Pamela Martin “Testing Ecuador’s Rights of Nature: Why Some Lawsuits 
Succeed and Others Fail” 9. Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention Atlanta, 
GA, March 18, 2016. Available at http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Papers/
Testing%20Ecuador%E2%80%99s%20RoN_16_04_20.pdf. According to the authors, the rights of nature are part of 
the national discourse in Ecuador and activists are using such rights to strengthen jurisprudence and norms related 
to these rights in an adequate way. However, they also noted that the politicization and lack of knowledge are still two 
important obstacles to successful jurisprudential development.    
518 Judgment, Provincial Court of Loja, Case No. 11121- 2011-0010, 30 March 2011, Wheeler vs Director de la 
Procuraduría General del Estado en Loja). For a discussion see Erin Daly “The Ecuadorean Exemplar: The First Ever 
Vindications of the Constitutional Rights of Nature” 2012 21(1) Review of European Comparative and International 
Environmental Law 63-66.
519 However, this case still indicated the many challenges that courts experience, especially to establish a clear 
distinction between the environmental right and the right of nature.
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lawsuit against a developer and the 
Ecuadorian government to suspend the 
first large-scale open-pit mining project, 
called “Mirador”, which is located in an 
indigenous territory and which is one 
of the most mega-diverse and fragile 
ecosystems in Ecuador. The plaintiffs 
argued that the mining project would cause 
serious environmental damage and would 
therefore constitute an infringement of the 
rights of nature.520  Despite the fact that the 
environmental impact assessment carried 
out by the developer acknowledged that 
the project would cause severe damage to 
the environment, the court ruled against 
the plaintiffs, the ruling being based on 
the argument that the project would 
not affect a protected area and that the 
environmental damage would not violate 
the rights of nature.521  The court argued 
that far beyond the private interest of the 
plaintiffs (in this case, civil society), the 
development of the project represented the 
public interest, since it was necessary to 
achieve the state’s sustainable economic 
development goals and to allow it to fulfill 
its social development agenda.522  The 
plaintiffs appealed the decision, but the 
Appellate Court confirmed the decision 
of the court of first instance.523 This case 
illustrates the lack of knowledge regarding 
the rights of nature in Ecuador, as well as a 
questionable interpretation of the contents 
of these rights. In the Paramo Tangabana 
lawsuit, judges failed to understand, 
among other things, the wide locus standi 
provisions in the Constitution (discussed 
above) that enable plaintiffs to represent 
and enforce the rights of nature. Based 
on procedural grounds, the court ruled 
against the claimants, arguing that they 
had proved neither their ownership over 
the affected area nor that they would be 
personally affected by its development.524 
The claimants appealed the decision but 
a second instance judge upheld the first 
ruling.525 
These cases suggest that on balance in 
the Ecuadorian judicial system both the 
politicization of judicial processes and 
a lack of knowledge about the rights of 
nature are still obstacles for developing 
and enforcing these rights. The lack 
of a detailed rights of nature statutory 
framework could also possibly be said to 
have bearing on the effectiveness of the 
judiciary. 
3. Rights of Nature in 
Bolivia
As in Ecuador, in 2009 Bolivia responded 
to its socio-ecological crisis by adopting a 
new constitution that describes nature in 
the Preamble as the common home where 
all forms of life have always coexisted 
harmoniously. While it does not provide 
520 Judgment, Twenty Fifth Civil Court of Pichincha, Case No. 17325-2013-0038, 18 March 2013, Viteri y otros vs 
Ecuacorriente S.A, Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Procurador General del Estado). 
521 Grounds 6 and 9 of the judgment.
522 Ground 7 of the Judgment.
523 Judgment, Provincial Court of Pichincha, Case No. 17111-2013-0317, 20 June 2013  (Viteri y otros vs Ecuacorriente 
S.A, Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Procurador General del Estado). 
524 Judgment, Juridical Court of Colta, Case No. 06334-2014-1546, 10 December 2014 (Bonilla y otros vs Rhor Hugo).
525 Judgment, Provincial Court of Chimborazo, Case No. 06334-2014-1546, 24 August 2015.
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rights to nature, the Bolivian Constitution 
recognizes the ancestral values that 
underpin the Aymara culture, such as the 
Vivir Bien or Suma Qamaña (living well).526 
Like the principle of Buen Vivir or Sumak 
Kawsay in the Ecuadorean Constitution, 
this principle also refers to the notion of 
living well in harmony with nature and in 
equilibrium with all forms of life.527 This 
led to the adoption of the first statutory 
framework in the world that recognizes 
and aims to protect the rights of nature: 
the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth (Ley 
071 de Derechos de la Madre Tierra)528 
and the Framework Law of Mother Earth 
and Integral Development for Living Well 
(Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo 
Integral para Vivir Bien).529  
Historical context
At the dawn of the twenty-first century 
Bolivia labored through a crisis of statehood 
as a result of its decaying economic, social, 
political and legal structures. This process 
was especially characterized by the 
marginalization and exclusion of indigenous 
people and the crisis brought about two 
events of significant historical importance: 
the election of the first indigenous 
president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, and the 
formation of a Constitutional Assembly 
that was tasked to draft a new Constitution 
for the regeneration of the Bolivian State. 
In response to popular demand, mainly 
from indigenous organizations, the 
Constitutional Assembly presented a 
constitutional text that was accepted during 
a Constitutional Referendum in January 
2009. It came into force in February 2009.
The active and strong participation of 
indigenous organizations in the process 
of drafting the new Constitution led to 
the inclusion of references to the values 
of indigenous cultures, especially those 
related to the relationship between people 
and nature. Thus, the call to build a new 
form of coexistence with nature, mutually 
and complementarily and based on Vivir 
Bien, enabled the adoption of the two laws 
indicated above. The adoption of these 
also arose in part from a draft bill on the 
rights of Mother Earth that was proposed 
by the main indigenous organizations 
grouped together in the so-called “Pacto 
de Unidad”. Eventually submitted to the 
Plurinational Legislative Assembly,530  the 
draft bill was based on the proceedings 
of the Word People’s Conference on 
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother 
Earth held in Bolivia in April 2010, and it 
was based on the Universal Declaration 
of the Rights of Mother Earth adopted 
during this event.531 This Declaration 
defines Mother Earth as “a unique, 
526 Article 8.
527 Fernando Huanacuni Mamani Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir. Filosofías, políticas, estrategias y experiencias regionales 
(Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas-CAOI, 2010) 46.
528 Law of the Rights of Mother Earth No. 071, December 21, 2010.
529 Framework Law of Mother Earth and Holistic Development for Living Well No. 300, October 15, 2012.
530 Pacto de Unidad, “Anteproyecto de Ley de la Madre Tierra”, 7 November 2010, available at http://www.somossur.net/
crisis-del-capitalismo/todo-sobre-el-cambio-climatico/540-ley-de-la-madre-tierra.html [accessed 24 March 2016].
531 See the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth on https://pwccc.wordpress.com/support/ [accessed 20 
March 2016].
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indivisible, self-regulating community 
of interrelated beings that sustains, 
contains and reproduces all beings”,532 
and recognizes nature’s rights to life, to 
exist, to be respected, and to restoration, 
among other things.533 The work of the 
Pacto de Unidad was also a reaction to 
the exclusionary policy that was being 
implemented by the Morales government 
against indigenous organizations in 
order to promote the expansion of the 
extractive industry.534 The draft required 
the government to establish policies 
and measures to achieve a shift from an 
energy matrix based essentially on fossil 
fuels to one based on clean and renewable 
resources.535 As Hindery points out, the 
draft, if adopted, would have prevented 
the approval of the extractive projects 
planned by the Bolivian Government.536 
The draft was not approved. Instead, 
the government adopted the Law of the 
Rights of Mother Earth as an abbreviated 
version of the draft, and the Framework 
Law, which is a watered-down version of 
the draft, as it reflects on the one hand the 
ecocentrist aspirations of the indigenous 
people, and on the other, the development 
agenda of Morales’ government.
The statutory provisions
Although the Bolivian Constitution does 
not recognize the rights of nature in the 
same explicit way that the Ecuadorean 
Constitution does, it provides the basis 
for such recognition at the statutory level 
through the constitutionalization of the 
environmental right and the right of all 
living beings to develop in a “normal and 
permanent” way (article 33), as well as the 
incorporation of the ancestral indigenous 
value and cosmovision of Vivir Bien or 
Suma Qamaña (living well) in harmony 
with Mother Earth. 
The statute-based Law of the Rights of 
Mother Earth goes much further than 
the Bolivian Constitution and, from an 
ecocentric perspective, recognizes in 
elaborate terms the inherent rights of 
nature and the obligations and duties 
of the State and society to ensure 
respect for those rights.537 Respect for 
and recognition of the rights of nature 
are underpinned in the Law by a set of 
legally binding core principles such as 
harmony, promoting the collective good, 
a guarantee of regeneration, eschewing 
commercialization, and promoting 
multiculturalism.538 Mother Earth takes 
on the character of a collective subject of 
the public interest and is entitled to all of 
the rights recognized in the law.539 Thus, 
532 Ibid. article 1.
533 Ibid. article 2.
534 Derrick Hindery From Enron to Evo Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia (The 
University of Arizona Press, 2013) at 217.
535 Pacto de Unidad (n 46), articles 8.8 and 25.8.a.
536 Hindery (n 50) 217.
537 Article 1.
538 Article 2. 
539 Article 5. 
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Mother Earth has the rights to life, to the 
diversity of life, to water, to clean air, to 
equilibrium, to restoration and to pollution-
free existence.540 The Law states that the 
exercise of individual human rights is 
limited by the exercise of collective rights 
in the living systems of Mother Earth, and 
any conflict of rights must be resolved in 
ways that do not affect the functionality of 
such systems.541 In addition, it attempts 
to respond to the problems of the 
representation and justiciability of the 
rights of nature by establishing the Office 
of Mother Earth (Defensoría de la Madre 
Tierra), which has the function of ensuring 
the fulfillment of the rights of Mother 
Earth.542  
The Framework Law, for its part, 
establishes the vision and fundamentals 
of notion of integral development in 
harmony with Mother Earth to achieve 
Vivir Bien, and its seeks to guarantee the 
continued capacity of Mother Earth to 
regenerate natural systems, to strengthen 
local and ancestral practices, and to 
create (within a rights framework (various 
obligations and responsibilities with 
respect to nature.543  Considered a superior 
law operating at a higher level than other 
sectorial laws,544  the Framework Law 
reaffirms certain principles, including a 
prohibition on the commercialization of 
Mother Earth’s environmental functions, 
precaution, a guarantee of the restoration 
and regeneration of Mother Earth, and the 
importance of a harmonic relationship 
between the natural environment and 
the satisfaction of human needs.545 By 
establishing an individual and collective 
responsibility to report violations of the 
rights of Mother Earth, the Framework Law 
confers locus standi on public authorities 
and individuals and groups of people 
directly affected by such violations.546 The 
Framework Law also refers to the Office 
of Mother Earth for the protection and 
enforcement of the rights of Mother Earth 
(article 39). 
A critical appraisal
As a first point, despite these lofty 
provisions, numerous tensions are evident 
in the Bolivian Constitution between 
the ecocentric and anthropocentric 
approaches. It clearly contains provisions 
based on an ecocentric approach, but other 
provisions have a clear anthropocentric 
orientation. The Constitution establishes 
that “[t]he State places the highest value on 
human beings and assures development 
through the equitable redistribution of 
economic surplus in the social policies…”547 
540 Article 7.
541 Article 6. 
542 Article 10. 
543 Article 1. 
544 Article 2. 
545 Article 4. 
546 Article 39. However, that recognition is inconsistent with the actio popularis established in the Bolivian Constitution 
with regard to the defense of the environmental right (article 34).
547 Article 306. Emphasis added.
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It consequently recognizes the right to 
water and the environmental right, which 
mainly focus on human needs, human 
health and human well-being.548  
To eliminate poverty and social and 
economic exclusion, and to achieve 
well-being, the Constitution provides 
that the State must actively promote the 
industrialization of natural resources as a 
national priority.549  In fact, the exploration, 
exploitation, refining, industrialization, 
transport and sale of non-renewable 
natural resources are characterized as 
state necessities and public utilities.550 
Thus, the exploitation of natural resources 
is still an important component of 
the Bolivian economy, a reality that 
perpetuates the anthropocentric and 
neoliberal logic of development based on 
the extraction of natural resources and 
that seemingly contradicts the central 
tenet of the laws described above. 
Second, similar contradictions and 
inconsistencies appear in the context of 
the Framework Law. Despite its reference 
to the rights of nature, it aims to establish 
the vision and fundamentals of “integrated 
development” to achieve the Vivir Bien 
that is mainly focused on human needs. 
It is also inconsistent with its own core 
ecocentric foundation and with the rights 
of nature because it provides for the 
continued exploitation of natural resources 
as an obligation of the State in order to 
achieve social justice.551  As Prada argues, 
by promoting both the defense of Mother 
Earth and the discourse of the model 
of integral development, the framework 
law now “allows the endorsement of the 
extractivist model under the Mother Earth 
discourse.”552 To this end, the framework 
law “becomes a device that legalizes the 
extractivist model now presented under 
the Vivir Bien discourse”.553  
Third, there are contradictions and 
tensions between the progressive policies 
of welfare based on the extractivist model 
on the one hand and, on the other, the 
rights of nature. At the time of writing, the 
Bolivian Government has neither approved Bolivian Andes region. Photo credit: © Paola 
Villavicencio Calzadilla Louis J. Kotzé
548 Articles 16-19.
549 Articles 9.6, 316.6, and 355. 
550 Article 356.
551 See, for instance, articles 1, 3 and 18.
552 Raul Prada, ‘Matricidio del Estado patriarcal’, 25 July 2013, available at http://horizontesnomadas.blogspot.
co.za/2013/07/matricidio-y-estado-patriarcal.html  [accessed 5 April 2016].
553 Ibid.
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the enforcement measures needed to give 
effect to the Law of the Rights of Mother 
Earth and the Framework Law, nor has it 
established the Office for the Protection 
of Mother Earth. The establishment of this 
Office would have allowed progress to be 
made in promoting compliance with the 
rights of nature. Unfortunately, the clear 
commitment of the Bolivian government 
to intensifying the extractivist model has 
led to the adoption of laws and policies 
fostering the exploitation of natural 
resources that, as in the case of Ecuador, 
are in conflict with the requirement to 
protect the rights of nature. An example is 
the new Mining and Metallurgy Law (Ley 
535 de Minería y Metalurgia),554 which 
authorizes mining activities in protected 
natural areas (article 220)555 and imposes 
limitations on the rights of nature. Another 
is the Supreme Decree no 2366 of May 
2015, which legalizes the possibility of 
drilling for exploration purposes in all 22 
of Bolivia’s protected areas.
The contradictions and evident conflicting 
tensions between the executive and 
legislative actions described above are 
clearly reflected in a recent conflict that 
centered on the construction of a highway 
across the Isiboro Secure National Park 
and Indigenous Territory (Territorio 
Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure 
- TIPNIS) that arose between 2011 and 
2012. This project not only affects the 
rich biodiversity in the region, but also 
554 Mining and Metallurgy Law 535, 28 May, 2014.
555 It must be noted, though, that the Law requires that such activities must comply with environmental and related 
regulations, and must not affect the achievement of the objective of protecting the environment. 
negatively impacts on the traditional 
lifestyles of the indigenous people in the 
area. The TIPNIS conflict is exemplary 
of the enduring historical struggle for 
land and indigenous rights that has been 
taking place since the 1990’s, and of how 
the extractivist model remains paramount 
in the Bolivian political economy. Such 
conflict is an example of where the 
political and economic interests of the 
government collide with the rights of 
nature as set out in Bolivian law. More 
worryingly, it is an example of an instance 
where the statutory protection of the rights 
of Mother Earth is unable to withstand the 
onslaughts of state-sanctioned neoliberal 
economic development. 
4. Conclusion
This brief analysis suggests that the 
ecocentric-oriented rights of nature 
paradigm is at long last gaining a foothold 
in constitutional and statutory regimes. 
Whereas such a radical juridical regulatory 
reality would have been unthinkable 70 
years ago when the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, 
the Bolivian and Ecuadorean legal 
regimes are prying open steadfastly 
closed epistemological and regulatory 
spaces that allow us to re-imagine the 
role of human rights in the environmental 
protection paradigm. While there are 
evidently stark differences between what 
exists on paper and what occurs in reality, 
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these two countries, as pioneers of the 
paradigm of the rights of nature, provide 
us with valuable guidance in our efforts to 
rid our legal systems of deeply embedded 
notions of anthropocentrism and to pursue 
our continued efforts to provide for more 
ecocentric world views that are so critical 
in the time of the Anthropocene. Evidently 
at a practical level much more needs 
to be done and while it is a crucial first 
step to have constitutional and statutory 
provisions that seek to protect the rights of 
nature, the extent to which the law will be 
able to secure and enforce an ecocentric 
paradigm will significantly depend on 
political will and practical governance 
initiatives. In the end, a constitution, its 
rights, and the law generally are only as 
effective as the extent to which they are 
observed, respected and implemented. 
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1.  The right to a healthy environment in the Inter-American 
System: The American Convention on Human Rights 
and the San Salvador Protocol for Social, Economic and 
Cultural rights
The spirit of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was to recognize the value 
of the human being (referred to throughout human rights discourse as “el ser humano” 
in Spanish) after the Second World War, and to establish the juridical mechanisms to 
protect basic civil and political rights including freedom, equality, and human dignity. The 
ACHR does not mention any environmental human rights nor indicate whether national 
institutions should protect the environment and, if so, how. The only reference to socio-
economic and cultural rights in the ACHR is in article 26, which states: 
“The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through 
international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, 
with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the 
full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, 
and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American 
States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires”.556 
After the ACHR was adopted, many governments in Latin America realized that the 
protection of social, economic and cultural rights was fundamental to guarantee effective 
implementation of human rights. In 1988, the San Salvador Protocol (SSP) was adopted, 
The relationship between environmental and human 
rights protection under regional law in Latin America
Juan Manuel Rivero Godoy
556 Text in Spanish “Los Estados Partes se comprometen a adoptar providencias, tanto a nivel interno como mediante la 
cooperación internacional, especialmente económica y técnica, para lograr progresivamente la plena efectividad de 
los derechos que se derivan de las normas económicas, sociales y sobre educación, ciencia y cultura, contenidas en 
la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, reformada por el Protocolo de Buenos Aires, en la medida de 
los recursos disponibles, por vía legislativa u otros medios apropiados”. 
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with the intent of consolidating those 
rights and providing balance to the civil 
and political rights protected under the 
ACHR. Article 11 of the SSP establishes 
that:
(1) “Everyone shall have the right to live 
in a healthy environment and to have 
access to basic public services.”
(2) “The States Parties shall promote 
the protection, preservation, and 
improvement of the environment.”  
While on paper this looks promising, the 
difficulty, of course, lies in the enforcement 
of these provisions. Articles 19 (6) and 
(7) of the SSP provide for direct access 
to the Inter American Commission - a 
political institution - but only if rights to 
education or workers’ rights to unionize 
are violated. The remaining human rights 
identified in the SSP are not enforceable 
at the regional level, but only pursuant to 
national rules and in national institutions 
of the American States. This includes the 
right to a healthy environment. Thus, for 
the social and economic rights (including 
their rights to a healthy environment) 
protected in the SSP, the obligation is on 
States to guarantee the legal, juridical, and 
administrative mechanisms to ensure that 
their citizens are able to vindicate them.
2. Implementation of 
human rights protection 
in the Inter-American 
system
The main objective of the ACHR is to 
reinforce or complement the protection 
of human rights provided by the 
domestic laws of the various States 
of the Americas.557 The Charter of the 
Organization of American States provides 
that, “States are the first step of protection 
for human rights as a minimum, as a basic 
standard.”558 States must ensure that all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction enjoy 
free and full exercise of those rights and 
freedom (civil, politics, social, economic 
and social). If not, “anyone” can go to the 
Inter American system to claim his or her 
rights. It means that when a serious breach 
of fundamental rights occurs within the 
State´s borders, affected people can go, 
first, to the Inter American Commission 
and then, eventually, to the Inter American 
Court. Following the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights’ recognition of the right of 
petition, the ACHR foresees that everybody 
must have his or her day in Court, at least 
in front of national tribunals, because the 
direct access to the Inter American Court 
is eventual and uncertain.559 But how does 
this apply in the context of the right to a 
healthy environment?
557 As it can be seen in “Velázquez Rodríguez vs. Honduras”, sentence of 29/07/1988, par. 61, also in “Godínez Cruz 
vs. Honduras”, sentence of 20/01/1989, par. 64 and “Fairén Gabri y Solís Corrales vs. Honduras”, sentence of 
15/03/1989, par.85. 
558 See e.g. articles 2 and 25 of the ACHR which refer to the right to judicial protection.
559 Couture, 1942, p 101. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 10. (1948).
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For example, if a community decides to 
complain about a concession or permit 
granted for an international company 
to explore or extract natural resources 
such as oil or gas or timber, the people 
must depend on the laws of their State 
to allow them to bring judicial actions 
before national tribunals. If the State did 
no more than provide for administrative 
consultation, it would be breaching Article 
1 of both the ACHR and the SSP. This 
Article requires States to comply with the 
obligations therein identified, including the 
obligation to provide simple and effective 
access to justice. 
Although the SSP acknowledges and 
guarantees important third generation 
rights such as the right to a quality 
environment, the States of Latin America 
missed a rare opportunity by failing to 
provide for enforcement of these rights 
(beyond education and workers’ rights) 
in the Inter-American Commission or the 
Inter-American Court. Thus, a substantial 
reform of the Inter-American human 
rights system is needed at this time if 
Latin America is to have an effective 
system that protects the environment and 
allows all people to access justice in a 
meaningful way. 
Of course it is important to get a full 
protection of environmental interests 
indirectly as well, by cases related to right 
to life, health, freedom, etc. For instance, 
such cases as “Yanomami vs. Brazil”560 or 
“Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni 
Mayagna (Sumo) vs. Nicaragua”,561 “San 
Mateo de Huanchor vs. Perú”562 and 
others have protected the environment 
indirectly. However, the Inter American 
system of human rights might work better 
if it did not depend on other mechanisms 
to enforce environment rights as a human 
right. 
2.1. The Inter American 
Commission on Human 
Rights
Under the rules of procedure of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
(the Commission), any person or group of 
persons can lodge legal petitions about 
the violation of both the ACHR and the 
SSP. There is, however, a requirement, in 
articles 1-2 of the ACHR and articles 1-2 
of the SSP, that all human rights must be 
protected and implemented by national 
jurisdictions concretely or by general 
obligations undertaken by American 
States in their domestic jurisdictions. The 
Commission accepts a case only if these 
admissibility requirements are satisfied. 
560 Resolución 12/85, Caso No. 7615 (Brasil), 5 de marzo de 1985, en Informe Anual de la CIDH 1984-85, OEA/Ser.L/V/ 
II.66, Doc. 10 rev.1, 1 de octubre de 1985, 24, 31 (Caso Yanomami).
561 Caso de la Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni vs. Nicaragua. Sentencia de 31 de agosto de 2001. Serie C, nº 
79. Disponible en: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm (Último acceso el 18-04-2015).
562 V. CIDH. CIDH. Informe N° 69/04, Caso San Mateo Huanchor vs. Peru, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, Doc.5, rev.1, octubre de 
2004; y Inuit People Petition 1413/05 vs. the United States, December 7, 2005. Cf. OSOFSKY, Hari M. Inuit petition as 
a bridge? Beyond dialectics of climate change and indigenous people’s rights. American Indian Law Review. vol. 31 
(2007), p. 675-698. 
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However, the Commission is a political 
and not a juridical body and its 
recommendations are therefore not 
binding. In practice, the Commission’s 
function is to present a legal action to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights if 
it considers that any of the rights of the 
Convention or the Protocol have been 
violated. But this, itself, is a political 
decision and as a result, there is no direct 
right in juridical terms of access to the 
Inter-American Court. 
2.2. The Inter American Court of 
Human Rights 
The Inter American Court of Human 
Rights (the Court) is the judicial organ of 
the Inter-American system created by the 
ACHR. Unlike the Commission, it is not 
an organ of the Organization of American 
States. 
The litigant parties before the Court are the 
Commission on behalf of the petitioners563 
and the States; that is, the people who 
are the subjects for whom the system 
was created are represented in the Court 
only indirectly. Moreover, each State Party 
must declare that it recognizes as binding 
the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters 
relating to the interpretation or application 
of the ACHR, thus effectively requiring 
States to allow themselves to be sued by 
their own nationals before the Court for it 
to be effective.564  Because such suits can 
have significant economic and political 
costs to vulnerable people or individuals, 
submission before the Court is weak, 
rendering the SSP less effective than 
many people had anticipated, because 
not all the rights envisaged there can be 
enforced, except in the national legal order 
where they can sue in their own State 
courts under domestic laws.  
Where the Court finds that there has been 
a violation of a right or freedom protected 
by either the ACHR or the SSP, it might rule 
that the injured party must be assured the 
enjoyment of the right or freedom that 
was violated. The remedies can include 
guarantees of non-repetition requiring 
the State to adopt national legislation that 
imposes, amongst other thing, economic 
obligations (as in the case Gelman vs. 
Uruguay), In cases of extreme gravity and 
urgency, and when necessary to avoid 
irreparable damage to persons, the Court 
can adopt such provisional measures as 
it deems necessary in the matter it has 
under its consideration.
Today, the Court´s Latin American 
jurisprudence does not include any 
leading case in which petitioners sought 
protection of the environment as an 
independent claim. One reason is that 
States do not recognize the competence 
of the Court in environmental matters 
directly in accordance with the text of SSP. 
563 ACHR, Art. 55.
564 Not all the States have made a statement in recognition the jurisdiction of the Court for all cases. Even, in a single 
case the State can made such a statement only for this issue. 
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Nevertheless, in the cases discussed in the 
following section, environmental issues 
were put before the Court, although always 
indirectly through claims of violation of 
other rights. In general, references to the 
violation of specific human rights refer to 
persons directly affected, and not to the 
environment as a singular object. But the 
Court’s jurisprudence lacks even a human 
perspective insofar as neither it nor the 
Commission recognizes the dignity basis 
of all of the Convention’s rights, whether 
substantive or procedural. Thus, although 
some of the cases (as will be seen below) 
vindicate human rights, they tend to focus 
on the right narrowly and not in its fuller 
context as important to the human beings 
that the inter-American rights protection 
system are meant to serve.
3.  The dependence of 
environmental protection 
on human rights claims 
This section describes some leading 
cases that confirm that environmental 
rights have not yet been fully implemented 
(directly) in the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.  These 
cases are representative of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in these areas.
1. Pueblo Kaliña y Lokono Vs. 
Suriname (2015)
Suriname granted a national company 
a public concession for mining within 
an indigenous reserve. The indigenous 
community was concerned about 
environmental pollution and brought 
claims to the Commission concerning 
the right to consultation, the right to 
information, guarantees of prompt and 
effective judicial recourse, the right 
to property, and the right to juridical 
personality. In this case, the Court based 
its opinion on the state’s failure to have 
recognized the indigenous groups as 
bearers of property rights, and the 
concommitant issuance of licenses for 
mining operations within natural reserves 
that formed part of the ancestral lands of 
the indigenous populations: 
… la ausencia, hasta la fecha, de un 
marco normativo que reconozca la 
personalidad jurídica de los pueblos 
indígenas, por lo que esta no ha 
sido reconocida en favor de los 
Pueblos Kaliña y Lokono hasta la 
actualidad. Asimismo, el Estado no 
ha establecido las bases normativas 
que permitan un reconocimiento del 
derecho a la propiedad colectiva 
de las tierras, territorios y recursos 
naturales de los pueblos indígenas 
Kaliña y Lokono. Esta falta de 
reconocimiento ha sido acompañada 
por la emisión de títulos de propiedad 
individuales a favor de personas 
no indígenas; el otorgamiento de 
concesiones y licencias para la 
realización de operaciones mineras, 
y el establecimiento y continuidad 
de tres reservas naturales en parte 
de sus territorios ancestrales. 
Las violaciones del derecho a la 
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propiedad colectiva derivadas de 
esta situación continúan hasta la 
fecha. Además, ni el otorgamiento 
de concesiones y licencias mineras 
ni el establecimiento y permanencia 
hasta el día de hoy de reservas 
naturales, han sido sometidos a 
procedimiento alguno de consulta 
dirigido a obtener el consentimiento 
previo, libre e informado de los 
Pueblos Kaliña y Lokono.565 
Ultimately, the Court acknowledged that 
the “protection of the environment is part 
of the general interest.” However, the Court 
did not elaborate the scope of the term 
“general interest”, nor even its content or 
its meaning to States and to the people for 
future actions. 
2. Pueblo índigena de Kichwa de 
Sarayaku vs. Ecuador (Indigenous 
People) (2012)
In this case, Ecuador granted a public 
permit for works to an international 
company to prospect for, and extract, oil in 
the territory of the Kichwas, consequently 
depriving the local people of access to 
their own natural resources. Furthermore, 
the company566 used a great quantity of 
explosives to prospect which affected the 
availability of food and housing for the 
indigenous people in question. The Kichwa 
community claimed violations of their 
rights to life, private property, personal 
liberty, personal integrity, and their rights 
to consultation. Typically, Latin American 
countries have adopted internally the right 
to consultation of the local community 
before the issuance of a permit to exploit 
and extract natural resources, although it 
needs to be implemented according to law 
or administrative rules.
Agreeing with the Kichwa claims, the 
Court held that Ecuador must consult the 
indigenous people every time it decides 
to grant a public concession or permit 
for prospecting or extracting natural 
resources that affect the local community. 
However, the Court decided the case purely 
on the basis of the human rights claims, 
without focusing on the environmental 
impacts and dimensions of the dispute. 
3. Claude Reyes y otros vs. Chile 
(2006).
This case also involved the failure to consult 
local residents. The case concerned 
the future installation of a multinational 
company in forestation activities which 
would have had a high environmental 
impact in the Rio Condor´s Village, despite 
supposed sustainability aims. Claude 
Reyes and others represented a civil 
society organization567 that promoted 
environmental protection. The civil society 
organization argued that the project would 
threaten Chile’s sustainable development 
and its environment, and that the Chilean 
565 Sentence of 25/11/2015 Caso “Pueblos Kaliña y Lokono vs. Surinam”, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.
566 Compañía General de Combustibles (CGC). 
567 Fundación Terram. Par. 57-11 of the Opinion. 
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government had failed to give the public all 
the information it needed to meaningfully 
engage in the debate regarding the 
efficacy of the extractive activities. 
Because it was framed in terms of the right 
to information to debate and to express 
opinions, the case was lodged as a claim 
of violation of freedom of thought and 
expression568 and specifically of the right 
to have prompt and effective recourse to 
access to information. Again, the Court 
agreed with the petitioners, but purely on 
the basis of their human rights, without 
reference to the environmental impact 
or to appropriate remedies that would be 
necessary to protect the environment. In 
the end, the project was not executed due 
to financial constraints.
4. Conclusion
The brief analysis in this chapter 
shows the incremental development of 
environmental protection within a human 
rights perspective in Latin America. There 
are many arguments that conspire against 
an effective right to a healthy environment 
for the people of Latin America. 
First, the inter-American system requires 
each State to provide its specific consent 
to be sued before either the Commission 
or the Court can assume jurisdiction 
and, to date, no State in Latin America 
countries has allowed itself to be sued by 
its nationals in the Inter-American Court 
(or any international tribunal) for violation 
of environmental rights. 
Second, the recognition of environmental 
rights in the SSP reflects an important 
acknowledgement of the salience of 
environmental protection to the people 
of Latin America. Nevertheless, it does 
not sufficiently advance these interests 
because of the impediments it places 
to those who would seek to vindicate 
environmental rights. Citizens must 
have the opportunity to access national 
tribunals to protect their environmental 
rights, and to further develop other rights. 
Unfortunately many countries have not 
provided such access legislatively or 
administratively. This imposes a special 
burden on vulnerable populations and on 
the marginalized indigenous populations 
who live throughout the region. While 
there are channels to gain access to 
the Commission, its power is limited to 
providing soft law recommendations and 
references to the Court where it deems it 
to be politically appropriate. The Court’s 
own jurisdiction is limited to cases 
568 Text in Spanish: Los hechos expuestos por la Comisión en la demanda habrían ocurrido entre mayo y agosto de 
1998 y se refieren a la supuesta negativa del Estado de brindar a los señores Marcel Claude Reyes, Sebastián Cox 
Urrejola y Arturo Longton Guerrero toda la información que requerían del Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras, en 
relación con la empresa forestal Trillium y el Proyecto Río Condor, el cual era un proyecto de deforestación que se 
llevaría a cabo en la décimo segunda región de Chile y “podía ser perjudicial para el medio ambiente e impedir el 
desarrollo sostenible de Chile”.  La Comisión indicó que tal negativa se dio sin que el Estado “argumentar[a] una 
justificación válida de acuerdo con la legislación chilena”, así como a que supuestamente “no [les] otorgó un recurso 
judicial efectivo para impugnar una violación del derecho al acceso a la información” y “no [les] aseguró los derechos 
al acceso a la información y a la protección judicial, ni contó con mecanismos establecidos para garantizar el 
derecho al acceso a la información pública”.
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referred to it by the Commission, which 
in turn is dependent on the acquiescence 
of the States. Thus, although the Inter-
American system for the protection of 
human rights on paper protects a broad 
and comprehensive set of rights, the 
effective implementation of such rights is 
weakened by procedural and institutional 
obstacles.
Ultimately, in Latin America, the regional 
level is just as important as national 
environmental rights protection, but it is 
incomplete; if enforcement at the regional 
level were better, it could help galvanize 
and support national constitutional 
environmental rights; as it is, the inter-
American system should follow what is 
being done in some of the national courts 
where these rights are better respected 
and more fully advanced. 
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1. Introduction
While it is widely accepted that there is a very close connection between human rights 
and the environment, what exactly the nature of that connection is, is not always 
clarified. Two fundamental aspects of the relationship are recognized by John Knox, 
in his Preliminary Report on human rights and the environment, namely that human 
rights and the environment are interdependent and secondly, that the relationship of 
interdependence is complex, involving multiple rights of multiple people and often whole 
communities.570 
The question to be addressed in this paper is whether human rights law, as it is currently 
practiced, adequately recognizes and reflects the complex interdependence of human 
rights and the environment. In particular, do human rights courts take sufficient account 
of the complicated ways in which individuals, communities and the environment are 
interconnected when making decisions in cases concerning the human rights impacts 
of environmental harm? 
2. Protecting the environment via human rights law
Growing evidence of the devastating impact of environmental degradation on a wide 
variety of human rights has, over the past few decades, led to increased legal recognition 
of the interface between human rights and the environment. This has taken the form 
of the ‘greening’ of human rights law, i.e. the recognition that environmental damage 
may lead to a violation of rights such as the right to health, the right to life and the right 
Judicial implementation of rights based approaches to 
environmental governance: Regional Perspectives569
Evadne Grant 
569 For a more detailed discussion of some of the issues raised in this article, see E Grant, ‘Re-imagining Adjudication: 
Human Rights Courts and the Environment’ in A Grear and E Grant (eds), Thought, Law, Rights and Action in the Age 
of Environmental Crisis (Edward Elgar 2015) 155. 
570 Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean 
healthy and sustainable environment: Preliminary report, A/HRC/22/43, 24 December 2012, para 10.
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to an adequate standard of living. There 
is also increasing recognition on the part 
of human rights courts of the important 
role of procedural rights, such as the 
right to information and participation, 
in providing support for individuals and 
organizations concerned with protecting 
the environment.571 And there has been 
increased recognition of a substantive 
right to a healthy/sustainable environment, 
particularly in the constitutional context.572 
In spite of this, the use of human rights law, 
particularly international human rights law, 
in seeking redress for environmental harm 
is often questioned. As Pederson argues:
From a legal point of view, the fact 
that a particular [environmental] 
event threatens the enjoyment of a 
right does not necessarily entail that 
the event violates the said right.573  
Critics of a rights based approach to 
pursuing environmental protection, 
argue that human rights frameworks and 
adjudication are ill-equipped to deal with 
environmental claims. For example, it is 
often contended that human rights law is 
concerned with the rights of individuals, 
which severely limits the extent to which 
human rights claims can be used to 
address environmental problems, such as 
pollution, that affect whole communities 
or global environmental problems such 
as climate change.574 It is therefore often 
argued that where environmental damage 
is considered in human rights cases, 
consideration is necessarily limited to 
how a particular right of a particular 
individual might have been affected, and 
a rights based approach is therefore not 
helpful in addressing the wider impact 
of environmental degradation on whole 
communities or the differential impact of 
environmental damage on multiple rights. 
The articulation of rights in many 
international instruments reinforces 
an individualistic and disconnected 
understanding of human rights, defining 
rights in isolation from each other and from 
the environmental context. Separation 
of civil and political rights from social 
and economic rights by incorporation 
into separate treaties highlights the 
disconnection. Worse still, the potential 
to use social and economic rights 
adjudication to defend the environment 
is often further reduced because human 
rights courts commonly have only limited 
jurisdiction over social and economic 
rights.  
However, while critics of the use of human 
rights law in addressing environmental 
concerns undoubtedly have a point, 
human rights law is much more varied 
and less static than their account allows. 
Focusing on the jurisprudence of the 
571 See D Shelton, ‘Developing substantive environmental rights’ (2010) 1 JHRE 89.
572 See D R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution (UBC Press 2012).
573 O W Pedersen, ‘Climate change and human rights: amicable or arrested development? (2010) 1 JHRE 236, 244.
574 See for example, A Boyle, ‘The role of international human rights law in the protection of the environment’ in A Boyle 
and M Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Clarendon 1996) 43; C Gearty, ‘Do 
human rights help of hinder environmental protection?’ (2010) 1 JHRE 7. 
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three regional human rights tribunals, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
the African Commission and Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
Inter-American Commission and Court 
of Human Rights, this paper considers, 
first, how human rights courts approach 
arguments that environmental harm has 
led to a violation of human rights and 
whether these approaches are necessarily 
limited by a lack of understanding of the 
interdependence and complexity of the 
relationship between human rights and 
the environment. Secondly, it considers 
how existing practice might assist in 
developing a human rights approach 
to environmental protection which fully 
recognizes and ensures respect for the 
interdependence of human rights and 
the environment – in all its glorious 
complexity. 
3. Regional Human Rights 
Tribunals 
Among the three regional human rights 
systems, only the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
expressly recognizes a substantive 
environmental human right (Article 24). 
The ACHPR is also the only regional 
human rights treaty that does not draw 
a distinction between civil and political 
rights and social and economic rights, 
protecting both categories of rights 
equally and explicitly acknowledging, 
in its preamble, that ‘the satisfaction of 
economic, social and cultural rights is a 
guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights’. 
By contrast, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) protects only civil 
and political rights. Social and economic 
rights are provided for separately in the 
European Social Charter (ESC). Neither 
instrument recognizes a substantive 
environmental right. While accession 
to the ECHR is a condition of Council 
of Europe membership, this is not 
required for the ESC and the ECtHR has 
no jurisdiction over the ESC. Within the 
Inter-American system, the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 
similarly focuses on civil and political 
rights, while the San Salvador Protocol to 
the American Convention makes separate 
provision for social and economic rights 
including a right to a healthy environment 
(Article 11). However, the jurisdiction of the 
Inter-American Commission and Court of 
Human Rights over the rights protected 
under the San Salvador Protocol, including 
the right to a healthy environment, is 
limited.575  
The picture that emerges from this brief 
summary of the three main regional 
human rights frameworks is very much 
- but fortunately not entirely - one of 
disconnection between civil and political 
rights and social and economic rights, 
limited access to legal redress for violation 
of social and economic rights and lack 
575 See O R Ruiz-Chiriboga, ‘The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties – 
Non-Enforceability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System’ (2013) 31 NQHR 159.
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of specific provision for environmental 
rights. Only the African system explicitly 
incorporates features which clearly 
facilitate a human rights based approach 
to environmental protection. But this 
is, of course, far too limited a view of 
the operation of the regional human 
rights systems and of human rights 
adjudication in general. The meaning 
and scope of right are not determined by 
human rights treaties in the abstract, but 
through interpretation, elaboration and 
application by human rights institutions. 
The extent to which environmental harm 
can be redressed via human rights law 
is thus crucially dependent on the extent 
to which those institutions recognize the 
interdependence of human rights and the 
environment and the complex ways in 
which that interdependence plays out in 
practice. 
4. Connecting the dots: 
Environment, Rights and 
Communities 
Critics of a human rights approach to 
environmental protection often focus on 
a number of particular obstacles which, 
it is argued, limit the extent to which 
human rights law can provide redress 
for environmental damage. One of the 
obstacles often noted is that access 
to human rights tribunals is restricted 
due to standing rules that permit only 
certain individuals to bring claims to 
human rights institutions and which 
therefore exclude many environmental 
claims. Another limitation is that human 
rights claims provide opportunities for 
vindication of individual rights only and 
that lack of recognition of collective or 
community rights means that the full 
impact of environmental damage on 
whole communities cannot be considered. 
A third inadequacy often highlighted is 
that human rights approaches tend to 
individualize rights by failing to recognize 
the interdependence of all human 
rights and the cumulative impact of 
environmental degradation on diverse 
rights. But what is the evidence on 
which these arguments are based? This 
section considers what the practice of the 
regional human rights institutions tells us 
about the perceived obstacles to bringing 
human rights claims in cases alleging 
environmental harm. 
Scrutiny of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
provides some support for the view that 
the scope for bringing environmental 
claims is limited. In relation to standing, 
for example, the ECHR (art 34) specifies 
that in order for an applicant to bring a 
case to the ECtHR, he or she must be a 
‘victim’ of a violation of one of the rights 
protected under the Convention. The 
ECtHR has interpreted this narrowly, 
saying that in order to bring a claim, an 
applicant or a group of applicants must be 
‘personally affected by an alleged violation 
of a Convention right’.576 The ECtHR has 
576 Karner v Austria App no 40016/98 (ECtHR 24 July 2003) para 25. 
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also emphasized in a number of cases 
that the ECHR does not provide protection 
of the environment as such and that 
public interest claims seeking to protect 
the environment as a common good are 
not permitted.577  
Despite its restrictive approach to standing, 
the ECtHR has increasingly been willing to 
examine complaints that environmental 
damage has had an adverse impact on 
particular rights protected under the ECHR 
and to consider arguments for broadening 
the scope of a number of ECHR rights to 
encompass environmental concerns. 
Thus the ECtHR has recognized that that 
the impact of environmental damage on 
a number of specific rights, including the 
right to life (art 2), the right to private and 
family life (art 8) and the right to a fair trial 
(art 6), may lead to violation of those rights. 
For example, the ECtHR has recognized 
that if environmental pollution or excessive 
noise and smells have a negative impact 
on the wellbeing of individuals and prevent 
them from enjoying their homes, the right to 
private and family life may be breached.578 
While not explicitly acknowledged by the 
ECtHR the jurisprudence does reveal an 
underlying appreciation of the connections 
between environmental harm and a 
number of different rights particularly 
between the right to private and family life, 
the right to health and the right to a healthy 
environment. 
However, the ECHR jurisprudence 
remains rather narrowly focused on the 
rights of individual claimants. In order 
to engage article 8 (the right to private 
and family life), the key question for 
the ECtHR is whether a direct causal 
link can be established between the 
environmental harm complained of and 
the individual claimant’s ability to enjoy 
his or her home. In Kyrtatos v Greece, for 
example, the applicants argued that their 
rights under article 8 had been breached 
because the Greek authorities had failed 
to prevent the destruction of a wetland 
situated close to their property and that 
their enjoyment of their home had been 
negatively affected as a consequence.579 
The ECtHR rejected the claim, arguing that 
it had not been shown that the damage to 
the wetland and wildlife living there had 
a direct impact on the wellbeing of the 
applicants and their ability to enjoy their 
home. This case, arguably, demonstrates 
the limitations of a narrow approach that 
focuses exclusively on the extent to which 
it can be shown that a particular right of 
a particular individual has been affected 
and fails to acknowledge the full impact 
of environmental destruction. However, 
even in Kyrtatos, the majority judgment 
indicated that if, for example, the 
argument had been that the destruction of 
a forest had affected the quality of life of 
the applicants, they may have had a case. 
This suggests that if the applicants had 
577 See Council of Europe, Manual on Human Rights and the Environment (2nd edn, Council of Europe Publishing 2012) 
7; Ilhan v Turkey App no 22277/93 (ECtHR 27 June 2000) para 52-53. 
578 López Ostra v Spain App no 16798/90 (ECtHR 9 December 1994); Guerra v Italy App no 116/1996/735/932 (ECtHR 
19 February 1998); Hatton v UK App no 36022/97(ECtHR 8 July 2003).
579 Kyrtatos v Greece App no 41666/98 (ECtHR 22 May 2003).
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formulated their complaint more clearly 
in terms of the impact of deterioration of 
the environment on their quality of life, 
rather than in terms of protection of the 
environment itself, they may have been 
more successful.580   
In spite of the narrow approach taken in 
Kyratos, the ECtHR has continued to widen 
the scope of article 8 in ‘environmental’ 
cases as demonstrated by the case of 
Taşkin v Turkey.581 The applicants in 
Taşkin raised concerns about the risk 
to the environment posed by the use of 
sodium cyanide during the extraction 
process at a gold mine situated close to 
their properties, arguing that this posed a 
risk to their right to respect for private and 
family life (art 8) as well as their right to 
life (art 2). Prior to the granting of permits 
to operate the mine, an environmental 
impact report had been prepared for the 
Turkish government, which identified 
serious potential risks to the environment 
and human health. In spite of this, the 
Ministry of the Environment granted 
permission for the mine to begin operating. 
The Turkish authorities subsequently 
ignored court judgments that highlighted 
the risks and the judicial annulment of the 
decision to issue an operating permit. The 
Turkish government argued that article 
8 was inapplicable as it had not been 
shown that the cyanidation process had 
in fact directly impacted the applicants’ 
right to respect for private and family life 
and that in the absence of a ‘serious and 
imminent risk’, there had been no breach 
of article 8. The Court disagreed, holding 
that article 8 applied if an environmental 
impact assessment had established a 
serious risk that was likely to affect the 
applicants in such a way as to affect their 
private and family life. The Court reasoned 
that this conclusion is in line with previous 
decisions holding that article 8 applies 
to situations in which environmental 
pollution affects individuals’ wellbeing and 
enjoyment of their homes, even if there 
is no evidence of serious danger to their 
health. 
Taşkin moves the jurisprudence 
forward, making provision for risks to 
the environment to be considered in the 
context of article 8, rather than requiring 
applicants to wait until actual damage 
has occurred. However, the court is clearly 
reluctant to consider the potential effect 
of environmental risks such as those at 
stake in Taşkin in the absence of the risk 
of impact on the rights of a particular 
individual or group of individuals who 
have standing to bring the matter before 
the court. 
Although, as noted above, the ECtHR 
has explicitly stated that public interest 
claims are not permitted under the ECHR, 
there is one area in which the Court has 
demonstrated an understanding that 
protection of the environment is a matter 
of general interest, namely in cases which 
raise concerns about the environmental 
580 See the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Zagrebelsky in Kyrtatos.
581 Taşkin v Turkey App no 46117/99 (ECtHR 10 November 2004).
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consequences of developments on private 
property. While the right to property enjoys 
protection under the ECHR, the right is 
subject to the right of public authorities 
to ‘enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest’ 
(art 1 of protocol 1 ECHR). In Hamer v 
Belgium, for example, the ECtHR upheld a 
decision of the Belgian authorities to order 
demolition of the applicant’s holiday home, 
which had been built in a forest without 
planning permission.582 The Belgian 
Government argued that the demolition 
order had been made in order to protect 
the environment, which was accepted by 
the court as a legitimate aim. The court 
concluded on that basis that interference 
with the applicant’s right to property was 
justified and that there had therefore been 
no violation of the right. In the course 
of the judgment, the ECtHR noted that 
although the ECHR do not provide specific 
protection for the environment, the 
importance of environmental protection 
has become an increasingly important 
consideration in implementing rights 
under the Convention. More importantly, 
the Court indicated unequivocally that in 
the context of justifying restrictions on 
property rights, the collective interest of 
the public in protection of the environment 
can trump individual rights: 
The environment is a cause whose 
defence arouses the constant and 
sustained interest of the public, and 
consequently the public authorities. 
Financial imperatives and even 
certain fundamental rights, such as 
ownership, should not be afforded 
priority over environmental protection 
considerations, in particular when 
the State has legislated in this 
regard.583 
While the ECtHR has made important 
progress in ‘greening’ rights, particularly 
in broadening the scope of the 
right to private and family life and 
acknowledging environmental concerns 
in counterbalancing private property 
rights, the overall assessment of the 
ECHR ‘environmental’ jurisprudence 
is that it provides grist to the mill of 
critics of a human rights approach to 
environmental protection. The ECtHR 
remains constrained by its individualistic 
focus which fails to acknowledge the 
interdependence of human rights and 
the environment, disconnects individuals 
from communities and turns a blind eye to 
the large-scale impact of environmental 
destruction.
In contrast, cases decided by both the 
African and Inter-American human rights 
institutions demonstrate far greater 
engagement with the complexity of 
the connection between human rights 
and the environment, moving beyond a 
focus on individual rights and individual 
applicants. One of the most significant 
characteristics of the environmental 
582 Hamer v Belgium App no 21861/03 (ECtHR 27 November 2007).
583 Hamer para 79.
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jurisprudence of the African and Inter-
American institutions is the recognition 
of group claims. This is an important 
factor in the development of a broader 
approach to environmental human rights 
that recognizes that most environmental 
claims concern whole communities rather 
than isolated individuals and that the 
relationship between human rights and 
the environment is much more complex 
than ‘one applicant, one right’.
Like the ECHR, the Inter-American system 
does not permit public interest claims 
and although the approach to standing 
of the Inter-American Commission is 
somewhat more flexible than that of the 
ECtHR, evidence of violation of the rights 
of particular, identifiable human victims 
remains a requirement.584 This was clearly 
articulated in the case of Metropolitan 
Nature Reserve v Panama, for example, 
where the Inter-American Commission 
ruled that a petition brought on behalf of 
the citizens of Panama challenging the 
construction of a road through a nature 
reserve was inadmissible.585 Significantly, 
however, the Commission confirmed that 
the need for identifiable human victims 
does not preclude group claims, as long 
as the group is clearly defined and the 
rights of individual members of the group 
are affected.586 The recognition of group 
claims has opened up more possibilities 
for bringing environmental claims within 
the Inter-American system and much of 
the ‘environmental’ jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Commission and Court 
of Human Rights has been developed 
in the context of group claims involving 
indigenous communities who are able to 
satisfy the requirement of being clearly 
identifiable groups.  
While the recognition of communal 
claims is important in itself, it is the 
understanding of the complex relationship 
of indigenous communities with the land 
traditionally occupied by such groups and 
the broad ranging impact of environmental 
degradation on multiple rights that has 
given impetus to environmental claims 
within the Inter-American system. In the 
case of Maya Indigenous Communities of 
the Toledo District v Belize, for example, 
the Inter-American Commission held that 
the State of Belize had violated the right 
to property (art 21 ACHR) of the Maya 
people by its failure to recognize and 
protect their communal right to traditional 
lands.587 However, as the quote below 
amply demonstrates, it was not merely 
the recognition that their traditional lands 
were owned by the Maya community as 
a group that is significant - the particular 
relationship of the Maya people with 
584 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in 
Violation of the Convention (Arts 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 
of 9 December 1994, para 45.
585 Metropolitan Nature Reserve v Panama, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 11.533, Report No 
88/03 (22 October 2003) para 34.
586 Metropolitan Nature Reserve, para 32.
587 Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v Belize, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Case 12.053, Report No 40/04 (12 October 2004) para 151-153. The failure to consult with the Maya people was 
considered to be an aspect of the violation of the right to property.  
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the land plays an important part in the 
recognition that their rights had been 
violated:  
[T]he organs of the inter-American 
human rights system have 
acknowledged that indigenous 
peoples enjoy a particular 
relationship with the lands and 
resources traditionally occupied 
and used by them, by which those 
lands and resources are considered 
to be owned and enjoyed by the 
indigenous community as a whole 
and according to which the use 
and enjoyment of the land and its 
resources are integral components 
of the physical and cultural survival 
of the indigenous communities 
and the effective realization of their 
human rights more broadly.588  
The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights subsequently extended recognition 
of communal rights to property to 
non-indigenous groups.589 In the case 
of Saramaka People v Suriname, for 
example, it was argued that although the 
Saramaka people are not indigenous to 
the area they inhabit, but are descended 
from African slaves, they are a distinct 
social, cultural and economic group who 
have the same cultural, spiritual and 
material relationship with their lands as 
indigenous communities.590 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights agreed, 
holding that the Saramaka people were 
entitled to the same protection of their 
communal lands as indigenous groups.591 
Further elaborating on the scope of the 
communal right to property of indigenous 
and non-indigenous communities, the 
court specified that the right to property 
of indigenous communities encompasses 
ownership of the natural resources 
necessary to enable communities to 
continue their traditional way of life. 
The court emphasized that protecting 
the environment was a vital aspect of 
protecting the right of communities to use 
and enjoy their traditional lands and that 
independent environmental and social 
impact assessments must be carried out 
before permission is granted for resource 
exploitation on traditional lands. 
While the refusal to permit public interest 
claims under the Inter-American human 
rights system continues to inhibit 
environmental claims, the recognition 
of group rights to property begins to 
open up other possibilities for the wider 
recognition of communal rights to a 
sustainable and healthy environment. 
Moreover the recognition that protecting 
the right to property includes protection 
of the environment as well as related 
rights such as the collective right to 
cultural identity,592 challenges many of 
the arguments put forward by critics of 
588 Maya Indigenous Communities, para 114.
589 Moiwana Village v Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Right, Series C No 124 (15 June 2005).
590 Saramaka People v Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No 172 (28 Nov 2007).
591 Saramaka, para 86.
592 See eg Kitchwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No 245 
(27 June 2012).
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rights based approaches to environmental 
protection. The Inter-American approach 
demonstrates an understanding of the 
interdependence of human rights and 
the environment and an appreciation 
of the complex interaction between a 
range of rights and the environment. 
Although recognition of communal 
rights by the Inter-American institutions 
remains limited to indigenous and quasi-
indigenous communities, the extension of 
recognition of communal rights to property 
from indigenous to non-indigenous 
groups suggests that there may be scope 
for further broadening of communal rights 
arguments in the environmental context. 
The African system demonstrates and 
even greater capacity to overcome the 
supposed limitations of a rights-based 
approach to environmental protection 
than either the European or Inter-American 
systems. First, the ACHPR takes a much 
more generous approach to standing 
than either of the other regional human 
rights instruments discussed. It imposes 
no ‘victim’ requirement, no requirement 
that applicants prove that they have been 
directly affected by the alleged breach 
or any need, even, for applicants to be 
citizens of countries that are party to 
the Charter.593 The African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission), moreover, does not require 
that applicants specify which provisions 
of the Charter are alleged to have been 
breached, only requiring that enough 
information is provided to enable it to 
determine the factual basis of the alleged 
violation and that sources of information 
may include media reports.594  
The progressive procedural framework and 
the fact that the ACHPR —uniquely among 
the regional systems —incorporates a 
substantive environmental human right 
specifically formulated as a group right 
greatly facilitates environmental claims. 
In spite of the fact that the number of 
environmental cases brought within 
the African system is regrettably small, 
important lessons can be learned from the 
approach of the African institutions. 
In the well-known Ogoni case, two 
NOGs filed complaints on behalf of the 
Ogoni people, a minority community, 
who live in the Niger Delta, alleging that 
the Government of Nigeria had violated 
a number of rights under the ACHPR, 
including the right to a ‘satisfactory’ 
environment (art 24), the right to health 
(art 16), and the right to life (art 4).595 
The claim arose from devastating 
environmental damage, including oil 
spills and soil and water contamination 
resulting from oil extraction operations in 
the Niger Delta, which, it was agued, the 
593 Article 55 and 56 ACHPR. In Maria Baes v Zaire, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 
31/89 (1995) a Danish national submitted a communication to the Commission which was declared admissible. 
Access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is more limited, see art 5 of the Protocol to the ACHPR on 
the African Court. 
594 Jawara v The Gambia, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 147/95 and 149/96 
(2000). 
595 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 155/96 (2001) (Ogoni case).
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Nigerian Government failed to regulate or 
monitor satisfactorily. 
There are a number of significant features 
of the decision of the African Commission 
in the Ogoni case which challenge the view 
that human rights law provides only limited 
scope to protect the environment. First, 
the African Commission had no difficulty 
in recognizing the communication as a 
public interest claim, or actio popularis, 
which, in its view, was ‘wisely allowed under 
the African Charter’.596 This demonstrates 
very clearly that there is nothing inherent 
in the nature of human rights law 
preventing human rights courts from 
providing an avenue for consideration of 
claims of environmental damage affecting 
human rights brought on behalf of the 
wider community. Perhaps the reluctance 
on the part of the ECtHR and the Inter-
American Commission and Court to 
permit public interest claims has more to 
do with fears of opening floodgates than 
any fundamental characteristic of human 
rights adjudication. 
Secondly, as we have already seen in relation 
to the Inter-American jurisprudence, the 
Ogoni case demonstrates that there is 
scope for recognition of communal rights 
as an aspect of human rights law. This is 
established by the ACHPR itself, as both 
the right to a ‘satisfactory’ environment 
(art 24) and the right to free disposal of 
wealth and natural resources (art 21) 
are expressed as communal rights in 
the Charter. The African Commission 
upheld the complaints in relation to both 
rights, concluding that ‘the Ogoni people’ 
as a distinct community are protected 
by the peoples’ rights provided for in the 
ACHPR.597  
The third noteworthy aspect of the decision 
is the extent to which the Commission 
acknowledged the interdependence of 
environmental protection and a range 
of rights. Rather than focusing on the 
impact of environmental destruction on a 
particular individual right, the Commission 
directed attention to the wider impact 
of pollution and other environmental 
damage, linking this to a number of rights 
- rights which the court clearly viewed as 
being interdependent. For example, the 
Commission paid particular attention to 
the connection between the right to health 
and the right to a healthy environment, 
resulting in a wide interpretation of 
both rights and, more importantly, an 
interpretation that takes the relationship 
between those rights into account. In 
the view of the Commission, compliance 
with its obligations in relation to both 
rights required the State to take action 
to prevent ecological damage, promote 
conservation and ‘secure an ecologically 
sustainable development and use of 
natural resources’.598 In the view of the 
Commission, this requires the State 
to take positive action to protect the 
environment, including the obligation to 
carry out environmental and social impact 
596 Ogoni case para 51.
597 Ogoni case para 56.
598 Ogoni case, para 54.
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assessments, or to permit independent 
assessments, in relation to all proposals 
for industrial development as well as 
ongoing monitoring of the impacts of 
such developments.  
The extent to which the Commission 
took the interdependence of a number 
of human rights seriously is a fourth 
aspect of the case that transcends the 
traditional narrow approach to protecting 
individualized rights. The applicants 
alleged violation of a wide variety of rights 
protected under the ACHPR. Rather than 
focus on each right individually, the African 
Commission paid particular attention 
to not only the complicated interplay 
between environmental degradation 
and rights but also the extent to which 
rights interrelate. This approach led the 
Commission to read into the ACHPR two 
new rights – rights that are not explicitly 
protected under the Charter - namely the 
right to food and the right to shelter. This 
quote in relation to the right to housing, 
illustrates the Commission’s thoughtful 
and nuanced analysis: 
Although the right to housing or 
shelter is not explicitly provided 
for under the African Charter, the 
corollary of the combination of the 
provisions protecting the right to 
enjoy the best attainable state of 
mental and physical health, cited 
under Article 16 above, the right to 
property, and the protection accorded 
to the family forbids the wanton 
destruction of shelter because when 
housing is destroyed, property, 
health, and family life are adversely 
affected. It is thus noted that the 
combined effect of Articles 14, 16 
and 18(1) reads into the Charter a 
right to shelter or housing which the 
Nigerian Government has apparently 
violated.599 
The African Commission’s unequivocal 
recognition of communal rights 
and its innovative approach to the 
interdependence of all human rights 
is further elaborated in Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) 
and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya.600 The 
communication arose from the removal of 
the Endorois community from their tribal 
land by the Kenyan authorities to make way 
for a game reserve. The communication 
alleged that the Endorois community 
considered the land in question to 
belong to the community as a whole and 
that their livelihood, cultural traditions, 
religion and health were intimately bound 
up with their ancestral lands on the 
shores of Lake Bogoria in the Rift Valley 
Province. Relying on the Ogoni case and 
on the recognition of the importance 
of community and collective identity 
throughout the ACHPR,601 they argued 
that they were entitled to bring collective 
599 Ogoni case para 54.
600 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International (on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council) v Kenya, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 276/03 (2009).
601 Endorois, para 75
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claims relating to violation of a number of 
rights under the AHCPR, including rights 
that are not specifically defined as group 
rights in the ACHPR such as the right to 
practice religion (art 8), right to property 
(art 14) and right to culture (art 17). The 
Commission agreed that the Endorois 
were as ‘a distinct tribal group whose 
members enjoy and exercise certain 
rights, including the right to property, in a 
distinctly collective manner’602 and upheld 
their complaint in full. 
The Ogoni and Endorois cases clearly 
demonstrate that the African Commission 
understands the importance and the 
complexity of the interconnections 
between environmental degradation and 
the multiple rights of whole communities 
and provides significant scope for 
enhancing environmental protection 
via human rights law within ACHPR 
framework.
5. Conclusion
At the commencement of this conference 
on ‘New Frontiers in Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism’, Sam Adelman 
challenged us to be innovative, imaginative 
and insurgent in how we conceive of 
and argue about human rights and the 
environment. There are, or course, many 
different ways of looking at the current 
practice of human rights courts and 
tribunals in environmental cases. My aim 
in this paper has been to explore whether 
the perceived limitations of a human rights 
approach to protecting the environment 
are real, by examining the jurisprudence of 
the three regional human rights tribunals. 
The analysis has shown that critics of a 
human rights approach are right, but only 
in some cases. There are clear examples 
of an individualistic approach and a lack 
of understanding of the complexity of the 
connection between human rights and the 
environment, particularly when looking at 
the environmental jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR. However, the analysis has also 
shown that there are, perhaps even more, 
examples of arguments and approaches 
that transcend those limitations and 
recognize and give effect to a much more 
complex and nuanced understanding of 
the relationship between human rights 
and the environment. 
While the limitations of a rights based 
approach should not be ignored, there is 
clearly a much more optimistic story to 
be told. The case law of the African and 
Inter-American judicial institutions, in 
particular, demonstrate that creative and 
progressive approaches are already part 
and parcel of their jurisprudence. The 
small selection of cases examined begin 
to show some of the ways in which human 
rights law is being used in an innovative, 
imaginative and insurgent way to address 
environmental concerns. They provide 
us with important examples or models 
to assist us in the important task of 
further developing a human rights based 
approach to the environment that is able 
to take account of the rich complexity of 
602 Endorois, para 161.
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the relationship between human rights and 
the environment and the interdependence 
of all human rights. It is for us as scholars, 
lawyers and activists to extend and 
mobilize those arguments in both national 
and international fora.  
Photo credit: © Elliot Yeo
212
PART 2: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES
1. Introduction
Since Portugal included the first environmental provision within a national constitution 
in 1976,603  many countries have followed suit by adopting such provisions themselves. 
However, until relatively recently the rights and obligations that have been included within 
such provisions have been qualitative or ambiguously framed rather than quantitative in 
nature. For example they might refer to the rights of citizens to an environment that is 
‘healthy’ or oblige states to ‘protect and improve’ the environment. In the last decade 
there have been isolated examples of states including specific quantitative environmental 
standards related to forest cover within their national constitutions. Article 5(3) of the 
2008 Bhutanese constitution requires the government to ensure that a minimum of sixty 
percent of the country’s total land mass remains under forest cover for all time.604 Also, 
article 69(b) of the 2010 Kenyan constitution states that Kenya shall work to achieve 
and maintain tree cover of at least ten percent of its land mass.605 As such these articles 
require examination because they represent a ‘new frontier’ through their departure from 
the more ambiguously framed provisions that predominate.
Though Bhutan and Kenya share this similarity, they could not be more different in 
many other respects. They differ in their histories, their topographies, the size of their 
populations, their cultures, their religions and their political make up. However, one 
other important factor that they have in common is that both countries have been going 
through periods of political transition.  In the case of Bhutan, this has been the transition 
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, and in the case of Kenya it has 
been the transition from an absolute presidential style of government to a more inclusive 
Quantitative Standards within the Environmental 
Provisions of National Constitutions –  
Bhutan and Kenya
Stephen J. Turner 
603 Art. 66 The Constitution of Portugal. Available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005.pdf 
(last accessed 16th October 2016). 
604 The Constitution of Bhutan. Available at: http://www.bhutanaudit.gov.bt/About%20Us/Mandates/Constitution%20
of%20Bhutan%202008.pdf  (last accessed 14th August 2016).
605 The Constitution of Kenya. Available at: http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398 (last accessed 14th August 2016).
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and democratic form. In both cases, it has 
been these transitions that have led to the 
new constitutions and the quantitative 
environmental standards that are included 
within them.
This chapter will seek to firstly build an 
understanding of the context within which 
each of these national constitutions 
has been promulgated. To do this, it will 
provide an overview of the legal, political 
and social developments that led to 
their adoption and from that platform it 
will consider the actual meaning of the 
relevant provisions. It will consider their 
relevance in terms of the potential for 
litigation relating to forest cover and the 
significance that they may have in the 
ongoing development of national forest 
policy. From there, the chapter will seek 
to comment on the importance of these 
provisions within the wider context of 
global environmental constitutionalism. 
It will therefore consider whether or not 
they can be seen simply as exceptions 
to the more common type of qualitative 
environmental provision or whether they 
have the potential to influence the way that 
other states develop the environmental 
provisions in their constitutions in the 
future.
2. The Quantitative 
Environmental Standard 
in the Bhutanese 
Constitution
First, the background to the promulgation 
of Bhutan’s constitution in 2008 will be 
addressed as the context and history 
assist in understanding how its provisions 
are likely to be regarded, both by the 
government and the populace of the 
country. The background also assists in 
enlightening the analyst to the influences 
and priorities that exist within Bhutanese 
government and society. In particular, the 
relationship that the government has had 
and continues to have with Buddhism is of 
fundamental importance, as is the stated 
governmental objective to achieve ‘gross 
national happiness’ (GNH) which was 
introduced in 1972.606  Whilst this chapter 
focuses on the emergence of quantitative 
standards within environmental provisions 
of constitutions, it could be said that 
the inclusion of the objective of GNH607 
within Bhutan’s national constitution 
in itself represents a ‘new frontier’ in 
environmental constitutionalism. This is 
because protection of the environment is 
viewed as one of the main tenets in the 
accomplishment of GNH.608 
Bhutan is a nation, which emerged in 
the 17th century and is now the last 
606 Sebastian, Sarish, Parliamentary Democracy in Bhutan – A Journey from Tradition to Modernity (New Delhi: Adroit 
Publishers, 2015), p. 69; Chang, Wen-Cheng; Thio, Li-ann; Tan, Kevin YL & Yeh, Jiunn-rong, Constitutionalism in Asia 
– Cases and Materials (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) at p. 69.
607 Art. 9(2).
608 Chang et al. supra n. 4.
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Himalayan kingdom. It has a unique 
history, as it was not colonized by the 
British, unlike its close neighbors India, 
Pakistan and Sri-Lanka.609  In 1907 the 
country moved from being a theocracy, 
in which the Buddhist Monk Body was 
synonymous with national and local 
government, to an absolute monarchy.610 
In 1953 the third King of Bhutan Jigme 
Dorji Wangchuck began a process which 
moved the country away from a policy 
of isolationism, abolished serfdom, and 
increased merit based authority.611  The 
country at that time was a ‘self-contained 
rural society’,612  which had no motorized 
transport or paved roads.613  The king 
created the national legislature, which was 
a 130 member national assembly, and in 
1968 he also created a cabinet.614  In 1971 
Bhutan became a member of the United 
Nations,615  and in 1998 following political 
crises involving different factions in the 
country,616  the fourth king transferred 
much governmental authority to an 
elected cabinet.617  In 2001, the fourth king 
instructed the cabinet that the nation 
needed a written constitution, which led to 
an extensive consultation process618  and 
the eventual adoption of their first national 
constitution in 2008.619 
The constitution contained certain key 
features wherein it: 
  transferred much governmental 
power from the king to Parliament;620  
  included the separation of powers of 
the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of government;621  
  specifically did not include Buddhism 
as the state religion although it did 
affirm Buddhism as the ‘spiritual 
heritage’ of the country;622  
  effectively removed the Monk Body 
from its political role for the first time 
in Bhutanese history;623  and 
  reinforced as a principle of state 
policy that the country, ‘shall strive 
to promote those conditions that will 
enable the pursuit of Gross National 
Happiness’.624  
609 Whitecross, Richard W. ‘Separating Religion and Politics? – Buddhism and the Bhutanese Constitution, in 
Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia, Sunil Khilnani, Vikram Raghavan and Arun K. Thiruvengadam (Eds) 
(OUP, 2013) pp. 116-144, at p. 116.
610 Ibid at p. 121.
611 Shera Lhundup, ‘The Genesis of Environmental Ethics and Sustaining its Heritage in the Kingdom of Bhutan’ 14 Geo. 
Int’l Envtl. L. Rev., 693, 2001-2002, at p. 695.
612 ibid.
613 ibid.
614 ibid.
615 Bhutan Country Study Guide, Vol. 1. Strategic Information and Developments (Washington D.C.: International 
Business Publications, 2014) at p. 132.
616 See Banki, Susan, ‘The Transformation of Homeland Politics in the Era of Resettlement; Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal 
and the Disapora’ European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 43. pp. 120-143 at p. 128. (2013); also Bothe, Whinnie, 
‘The Monarch’s Gift: Critical notes on the constitutional process in Bhutan’ EBHR 40 Spring/Summer issue EBHR, 
27-58 (2012) at p.  54.
617 Whitecross supra n.7.
618 Art. 3(1); see Whitecross supra n. 7. at pp. 129 & 141.
619 The Constitution of Bhutan supra n. 2.
620 Arts. 1(10) supra n. 2.
621 Art. 1 (13) supra n. 2.
622 Art. 1(13) supra n. 2 ; see Whitecross supra n.7 at p. 133.
623 Whitecross supra n. 7 at p. 134.
624 Art. 9(2).
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In Bhutan’s case, as has been the case in 
many countries, constitutional change has 
not been  confined to a single event but has 
been a process in which adjustment has 
been and continues to be gradual. Therefore 
there are still many questions that relate to 
the interpretation and role of the constitution, 
which inevitably affect the meaning and 
effectiveness of specific provisions.
As the protection of the environment is part 
of the overall policy of the pursuit of GNH,625 
it is of little surprise that the constitution 
contains duties for both the government and 
its citizens to protect the environment.626 
Generic rights to information627 and ‘legal aid 
to secure justice’628 are included, however, 
it does not provide specific environmental 
procedural rights to information, 
participation in decision-making or access 
to justice, as is the case with many other 
national constitutions.629 Whereas most 
of the environmental provisions within the 
Bhutanese constitution are unremarkable 
when seen within the context of the rise 
of environmental constitutionalism,630 it is 
clear that Article 5(3) breaks new ground by 
stating that:
The Government shall ensure that, in 
order to conserve the country’s natural 
resources and to prevent degradation of 
the ecosystem, a minimum of sixty percent 
of Bhutan’s total land shall be maintained 
under forest cover for all time.631
As noted above, one of the characteristics 
of the traditional manner in which 
environmental rights have been drafted 
is that they have deliberately been left 
vague. This has led to the criticism that is 
encapsulated in the remark of Douglas-
Scott that, ‘such provisions are by their 
nature indeterminate and give little idea 
of the sorts of measures that should be 
introduced to enforce them.’ 632 As such, 
for a state to include a specific quantitative 
and scientifically measurable requirement 
relating a particular aspect of the 
environment within a national constitution 
is a remarkable step. Having said this for 
Bhutan itself, the inclusion of this provision 
probably seemed less remarkable at the 
time of drafting, as the government had 
first developed the policy of maintaining 
at least sixty percent of the country under 
forest cover in the 1970s.633 
625 Chang et. al. supra n.4.
626 Art. 5 & Art. 8(2).
627 Art. 7(3).
628 Art. 9(6).
629 See Turner, Stephen J., A Global Environmental Right, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) pp. 24-5; Boyd, David R., The 
Environmental Rights Revolution – A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights and the Environment  (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2012) at p. 66.
630 See generally  Daly, E. & May, J., Global Environmental Constitutionalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014).
631 The Constitution of Bhutan supra n. 2.
632 Douglas-Scott, S., ‘Environmental Rights in the European Union – Participatory Democracy Or Democratic Deficit’, in 
Boyle, A., & Anderson, M.A., (Eds) Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) at p. 110.
633 Wangdi, T., P. Lhendup & N. Wangdi 2013. An Analysis of Forestry Policy, Acts and Rules of Bhutan to Mainstream 
Climate Change Adaptation. Regional Climate Change Adaptation Knowledge Platform for Asia, Partner Report 
Series No. 13. Stockholm Environment Institute, Bangkok. Available at: https://www.weadapt.org/sites/weadapt.org/
files/legacy-new/knowledge-base/files/521c8788e61b3bhutan-serie-13-cs5-v7-for-web.pdf  (last accessed 2nd 
November 2016).
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As with all new national constitutions, it 
takes time before the precise meaning 
and effectiveness of specific provisions 
become clear. In the case of Article 5(3), 
the question of whether or not it can be 
legally enforced is one that only time will 
tell. This is for two reasons; the first is 
that recent statistics indicate that Bhutan 
currently has somewhere in the region 
of 69.1 percent of its land area covered 
by forest;634  although some unofficial 
sources suggest that the correct figure is 
closer to 64.5 percent.635  Nevertheless it 
means that it is unlikely that Art. 5(3) will 
be actively tested in the near future. The 
second is that it is uncertain precisely what 
legal mechanisms would be available to 
respond to any breach or potential breach. 
Article 1 states that the Supreme Court is, 
‘the guardian of this Constitution and the 
final authority on its interpretation.’636  It 
therefore appears to vest in the Supreme 
Court the ultimate authority to determine 
whether or not the constitution has been 
complied with and how it should be 
interpreted. However, it is unclear precisely 
what rights citizens or other interested 
parties may have to seek judicial review 
of government decision-making related to 
environmental issues. Citizens do have the 
right to, ‘initiate appropriate proceedings 
in the Supreme Court or High Court’ for the 
enforcement of their fundamental rights 
under Article 7.637  All the same, examples 
of the fundamental rights listed in Article 
7 include the right to life,638  the right to 
property,639  and the right to information,640 
but not specific rights related to the 
protection of the environment or levels 
of forest cover. Additionally Article 21(18) 
does state that, ‘[e]very person has the 
right to approach the courts in matters 
arising out of the Constitution or other 
laws subject to section 23 of Article 7’. 
However, it is uncertain exactly what the 
procedural requirements for individual 
citizens to bring such actions would be and 
whether or not it would be possible to use 
that provision to challenge government 
decision-making in relation to Article 5(3). 
Additionally, it is important to be aware 
that the culture of the populace in 
Bhutan is not one that is entirely used 
to the concept of litigation and certainly 
not litigation against the government. 
Although in recent decades and during 
the 1990s especially, the government 
did experience significant opposition to 
some of its policies from groups within 
society,641 it must be borne in mind that 
traditionally for many Bhutanese people, 
634 Purna B.Chetri, ‘State of Forest Genetic Reources of Bhutan – Country Report’ (Yuispang: RNR Research and 
Development Centre – Royal Government of Bhutan, 2012). Avaialable at:  http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3825e/i3825e5.
pdf (Last accessed 16th August 2016)
635 Some sources challenge those figures and state that there has been considerable deforestation in recent years 
which may mean that the government finds it difficult to maintain the constitutionally stated level of forest cover. 
See Rai, B (2005) ‘Bhutan’s Forests: The Real Picture’ Kuensal Online. Available at: www.kuensalonline.com (Last 
Accessed 16th August 2016).
636 Art 1 (11).
637 Art. 7(23). 
638 Art. 7(1).
639 Art. 7(9).
640 Art. 7(3).
641 Dhurba Rizal, The Royal Semi-Authoritarian Democracy of Bhutan (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015) pp. 91-126.
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the concept of challenging the authority 
of the king and the government is an 
uncomfortable notion. Shera Lhundup 
refers to a Bhutanese proverb, ‘Zarley babi 
chulu logni mei, gyalpoi kalu lenthechi’ 
which means, ‘even as the water that 
falls down the steep cannot return up, 
so be it with the King’s command, once 
commanded.’642 Therefore the potential 
for any such litigation, would in part, be 
tied to the capacity of the populace of 
Bhutan to take ownership of their rights 
and also their willingness to challenge 
government decision-making. Having 
said that Bhutan is definitely modernizing 
and the High Court has already instituted 
a ‘green bench’ to deal with environmental 
cases, so it is quite possible that there will 
be marked developments within this field 
in the future.643 
Whilst there is a lack of clarity relating to 
the precise legal meaning and potential of 
Article 5(3), it is clear that Bhutan has an 
extremely rich environmental heritage. It 
can boast of negative carbon emissions 
which has led to praise from the former 
Executive Secretary of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Christina Figueres who stated 
in 2014 that, ‘Bhutan is already and can 
continue to be inspiration and a role model 
for the world on how economies and 
different countries can address climate 
change while at the same time improving 
life of the citizen.’644  Therefore although 
Bhutan is a relatively small country 
that is unorthodox in its approach to 
government by western standards, there 
may be lessons that can be taken from 
its approach, owing to the high degree of 
environmental sustainability that it has 
achieved and maintained.
3. The Quantitative 
Environmental Standard 
within Kenya’s 
Constitution
Consideration will now be given to 
Kenya’s revised 2010 constitution and the 
quantitative environmental standard that 
it contains. Unlike Bhutan, which has a 
very unique cultural and political history, 
the context of Kenya’s constitution is one 
which is mirrored by numerous other sub-
Saharan African countries. An examination 
of the background to the 2010 constitution 
highlights the struggles that the people of 
Kenya have faced since the country achieved 
independence. Those struggles heavily 
influenced the way that the constitution 
was drafted and therefore help to provide an 
understanding of the underlying context of 
its environmental provisions.
Kenya became a British Protectorate 
in 1895 and a Crown colony in 1920.645 
In 1928 Jomo Kenyatta commenced 
campaigning for land reform and political 
rights for African people; this led to fierce 
642 Shera Lhundup supra n. 9 at p. 696.
643 Pema Seldon, ‘Supreme Court to Allow Public Interest Litigation for Environmental Issues’ (Business Bhutan, 19th 
March 2016) at pp.1 & 15.
644 See BBSBhutan website available at: http://www.bbs.bt/news/?p=39604 (accessed 16th August 2016).
645 Mwakikagile, Godfrey, Kenya: Identity of a Nation, (Pretoria: New Africa Press, 2007) at pp. 16-17.
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conflict in which many died.646 Although 
independence was achieved in 1963 and 
a national constitution was adopted, 
it did not bring about fair democratic 
government but autocratic presidential 
governments that failed to address the 
political and tribal tensions that remained 
following the colonial era.647 These were 
the conditions that ultimately led to 
widespread suffering and displacement 
through ethnically based violence.648 
Eventually in 2008, a coalition government 
was established in which a President and 
a Prime Minister from opposing sides 
shared power with a cabinet that had an 
equal number of ministers from each 
side.649  This power sharing arrangement 
led to an effort to reframe the modus 
operandai of government, and a significant 
part of that process was the drafting of the 
2010 constitution. As Prempeh states, the 
significance of the 2010 constitution is that 
it has, ‘made a credible attempt to revisit 
the constitutional choices made in the 
early postcolonial period and undo some of 
the structural and legal devices that have 
sustained absolute presidentialism’.650 
There are three articles in the constitution 
that together provide a framework of 
rights and obligations relating to the 
environment. First and foremost are the 
rights and freedoms that are found in 
Article 42, which states:
Every person has the right to a clean and 
healthy environment, which includes the 
right:
(a) to have the environment protected 
for the benefit of present and future 
generations through legislative and 
other measures, particularly those 
contemplated in Article 69; and
(b) to have obligations relating to the 
environment fulfilled under Article 70.651 
Article 69 provides a number of 
obligations that the state has in relation 
to the environment. These include inter 
alia obligations relating to the sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources,652 the 
protection of intellectual property of 
biodiversity and genetic resources of the 
communities,653 and the establishment 
of systems of environmental impact 
assessment.654 It also includes Article 
69(1)(b), which provides that the state 
shall, ‘work to achieve and maintain a tree 
cover of at least ten percent of the land 
area of Kenya’.
646 ibid at pp. 17-18.
647 Koko, Sadiki, ‘The Tensions between Power Sharing, Justice and Human Rights in Africa’s ‘post-violence’ socieities: 
Rwanda, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2013) AHRLJ pp. 254-280 at p. 272.
648 Baranger, Dennis, & Murray, Christina, ‘Systems of Government’ in Tushnet, Mark; Fleiner, Thomas & Saunders, Cheryl 
(Eds.) Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) at p. 83.
649 ibid
650 Prempeh, Kwasi H., ‘Constitutional Autochthony and the Invention of ‘Absolute Presidentialism’ in postcolonial 
Africa’, in Günter Frankenberg (ed.) Order from Transfer – Comparative Constitutional Design and Legal Culture’, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009), pp. 209-233, at p. 230.
651 The Constitution of Kenya. Available at: www.kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398  (last accessed 18th August 2016).
652 Art. 69(1)(a)
653 Art. 69(1)(c)
654 Art. 69(1)(f)
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When the two aforementioned articles 
are read in conjunction with Article 70, it 
appears that citizens have the right to take 
legal action to enforce the government’s 
obligations under Article 69.
Article 70(1) states as follows:
If a person alleges that a right to 
a clean and healthy environment 
recognized and protected under 
Article 42 has been, is being or is 
likely to be, denied, violated, infringed 
or threatened, the person may apply 
to a court for redress in addition to 
any other legal remedies that are 
available in respect to the same 
matter. 
This is followed by a list of orders that the 
court may give, which include: ‘to prevent, 
stop or discontinue any act or omission 
that is harmful to the environment’  and 
‘to compel any public officer to take 
measures to prevent or discontinue any 
act or omission that is harmful to the 
environment’.656 It also states that, ‘[f]or 
the purposes of this Article, an applicant 
does not have to demonstrate that any 
person has incurred loss or suffered 
injury’.657 Whilst these provisions in 
principle provide a route through which 
legal action could be taken to enforce the 
state’s obligations relating to Article 69(1)
(b), there is still a certain lack of precision 
with regard to the state’s obligations in 
this respect. This is because the provision 
states that the government is required 
to ‘…work to achieve and maintain...’ 
the objective rather than providing an 
unequivocal obligation that it must achieve 
and maintain ten percent of the land area 
under forest cover.
According to figures published in a 
2014 report by  Kenya’s Forestry Service 
(KFS),  Kenya has 6.99 percent of its land 
mass covered by forest and is working 
to gradually increase that figure.658 The 
report specifically refers to the target 
of ten percent forest cover as part of an 
overall plan,659 which is also included in 
the Kenya Vision 2030 strategy.660 The KFS 
states that it has a target of increasing 
the forest cover in Kenya by 1 percent 
over the period of 2014-17661 and that 
the objective of 10 percent forest cover 
is gradually being integrated into primary 
and secondary legislation.662  Therefore, it 
appears that the strength of Article 69(1)
(b) rests in the authority that it lends to the 
policy as a whole, and the effect that this 
has on the integration into subordinate 
law and policy-making processes which 
655 Art. 70(2)(a)
656 Art. 70(2)(b)
657 Art. 70(2)
658 Kenya Forest Service, ‘Second Kenya Forest Service Strategic Plan (Period 2014-17)’ (2015) at p. 20. Available at: 
http://www.kenyaforestservice.org/documents/KFS%20Vision%202015-17%20FINAL%20%20printed.pdf (Last 
accessed: 18th Aug. 2016)
659 Kenya Forest Service  Ibid at p. 19.
660 Kenya Vision 2030, ‘Second Medium Term Plan: 2013-2017’ (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2013). Available 
at: www.vision2030.go.ke/lib.php?f=second-medium-term-plan-2013-2017 (Last accessed: 18th Aug. 2016)
661 Kenya Forest Service supra n. 56 at p. 8.
662 Kenya Forest Service supra n. 56 at p. 28-9.
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in turn renders the government at both 
the local and national level, more likely to 
achieve its stated aims.
4. Comment on 
the Implications 
of Quantitative 
Environmental Standards 
within National 
Constitutions
Having briefly considered the background 
and potential application of these types 
of provisions within the constitutions of 
Bhutan and Kenya, consideration will now 
be given to the influence that they may 
have in the development of environmental 
constitutionalism in other jurisdictions in 
the future.  
At the international level, the inclusion 
of these quantitative environmental 
standards in 2008 and 2010 respectively, 
was largely overshadowed by other events 
in the field of environmental rights that 
took place at that time. For example the 
inclusion of the right of pachamama (the 
right of Mother Nature) in the Constitution 
of Ecuador in 2008,663 received much 
greater attention from the international 
community, including significant attention 
at the United Nations level.664  However 
it can be argued that the provisions in 
question also deserve attention owing to 
their significance within the context of the 
development of environmental rights. In 
essence, by providing certainty relating 
to the precise environmental standards 
that governments are obliged to comply 
with, they answer the criticism that 
environmental rights are ambiguous in 
terms of their meaning and content.665 It 
can of course be argued that constitutional 
rights are usually qualitative in nature; 
examples include those relating to due 
process, free speech and unreasonable 
search and seizure. However, it can equally 
be argued that for the aforementioned 
rights it would be extremely difficult to 
provide specific quantitative standards 
within a constitution whereas for certain 
aspects of the environment (including 
levels of forest cover), it is possible to do 
so.
In terms of constitutionalism it can be 
argued, as Elkin et al. have, that the most 
important role of specific provisions 
within national constitutions is that 
they place necessary constraints on 
the behavior and decision-making of 
governments.  Similarly Kiss and Shelton 
have asserted that placing constraints 
upon governments through environmental 
provisions within constitutions can be 
important, ‘particularly given the high 
short-term costs involved in many 
663 Art. 71. Available at: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html (last accessed 20th Aug. 
2016).
664 See for example: United Nations Econ. & Social Council. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ‘Study on the need 
to recognize and respect the rights of Mother Earth’ New York. 19-30th April 2010. UN Doc. E/C.19/2010/4.
665 See Douglas-Scott supra n. 30.
666 Elkins, Z; Ginsbury, T & Melton, J; The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) at p. 38.
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environmental protection measures and 
the resulting disfavor they experience.’667 
Increasingly there are scientific arguments 
that there are specific ‘planetary 
boundaries’ that governments and the 
international community should be bound 
by in decision-making that affects the 
environment.668  As such, it can be argued 
that a major failure of much national and 
international environmental law is that it 
ultimately does not respond adequately to 
those ecological constraints.669  Therefore, 
one case for the potential inclusion of 
specific quantitative restrictions within 
national constitutions would be that they 
can provide specific standards within 
aspects of environmental decision-
making that relates directly to those 
‘planetary boundaries’. Equally it can be 
argued that decision-making relating 
to the environment rarely follows such 
clear-cut quantitative limitations. The 
environment is usually one of a number 
of important factors that need to be taken 
into account when decisions are made 
that impact upon it. As such it could 
be contended that such an approach is 
unrealistic except under exceptional and 
case-specific circumstances. It must also 
be emphasized as Daly and May point 
out, that the quality of environmental 
constitutionalism is not the only factor 
that influences effective protection of 
the environment; there are numerous 
countries that do not have environmental 
provisions in their national constitutions at 
all, but which all the same have developed 
sophisticated regimes of environmental 
law.670 
Whether or not other countries would 
embrace the idea of including these 
types of provisions within their own 
national constitutions would be affected 
by a number of factors. It is certainly 
the case that traditionally states have 
framed environmental provisions 
within constitutions in ways that leave 
significant room for interpretation. 
Therefore, expressions such as the right 
to, ‘an environment that is not harmful 
to their health or well-being…’671 and the, 
‘right to live in an environment free from 
contamination…’672 are typical in the 
sense that they leave much scope for 
flexibility on the part of decision-makers. 
This has meant that in practice courts 
have a wide margin of appreciation in 
their interpretation except in the most 
extreme of cases.673 Therefore of course, 
states may be deterred from adopting 
quantitative environmental standards 
within constitutions, as they may not wish 
to be constrained by them.
667 Kiss, A. & Shelton, D., International Environmental Law, 3rd edn (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2004), at 
p. 709.
668 Rockström, J. et al., ‘A Safe Operating Space for Humanity’ (2009) 461 Nature, pp. 472-5; 
669 Bosselmann, K., ‘Global Environmental Constitutionalism: Mapping the Terrain’ (2015) Wid. L. Rev. 21(2), 171-86 at 
pp. 180-2.
670 Daly & May supra n. 28, at p. 13.
671 Constitution of South Africa. Art. 24(a).
672 Constitution of Chile. Art. 19(8).
673 See Turner  supra n. 27 at pp. 63-6.
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However, as is clear from the history of 
constitutionalism, there is a tendency 
for nations to replicate provisions, or 
sometimes the form of entire constitutions, 
in the development of their own 
constitutions.674  Also it has been shown 
that on average national constitutions 
have a life of only nineteen years675 and 
in any given year have a 38% chance of 
being subject to amendment.676 Therefore 
as constitutions become amended over 
the years there is a tendency for a degree 
of convergence in terms of the provisions 
that they include.677 Although there are 
certain notable exceptions to this trend, 
the majority of countries seek to develop 
their written constitutions over time. As 
such it is quite possible that in the future 
other nations will consider revising their 
existing constitutions to include the type 
of quantitative environmental standards 
that Bhutan and Kenya have adopted.
5. Conclusion
In adopting quantitative environmental 
standards within their national 
constitutions, Bhutan and Kenya have 
done something extraordinary, as 
these types of provisions had not been 
included within national constitutions 
before. Within the field of environmental 
law, these developments were largely 
unheralded and therefore have received 
little academic attention. This chapter has 
sought to highlight the nature of these 
provisions within the very different social, 
political and environmental contexts from 
which they have emerged. It has shown 
why at this stage, it is difficult to calibrate 
the merits of such provisions in terms of 
the levels of success that they will have. 
It is difficult to determine whether or not 
countries such as Bhutan and Kenya who 
incorporate such provisions will be more 
likely to achieve their objectives relating 
to forest cover, than countries who simply 
incorporate such goals within their national 
policies but not within constitutional law.
It appears that in both the cases of Kenya 
and Bhutan, it is unlikely that the provisions 
in question will lead to litigation, certainly 
in the near future. Therefore, the success 
of such provisions is far more likely to be 
dependent upon the manner in which the 
respective governments administer and 
manage forests in terms of conservation, 
commercial exploitation and use by rural 
communities. This in turn is dependent 
on a host of other factors, which include 
the quality of administration, subordinate 
legislation, economic and subsistence 
needs, commercial and political pressure, 
levels of corruption and education.
674 Law, D. S. & Versteeg, M., ‘The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution’ (2012) N. Y. U. L.  Rev.  87(3), pp. 
762-858 at pp. 764-766; Law, D.S. & Versteeg, M., ‘The Evolution of Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 
Cal. L. Rev.,  pp.1163-1257.
675 Elkins et al. supra n. 64 at p. 129
676 Elkins et al. supra n. 64 at p. 101.
677 Law & Versteeg, n. 72 ‘The Evolution of Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’, at p. 1172.
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What is clear is that these developments do 
bear a certain importance. This is because 
they represent a departure from the more 
commonly found environmental rights 
that are qualitative in nature. They are also 
important because they may provide an 
example to other countries of the way that 
future national constitutional provisions 
related to the environment can be framed. 
In other words, it is possible that qualitative 
environmental rights and obligations 
within constitutions can be complemented 
with specific quantitative environmental 
standards where appropriate. Finally they 
are important, because on a global level, 
the international community is currently 
considering and debating the role that 
environmental rights could or should have 
in the future; as such part of that debate 
should include the potential of including 
quantitative environmental standards 
within environmental rights at the national 
and international levels.
At this stage, however such provisions 
are still so new that further research is 
required to better understand whether 
or not they have a more prominent role 
to play in the future, and if they have a 
greater role to play, what it could be and 
how it could best be implemented. 
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1. Introduction
In the quest to realize the right to water for all, states are experiencing a number of 
challenges. These challenges particularly concern fulfilling their obligations towards 
unserved and under-served populations. Water resources are becoming scarcer and 
states are increasingly required to review their overall water management in relation to 
providing access to water for domestic purposes. The right to water can play a crucial 
role in assisting the development of context-specific policy and regulations. The exact 
elements of the right, however, are still developing further, and its position within the 
overall system of water management needs more deliberation. This chapter provides 
a method by which the right to water can be observed within the bigger picture of 
sustainable water management, and in a specific national context. 
This chapter discusses an assessment method for water governance in which the rights-
based approach to access to water and relevant environmental principles have been 
integrated with the aim of facilitating the sustainable enjoyment of the right to water 
by vulnerable groups. The assessment method will be referred to as the ‘Ten building 
blocks for sustainable access to water for domestic purposes of vulnerable groups.’ It 
was built out of a three step multi-disciplinary assessment method for water governance 
(including issues of water shortage, water quality, and flood risks) developed by authors 
Van Rijswick, Edelenbos, Hellegers, Kok, and Kuks. 
The method is suitable for asking specific questions in relation to water management. It 
has therefore been adjusted to assess relevant aspects necessary for the implementation 
of a sustainable right to water for vulnerable groups. It brings together aspects of 
law, economics, and public administration, and provides for the assessment of basic 
knowledge of the water system. This is needed for a comprehensive exploration of the 
main implementation challenges, and for offering recommendations specific to a national 
Ten building blocks for a sustainable human right to 
water: an integrated method to assess sustainable 
access to water for domestic purposes of vulnerable 
groups
Daphina Misiedjan
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or regional context. The developed method 
is of a diagnostic nature.678  It serves 
to identify strengths and weaknesses 
in water governance, with the aim of 
providing recommendations for dealing 
with water issues in an efficient and 
sustainable manner. For this reason the 
method can be directly applied in national 
contexts.679  
2. The assessment method 
The Global Water Partnership defines 
water governance as “the range of political, 
social, economic and administrative 
systems that are in place to develop and 
manage water resources and the delivery 
of water services at different levels of 
society.”680  It is difficult to formulate an 
all-encompassing definition of water 
governance. Governance examines 
all relevant parties and not merely 
government. Further, governance includes 
non-governmental organizations, private 
sector actors and industries, individuals, 
and local groups or communities. 
According to the international human 
rights based approach, the State is 
the primary duty-bearer, and national 
legislation and policies must detail how 
the State’s human rights obligations will 
be discharged at national, provincial and 
local levels. Legislation should further 
set out the extent to which individuals, 
companies, and other non-state actors 
will directly shoulder responsibility for 
implementation. Human rights obligations 
can also attach to non-governmental 
actors and private individuals. These 
parties may also contribute to or diminish 
efforts toward the realization of the right 
to water for vulnerable groups, and are 
relevant to discuss within this assessment 
method. 
3. Building blocks of the 
assessment method 
As Figure 1 shows, the assessment 
method discusses three levels for sound 
water management; namely content, 
organization and implementation. These 
three levels are divided into ten interrelated 
building blocks.  Each of the ten building 
blocks is described in more details in the 
sections that follow. 
3.1  Vulnerable groups 
The assessment method looks specifically 
at the situation of vulnerable groups, 
across the ten building blocks.681 The 
term “vulnerable groups” in this context 
refers to those groups that are not able 
678 van Rijswick, M., Edelenbos, J., Hellegers, P., Kok, M., & Kuks, S. (2014). Ten building blocks for sustainable water 
governance: an integrated method to assess the governance of water. Water International, (September), 1–18. http://
doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2014.951828, p. 2.
679 This method has been applied to the national contexts of Suriname and Yemen. See Misiedjan, D., van Rijswick, M., & 
Tjen A Kwoei, A. (2015). A human right to water while the well runs dry: analysing the legal and regulatory framework 
of Yemen water law. The Journal of Water Law, 24(5/6), 199–206.
680 Rogers, P., & Hall, A. W. (2003). Effective Water Governance. Global Environmental Change (Vol. 7). Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.04.003\nwww.gwpforum.org 
681 The term vulnerable has been chosen, as opposed to disadvantaged or marginalized, due to its cross-disciplinary 
use. Similarly to the issue of water access, the term vulnerability is relevant in the context of the nexus of 
environmental science and human rights.
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to secure sustainable access to adequate 
quantities of acceptable quality water for 
domestic purposes due to social and/or 
environmental factors.682  This definition 
expands on the call by the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) for states to give special 
attention to certain groups who have 
traditionally faced difficulty in exercising 
the right to water.683  Vulnerable groups 
should be identified in the national context 
taking into account groups and individuals 
as suggested in the CESCR’s General 
Comment 15. The categories provided by 
the CESCR are not always applicable to all 
national contexts; and not all vulnerable 
groups are considered as such in every 
country context. 
3.2  Water system knowledge 
Improving our knowledge about the 
water system will in turn improve efforts 
towards realizing the right to water, and 
will ultimately enhance the sustainability 
of this right. The water system is defined 
as:
“…the combination of natural 
physical resources (such as rivers, 
rainfall, seas, lakes etc.) and man-
made infrastructure (such as canals, 
pumping stations, reservoirs, flood 
defenses etc.). The system supports 
societal functions, such as domestic 
and industrial water use, irrigation, 
shipping, hydropower, safety, etc., 
Figure 1.  Dimensions for the assessment of sustainable access to water for 
vulnerable groups
682 Developed from the term ‘water security’ (UN-Water) and defined as the capacity of a population to safeguard 
sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, 
and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, 
and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability.”
683 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. (2002). General Comment No. 15 The right to water. Geneva.
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and includes the ecosystems related 
to water.”684  
In this definition, a distinction is made 
between natural physical resources and 
man-made infrastructure. The focus within 
the assessment framework discussed 
in this chapter is on the sustainability of 
the water system that supports domestic 
water use. This is defined by the CESCR 
as water that is used for the following 
purposes: drinking, personal sanitation, 
washing of clothes, food preparation, 
personal and household hygiene.685 
There is a need therefore to study the 
water resources and infrastructure which 
directly and indirectly support domestic 
uses.  
The CESCR sets out certain 
recommendations and requirements for 
the infrastructure to realize the right of 
access to clean water. However, in relation 
to actual water resources, the CESCR 
standards are rather limited. For instance, 
it discusses quality and quantity standards 
at service points, but these standards 
are not yet connected to sustainability 
requirements. General Comment No. 
15686 mentions that the realization of 
the right must be sustainable, but does 
not elaborate on the manner in which 
this should take place. The information 
collected in this first building block assists 
in this respect. Sustainability in relation 
to water system knowledge “means that 
water quality and availability have to 
be ensured in a way that respects and 
supports the larger environment. Water 
contamination and over-extraction must 
be avoided in order to ensure continued 
access to safe and sufficient water.”687 
As a result, states must determine what 
uses are sustainable on the basis of highly 
fact-specific analyses of the uses of a 
particular water resource in a particular 
context.688 
3.3 Values and principles  
Values are important in a society. They 
guide and control behavior and assist 
people in making decisions. In terms 
of water management, values help in 
prioritizing water allocation. Values can 
be elaborated in principles and translated 
into policy and regulation.689  Importantly, 
multiple values can be upheld in society. 
684 van Rijswick, M., Edelenbos, J., Hellegers, P., Kok, M., & Kuks, S. (2014). Ten building blocks for sustainable water 
governance: an integrated method to assess the governance of water. Water International, (September), 1–18. http://
doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2014.951828, p. 4. 
685 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. (2002). General Comment No. 15 The right to water. Geneva, 
paragraph 12. “In this context, “drinking” means water for consumption through beverages and foodstuffs. “Personal 
sanitation” means disposal of human excreta. Water is necessary for personal sanitation where water-based means 
are adopted. “Food preparation” includes food hygiene and preparation of food stuffs, whether water is incorporated 
into, or comes into contact with, food. “Personal and household hygiene” means personal cleanliness and hygiene of 
the household environment.”
686 ibid. paragraph 11 
687 De Albuquerque, C. (2010). Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to 
access to safe drinking water and sanitation “Compilation of good practices,” p. 16. 
688 Dellapenna, J. W. (2004). Is Sustainable Development a Serviceable Legal Standard in the Management of Water? 
Water Recources Update, (127), 87–93, p. 89.
689 van Rijswick, M., Edelenbos, J., Hellegers, P., Kok, M., & Kuks, S. (2014). Ten building blocks for sustainable water 
governance: an integrated method to assess the governance of water. Water International, (September), 1–18. http://
doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2014.951828,  p. 5.
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How these values are followed-up by 
principles, policy and legislation determine 
their hierarchy. Examples of commonly 
held values are justice and human 
dignity.690 It is often argued that societies 
across the globe have a common set 
of values.691 However, how these values 
are interpreted may differ between 
societies. These common societal values 
have contributed to the development of 
universal human rights. Besides common 
values, societies may also have more 
specific values sometimes related to 
religion or culture. 
Principles 
Binding human rights principles apply 
to the human right of access to water. 
These principles are non-discrimination, 
equality, access to information, right to 
participation, sustainability692 and non-
retrogression. In addition to human rights 
principles, a number of environmental 
principles should also be integrated into 
national strategies to realize the human 
right of access to water for vulnerable 
groups. Environmental legislation based 
on these environmental principles can 
also complement the human rights 
framework.693 Environmental principles 
are articulated in numerous treaties 
concerning environmental law, including 
the 1992 Rio Declaration from the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development. The following principles 
have been found to be most relevant 
for this framework: intergenerational 
equity, integration, common but 
differentiated responsibilities, public 
participation, precautionary principle, 
polluter-pays principle, environmental 
impact assessment, and international 
cooperation. 
The assessment framework studies which 
of these principles states have translated 
into national policies and legislation, and 
how the realization of the right to water 
relates to these principles.  For instance, 
translation of the polluter-pays principle 
can be effective in protecting water 
resources, used by vulnerable groups, 
from pollution and thereby support the 
realization of the right. What is also 
important is that the principles and values 
which steer water management are 
agreed upon and that there are no internal 
conflicts. 
3.4 Stakeholder participation  
Different parties are involved in 
the provision of water supply for 
domestic purposes and in overall water 
management. Governments hold the final 
690 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: http://
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 25 October 2016] 
691 Klug, F. (2015). A Magna Carta for all humanity. New Scientist (Vol. 226). New York: Routledge. http://doi.
org/10.1016/S0262-4079(15)30366-3, p. 84.
692 The Special Rapporteur deems sustainability to be a fundamental principle for the realization of human rights in 
general and the human right to water specifically. De Albuquerque, C. (2013). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
human right to safe drinking water and sanitation.
693 Tully, S. (2005). A Human right to access water? A Critique of General Comment No. 15. Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights, 23(15), 35–63, p. 57.
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responsibility in providing access to water 
for domestic purposes to those within their 
territory, including vulnerable groups and 
individuals. Nonetheless, governments are 
often dependent on different stakeholders 
in order to realize this responsibility. ‘In 
this context, governments sometimes 
deliberately, sometimes forced by 
circumstances, give more room to certain 
stakeholders to influence decision-
making and implementation which often 
have different values and interests.’694 
How these different interests and values 
influence access to water for vulnerable 
groups is highly relevant when assessing 
the sustainability and the general exercise 
of the right. This process of influencing 
and balancing is covered within this 
building block of stakeholder participation. 
The principle of participation is enshrined 
in many human rights conventions as well 
as in environmental conventions. In this 
sense, the practice and theory around 
this principle within these two fields will 
enhance its application in relation to the 
implementation of a sustainable human 
right to water. Participation, in the human 
rights sense, qualifies as ‘active, free 
and meaningful participation.’695 The 
environmental perspective of the principle 
goes further to include aspects of access 
to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice. 
These aspects are considered to be 
the clearest elaboration of Rio Principle 
10 as it is presented in the Aarhus 
Convention.696 Principle 10 contributes 
to the specific environmental viewpoint 
and provides whoever is affected with the 
option of redress, which is relevant to the 
right of access to water. This is especially 
important in circumstances where 
environmental issues affect the quality 
and quantity of drinking water available to 
vulnerable groups. 
The ten building blocks framework 
discusses the participation of all relevant 
stakeholders in this building block and 
not merely that of vulnerable groups. It 
is important to assess how the different 
viewpoints are presented, represented and 
weighed. Other stakeholders, who may 
not be directly involved in the domestic 
water supply to vulnerable groups may 
nevertheless affect those groups’ access 
to water. Consequently, the relationship 
between, for instance, water suppliers and 
rights-holders, and also the relationship 
amongst different rights-holders are 
assessed. 
3.5  Trade-offs between social 
objectives: service-level 
agreements 
Realizing sustainable access to water for 
vulnerable groups is not solely an issue 
of establishing the appropriate rules and 
694 van Rijswick, M., Edelenbos, J., Hellegers, P., Kok, M., & Kuks, S. (2014). Ten building blocks for sustainable water 
governance: an integrated method to assess the governance of water. Water International, (September), 1–18. http://
doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2014.951828, p. 7
695 General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, 4 December 1986, A/Res/41/ 128, Art 2(3)
696 ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, Aarhus, 25 June 1998, entry into force: 30 October 2001
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norms and implementing them. Such 
realization is to be seen as a continuing 
process of negotiating and tradeoff 
between stakeholders to come to agreed 
service levels.697 This also ties into the 
governance perspective which takes into 
account the different roles, authorities and 
parties. 
States are expected to invest all necessary 
resources to immediately realize the 
minimum core obligations of the human 
right of access to water. However, at times 
some states may be unable to immediately 
accomplish this. Nevertheless, in most 
cases, reallocation of resources can assist 
states in realizing the minimum core 
obligations for a greater number of people, 
if not all.698 In order for this reallocation 
to take place, (re)distribution of water 
must be renegotiated. This building block 
analyzes which social trade-offs states 
have to make. For instance, states may 
decide to implement subsidies to cover 
costs for infrastructure instead of raising 
the price of water services.  
3.6  Responsibility, authority and 
means   
Property rights/water rights  
Ownership of water supply infrastructure, 
or the right to use water which is often 
combined with the right to use land, 
indicates power and control. The role 
and responsibilities that come along with 
these rights relate to water governance 
and management in a particular manner 
and are rooted in formal and informal 
legislation. Central issues often deal with 
how property rights are defined, who 
benefits from these rights, and how the 
enforcement of these rights is carried 
out. How ownership rights are regulated 
really depends on the specific legal 
context of a state as it formulates whether 
water is for instance seen as a common 
good, or its ownership is connected to 
land ownership. With changing patterns 
in water supply and demand, revisions 
of existing legal frameworks are often 
required. There is a need for well-defined, 
coherent rules, roles, and responsibilities 
through legislation of formal and informal 
water rights. This is assumed to lead to 
both social and economic benefits as well 
as environmental benefits.699  
Responsibility 
States are the main duty-bearers under 
international human rights law and 
therefore carry the primary responsibility 
for fulfilling the human right of access 
to water. The state also has certain 
obligations in this regard. These obligations 
can be divided into three categories. The 
first of these is the tripartite typology, also 
known as the responsibility to respect, 
697 Stenekes, N. (2006). Sustainability and Participation in the Governing of Water Use: The case of urban water 
recycling. University of New South Wales, p. 15.
698 Winkler, I. (2012). The Human Right to Water Significance, Legal Status and Implications for Water Allocation (First). 
Portland, Oregan: Hart Publishing, p. 122.
699 Charles Batchelor, p. 8
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protect and fulfil. Second is the general 
obligation to progressively realize the right 
of access to water. Finally, the state has 
minimum core obligations. To discharge 
these obligations, states can follow 
the recommendations as formulated in 
CESCR General Comment No. 15. 
Means and capacity 
The requirements for the use of means 
or resources are related to the level of 
services intended. To put it into human 
rights terms, the requirements deal with 
the immediate realization of obligations 
related to the minimum core and the 
progressive realization of the human right 
of access to water. Regarding minimum 
core obligations, such as access to drinking 
water to sustain life, states are expected 
to be able to meet the requirements, and 
use all necessary resources as a priority 
matter to bring this about.700  Beyond the 
minimum core, states are expected to 
exploit the maximum amount of available 
resources to progressively realize the full 
enjoyment of the human right of access 
to water. In this case, the definition of 
resources that will be followed includes 
“all relevant resources needed for 
the realization of human rights”. This 
includes natural, human, organizational, 
technological resources, information and 
other resources.701 
3.7 Regulations and agreements 
Appropriateness 
Whether the regulations (including planning 
and policy instruments) and agreements 
are suitable within the context in which they 
have to function depends on a number of 
circumstances. This assessment method 
looks at the cultural, political, institutional, 
legal and economic circumstances. For 
instance, the legal systems or traditions 
present within a nation will influence 
whether the agreements and regulations 
are appropriate. If, for example, a national 
legal context is pluralistic, regulations and 
agreements will need to be harmonized or 
will need to reinforce one another. Otherwise 
the regulatory system will experience 
internal conflicts.702 The agreements and 
regulations need to fit within the context 
essential to function within. It happens 
often that regulations, which are effective 
in one context, are transplanted into other 
legal systems and contexts. This is a 
challenge as regulations may not yield the 
same results, or translate well when used in 
different legal systems.
Legitimacy  
Agreements and regulations need to be 
considered as legitimate sources of law 
and established in a legitimate manner. 
The legitimacy of the regulations and 
700 Winkler, I. (2012). The Human Right to Water Significance, Legal Status and Implications for Water Allocation (First). 
Portland, Oregan: Hart Publishing, p. 122.
701 Categories as suggested in Robertson, R. E. (1994). Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the 
“Maximum Available Resources ” to Realizing Economic , Social , and Cultural Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 16, 
693–714. 
702 See for instance Misiedjan, D., van Rijswick, M., & Tjen A Kwoei, A. (2015). A human right to water while the well runs 
dry: analysing the legal and regulatory framework of Yemen water law. The Journal of Water Law, 24(5/6), p. 205
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agreements is expected to enhance the 
acceptance of them as norms by the 
stakeholders. 
Legal certainty and adaptiveness 
Norms and rules should strike a perfect 
balance between adaptiveness and legal 
certainty. The adaptiveness of norms can 
be realized by including open norms and 
having procedures that allow for flexibility. 
Striving for sustainability in the realization 
of the human right of access to water 
asks for adaptiveness of the regulatory 
framework. The availability of water may 
fluctuate due to, for instance, climate 
change and pollution. The norms must be 
able to adapt to these changes. 
Nevertheless, the regulatory system should 
enhance legal certainty. Stakeholders need 
to be able to anticipate, and be able to base 
their behavior on the rules that they are 
aware of. 
3.8 Financial arrangements  
When it comes to financial arrangements 
regarding a sustainable right to water for 
vulnerable groups, two aspects deserve 
special attention. Firstly, financing and 
budgeting is necessary in order to realize 
this basic human right. Secondly, what is 
highly relevant for vulnerable groups is the 
affordability of and access to water.    
In developing their budgets, states 
are obligated to allocate resources 
for the realization of human rights. 
They nevertheless have a margin 
of appreciation.703 Even though the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights does not include 
a benchmark, meaning there is no fixed 
percentage of the budget which must be 
allocated; it is presumed that states are 
required to show they have adequately 
considered the financial resources 
available to satisfy the right to water.704 
The 2006 United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Human Development 
Report suggests that states should spend 
a minimum of 1% of their Gross Domestic 
Product on water and sanitation.705  
Besides government-raised financing 
(through, for instance, taxes) and transfers 
(such as grants from international 
organizations), household and user 
contributions are other sources of funding 
for water and sanitation services. These 
options are required to be affordable, 
including for vulnerable groups. Here 
it is important whether households are 
connected to informal or formal services. 
In the case of informal services, it is often 
703 Odello, M., & Seatzu, F. (2013). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In The UN 
Committee on economic, social and cultural rights: the law, process and practice, p.17, London: Routledge.
 p. 17 & De Albuquerque, C., & Roaf, V. (2014). Financing. In Realising the human rights to water and sanitation: A 
handbook by the UN Special Rapporteur Catarina De Albuquerque, p. 7.
704 Alston, P., & Quinn, G. (1987). The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 9, p. 180
705 United Nations Development Programme. (2006). Human Development Report 2006 Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty 
and the global water crisis. New York. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/
HDR/2006 Global HDR/HDR-2006-Beyond scarcity-Power-poverty-and-the-global-water-crisis.pdf, p. 9. 
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challenging to guarantee affordability and 
to track developments.706 Nevertheless, 
states are ultimately responsible for 
ensuring, as much as possible, the 
affordability of services. In order to ensure 
that relevant authorities set affordable 
tariffs, it is advised that states gather 
information on what percentage of their 
income households spend on access 
to water. This information should be 
differentiated according to income and 
social groups. It is also important to 
track where the household contributions 
are invested, for example by earmarking 
the incomes generated from taxes or 
payments of services.707  
3.9 Engineering and 
maintenance
When it comes to technology and 
engineering, the choices need to be 
appropriate and economically and 
socially viable. Sustainable services and 
the technology that goes with them may 
require a higher investment cost, and 
may require relatively more maintenance 
than unsustainable services. For this 
reason, choices around technology and 
maintenance must be made based on 
sufficient information explaining existing 
and projected resources for the medium 
and long term.708 
One of the dilemmas that states face when 
resources, especially water resources, are 
scarce is how to prioritize sustainability 
and sufficient spending on water and 
sanitation services to those currently 
under-serviced.709 What states should 
consider is that, from the human rights 
perspective, they must firstly strive for 
equality through efficient use of resources. 
States should expand access to minimum 
essential services before improving the 
services of those already served. In this 
sense, the principles of equality and 
sustainability complement each other.710  
3.10 Enforcement, monitoring and 
follow up after monitoring
Implementation, enforcement and 
monitoring are essential for the longevity 
of a sustainable right to water. Not 
only are they necessary for upholding 
standards but also for evaluating whether 
the economic, social and ecological 
conditions have been met, and whether 
adjustments and renegotiations are 
necessary to ensure adaptiveness and the 
realization of the human right.711  
706 De Albuquerque, C., & Roaf, V. (2014). Monitoring. In Realising the human rights to water and sanitation: A handbook 
by the UN Special Rapporteur Catarina De Albuquerque, p. 18.
707 De Albuquerque, C., & Roaf, V. (2014a). Financing. In Realising the human rights to water and sanitation: A handbook 
by the UN Special Rapporteur Catarina De Albuquerque,  p. 18.
708 Loucks, D. P. (2000). Sustainable Water Resources Management. Water International, 25(1), 3–10. http://doi.
org/10.1080/02508060008686793, p. 6.
709 De Albuquerque, C., & Roaf, V. (2014c). Principles. In Realising the human rights to water and sanitation: A handbook 
by the UN Special Rapporteur Catarina De Albuquerque, p. 78.
710 ibid. p. 78
711 See for instance Pienaar, H., Belcher, A., & Grobler, D. F. (2011). Protecting Aquatic Ecosystem Health for Sustainable 
Use. In B. Schreiner & R. Hassan (Eds.), Transforming Water Management in South Africa: Designing and 
Implementing a New Policy Framework (pp. 97–118). Springer Science. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9367-7. 
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The enforcement of rights and policies 
is an often neglected aspect in water 
governance.712 The emphasis lies on the 
process of policy development, while 
implementation and enforcement are 
of equal importance. By articulating a 
sustainable right to water in national 
legislation, the right moves from being 
a political and moral ambition to an 
enforceable right. Human rights are not 
self-enforcing and therefore enforcement 
mechanisms should be established. Such 
mechanisms include administrative and/
or judicial enforcement where the court 
system is used for individuals and groups 
to assert their rights. This is especially 
important for vulnerable groups as it 
can empower them directly or indirectly 
when they, or NGOs on their behalf, go 
through the court system to enforce these 
rights.713 However, the enforcement of a 
legal decision can still be challenging and 
depends on factors such as the capacity 
available to deal with this, the compliance 
mechanisms such as fines, and the overall 
trust in the legal system. 
Outside of judicial or administrative 
enforcement, monitoring is an additional 
mechanism for realizing access to water. 
This will stimulate the overall compliance 
and will assist those who do not assert 
their rights through the judicial system or 
other enforcement mechanisms. States are 
required to monitor their compliance and 
that of others with the legal content of the 
human right of access to water and other 
environmental obligations.714 In order to 
facilitate this, key performance indicators 
should be developed. The human rights 
framework requires structural, process 
and outcome indicators to be defined for 
monitoring.715 States should therefore 
identify standards, targets and indicators 
regarding availability, accessibility, quality, 
affordability, acceptability, sustainability 
and non-discrimination. 
Monitoring in itself is not sufficient as it 
is a tool for both further development of 
policy and public awareness. Monitoring 
results require follow up actions after 
the monitoring results are available. 
This enhances adaptiveness and a 
constant improvement of performance. 
Therefore this building block is linked to, 
among other blocks, that of stakeholder 
participation. States must ensure ‘that 
data are adequately collected, organized 
and stored, and then made public in a 
timely, accurate, accessible and useful 
form.’716 Especially, data concerning the 
inequalities in water access are important 
for realizing the right for vulnerable groups. 
Often states do not supply disaggregated 
data which is useful for identifying where 
712 van Rijswick, M., Edelenbos, J., Hellegers, P., Kok, M., & Kuks, S. (2014). Ten building blocks for sustainable water 
governance: an integrated method to assess the governance of water. Water International, (September), 1–18. http://
doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2014.951828, p. 12.
713 van der Valk, M., & Keenan, P. (Eds.). (2011). The right to water and water rights in a changing world. In Colloquium 
the right to water and water rights in a changing world, p. 52.
714 De Albuquerque, C., & Roaf, V. (2014b). Monitoring. In Realising the human rights to water and sanitation: A handbook 
by the UN Special Rapporteur Catarina De Albuquerque, p. 5.
715 ibid. p. 7.
716 ibid. p. 8.
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and how discrimination occurs and also 
whether progress is being made. 
3.11 Conflict prevention and 
resolution 
Conflict prevention 
In relation to conflict prevention, particularly 
for vulnerable groups, sustainability and 
equity are highly relevant. The principles of 
intergenerational and intra-generational 
equity are especially important. This 
is because with the exploitation of 
natural resources in many resource-
rich developing countries, governments 
often gain substantial financial benefits. 
However, the social conditions of 
vulnerable groups are neglected, 
threatening human security, which can lead 
to (armed) conflict between governments 
and local populations.717 Because of 
this, the UNDP recommends in its 2015 
‘Human Development Report’ that in order 
to prevent conflicts and strive after human 
security, balance must be found between 
using and equitably distributing resources, 
while still considering the needs of current 
and future generations.718  
Overall, the assumption is that having clear 
rules based on shared responsibilities and 
values, which are represented in several 
other building blocks, in alignment with 
the physical circumstances can, in many 
cases, prevent conflicts from arising. These 
values and responsibilities should, however, 
be grounded in equity and sustainability. 
Conflict resolution 
In the event that conflicts do occur, 
provision must be made for mechanisms 
which can deal with these conflicts in an 
independent manner. Frequently, these 
mechanisms take the form of independent 
mediators, arbiters or judges. The absence 
of conflict resolution mechanisms 
adversely impacts and excludes affected 
vulnerable communities.719 As mentioned 
in the building block on participation, 
access to justice is a necessary element in 
conflict resolution, especially for vulnerable 
groups. In addition, the principles of public 
participation and access to information 
go hand-in-hand with access to justice. 
Many states have developed laws and 
regulation regarding access to justice. 
However, the implementation of these 
laws is often insufficient.720  For this reason 
it is not only relevant to assess whether 
the appropriate laws and regulations are 
in place, but also whether the outcomes 
of these mechanisms are enforced and 
implemented. 
717 Marong, A. B. M. (2003). From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of International Legal Norms in 
Sustainable Development. Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 16(21), p. 38.
718 United Nations Development Programme (2015). Human Development Report. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/
default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf 
719 Krchnak, K. M. (2004). Improving Water Governance Through Increased Public Access to Information and 
Participation. Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 5(1), p. 34.
720 ibid.
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Judicial mechanisms often apply 
to individual cases only. If the issue 
is a problem relevant for a broader 
demographic group than just the individual 
parties of the case, mechanisms should 
be in place for the issue to be taken up by 
other authorities. For instance, if the water 
allocation mechanism in place has become 
inappropriate due to a significant change 
in water quantity and a dispute occurs 
because of this, other relevant authorities 
should pick up on this issue leading 
possibly to necessary policy and legislation 
changes. 
4. Conclusion 
To develop an integrated assessment 
method for sustainable access to water for 
domestic purposes for vulnerable groups 
is challenging. This method highlights the 
main topics which assist in reviewing the 
national water management regulations 
and policy. The method incorporates 
information from different disciplines to 
paint a clearer picture of the situation. 
Access to water for domestic purposes 
is not merely influenced by whether or 
not the human right of access to water 
is recognized, but also whether other 
circumstances influence this access. 
The building blocks are interlinked and 
point out the three different steps of 
the assessment method:  the content, 
organization, and implementation. The 
emphasis is that not only the outcome is 
important, but also the procedure. This is 
especially important for vulnerable groups 
whose interests are often left out. 
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1. Introduction
The recognition of the relationship between human rights and the environment is one 
of the fundamental principles necessary in the advancement of justice, governance and 
law, for environmental sustainability. This relationship works both ways: the protection 
of the environment is necessary to uphold human rights, and the protection of human 
rights is necessary to protect the environment. This paper focuses on how the protection 
of indigenous rights can help protect the environment. It suggests that upholding 
indigenous rights can contribute to these ends through emphasizing our responsibilities 
toward nature and de-emphasizing our rights over it. 
This paper does not discuss indigenous beliefs themselves. I note here that indigenous 
peoples stress that their identity is entwined with their relationship with nature. This 
relationship views nature as a relative to be respected rather than as a resource to be 
exploited. Humans are part of nature as an interdependent whole, with there being no 
right of any one part of that whole to dominate another part. To uphold indigenous rights 
is to uphold such conceptions about our relationship with the natural world. If protective 
environmental views are respected, then the environment itself is more likely to be better 
respected and protected. 
This paper illustrates this with examples from Aotearoa721  New Zealand that recognize 
the right of Maori to have their relationship with the natural environment upheld in 
New Zealand law.  There are many different such examples in New Zealand law, from 
recognition of Maori interests in mainstream resource management decision-making, 
to special arrangements in the management of New Zealand’s natural resources.  In 
this summary paper, only the main illustrations are presented. One recent example of 
Using human rights to recognize human 
responsibilities toward nature
Catherine Iorns Magallanes
721 This is the Maori term for New Zealand.
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a special arrangement is then discussed, 
because the arrangement has recognized 
in law the Maori view that the natural 
environment should be treated more as a 
person—indeed, as a living relative—rather 
than simply as a resource. 
These examples from Aotearoa New 
Zealand illustrate ways in which the 
law can be used to implement and 
incorporate indigenous conceptions of 
our responsibilities towards the natural 
world within a Western society and 
legal system. They thus illustrate ways 
that we can better protect the natural 
environment by upholding human 
rights. The way that some of these 
examples have been celebrated by non-
indigenous environmentalists illustrates 
also that such recognition may alter the 
mainstream constructions of nature, 
through normalizing the indigenous 
constructions.  Thus, the protection of 
indigenous rights to culture and religion 
could help us change our conception 
of responsibilities toward and thus our 
relationship with nature, and better secure 
a healthy environment for all.
2. Maori concepts of 
responsibility for nature 
in New Zealand law
Traditional indigenous views of the 
environment consider humans as being 
part of nature and acknowledge and reflect 
humankind’s interdependence with nature. 
Importantly, these indigenous cultures’ 
connections with nature are so deep that 
the nature is imbued with personality 
and viewed as kin – it is regarded as a 
true living ancestor of the people. This 
view corresponds with responsibilities 
to protect nature as guardians, as they 
would in respect to a family member. The 
adoption of an indigenous perspective 
within a legal system can provide a set 
of responsibilities to nature from an eco-
centric approach. An example of this 
exists in Aotearoa New Zealand, where 
the guardianship relationship of the 
indigenous Maori with the environment 
has been recognized and protected in 
law.722  
Maori relationships with the natural world 
have been incorporated or upheld in 
New Zealand environmental law through 
judicial decisions, legislation, as well as 
local, regional and national policy.  For 
example, courts have required the Maori 
spiritual relationship with the environment 
to be considered by government in making 
water management decisions, even 
722 See Catherine Iorns Magallanes, Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: Protecting the Cosmology that 
Protects the Environment, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 273, 273–327 (2015) (hereinafter Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa 
New Zealand), for more detailed information on the various different ways that New Zealand law has recognised 
Maori cosmology in law.  See Catherine Iorns Magallanes, Native American Values and Laws of Exclusion, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CONTRASTING IDEAS OF NATURE: A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH 200, 201 (Keith H. 
Hirokawa ed., 2014), for more information in a US context.
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when the legislation did not specifically 
provide for this.723 Another judicial 
decision underlined the need for the “the 
relationship of Maori with their ancestral 
land”724  to be given greater recognition in 
the government’s environmental decision-
making, and even “primacy” as a matter 
of national importance when balancing 
competing factors.725  Since 1986, New 
Zealand has made the need to consider 
Maori culture and the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi726  a core part of the 
development of all national legislation; and 
it has become part of policy development 
requirements within the executive.727   
The primary environmental statute in New 
Zealand is the Resource Management 
Act of 1991.  Its overriding purpose is “to 
promote the sustainable management 
of natural and physical resources,” 
which is widely defined.728  Significantly, 
“matters of national importance” which 
all decision-makers under the Act must 
“recognize and provide for,” include “the 
relationship of Maori and their culture and 
traditions with their ancestral lands, water, 
sites, waahi tapu [sacred sites], and other 
taonga [treasured things].”729  In addition, 
all decision-makers must “have particular 
regard to” “kaitiakitanga,” which is defined 
in the Act as “the exercise of guardianship 
by the tangata whenua [tribe from an area] 
of an area in accordance with tikanga 
Maori [Maori protocol] in relation to natural 
and physical resources; and includes the 
ethic of stewardship.”730  Finally, the Act 
requires all decision-makers to “take into 
account the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi.”731 
These provisions upholding responsibility 
to the environment occur within 
the anthropocentric, mainstream 
environmental legal system. However, 
the application of these provisions has 
successfully resulted in the consideration, 
recognition, and even protection of Maori 
relationships with the natural world in 
decisions under the Act relating to the 
use, development, and protection of New 
Zealand’s natural and physical systems. 
This has produced positive protection for 
such interests in some cases, such as 
through accommodation in the planning 
and development process, and through 
being upheld by courts in reviewing 
decisions made against such interests. 
For example, as early as 1994, it was 
decided that, where Maori had an ancestral 
723 See, e.g., Huakina Dev. Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188 (HC). 
724 Town and Country Planning Act 1977, s 3(1)(g) (N.Z.).
725 Environmental. Defence Society, Inc. v. Mangonui Cty. Council [1989] 3 NZLR 257 (CA).
726 The Treaty of Waitangi is the Treaty between the British Crown and the indigenous Maori that was agreed to in 1840 
in order to enable British settlement of New Zealand. The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti O Waitangi, NEW ZEALAND 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/treaty-of-waitangi/ (last visited July 30, 2016).  
727 PHILIP JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 82 ¶ .4.9.4. (Brookers, 4th ed. 
2014). See also Cabinet Manual 2008, s 7.60-61 (NA) (N.Z.).  
728 Resource Management Act 1991, s 5(2) (N.Z.).
729 Id. s 6 (emphasis added). See Catherine Iorns Magallanes, The Use of ‘Tangata Whenua’ and ‘Mana Whenua’ in New 
Zealand Legislation: Attempts at Cultural Recognition, 42 VICTORIA UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 259 (2011), for a 
discussion of the use of Maori terms in legislation.
730 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 7, 9 (emphasis added).
731 Id. s 8.
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relationship with a natural system, then 
before any permit (“resource consent”) 
could be issued, decision-makers must 
recognize that ancestral link, provide for 
the maintenance of that relationship, and 
provide for the tribe’s guardianship—in 
accordance with Maori culture—over that 
natural system for the future.732  
The protection has thus ranged from the 
need to consult with relevant Maori over 
the impact of a development proposal 
on their interests,733  to rejection of 
development proposals because they 
interfere with Maori values and their 
spiritual relationship with the site 
proposed to be developed. Cases rejecting 
such interference have concerned a wide 
range of matters, including the discharge 
of sewage effluent into the sea,734  the 
location of a road being too close to old 
burial sites,735  a television aerial being too 
close to and thereby interfering with Maori 
metaphysical relationships with a battle 
site,736  and a wind farm being too close to—
and interfering with Maori metaphysical 
relationships with—a mountain of spiritual 
significance.737 
The inclusion of these elements respecting 
Maori culture and spiritual relationships 
with nature has occurred within an 
anthropocentric legal framework. 
However, this is the helpful beginning 
of adopting a structure of responsibility, 
through upholding the indigenous Maori 
view of nature as an ancestor and 
devising legal frameworks for better 
protecting its interests. Indeed, since 
the 1980s there have been many such 
examples upholding responsibility. For 
example, co-governance arrangements 
have been established between Maori and 
the government with the express purpose 
of restoring lakes, rivers, and other 
aspects of nature, in line with respect for 
them as ancestors.738  Most recently and 
most significantly, natural features have 
been accorded legal personality, with 
human guardians appointed to protect 
their interests.  
New Zealand has recently adopted a novel 
method for upholding human responsibility 
for nature: it has recognized elements of 
nature as legal persons and appointed 
guardians to protect the interests of these 
elements of nature. There are two current 
examples: a river and a forest. Both were 
adopted for human rights reasons: to 
do justice to the indigenous peoples, 
by settling long-standing grievances 
between the New Zealand government 
and the indigenous Maori who consider 
themselves the rightful guardians of 
these areas. Indeed, the indigenous tribes 
concerned consider that the river and 
the forest are their respective ancestors, 
732 See, e.g., Haddon v. Auckland Regional Council [1994] 3 NZRMA 49 at 52, 5758 (PT). 
733 See, e.g., Mason-Riseborough v. Matamata-Piako District Council [1997] 4 ELRNZ 31 (EC). 
734 See, e.g., Te Runanga o Taumarere v. Northland Regional Council [1996] NZRMA 77.
735 Te Runanga o Ati Awa ki Whakarongotai, Inc. v. NZ Historic Places Trust [2002] 8 ELRNZ 265 at 272 (EC).  
736 TV3 Network Services Ltd. v. Waikato District Council [1998] 1 NZLR 360 at 363–64 (HC).  
737 Outstanding Landscape Protection Society, Inc. v. Hastings District Council [2007] NZRMA 8 (EC). 
738 See, e.g., Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 (N.Z).
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such that the tribes have the burden and 
privilege of responsibility of care for them 
as kin. These examples are discussed in 
turn.739 
1. Te Awa Tupua: Whanganui River 
Settlement Agreement
The Whanganui River flows through the 
traditional territory of the Whanganui 
Maori. The river is said to be “central to the 
existence of Whanganui Iwi and their health 
and wellbeing,” providing “both physical 
and spiritual sustenance to Whanganui 
Iwi from time immemorial.”740  The river 
is seen as the ancestor of the Whanganui 
tribes,741  and the concept that the people 
are inseparable from the river “underpins 
the responsibilities of the iwi [tribes] and 
hapū [subtribes] of Whanganui in relation 
to the care, protection, management and 
use of the Whanganui River in accordance 
with the kawa and tikanga [protocols]” of 
the tribes.742  It is this that has given rise 
to the Whanganui saying “Ko au te awa, ko 
te awa ko au”, which means “I am the river 
and the river is me.”
Many activities of the New Zealand 
government over the years from the 
1800s breached not only the guarantees 
given to the Whanganui iwi by treaty but 
also violated what they view as the life 
force or spirit of the river.743  The New 
Zealand courts have agreed that such 
violations of Maori cosmology impacted 
the Whanganui tribes themselves, and 
prevented them from exercising their 
duties of guardianship over the river.744 
Throughout the breaches, the Whanganui 
tribes have maintained that they are still 
the rightful guardians of the river and of 
its life force, and that the right to control 
its management should be returned to 
them. An agreement in resolution of these 
739 See Catherine Iorns Magallanes, Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand, supra note 2, for more detailed 
information on and discussion of these examples.
740 WHANGANUI IWI AND THE CROWN, RURUKU WHAKATUPUA - TE MANA O TE IWI O WHANGANUI cl.1.4 (2014) 
(hereafter referred to as TE MANA O TE IWI O WHANGANUI), http://nz01.terabyte.co.nz/ots/DocumentLibrary/14080
5RurukuWhakatupua-TeManaOTeIwiOWhanganui.pdf.  
741 See Id. cls. 2.1–2.25, for the Whanganui iwi account of the origins and the significance of the river to them.  This 
account includes tribal lore about the river’s supernatural guardians and their relationship to the people. Id. cls. 
2.19–2.20).
742 Id. cl. 3.2 (italics added).
743 WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, TE IKA WHENUA RIVERS REPORT (1998), https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/
WT/wt_DOC_68382633/Te%20Ika%20Whenua%20Rivers%201998-compressed.pdf.
744 Ngati Rangi Trust and Ors v Manawatu Whanganui Regional Council [2004] NZEnvC 172 at ¶ 318.
Photo credit: © Jorg Bauer
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grievances745  – between the tribes and the 
government over future joint management 
of the river – was reached in 2012,746 
finalized in 2014,747  and the legislation 
to implement the agreement was 
introduced into Parliament in May 2016.748 
Significantly, this agreement incorporates 
the personification of the river held by the 
indigenous tribes - according it the title 
Te Awa Tupua - creates a new legal entity 
for Te Awa Tupua, and upholds the tribes’ 
spiritual relationship with it.
The Whanganui River agreement 
recognizes the indivisible unity of the river 
and its metaphysical status as a living 
being. It adopts the genealogical approach 
to describing the river, emphasizing the 
connection of people to the river. These 
aspects are reflected in a set of overarching 
“intrinsic values,”749  described also as 
“the natural law and value system… which 
binds the people to the River and the River 
to the people”:750 
13 Tupua te Kawa
Tupua te Kawa comprises the intrinsic 
values that represent the essence of Te 
Awa Tupua, namely—
(a)   Ko te Awa te mātāpuna o te ora: 
the River is the source of spiritual 
and physical sustenance: 
Te Awa Tupua is a spiritual and physical 
entity that supports and sustains both 
the life and natural resources within the 
Whanganui River and the health and 
wellbeing of the iwi, hapū and other 
communities of the River.
(b)  E rere kau mai te Awa nui mai 
te Kahui Maunga ki Tangaroa: 
the great River flows from the 
mountains to the sea 
Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and 
living whole from the mountains to the 
sea, incorporating the Whanganui River 
and all of its physical and metaphysical 
elements.
(c)   Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au: I am 
the River and the River is me: 
745 See Catherine Iorns Magallanes, ‘Reparations for Maori Grievances in Aotearoa New Zealand’, in Lenzerini (ed.) 
Reparations for Indigenous Peoples (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) for a summary of a range of modern 
reparations settlement agreements.  See the Office of Treaty Settlements, www.ots.govt.nz/ (last visited July 30, 
2016), for more information on settlement of historical Treaty of Waitangi claims.  See also TREATY OF WAITANGI 
SETTLEMENTS(Nicola Wheen & Janine Hayward, eds., 2012).
746 The 2012 agreement, entitled Tutohu Whakatupua, was signed on August 30 between the Whanganui Iwi and 
the Crown.  WHANGANUI IWI AND THE CROWN, TUTOHU WHAKATUPUA (2012), http://nz01.terabyte.co.nz/ots/
DocumentLibrary/WhanganuiRiverAgreement.pdf.
747 The 2014 Deed of Settlement comprises two documents: TE MANA O TE IWI O WHANGANUI supra note 77) 
(including the main elements of the settlement: apology, recitation of the history of the grievances and claims, 
and all the elements of the settlement; and RURUKU WHAKATUPUA - TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA, (hereinafter 
referred to as TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA), http://nz01.terabyte.co.nz/ots/DocumentLibrary/RurukuWhakatupua-
TeManaoTeAwaTupua.pdf (last visited July 30, 2016)  (including the agreed Te Awa Tupua framework for the 
status and management of the Whanganui River).  See OFFICE OF TREATY SETTLEMENTS, supra note 82, for more 
information and the relevant documents, including a summary of the Whanganui River Deed of Settlement. 
748 The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill 2016 (129-1) (N.Z.) (hereinafter Te Awa Tupua Bill). At 
the time of writing the Bill was still under consideration by the NZ Parliament.
749 Id. cl. 13; TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA, supra note 27, cl. 2.6,
750 TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA, supra note 27, at 6.
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The iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River 
have an inalienable interconnection 
with, and responsibility to, Te Awa 
Tupua and its health and wellbeing.
(d)  Ngā manga iti, ngā manga nui e 
honohono kau ana, ka tupu hei 
Awa Tupua : the small and large 
streams that flow into one another 
and form one River: 
Te Awa Tupua is a singular entity 
comprised of many elements and 
communities, working collaboratively 
to the common purpose of the health 
and wellbeing of Te Awa Tupua.751  
To uphold this in law, the legislation 
recognizes the river as a legal person: “Te 
Awa Tupua is a legal person and has all the 
rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a 
legal person.”752  This is expressly intended 
to “reflect the Whanganui Iwi view that the 
River is a living entity in its own right and is 
incapable of being ‘owned’ in an absolute 
sense” and to “enable the River to have 
legal standing in its own right.”753  
An official guardian for Te Awa Tupua is 
being established by the 2016 proposed 
legislation.754  This guardian will “act and 
speak for and on behalf of Te Awa Tupua” 
and uphold “the Te Awa Tupua status” and 
intrinsic values, “promote and protect the 
health and well-being of Te Awa Tupua”, 
and perform other necessary functions 
for it, including participating in relevant 
statutory processes and holding property 
or funds in the name of Te Awa Tupua.755 
Importantly, the guardian “must act in the 
interests of Te Awa Tupua and consistently 
with Tupua te Kawa” (the intrinsic values, 
above).756 
The guardian, referred to as Te Pou 
Tupua, will consist of two persons “of 
high standing,”757 one appointed by the 
Crown and one appointed collectively 
by all tribes with interests in the river.758 
Each appointee must have “the mana 
[prestige, status], skills, knowledge, and 
experience to achieve the purpose and 
perform the functions of Te Pou Tupua.”759 
Underneath Te Pou Tupua is a 3-person 
advisory group.760  
A key interest of the river is its health and 
wellbeing. This is specifically addressed 
through the development of a “Whole of 
River Strategy,”761 which will be designed “to 
751 Te Awa Tupua Bill, supra note 28, cl. 2.7.
752 Id, cl. 14(1).
753 TUTOHU WHAKATUPUA, supra note 26, cl. 2.7.
754 This guardian will be called Te Pou Tupua. Te Awa Tupua Bill, supra note 28, cl. 14(2).
755 Id. cl. 19(1).
756 Id. cl. 19(2).
757 TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA, supra note 27, cl. 3.8; TUTOHU WHAKATUPUA, supra note 26, cl 2.20.4.  The high 
standing is so as to recognize “both the importance of the role and the need to interact with Ministers and other 
interested parties at a leadership level.” Id.
758 TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA, supra note 27, cl. 3.9; TUTOHU WHAKATUPUA, supra note 26, cl. 2.19. See TE MANA O 
TE AWA TUPUA, supra note 27, cls. 3.9–3.19, for more details of the appointment process, term, and conditions.  See 
Id. cls. 3.20–3.40, for the administrative and advisory support for Te Pou Tupua in carrying out its role.
759 Te Awa Tupua Bill, supra note 28, cl. 20.  “Mana” is best translated here as moral authority or standing. 
760 The advisory groups is called Te Karewao. Te Awa Tupua Bill, supra note 28, cls. 27–28.
761 TUTOHU WHAKATUPUA, supra note 26, cl. 2.23. This strategy is called Te Heke Ngahuru, in the Bill. Te Awa Tupua 
Bill, supra note 28, cls. 35–36.
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address and advance the environmental, 
social, cultural and economic health and 
wellbeing of the Whanganui River.”762 To 
this end, the agreement defines the goals, 
status and parameters of a strategy to 
identify and address such issues of health 
and wellbeing, including recommending 
actions to address the identified issues.763 
It establishes a strategy group of up 
to 17 members representing various 
different organizations with interests 
in the river,764 to “act collaboratively” to 
develop the strategy765 and monitor its 
implementation.756  Local government and 
other decision-makers will be required 
to consider and take into account the 
strategy in relevant decisions. It has been 
noted that the group and the strategy are 
intended to provide “strategic direction 
and the lens through which the River is 
viewed, not day to day management.”767  
In order to “support the health and 
wellbeing” of the river, a fund will be 
established with a Crown grant of 
NZD30 million.768 At earlier stages of the 
negotiation, this money was described as 
a clean-up fund for the river. 
2.   Te Urewera: Tūhoe Settlement 
Agreement
Until recently, Te Urewera National Park 
was the largest national park in the 
North Island of Aotearoa, New Zealand. 
It is all virgin, original forest or bush, but 
was created from most of the traditional 
lands of the Tūhoe people. This taking 
was the subject of a grievance against 
the Crown,769  and Tūhoe have argued 
continuously for the need to exercise their 
spiritual authority over the land through 
guardianship for it.770  In 2013, Tūhoe and 
the New Zealand government agreed on 
a settlement to this grievance whereby 
legal personality would be attributed to 
the park, and Tūhoe could exercise their 
responsibility of guardianship over it. The 
lands would remain protected, but they 
would maintain a separate identity and 
be governed through a co-governance 
arrangement with Tūhoe. Legislation to 
implement this agreement was passed in 
July 2014.  
A fundamental aspect underlying this 
agreement is the importance placed on 
762 TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA, supra note 27, cl.4.1; see also TUTOHU WHAKATUPUA, supra note 26, cl. 2.24. In 
the 2014 agreement this Strategy is called Te Heke Ngahuru.  See TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA,supra note 27, cls. 
4.1–4.23.
763 Id. cl. 4.2.
764 This group is called Te Kopuka. Te Awa Tupua Bill, supra note 28, cls. 29–32.
765 TE MANA O TE AWA TUPUA, supra note 27, cl. 5.3.
766 Id. cl.5.4. See Id. cls. 5.1–5.47, for functions, membership matters, procedures meetings, decision-making, and 
support.  See Id. cl. 5.45, stating that the Crown will support it financially..
767 Press Release, New Zealand Government, Whanganui River Deed of Settlement Initialled (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.
scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1403/S00514/whanganui-river-deed-of-settlement-initialled.htm.
768 The fund is called Te Korotete.  Te Awa Tupua Bill, supra note 28, cls. 57–58.
769 Tūhoe Claims Settlement Act 2014, cl 9(36)–(37) (N.Z).  The detailed Crown acknowledgements of its actions in § 9 
and the apology in § 10 provide excellent background to this settlement.
770 See, e.g., Id. cl. 9(36).
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the intrinsic value of nature itself.771  The 
Te Urewera Act 2014 explicitly identifies 
the “intrinsic worth” of Te Urewera,772  as 
well as protection of its interests.773  The 
key means of upholding the Tūhoe view 
of Te Urewera as an ancestor is to declare 
it to be its own legal entity, with “all the 
rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a 
legal person.”774   It will accordingly hold 
title to its own land (i.e., title to itself), 
where that land is inalienable.  
Responsibility for the guardianship of Te 
Urewera is given to the Te Urewera Board, 
“to act on behalf of, and in the name of, Te 
Urewera” and “to provide governance for 
Te Urewera.”775  Half of the Membership of 
the Board is appointed by  Tūhoe and half 
by the New Zealand government.776 The 
Act contains an extensive list of powers 
and obligations of the Board, including 
the ability to make by-laws and to grant 
activity permits with Te Urewera.777  Yet the 
overriding notion is human responsibility 
for the protection of Te Urewera.
It is too soon to tell how the guardianship 
regime will operate in practice, including 
how the interests of Te Awa Tupua or Te 
Urewera will be defined, and how well they 
will be protected. Yet this combination of 
formally legislating for a natural feature as 
a legal person and upholding its interests 
for its own sake, suggests to all—not just 
to its Maori descendants—that it is more 
than just a resource to be exploited, even 
for relatively benign use, such as low-
impact recreation. 
The Maori New Zealand examples show 
that responsibility can be articulated 
in legislation and that guardians can 
be established to uphold duties of care 
for nature. Respect for the rights of 
indigenous peoples, including redress for 
wrongs suffered and maintenance of their 
culture, can result in laws that treat the 
environment in a way that reflects human 
responsibilities for and toward the natural 
world, and will likely ultimately better 
protect it in the future. 
3. Conclusion
If we want to encourage the adoption of 
international and domestic legal systems 
that ensure the survival of the living world 
as we know it, then the frameworks that 
underpin them will need to change. They 
will have to move from exclusionary 
771 Te Urewera Act 2014, s 4 (finding “[t]he purpose of this Act is to establish and preserve in perpetuity a legal identity 
and protected status for Te Urewera for its intrinsic worth, its distinctive natural and cultural values, the integrity of 
those values, and for its national importance, and in particular to—
 (a) strengthen and maintain the connection between Tūhoe and Te Urewera; and
 (b) preserve as far as possible the natural features and beauty of Te Urewera, the integrity of its indigenous 
ecological systems and biodiversity, and its historical and cultural heritage; and
 (c) provide for Te Urewera as a place for public use and enjoyment, for recreation, learning, and spiritual reflection, 
and as an inspiration for all.”).
772 Id. ss 3(8), 4.
773 Id. s 18(1)(g).
774 Id. s 11(1).
775 Id. s 17.
776 Id. s 21. After three years the Board will increase to nine members, six of which will be appointed by Tūhoe trustees, 
so that Tūhoe will have a majority.
777 Id. s 20.
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systems based on human property rights 
over nature, to a system that is based on 
responsibilities for nature and includes 
respect for all life forms and systems. The 
stance will need to abandon the fiction that 
we are all separate from and independent 
of nature, to recognize that we are all part 
of and completely dependent on the Earth 
and its systems for our survival.  
Despite the anthropocentric nature of 
human rights, a human rights based 
approach can help achieve the shift 
necessary for such system changes. 
First, respect for the intrinsic value of all 
life is frequently discussed in the context 
of – and as a basis for – a rights-based 
approach.778 Secondly, as this chapter has 
outlined, the recognition of indigenous 
human rights can be used to recognize 
and implement human responsibilities for 
nature and its protection.  If we are to truly 
respect nature and our appropriate place 
within it, the law needs to recognize – if 
not be based around – our responsibilities 
towards it. It is critical to explicitly 
recognize human responsibility for nature 
in a way that emphasizes our partnership, 
guardianship and trusteeship roles, as 
opposed to the false human construct 
that we have rights over nature. 
These examples in Aotearoa New Zealand 
have depended upon the existence of the 
indigenous Maori people and the recognition 
of their human rights, but I suggest that 
the examples are generalizable. They 
778 See, e.g., MYRES S MCDOUGALL, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980) (arguing for respect 
as a universal human rights principle that would protect the rights of all forms of life, including non-human). 
show that we can take ancient concepts 
of interconnectedness with nature and 
translate them into a modern, liberal legal 
system. The enactment of these examples 
in national and local legislation makes 
this alternative worldview much more 
visible as well as obviously implementable. 
Adopting such provisions and requiring 
us to act in accordance with them will 
247
start to change our thoughts as well 
as our actions. I therefore suggest that 
widespread recognition of indigenous 
human rights in law will help encourage 
us all to realize, as our forebears did, that 
our relationships with the natural world are 
crucial to identity and survival. All rights 
come with responsibilities; it is time for 
our environmental responsibilities to come 
out from under the shadow of our human 
rights.
Photo credit: © Andres Medina
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Photo credit: © Unsplash.com
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1. Introduction
When we look back in time and imagine the South Africa of 1990, we should recall a 
country which looked somewhat different from the one we are familiar with today. The 
South Africa of that time also had an abundance of natural resources and a culturally 
diverse society, but it did not have a democratic Constitution,779 it had no constitutional 
environmental right,780 it had no such thing as a Centre for Environmental Rights,781 not a 
single court case addressing the matter of substantive environmental rights, international 
environmental law had limited real meaning and, in general, lawyers and others still had a 
particularly narrow view of the meaning of ‘the environment’.782   
Enter the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and an environmental 
right that has since had its days in court,783  that is celebrated worldwide as a very fine 
example of this type of right,784 that is supported by strong procedural rights,785 and 
that seems to have influenced the design of constitutional environmental provisions in 
other African countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe.786 Twenty years down the line, 
South Africa’s Constitutional Environmental Right and 
the Pursuit of a Country Where ‘Well-being’ Thrives
Anél du Plessis
779 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
780 Section 24 of the Constitution.
781 See on the Centre for Environmental Rights established in 2009, http://cer.org.za/about/background (last visited 30 
May 2016).
782 The Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989, South Africa’s main overarching environmental law until 1998, 
defined the environment as the “aggregate of surrounding objects, conditions and influences that influence the life 
and habits of man or any other organism or collection of organisms.” 
783 Most notably in the cases of Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General Environmental 
Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment Mpumalanga Province and Others 2007 (10) 
BCLR 1059 (CC), HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2006 (5) SA 
512 (T), Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Save the Vaal Environment and 
Others 1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA) and RA le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 JDR 0178 (KZP).
784 See for example the description of South Africa’s environmental right and its legal framework in the Australian 
author, Douglas Fischer’s work titled: Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law – A Study of Structure, Form and 
Language (Edward Elgar, 2013) 339-343.
785 The Constitution includes the rights to access to information and just administrative action; the relevance of 
which for environmental protection has been attended to in, inter alia, the recent case of Company Secretary of 
Arcelormittal South Africa and Another v Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance 2015 (1) SA 515 (SCA).
786 Stark resemblances exist between the phrasing of section 24 of the Constitution of South Africa and section 73 of 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) and section 42 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010).
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section 24 of the Constitution has brought 
about significant positive change – it has 
resulted in unprecedented environmental 
law reform spanning from the enactment 
of framework environmental legislation787 
and laws on biodiversity, the marine 
environment, protected areas, air quality, 
land management and water resources, 
to the development of very specific norms 
and standards in relation to hazardous 
substances, waste management and 
water services provision.788  
In 2008, Feris researched environmental 
law jurisprudence between 1996 and 2008, 
posing the question whether or not section 
24 was an under-utilized resource.  She 
concluded at that point that: ‘the content 
of the right and its value in a developing 
country, which grapple with highly-
contested interests such as economic 
development versus environmental 
protection, remain undefined.’790 It is in 
this vein that despite the meaningful 
inroads referred to above, I argue in this 
paper that the need remains to establish 
and embrace the full scope of protection 
promised in section 24. I specifically 
argue that the executive branch of 
government791 a) has not yet internalized 
the meaning and implications of the right 
to an environment not detrimental to 
human “well-being” (among other things); 
and b) battles to implement the measures 
and actions needed to ensure that people 
in South Africa live and work in such an 
environment.  In other words, it is argued 
that the decision-making practices 
and the acts of government budgeting, 
planning, procurement, monitoring, 
auditing etc. may not yet fully be attuned 
to what the constitutional environmental 
right demands of public authorities.  
The point of departure is that a meaningful 
nexus exists between the environment, 
human health and well-being – three 
notions with independent meanings but all 
living in section 24(a) of the Constitution. 
The link that lies therein is that human 
health and well-being ‘are influenced 
by environmental conditions both 
positively and negatively, with significant 
economic and social consequences.’792 
The flipside of this understanding is that 
the government’s duties arising from the 
constitutional environmental right are 
multifaceted.  
Following a discussion on the meaning 
of well-being, this paper explores 
in preliminary fashion some of the 
implications of the fact that the concept of 
well-being was included in section 24(a) 
of South Africa’s Constitution. 
787 The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.
788 See on South Africa’s environmental law in general, Jan Glazewski Environmental Law in South Africa (Butterworths 
LexisNexis, 2005), Michael Kidd Environmental Law (Juta, 2011) and Louis J Kotzé and Alexander Paterson (eds) 
Environmental Law and Compliance in South Africa (Juta, 2009).
789 Loretta Feris “Constitutional Environmental Rights: An Under-Utilised Resource” SA Journal of Human Rights 29-49.
790 Loretta Feris “Constitutional Environmental Rights: An Under-Utilised Resource” SA Journal of Human Rights 49.
791 Specifically referring to the administration in the national, provincial and local spheres of government.
792 European Environmental Agency ‘Report of the EEA Scientific Committee Seminar on Environment, Human Health 
and Well-Being’ 12 February 2014 iv available at www.eea.europa.eu/.../scientific-committee/reports/report-of-the-
scientific-committee (last visited 31 May 2016).
252
PART 3: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES IN AFRICA
2. The meaning of ‘well-
being’ relative to 
people’s environment
The concept of well-being is of the 
mystical kind – hard to define and highly 
context specific.793 The way in which 
people view and experience ‘a state of 
well-being’ differs while different scientific 
or policy angles are used to conceptualize, 
measure and assess levels of human well-
being.  The discussion below first revisits 
some of the existing general definitions 
and understandings of well-being before 
turning to a discussion focused on the 
intersection between human well-being 
and the environment.
Well-being and ill-being and the (illusive) 
space between them
Well-being has to date often been defined 
and described from the perspective of 
fields such as psychology, philosophy, 
morality, economics and health. The 
dictionary meanings of well-being typically 
refer to a good or satisfactory condition of 
existence; a state characterized by health, 
happiness, and prosperity.  Words like 
wretchedness and misery and a condition 
of being deficient in health, happiness or 
prosperity typically describe aspects of ill-
being.  Well-being may further belong to 
a single person or to a ‘state’ or to people 
or a group in the collective sense. Some 
scholarly definitions and descriptions 
suggest that well-being:
  Refers to an assessment of a person’s 
quality of life according to his or her 
own chosen criteria. Quality of life in 
this context is then described as an 
‘individual’s perception of his or her 
position in life in the context of the 
culture and value systems in which 
he or she lives and in relation to his 
or her goals, expectations, standards 
and concerns.  It is a broad ranging 
concept affected in a complex way 
by the person’s physical health, 
psychological state, personal beliefs, 
social relationships and his or her 
relationship to salient features of the 
environment’;794 
  Must be understood in terms of the 
highly subjective ‘good life’;795 
  Comprises more than just happiness. 
While well-being is about feeling 
satisfied and happy it also denotes 
the development of a person, him 
or her being fulfilled, and making a 
contribution to the community;796  and
  Comprises as much of psychological, 
social and physical resources as 
psychological, social and physical 
challenges – well-being depends on 
an equilibrium between these; it is 
the set-point for well-being.  Stable 
well-being exists when individuals 
793 Rachel Dodge et al “The challenge of defining wellbeing” 2012 International Journal of Wellbeing 2(3) 222 refer to 
Thomas stating that well-being is ‘intangible, difficult to define and even harder to measure’.
794 ibid. 224 with reference to the work of Shin and Johnson and others.
795 ibid. 224.
796 ibid. 225 with reference to the work of Shah and Marks.
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have the psychological, social and 
physical resources they need to meet 
a particular psychological, social 
and /or physical challenge. When 
individuals have more challenges than 
resources, the see-saw dips, along 
with well-being and vice versa.797 
Two particularly meaningful discussions 
in relation to the notion of well-being are 
found in the work of Amartya Sen and 
James Griffin.  Sen questions ‘capability 
and well-being’ from an economics and 
philosophical perspective.  He explores 
a particular approach to well-being and 
advantage in terms of a person’s ability to 
execute valuable acts or to reach valuable 
states of being. The relevance of well-
being according to Sen, lies in part in 
the determination of whether a person is 
deprived in a way that calls for assistance 
from others or from government.798 
Well-being and advantage play in on the 
alternative combination of things that a 
person is able to do or be – in other words, 
it determine the various ‘functionings’ 
a person can achieve.799   Sen refers to 
a person’s ‘living’ as a combination of 
various ‘doings and beings’, with quality 
of life being assessed in terms of the 
capability of a person to achieve valuable 
functionings.   Notably, Sen explains 
that:800 
Some functionings are very elementary, 
such as being adequately nourished, 
being in good health, etc., and these may 
be strongly valued by all, for obvious 
reasons.  Others may be more complex, 
but still widely valued, such as achieving 
self-respect or being socially integrated. 
Individuals may, however, differ a good 
deal from each other in the weights they 
attach to these different functionings 
– valuable though they may all be – 
and the assessment of individual and 
social advantages must be alive to these 
variations.
Sen further sees well-being as part of the 
classification of human advantage and 
makes a distinction between, inter alia, the 
promotion of a person’s well-being and 
well-being freedom.801  ‘The well-being 
achievement of a person can be seen as an 
evaluation of the ‘wellness’ of the person’s 
state of being. The exercise, then, is that of 
assessing the constituent elements of the 
person’s being seen from the perspective 
of her own personal welfare.  The different 
functionings of the person will make up 
these constituent elements.’802 These 
functionings are central to the nature of 
a person’s well-being while the sources 
of well-being may be ‘external to the 
person’ – i.e. they may be impersonal 
concerns.803 ‘Well-being freedom’ refers to 
‘the freedom to enjoy the various possible 
797 Rachel Dodge et al “The challenge of defining wellbeing” 2012 International Journal of Wellbeing 2(3) 230.
798 Amartya Sen ‘Capability and Well-being’ in M Nussbaum and A Sen (eds) The Quality of Life (Clarendon Press, 1993) 
36.
799 ibid. 30.
800 ibid. 31.
801 ibid. 35-36.
802 ibid. 36.
803 ibid. 36-37.
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well-beings’ as well as to the freedom to 
choose and to act freely. With reference 
to well-being freedom, Sen makes it clear 
that a) standard of living and well-being 
are two different matters; and that b) there 
are different role-players involved in a 
single person’s state of well-being:
Being free to live the way one would like 
may be enormously helped by the choice 
of others, and it would be a mistake to think 
of achievements only in terms of active 
choice by oneself.  A person’s ability to 
achieve various valuable functionings may 
be greatly enhanced by public action and 
policy, and these expansions of capability 
are not unimportant for freedom for that 
reason.  Indeed … ‘freedom from hunger’ 
or ‘being free from malaria’ need not be 
taken to just be rhetoric …. there is a very 
real sense in which the freedom to live the 
way one would like is enhanced by public 
policy that transforms epidemiological 
and social environments.  But the fact 
that freedom has that aspect does not 
negate the relevance of active choice 
by the person herself as an important 
component of living freely.804 
In the most elementary sense, Sen argues 
that well-being is a matter of choice, 
of freedom but that the boundaries of 
choice are inter alia determined by the 
functionings on offer – functionings that 
are often created or enabled by authorities 
and the way in which they govern. 
Government does have a hand in a 
person’s ability to execute valuable acts or 
to reach valuable states of being.  The will 
to execute these acts and to reach these 
states of being may however depend on 
the person him or herself.
Griffin casts some additional light on 
the meaning, measurement and moral 
importance of well-being.  Focusing on 
human needs as part of a moral theory 
on well-being, Griffin argues that there 
are two sorts of needs that a person has 
because of its aims or ends - some needs 
are instrumental while others are basic 
needs.805 Instrumental needs are needs 
we have because of the ends we happen 
to choose.  Basic needs are needs we have 
just by being human, the needs we have 
for survival, such as food, rest and health. 
For Griffin, well-being is the level to which 
basic needs are met806  - basic needs being 
needs that we do not choose but which are 
characteristic of human existence.  While 
this may sound straightforward enough, it 
really is not given that ‘(a) person’s natural 
expectations (needs) are formed by much 
more than the real possibilities that face 
him; they are formed by how good his 
education happens to be or by how much 
hope traditions or forms of government 
have left him’,807 for example.  While the 
lines often become blurred, a distinction 
must be made between desires and needs: 
804 Amartya Sen ‘Capability and Well-being’ in M Nussbaum and A Sen (eds) The Quality of Life (Clarendon Press, 1993) 
44.
805 James Griffin Well-Being (Clarendon Press, 1986) 41-42.
806 ibid. 42.
807 ibid. 44.
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Needs generally trump desires. What 
is at stake with basic needs generally 
matters much more to our lives than 
what is at stake with mere desires, and 
governments should concern themselves 
with basic needs and not at all, or at least 
not much, with mere desires.  But it is a 
great mistake to move from that truth to 
the conclusion that needs as such count 
morally and desires as such do not, or 
anyway countless.  Not all basic needs are 
morally important, some mere desires are. 
What we need are deeper categories. We 
have to get behind talk about needs and 
desires to their deeper significance in our 
lives.808 
Well-being understood this way ties in 
with personhood - the quality or condition 
of being an individual person - and it 
therefore makes sense that it could end 
up in a constitutionally entrenched right in 
a Bill of Rights.  What is important from 
the reasoning of Griffin is that ‘we all have 
a right to minimum material provision 
– the right to what is necessary to carry 
out any life plan’ but what it comes down 
to is a secure ‘use of goods, not a claim 
that approaches ownership of them’.809 
This of course, raises difficult questions 
of distribution. But it also raises the 
question as to whether or not the right 
to an environment that is conducive to 
well-being means anything more than 
a) the right to life and b) the right to an 
environment in which one’s health is safe. 
And if it means more than having access to 
the critical functionings and the fulfilment 
of basic human needs, what does it mean 
exactly?
What we get from Griffin’s work is that 
‘perhaps needs are indeed the best index 
… of how well a person’s life goes, but 
perhaps they take in too little of a person’s 
life to be called, with its all-encompassing 
air, ‘well-being’. But well-being does 
not always suggest how life goes as a 
whole.’810   Still, it is not wrong or misleading 
to confine the interpretation of well-being 
to some conception of ‘absence’ – be it 
a state of misery (in the absence of what 
someone views as a state of well-being) 
or the lack of basic needs.
Well-being and people’s environment
A plethora of materials exists on the 
meaning of well-being in relation to 
human development.  These studies are 
often less focused on the individual and 
her well-being than on the collective, 
the state or the nation. In the fields of 
economics and human ecology studies 
have been conducted for example on: how 
to measure well-being;811 the validation 
and improvement of population well-
being;812 factors for the prediction of 
808 ibid. 47.
809 ibid. 292. 
810 ibid.
811 Pedro Conceição and Romina Bandura ‘Measuring Subjective Wellbeing: A Summary Review of the Literature’ 
(UNDP, 2008) 1-24 available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Development%20Studies/
subjective_wellbeing_conceicao_bandura.pdf 
812 Lindsay E Sears et al ‘The Well-Being 5: Development and Validation of a Diagnostic Instrument to Improve 
Population Well-Being’ Population Health Management 2014 1-9.
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subjective well-being of nations;813 trade-
offs to be made between biodiversity 
conservation and human well-being;814 the 
linkages between ecosystem services and 
well-being;815 the relationship between 
well-being and environmental impacts;816 
urban environmental quality and well-
being;817  and the relationship between 
well-being, affluence and technology.818  
That a nexus exists between human 
health, the environment and well-being, is 
uncontested. In the main, human health and 
well-being are understood to be ‘intimately 
linked to environmental quality’.819  In 
other words, human health and well-being 
depend on the quality of the environment. 
This understanding is reinforced by the 
view that four environmental principles 
are central to maintaining, improving and 
managing risks to human health and well-
being namely the principles of precaution, 
prevention, polluter-pays and rectification 
of damage at source.820 Still, it has been 
held that one must look not just at ‘disease 
outcomes’ in the nexus between health, 
the environment and well-being but also 
at maintaining additional ‘functions’ – 
children’s blood lead concentrations 
at levels below current exposure limits 
have for example been associated with 
lower school performance and behavioral 
issues.821 
Particularly meaningful work has been 
done on human well-being and the natural 
environment by Dasgupta.822 He views the 
natural environment as a source of human 
well-being – albeit not the only one – a 
source which depends on the carrying 
capacity of the earth.823 He also regards the 
link between the natural environment and 
human well-being to be understood on the 
basis of a pluralist conception of personal 
well-being (much in the same vein as Sen 
and Griffen) which then becomes part of 
the broader conceptualization of social 
well-being:824 
Natural resources are of direct use in 
consumption (fisheries), or indirect use as 
inputs in production (oil and natural gas; 
the wide array of ecosystem services), 
and of use in both (air and water). The 
813 Ed Diener et al ‘Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-being of Nations’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
1995 Vol 69(5) 851-864.
814 Thomas O Mshane et al ‘Hard choices: Making trade-offs between biodiversity conservation and human well-being’ 
Biological Conservation 144 (2011) 966-972.
815 Elena Blanco and Jona Razzaque ‘Ecosystem Services and Human Well-Being in a Globalized World: Assessing the 
Role of Law’ Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009) 692-720.
816 Thomas Dietz et al ‘Environmentally Efficient Well-Being: Rethinking Sustainability as the Relationship between 
Human Well-Being and Environmental Impacts’ Human Ecology Review Vol 16(1) 2009 114-123.
817 Irene van Kamp et al ‘Urban Environmental Quality and Human Well-being Towards a Conceptual Framework and 
Demarcation of Concepts: A Literature Study’ Landscape and Urban Planning 65 (2003) 5-18. 
818 Indur M Goklany ‘Affluence, Technology, and Well-Being’ Case Western Reserve Law Review Vol 53 369-390.
819 European Environmental Agency ‘Report of the EEA Scientific Committee Seminar on Environment, Human Health 
and Well-Being’ 12 February 2014 1 available at www.eea.europa.eu/.../scientific-committee/reports/report-of-the-
scientific-committee (last visited 31 May 2016).
820 ibid.
821 ibid. 
822 Partha Dasgupta Human Well-being and the Natural Environment (2001, Oxford University Press).
823 ibid. xx.
824 ibid. xxi.
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value of a resource may be utilitarian (as a 
source of food, or as a keystone species) 
– economists call this its use-value; it may 
be aesthetic (places of scenic beauty), 
or it may be intrinsic (primates). In fact, 
it may be all these things (biodiversity). 
Their worth to us could be from extraction 
(timber) or from their presence as a stock 
(forest cover), or from both (forests). 
Interpreting natural resources in a broad 
way, as we are doing here, enables us to 
consider a number of substantive issues. 
Included on our list of resources are 
assets that provide the many and varied 
ecosystem services upon which life is 
based.  We should also add minerals and 
fossil fuels. Note too that environmental 
pollution is the reverse side of natural 
resources. In some cases the emission 
of pollutants amounts directly to a 
degradation of ecosystems (the effects of 
acid rains on forests). In others, it means 
a reduction in environmental quality 
(deterioration of water quality), which also 
amounts to degradation of ecosystems 
(watersheds).825 
It follows that the natural environment 
and the protection thereof is not a 
luxury or a mere desire (in the words of 
Griffin) – a large part of what the natural 
environment offers us is a necessity, 
a basic need.  The services offered by 
the natural environment include, for 
example: ‘maintaining a genetic library, 
preserving and regenerating soil, fixing 
nitrogen and carbon, recycling nutrients, 
controlling floods, filtering pollutants, 
assimilating waste, pollinating crops, 
operating the hydrological cycle, and 
maintaining the gaseous composition 
of the atmosphere.’826 In this vein it has 
been held in the European context that 
multiple systemic links exist between the 
environment, health and well-being and 
that, as a consequence, there is a need to 
shift from the prevailing pollution-focused 
agenda to policies that address wider 
socio-economic and well-being issues 
and that recognize relations with systems 
of production and consumption, behavior, 
water and land-use and urban issues, and 
that draw on emerging concepts such as 
resilience and ecological public health.827 
Be it as it may, well-being may be 
individualistic and attached to a person or 
may be a collective descriptor of a country 
(a state) or a community. A combined 
reading of the works of Sen, Griffin 
and Dasgupta suggests that there are 
functionings that are central to the nature 
of a person’s well-being and that some of 
the sources of well-being may be external 
to the person – i.e. they may be situated 
in the surrounding natural environment. A 
person should have the freedom to enjoy 
various possible ‘well-beings’ as well as 
the freedom to choose and to act freely. For 
this, access to inter alia natural resources 
825 ibid. 124-125.
826 ibid. 125-126.
827 European Environmental Agency ‘Report of the EEA Scientific Committee Seminar on Environment, Human Health 
and Well-Being’ 12 February 2014 1 available at www.eea.europa.eu/.../scientific-committee/reports/report-of-the-
scientific-committee (last visited 31 May 2016).
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is needed. The freedom to choose 
arguably lies in access to the quantity and 
quality of natural resources necessary for 
the fulfilment of basic needs (e.g. air to 
breathe, water to drink and soil to produce 
food) as well as natural resources needed 
for the achievement of other, non-basic 
needs-related functionings (e.g. water for 
recreational activities, land for purposes 
of land acquisition and biodiversity for 
aesthetic purposes). There are also 
different role-players involved in creating 
a person’s state of well-being (or ill-being) 
– one of which is the custodian of the 
natural resource base, the public trustee, 
the government.828 
Well-being protected in a constitutional 
environmental right
Section 24(a) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa determines that: 
‘everyone has the right to an environment 
that is not harmful to his or her health 
or well-being’.  Authorities that have to 
date examined section 24(a) and the 
courts that have dealt with it, mostly 
emphasized what can potentially be 
harmful to human health.  Very limited 
attention has been paid to the meaning of 
well-being – a concept which must have 
been deliberately added to section 24(a) 
when one considers the formulation of the 
section. The drafters of the Constitution 
could have referred simply to a clean 
environment or to a healthy environment 
– as many state constitutions do.  Instead 
the drafts team included two separate 
descriptors or modifiers – health as well 
as well-being.
Authorities and judges that have at 
some point attempted to define, describe 
or explain what well-being in the 
context of South Africa’s constitutional 
environmental right means, left us with 
the following understandings:
  Well-being is a broad and contested 
concept that relates to those instances 
where a person’s environmental 
interests - which do not necessarily 
have evident health implications - 
are affected.  Whereas the concept 
of ‘health’ covers issues of pollution, 
‘well-being’ guards against the 
destruction of natural habitats of the 
kind which does not necessarily have 
direct health impacts or satisfy the 
definition of pollution;829 
  Well-being has a spiritual or 
psychological meaning which may 
include the aesthetic, cultural or 
religious value that the environment 
and natural objects such as certain 
rock formations, water courses or 
portions of land have for people,830  yet 
the courts have been reluctant so far 
828 See on this idea in general, Anél Du Plessis”The Tomorrows of the Unborn: Legal Perspectives on the Future’s 
Implications for ‘Climate Resilient Development’ in South Africa” SA Journal on Human Rights 31(2) 269-293.
829 Anél Du Plessis ‘South Africa’s Constitutional Environmental Right (Generously) Interpreted: What Is in It for Poverty?’ 
South African Journal of Human Rights 2011 (27) 296.
830 Lynda Collins ‘Are We There Yet? Revisiting the Right to Environment in International and European Law’ 2007(3) 
McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 150.
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to provide such a wide interpretation 
of well-being;831 
  While harm to well-being need not 
amount to mental or physical ill-
health, something more is required 
than a sense of emotional insecurity 
or aesthetic discomfort before section 
24(a) becomes applicable;832 
  A person’s knowledge or reasonable 
anticipation of a threat to the 
environment anywhere may impact 
on his or her well-being.833 It is 
possible to derive from this that well-
being may in fact be the subjective 
or psychological counterpoint to 
objectively determinable physical 
health;
  Well-being links with physical 
discomfort and is a subjective matter 
while impact on well-being involves a 
considerable measure of subjective 
import.  The courts found for 
example that to be in an environment 
contaminated by H2S (hydrogen 
sulphate) is adverse to one’s well-
being.834 This raises questions about 
the quantum of ill-being versus the 
quality of well-being and the scope of 
violations and about what it takes to 
prove a violation;
  Well-being covers the built 
environment or the sense of place 
(environment) when the identity 
or economic value of a particular 
setting or settlement has everything 
to do with the surrounding natural 
environment;835  and
  The protection of environmental 
integrity836 (maintaining the natural 
habitat, composition and abundance 
of native species and biological 
communities and its supporting 
processes in ecosystems etc.) forms 
part of human well-being.
I have argued before that the well-being 
envisioned in section 24(a) talks to 
people’s welfare which has to do with 
being happy and prosperous and to the 
ability of a community to be content and 
at ease837  – in other words, it covers those 
individual and collective environmental 
interests that may not have anything to do 
with physical health per se. Following this 
line of thinking, the concept of well-being 
typically comprises of developments 
such as improved urban livability and 
mobility and the protection of indigenous 
knowledge on the use of fauna and flora, 
for example. The prosperity-dimension 
831 See the discussion of Loretta Feris ‘Environmental Rights and Locus Standi’ in Louis J Kotzé and Alexander Paterson 
(eds) Environmental Law and Compliance in South Africa (Juta, 2009) 135-136.
832 Loretta Feris ‘Environmental Rights and Locus Standi’ in Louis J Kotzé and Alexander Paterson (eds) Environmental 
Law and Compliance in South Africa (Juta, 2009) 135 note 48 referring to the work of Sandra Liebenberg.
833 Michael Kidd Environmental Law (Juta, 2011) 23.
834 Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts Products and Others 2004(2) SA 393 
(E).
835 John McConnachie ‘Environmental Conservation in South Africa – Its Application to the Built Environment’ (1998) 5 
South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 99, 104-9.
836 See the discussion in Anél Du Plessis ‘South Africa’s Constitutional Environmental Right (Generously) Interpreted: 
What Is in It for Poverty?’ South African Journal of Human Rights 2011 (27) 295-297.
837 Anél Du Plessis ‘South Africa’s Constitutional Environmental Right (Generously) Interpreted: What Is in It for Poverty?’ 
South African Journal of Human Rights 2011 (27) 295.
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has to do with the ability of a person to 
live and work in a ‘safe’ place which 
protects human comfort and safety needs 
but that also protects environmental 
interests close to a community’s very 
being, generally, e.g. its heritage resource 
interests. 
In hindsight I would rather argue that well-
being as included in section 24(a) must be 
seen as the cup holding the interests in 
the environment that are not directly tied 
to a) the protection of human health or, b) 
the conservation of the natural resource 
base.  The protection of environmental 
interests related to health lies with the 
clear reference to human health in section 
24(a) while section 24(b) elaborates on the 
right of everyone to have the environment 
protected and preserved.  I would like to 
argue that there is a space in between and 
that section 24(a)’s reference to human 
‘well-being’ should be understood in the 
context of the following:
1) Well-being is one of the things that 
feed into a person’s ability to execute 
valuable acts or to reach valuable 
states of being;
2) While people’s health and well-being 
are connected, they are not identical 
states of being;
3) Well-being and standard of living 
are different things with standard of 
living referring specifically to the level 
of wealth, comfort, material goods 
and necessities available to a certain 
socioeconomic class or a certain 
geographical area based on factors 
such as income, gross domestic 
product, economic and political 
stability and safety;
4) Well-being depends inter alia on 
protection of what the environment 
provides;
5) Only some aspects of the 
comprehensive notion of ‘well-being’ 
tie in with, or relate directly to people’s 
natural environment;
6) Well-being denotes the absence of ill-
being in a person with respect to his or 
her personhood in relation to the state 
of his or her natural resource base;
7) The state of well-being is subjective 
and is influenced by expectations 
arising from education, prior exposure 
and want (desire), for example; and
8) There are basic or critical well-being 
needs and there are needs in relation 
to well-being that may at most be 
desirable.
At this point, the so what question arises. 
What is it to know that well-being has a 
meaning of its own and has deliberately 
been included in the constitutional 
environmental right in South Africa and 
in so doing, expands the scope and 
strengthens the level of protection afforded 
by this specific right?  This is not a trivial 
question given the wording in section 
7(2) of the Constitution and the duty of 
the state to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil all of the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
The fact that the Constitution boasts an 
environmental right is one thing; but the 
fact that this right includes the right to an 
environment that is not detrimental to the 
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very composite being of a person – his or 
her well-being- is something else.  
Above an attempt was made to articulate 
aspects of the potential meaning of 
well-being as it features in section 24 
of the Constitution. The next question 
to be addressed is namely what this 
suggests for the duty-bearing, South 
African government.  While national 
environmental legislation in South Africa 
specifies various kinds of reporting and 
monitoring, the mandates generally are 
aimed at measuring legal compliance 
rather than environmental outcomes.  I am 
of the view that human well-being is an 
environmental outcome entrenched in the 
Constitution, for example.  This outcome 
must be sought in multiple ways including 
via the principles guiding environmental 
decision-making and how authorities 
decide on priorities when it gets to spatial 
and strategic planning, for example. 
This discussion on how environmental 
outcomes must be achieved in and through 
the work of government is imminent but 
falls beyond the scope of this paper.
3. Qua vadis
With the above said, it remains necessary 
to make a distinction between perceived 
prosperity and true prosperity – harm 
or degradation is often invisible and 
very gradual which could result in false 
confidence about the state of a community 
or a person’s environment and well-being. 
To question the meaning and presence of 
well-being in relation to the environment is 
inter alia about questioning accountability 
for the type of living and working 
environment promised in South Africa’s 
transformative Constitution. I fully agree 
with Boyd who holds that environmental 
rights matter only if they make a difference 
in peoples’ lives.838   Given South Africa’s 
history and the transformative present and 
future vision of the Constitution, I doubt if 
the inclusion of well-being in section 24 
can be reduced to having been included 
for mere symbolic purposes. The dilemma 
is that the right to an environment not 
detrimental to ‘well-being’ is not going 
to self-generate its meaning. What is in 
the space between ‘merely symbolic’ and 
‘self-generating’ is also questionable.
I argue, and I find support for this reasoning 
in the available literature on well-being, 
that given the present environmental 
and population pressures in the world 
‘underdevelopment is unsustainable’. 
Wealth and technology are at least two of 
the integral parts of a so-called ‘Cycle of 
Progress’ which provides the means for 
improving well-being both for people and 
the natural resource base.  To help ensure 
that the Cycle of Progress moves forward, 
it is important to bolster the institutions 
and processes that fuel the cycle: secure 
property rights, honest, predictable, 
transparent and fiscally responsible 
government and bureaucracies, adherence 
to the rule of law, constitutionalism etc.  
838 David Boyd The Environmental Rights Revolution – A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the 
Environment 290.
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It is for this reason that we must question 
the design, measures and behavior of those 
institutions and processes in government 
that are the custodians of people’s well-
being.  And not only should we question 
this as academics, scholars, officers of the 
court or curious practitioners.  We should 
critically assess the institutions, we should 
fierce-fully challenge processes and we 
should courageously correct the wrong.
More interdisciplinary work is needed in 
this area but the preliminary observation 
is that the well-being of South Africans 
as entrenched in section 24(a) of the 
Constitution must be:
  seen as having much more than 
cosmetic meaning and to extend the 
scope of the environmental right and 
the concomitant duties of especially 
the executive branch of government, 
beyond the matters of human health 
and the conservation of natural 
resources; and that it must be
  informed by what people in 
South Africa themselves, through 
participatory democracy and other 
processes, indicate to be necessary 
specifically to: secure resource access; 
ensure security from disasters; 
provide adequate livelihoods; provide 
sufficient nutritious food and shelter; 
enable physical and mental strength 
in relation to the environment; provide 
sufficient access to good quality 
water and air; and to give people 
freedom of choice and action of the 
kind supported by the right to human 
dignity and the constitutional values 
– i.e. to provide society with the type 
of environment needed to be able to 
achieve what ‘the individual in South 
Africa values doing, and being’.
Given its history and its future, the 
well-being of South Africans are very 
relevant for the transformative vision the 
Constitution sets out to achieve.  The 
mandate to care for the well-being of 
the people is scattered across various 
legal provisions.  I wish to express the 
hope that this mandate will increasingly 
become an intrinsic part of the mindset, 
planning and action of the three sphered 
government, the executive, legislature and 
the judiciary and, most of all, part of the 
way in which civil society actively guards 
over the environmental and other interests 
of those still to be born.
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1. Introduction
Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 (the Banjul 
Charter) contains the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to peoples’ 
development.  On the African Continent, the environment plays a central role in sustaining 
the livelihoods of people and is therefore crucially important to the health and well-being 
of present and future generations.  The conservation and sustainable use of natural 
resources is therefore important to ensure socio-ecological security on the African 
Continent.  With natural resources being depleted at a rate converse to the best interest 
of present and future generations, the question posed by this paper is how individuals 
can secure the right encapsulated in article 24 of the Banjul Charter through judicial 
means. This question is posed against the background of many African countries not 
having well-functioning judicial systems and the fact that human rights abuses are rife 
on the continent.  It is here that article 24 read with other fundamental rights relating to 
access to justice could potentially be employed to secure socio-ecological security on 
the African Continent.839 Although this paper will primarily focus on access to justice, a 
brief discussion of the right contained in article 24 of the Banjul Charter is required to 
provide a specific backdrop against which a “general satisfactory environment” should 
be viewed.
2. Article 24 of the Banjul Charter
The wording of article 24 clearly dictates the anthropocentric nature of this right with 
the wording “favorable to their development.”  This comes as no surprise, as Africa is a 
developing region and socio-economic development has always been seen as a primary 
concern. The term “satisfactory environment” used in article 24 can be argued to be 
Access to justice in light of the Atabong case:  
a means to ensure the realization of article 24 of the 
Banjul Charter?
WD Lubbe 
839 Mosaffa Nasrin and Zargari Hadi, ‘International Instrument of Human Rights: Compliance and Non Fulfilment in 
Africa’  [2014]  World Politics 101.
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a weak standard desired by the Banjul 
Charter for such an important resource. 
It is also vague, as “satisfactory” can 
mean different things to different people, 
thus contributing to the weakness of the 
provision.840 With article 24 juxtaposing 
the environment and development, 
the notion of sustainable development 
becomes part and parcel of the content 
and interpretation thereof.841 The notion of 
sustainability is important in Africa since 
most of its citizenry depend on natural 
resources for their daily livelihoods. For 
example, 80 per cent of Africa’s rural 
population depend on biodiversity for 
traditional medicine.842 The importance 
of the natural environment is captured in 
the second Africa Environmental Outlook 
report:
The productivity and sustainability of 
Africa’s environment is heavily dependent 
on how this asset is managed. This, in 
turn, can affect the availability, stocks 
and functioning of the remaining assets, 
either enhancing opportunities or putting 
livelihoods at risk.843 
Unfortunately the hard truth is that since 
the Brundtland Report844  provided traction 
to the notion of sustainable development 
in law and policy, we have made little 
progress in relation to environmental 
sustainability and therefore livelihoods 
are more at risk.845 In fact, based on earth 
systems science, mankind is currently 
crossing planetary boundaries with the 
effect of irreversible damage to earth 
systems.846 The maths for the current 
dilemma can be simply explained by 
arguing that the environmental sphere in 
the three-sphere sustainable development 
model is not given enough weight. Socio-
economic development inevitably trumps 
environmental conservation (especially in 
Africa).  Accordingly, it can be argued that 
this three-sphered approach is inherently 
flawed, looking at the results achieved so 
far. Winter denotes the dilemma in stating 
that:
if we stick to pre-environmental or old 
environmental paradigms and theory 
frameworks, we are in fact acting against 
theory for sustainable development. The 
previous paradigms are not capable of 
easily (if at all) adapting intergenerational 
equity in legal thinking and combining 
it with ecological understanding, where 
inter alia non-linearity is an ever present 
issue and the widespread tradition in 
legal science of dealing with law as is, 
840 For a discussion on art 24 see Morne Van der Linde and Lirette Louw, ‘Considering the Interpretation and 
Implementation of Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in Light of the SERAC 
Communication’ African Human Rights Law Journal [2003] 167.
841 See for example the discussion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the Social and 
Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, 2001 communication on the 
interpretation of art 24.
842 UNEP 2013 Africa Environment Outlook 3: Summary for Policy Makers 10.
843 UNEP 2006 Africa Environment Outlook 2: our Environment, our Wealth 2.
844 WCED 1987 Our Common Future 1.  
845 See in general Christina Voigt, ‘The principle of sustainable development: integration and ecological integrity’ in 
Christina Voigt (ed), Rule of Law for Nature (Cambridge University Press 2013).
846 Johan Rockström et al, ‘A safe operating space for humanity’ [2009] Nature 472.
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efficiently slows down not to say obstructs 
completely significant developments 
towards adequate legal theory for 
sustainable development.847 
We (human beings) are dependent on 
nature.  Social and economic development 
are dependent on the environment. 
Therefore the environment should be the 
first or base concern when conceptualizing 
sustainable development.  It should be 
a concern on its own and it should be 
considered as the paramount concern. 
To encapsulate the foregoing argument, 
Winter reconceptualizes the sustainable 
development model in what he calls a 
“fundament and two pillars” approach. 
This is portrayed in figure 1 below:
As can be seen from this figure, natural 
resources are the basis of sustainable 
development and therefore the most 
important factor to be weighed when 
decisions are to be taken.  This makes 
sense as we, as human beings, cannot 
have any development without the 
environment.   
Although Africa is endowed with rich and 
vast natural resources, political instability; 
warfare, deforestation, and many other 
challenges cause concern as to the 
sustainability of the natural resources.849 
In the light of the Banjul Charter, the 
question now turns to whether African 
citizens will have access to justice (in 
this context specifically access to the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR)) to utilize article 24, 
where the environment and thus the basis 
of their livelihoods is being jeopardized 
by their governments. This question is 
Society
Future Generations 
Economy
Natural Resources
Figure 1: A fundament and two pillars848 
847 Gerd Winter, ‘Eco-logical proportionality - an emerging principle of law for nature?’ in Christina Voigt (ed), Rule of Law 
for Nature (Cambridge University Press 2013).
848 Gerd Winter, ‘A Fundament and Two Pillars The Concept of Sustainable Development 20 Years after the Brundtland 
Report’ in Hans C Bugge and Christina Voigt (eds), Sustainable Development in International Law (Europa Law 
Publishing 2008).
849 Kalemba Mwambazambi, ‘A Glance on Environmental Protection in Africa: Theological Perspective’ [2009] Ethiopian 
Journal of Environmental Studies and Management 19.
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specifically focused on access to justice 
in the ACHPR, where state parties are 
members of the Banjul Charter but have 
not accepted the jurisdiction of the ACHPR 
in terms of article 34(6) of the Protocol 
on the Establishment of the ACHPR. The 
following figures elucidate the challenge 
and reasoning behind the question posed 
in the paper. The Banjul Charter has been 
signed and ratified by 53 member states 
of the African Union.850 In stark contrast, 
only 24 member states have signed and 
ratified the Protocol establishing ACHPR – 
the primary instrument entrusted with the 
protection and enforcement of the rights 
contained in the ACHPR.851 Viewed in the 
context of these figures, it seems that 
virtually all African states have committed 
themselves to human rights in terms of the 
Banjul Charter but fewer than half of the 
states are willing to be held accountable 
under the jurisdiction of the ACHPR. These 
latter states render their signature and 
ratification of the Banjul Charter useless 
if they do not, at national level, implement 
and effect the rights of the Charter. 
Access to the ACHPR is regulated in terms 
of article 5 of the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1998 (the 
Protocol). Article 5(3) determines that the 
ACHPR may entitle individuals to institute 
cases directly before it in accordance with 
article 34(6) of the Protocol.  Article 34(6) 
in turn determines that:
[a]t the time of the ratification of this 
Protocol or any time thereafter, the State 
shall make a declaration accepting the 
competence of the Court to receive cases 
under article 5 (3) of this Protocol. The 
Court shall not receive any petition under 
article 5 (3) involving a State Party which 
has not made such a declaration.
In effect, article 34(6) allows the states 
to decide whether or not their citizens 
will have access to the ACHPR. On a 
continent riddled with a history of human 
rights abuses, it is troubling that states 
can decide whether or not individuals can 
approach the continental judicial body 
that is the primary custodian of the rights 
encapsulated in the Banjul Charter. The 
validity of article 34(6) was challenged 
before the ACHPR in Atabong Denis 
Atemnkeng v African Union (Atabong 
case).852 Although the case did not address 
article 24 of the Banjul Charter, it serves as 
the perfect illustration of the challenges 
posed to access to the ACHPR in Africa 
and is therefore relevant to the context of 
this paper.
850 <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/#a3> accessed 30 August 2016. Only one of the 54 member states has 
not signed and ratified the Banjul Charter.
851 < http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment> accessed 30 August 2016. 25 of the member states have 
signed but not ratified and 5 member states have not signed or ratified. 
852 Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v African Union (014/2011).  A similar question was adjudicated in Femi Falana v African 
Union (001/2011), but due to length restrictions the focus here will be on the Atabong case only.
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3. Facts of Atabong
Mr. Atabong brought an application before 
the ACHPR arguing the following:853 
1. That  article 34(6) is inconsistent with 
the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, 2000 (Constitutive Act);
2. That article 34(6) gives violators the 
power to prevent individuals access 
to the ACHPR;
3. The African Union must ensure 
that its rules are consistent with 
the Constitutive Act and the Banjul 
Charter; and that
4. Every African has an obligation to 
defend the Constitutive Act and 
without the ability to defend both the 
rights and principles enshrined in 
the Constitutive and Banjul charter, 
the rights and principles become 
meaningless.
In this context, Mr. Atabong sought that 
article 34(6) be declared null and void as 
it is contrary to the spirit and letter of the 
Constitutive Act and Banjul Charter.854 
Counsel for Mr. Atabong also argued that 
article 34(6) was null and void in the light of 
jus cogens. The latter argument, although 
quite controversial, seems to have some 
traction among academics and regional 
human rights courts.855 The Respondent 
in this case (the African Union) relied on 
the following submissions in response to 
those presented by Mr. Atabong:856 
1. It argued that Mr. Atabong had no 
capacity to seize the court as Mr. 
Atabong is a national of a state which 
has not yet made a declaration in 
terms of article 34(6) and Mr. Atabong 
can therefore not approach the court;
2. It was submitted that member states 
have the right to negotiate, adopt, sign 
and ratify any treaty as they see fit 
and further that the Protocol and all 
of its provisions including article 34(6) 
conformed to rules prescribing the 
nature and content of treaties;
3. Furthermore, the Respondent argued 
that it is not a party to any of the 
documents in question and can 
therefore not be brought before the 
court in terms of article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention on the law of 
Treaties857 
In the above context the Respondent 
sought that the application be rejected 
and that Mr. Atabong bear the costs. 
853 Paras 17-24 Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v African Union (014/2011).
854 Para 25 Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v African Union (014/2011).
855 For example see Andrea Bianchi. ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ [2008] European Journal of 
International Law 491. Also see Antônio AC Trindade. The access of individuals to international justice (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) and Francioni Francesco, (Ed), Access to justice as a human right (Oxford University Press 
2007).
856 Paras 26-29 Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v African Union (014/2011).
857 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 8 I.L.M. 679.
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4. Judgement 
Majority
The ACHPR concluded that the African 
Union is not a party to the Banjul Charter 
nor to the Protocol, and since Cameroon 
(where Mr. Atabong has citizenship) did 
not make a declaration as required by 
article 34(6), it has no jurisdiction over the 
matter. Accordingly, the ACHPR did not go 
further to consider the merits of the case 
and dismissed the application.
Dissenting
The dissenting opinion emphasized 
the applicant’s argument that article 
34(6) violates article 2, 3 and 7 of the 
Banjul Charter.858 The court stated that 
the African Union should be held liable 
where states abandon the rights and 
principles set out in the Constitutive Act 
and the Banjul Charter.859 Furthermore the 
judges controversially stated that access 
to justice is a peremptory norm – jus 
cogens.860   
5. Brief critical analysis 
The majority judgement cannot be found 
wanting in terms of lex lata.  From a purely 
positivistic point of view, the majority 
judgement is correct. One can ask, 
however, whether the majority judgement 
is just and fair.  By applying the procedural 
rules rigidly, the court ignores principles 
such as equality, fairness, and justice.861 
The view of the court is very positivistic 
in nature and this may be detrimental to 
legal development and more specifically 
human rights protection. If we look back 
in history, many if not most human rights 
violations were justified in legal systems 
that were not influenced by natural law 
principles such as equality, fairness and 
justice.862  
The question that needs to be raised is: 
can states decide whether or not they 
can be held accountable for respecting 
human rights? The answer is quite simple 
– yes, they can decide.  This is the basis of 
sovereignty and statehood.  Is this position 
desirable, especially where states have 
ratified the Banjul Charter? In other words, 
where they have committed themselves 
to the protection of human rights? On a 
858 Arts 2, 3 and 7 contain the following provisions: ‘art 2 Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or any 
status. Art 3 (1) Every individual shall be equal before the law (2) Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection 
of the law. Art 7(1) Everyry individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) The right to an 
appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed 
by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by 
a competent court or tribunal; (c) The right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; (d) 
The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.’
859 Dissenting opinion Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v African Union (014/2011).
860 Dissenting opinion Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v African Union (014/2011).
861 These principles are broadly ancapsulated in the Banjul Charter, especially in arts 2,3 and 7.
862 The legal systems supporting Nazi-Germany and Apartheid South Africa are but two examples.
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Continent with a history of human rights 
abuses these are important questions. 
One could argue that the ACHPR fails its 
duty as human rights custodian when 
an opportunity to answer these question 
arises and it chooses a positivistic and 
stringent interpretation of procedure to 
dismiss the merits of such a case.  
As stated earlier, the dissenting opinion 
supported the arguments raised by Mr. 
Atabong.  A challenge in their dissenting 
opinion is however the fact that they did 
not substantiate their view that access to 
justice is a peremptory norm – jus cogens. 
One would have expected some form of 
argument and reference to other case law 
to give weight to this statement as there are 
various sources to support this statement. 
The importance of this is not for the case 
at hand but for future applicants who wish 
to raise similar arguments. By putting 
forth a good argument as to why access 
to justice is indeed a peremptory norm – 
jus cogens, the minority judgement could 
have influenced future jurisprudence in 
the ACHPR and potentially influenced 
the legality of article 34(6). This 
notwithstanding, one could argue that 
even in its current unsubstantiated format, 
the minority judgment can be seen as a 
positive step in human rights protection in 
Africa. 
6. Conclusion
The legal status of access to justice in 
international law remains uncertain.  As 
argued above, the dissenting opinion 
could have provided some form of future 
reference for applicants that will face the 
same challenge and in so doing, positively 
contribute towards jurisprudence in 
Africa. Given that the African Union is 
mandated with human rights protection, 
it needs to reconsider access to justice 
for individuals in the ACHPR.  The current 
position undermines human rights 
protection and the very nature of the 
Banjul Charter.  Perhaps the answer lies 
in the development of the positive law in 
accordance with natural law principles, as 
argued. Such an approach may avoid the 
various pitfalls presented by peremptory 
norms.  However, it does require a willing 
and progressive judiciary. As the situation 
currently stands, less than half of the 
citizenry on the African Continent are 
allowed direct access to the ACHPR. 
The effect is that they will not be able to 
protect their livelihoods (in terms of article 
24) where they are being infringed upon. 
Given that the environment is argued to 
be the primary concern in establishing 
both economic and social development 
and well-being, this is a challenge needing 
urgent attention on the African Continent.
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1. Background
The theory of transnationality in law evolved from Phillip Jessup’s Storrs lectures in 
which he argued that transnational law is ‘all law which regulates actions or events that 
transcend national frontiers’, including both public and private international law and other 
rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories. 863 Transnational law (TL) as 
perceived by Jessup is thus sufficiently flexible to be an umbrella term for rules and 
The emerging transnationality of environmental rights
Caiphas Brewsters Soyapi
863  Jessup PC Transnational Law (Yale University Press Connecticut 1956) 2. 
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norms that cannot be categorized under 
national, inter-national or international 
law. With the impacts of globalization, the 
theory of the transnationality of law has 
been expanding, as it has been applied to 
broader legal fields like trade, commerce 
and environmental law. In the latter context, 
a term of art has developed: transnational 
environmental law (TEL). At the core of 
what TEL is, and in line with Jessup’s 
orations, we see that it is cross-cutting; 
permeating the national, the inter-national, 
the regional and the supranational divide. 
If one functional characteristic of TEL is to 
be identified, it would be its ability to be 
identified beyond the confines of national 
environmental law and international 
environmental law. Furthermore, it is the 
primary site for the confluence between 
international and domestic, and inter-
national and cross-regional environmental 
legal processes that are not only confined 
to the state, but that extend well into the 
non-state domain. A primary example of 
how transnational processes have been 
(marginally) changing the regulatory 
space is the development of constitutional 
environmental rights. Although these 
rights have been developing globally, this 
paper will primarily use examples from 
Africa to demonstrate how transnational 
juridical processes have cumulatively 
contributed to the recognition of 
constitutional environmental rights. 
2. TEL as a framework 
of inquiry/analytical 
perspective 
Transnationality could represent the 
emergence of a body of law in a normative 
sense or transnationality could purely 
serve as an analytical perspective/
methodology on law. Those who support 
the first approach see TL as occupying 
a space that is diverse and discernible 
as a result of the dislodgment of the 
exclusive focus of the law on nation 
states.864  Following this approach in the 
environmental context, TEL as a distinct 
body of law could be seen in the regulatory 
space operated by supranational/regional 
bodies like the European Union, the African 
Union and Southern African Development 
Community. Within such groupings, TEL 
might take three forms. It could mean 
the normative practices in that region in 
pursuance of their general principles of 
international environmental law; it could 
denote ‘some common or core minimum 
standards of environmental norms’ which 
are observed by some states in that region; 
or it could be a corpus of environmental 
rules operating within that region only.865  
The first approach is, however, still 
debatable. In recent times, transnationality 
has been discussed more as an analytical 
perspective on law. Zumbansen has 
864 Cotterrell R “A Legal Concept of Community” 1997 Can. J.L & Soc 12:2, 75-91, 76. See also Halpin A and Roeben V 
“Introduction” in Halpin A and Roeben V (eds) Theorising the Global Legal Order (Hart Publishing Portland 2009) 3 
and Aleinikoff TA “Transnational Spaces: Norms and Legitimacy” 2008 Yale Journal of International Law 33, 479-490, 
who all speak of a space above the nation state. 
865 Crawford J “The Role of Transnational Environmental Law in Protecting the Environment of Asia and the Pacific” 
1992 Asia Pacific Law Review 1, 32-50, 33.
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argued that we should refrain from quickly 
depicting the ‘transnational’ as a distinct 
regulatory space different from the 
national and international because of its 
‘de-territorial scope and its hybrid, public-
private constitution’.866 He proposes 
that TL is a certain ‘perspective on law’ 
in a society that cannot by and of itself 
be conceived solely in terms of national 
or de-nationalized boundaries.867 In the 
environmental domain, Heyvaert and 
Etty868 observe that TEL:
 … does not conjure into existence 
a new, previously unknown layer of 
jurisdiction that is untrammelled by 
either the geographical limitations 
of national/regional law or the 
legitimacy and authority deficits of 
international/global law.
The authors add that TEL is more than 
a domain and ‘embodies an approach to 
legal studies and practice.’869  For Carlarne 
and Farber:870 
…the concept of transnational 
environmental law may be a tool 
to organize our debates about 
domestic environmental law, 
comparative environmental law, 
and international environmental law. 
That is, framing analysis in terms 
of transnational environmental law 
may improve our understanding 
of how these systems come into 
being, exist, interact and evolve.
The authors conceive of TEL as a 
framework of analysis, much in the same 
way that Zumbansen considers TL to be 
a methodology on law. In other words, 
we could use transnationality to identify 
national environmental laws that are 
applicable within states but which have 
become transnational in that there are 
commonalities in the manner in which 
the rules are provided for, applied or 
interpreted. 
Glaringly, there is no global environmental 
rights treaty, yet there has been an 
explosion of environmental rights globally. 
How do we explain this? David Boyd 
considers this explosion in terms of a 
revolution in the environmental rights 
domain871  while Professors James May 
and Erin Daly explain this in a very recent 
book in terms of global environmental 
constitutionalism.872 Following the second 
approach above, the explosion could 
also be explained in the provision and 
866 Zumbansen P “Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism” 2011 
Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 21, 23-24.
867 Zumbansen P “Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism” 2011 
Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 2123-24. See also Backer LC 2012 Transnational Law as Field or Method http://
lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/transnational-law-as-field-or- method.html. 
868 Heyvaert V and Etty T “Introducing Transnational Environmental Law” 2012 Transnational Environmental Law 1:1, 
1-11, 2.
869 ibid.
870 Carlarne C and Farber D ‘Law Beyond Borders: Transnational Responses to Global Environmental Issues’ 2012 
Transnational Environmental Law 1:1, 13-21, 14.
871 Boyd DR The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment 
(UBC Press Vancouver 2011).
872 May JR and Daly E Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press New York 2015).
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interpretation of environmental rights in 
terms of transnationality. Put differently, 
one could argue that there is an emerging 
transnationality of environmental 
rights. Arguably, there are 5 interrelated 
‘transnational juridical processes’ 
that have largely contributed to the 
transnationality of environmental rights 
and which could assist in the creation and 
spread of innovative ways of advancing 
and interpreting environmental rights. 
3. Transnational juridical 
Processes
3.1 Transplantation/borrowing 
History is filled with evidence of the 
interaction of legal systems.873 Watson 
defines legal transplantation as ‘the 
moving of a rule or system of law from one 
country to another’.874 Through a process 
of such transplantation or borrowing, legal 
developments in one country can serve 
as the basis upon which other countries 
develop their own legal systems.875 There 
are various ways through which this 
process happens. It could be that countries 
with less developed legal systems try to 
catch up with more developed systems 
in other countries by importing rules or 
principles into their own legal systems. 
This essentially means that laws in 
different states could become ‘similar’ 
because of copying or cross-pollination by 
one state of another’s provision/law (which 
could happen as a result of scholars being 
exposed to other judicial systems through 
networking).876  Similarly, in describing 
why this happens in the context of TEL, 
Bell, Macgillivray and Pedersen argue 
that a rule developed or used in one state 
might find its way into other jurisdictions 
because the adopting jurisdictions view it 
or consider it to be desirable or convenient 
to adopt the rule.877 One example is that 
of the development and implementation 
of environmental impact assessment 
which originated in the United States 
of America (US). Environmental impact 
assessment is now widely accepted and 
operational beyond the US from where it 
evolved.878 This includes its incorporation 
into international environmental law. 
Thus, environmental laws around the 
globe could become ‘similar’ because of 
copying or cross-pollination by one state 
873 Twining W “Implications of ‘Globalisation’ for Law as a Discipline” in Halpin A and Roeben V (eds) Theorising the 
Global Legal Order (Hart Publishing Portland 2009), 52.
874 Wiener JB “Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental 
Law” 2001 Ecology Law Quarterly 27, 1295-1371, 1298.
875 Yang T and Percival RV “The Emergence of Global Environmental Law” 2009 Ecology L.Q. 36, 615-664, 617; Percival 
RV “Human Rights and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law” in Rajkhowa S and Stuti D (eds) Economic, Social 
& Cultural Rights, Volume2 (Eastern Book House Guwahati 2013), 2. This was earlier echoed by Watson who stated 
that “[A]mong the most important causes of similarities is borrowing or transplanting”. Watson A “Legal Transplants 
and European Private Law” 2000 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 4:4.
876 See the discussion on networking below.
877 Bell S, Macgillivray D and Pedersen O Environmental Law (Oxford University Press London 2013), 87. The authors 
further argue that states borrow or transplant because it is easier to pick existing laws “off the shelf”. However, if 
states just adopt rules without changing/contextualizing them to suit their particular system, such ‘off the shelf’ 
could affect the worth and utility of the particular laws concerned. 
878 Sand PH ‘Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance’ 1991 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law 
Review 18:2, 213–277, 256.
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of another’s legal system, notably to the 
extent that these are shaped by regional 
and international law. 
Globally, there are many environmental 
rights provisions that are strikingly 
similar.879 Various African countries, for 
instance, have provisions that could have 
been the result of transplantation. The 
1995 Ugandan Constitution provides that 
‘Every Ugandan has a right to a clean and 
healthy environment.’880 In 1996 South 
Africa went a step further, providing for 
the following:
Everyone has the right- (a) to an 
environment that is not harmful 
to their health or well-being; 
and (b) to have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other 
measures that- (i) prevent pollution 
and ecological degradation; (ii)  
promote conservation; and (iii)  
secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural 
resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social 
development.881  
In 2010, Kenya’s new Constitution provides 
the following:
Every person has the right to a 
clean and healthy environment, 
which includes the right (a) to have 
the environment protected for 
the benefit of present and future 
generations through legislative and 
other measures, particularly those 
contemplated in Article 69; and (b) 
to have obligations relating to the 
environment fulfilled under Article 
70.882  
Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution provides 
the following:
(1) Every person has the right— 
(a) to an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or well-being; 
and (b) to have the environment 
protected for the benefit of present 
and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other 
measures that— (i) prevent pollution 
and ecological degradation; (ii) 
promote conservation; and (iii) 
secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural 
resources while promoting 
economic and social development. 
(2) The state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, 
within the limits of the resources 
available to it, to achieve the 
progressive realization of the rights 
set out in this section.883 
879 See May JR and Daly E Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press New York 2015).
880 Section 39 of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995.
881 Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
882 Section 42 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
883 Section 73 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013.
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Interestingly, Tanzania’s 2013 draft 
constitution has an environmental right 
that is strikingly similar to all the above. It 
reads as follows:
1) Every person resident in the 
United Republic has the right to live 
in a clean and safe environment.
(2) The right to live in a clean and 
safe environment includes the 
right of every citizen to use public 
spaces or various places that have 
been reserved for entertainment, 
delivery of educational services, 
medical services, for religious 
gatherings, cultural and economic 
activities.(3) Any person who is 
resident in Tanzania is responsible 
for protecting the environment and 
informing the authorities of the 
land of activities or anything that 
is harmful or is likely to adversely 
affect the environment.884 
What is evident from these examples 
is that the transnationality of laws 
through transplantation could involve 
conversations and interactions that are 
both horizontal and vertical in an inter-
national sense and international sense. 
Borders are irrelevant here and rules 
migrate between different levels to fulfil 
a particular common function between 
states.
3.2 Convergence
Convergence is a process whereby 
environmental laws of some states 
develop similarly not because of deliberate 
acts of transplantation or borrowing, but 
as a result of similar external pressures 
and common functional demands to 
which these laws must respond.885  It could 
involve the growth of expert networks 
and the spread of a type of ‘universal’ 
world culture.886  Ultimately, convergence 
is an elaborate process that results in 
the increased similarity of policies in a 
certain field across a set of jurisdictions 
over a period of time in reaction to global 
regulatory problems such as climate 
change.887  Processes of convergence will 
normally be driven by states, but non-state 
actor initiatives might also play a part. The 
process of convergence allows a more 
harmonious global regulatory framework 
to be created when the self-interests of a 
state are aligned with those of other states 
or other global governance actors.888  In 
other words, if there is a convergence of 
interests, a transnational emergence of 
norms and principles might occur along 
the lines of those interests. 
884 Section 40 of Tanzania’s Draft Constitution. Available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/proposed-
constitution-tanzania-sept-2014. 
885 Yang T and Percival RV “The Emergence of Global Environmental Law” 2009 Ecology L.Q. 36, 615-664, 627.
886 Shaffer G and Bodansky D “Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law” 2012 Transnational 
Environmental Law 1:1, 31-41, 33.
887 Holzinger K, Knill C and Sommerer T ‘Environmental Policy Convergence: The Impact of International Harmonization, 
Transnational Communication, and Regulatory Competition’ 2008 International Organization 62:4, 553-587, 556.
888 Cremades BM and Plehn SL “The new Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International 
Commercial Transactions” 1984 Boston University International Law Journal 2, 317-348, 319.
276
PART 3: REGIONAL AND COUNTRY STUDIES IN AFRICA
Examples of convergence can be seen in 
Southern Africa. For instance, South Africa 
responded to the environmental and social 
ills caused by apartheid through strong 
anthropocentric environmental provisions 
that are focused on transformation and 
social justice.  Similarly, Zimbabwe adopted 
a new constitution with environmental 
rights after a broad coalition of civil society 
organizations pressured and called for 
the inclusion of environmental rights. 
Both events that led to the emergence of 
environmental rights in these two states 
are very different, but the similar pressures 
they presented to governments led to the 
same result: the adoption of environmental 
rights in the countries’ new constitutions.
3.3 Integration and 
harmonization
Integration and harmonization refer 
to multi-country efforts that result in 
similar approaches to various regulatory 
issues such as transboundary water 
governance.889 Unlike convergence, which 
could happen without states specifically 
cooperating to reach a certain level of 
standard of homogeneity, integration 
and harmonization are usually the 
result of concerted efforts by states to 
achieve specific goals.890  Shaffer and 
Bodansky specifically note TEL ‘involves 
cooperative action among states – for 
example, to mutually recognize each 
other’s licences and permits’.891  There are 
various examples regional environmental 
governance organization that have been 
constituted on the basis of the need 
for integration and harmonization. For 
example, the East African Community 
has made an effort to have environmental 
issues handled through integration and 
harmonization. In 2009 the East African 
Community developed the EAC Draft Bill 
of Rights which contains a right to a clean 
environment.892  This draft has been ratified 
by two of the five East African Community 
member states. If states develop or 
amend their environmental rights along 
Article 31, this could be an indication 
of harmonization and integration.893 
In some instances, there is a clear link 
between regional desired goals and the 
harmonization and integration efforts that 
drive the pursuit of those goals.
889 Yang T and Percival RV “The Emergence of Global Environmental Law” 2009 Ecology L.Q. 36, 615-664, 627; Shaffer 
G and Bodansky D “Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law” 2012 Transnational Environmental Law 
1:1, 31-41, 33. See also Fisher E “The Rise of Transnational Environmental Law and the Expertise of Environmental 
Lawyers” 2012 Transnational Environmental Law 1:1, 43-52, 46 who prefers the term regulatory diffusion.
890 Holzinger K, Knill C and Sommerer T ‘Environmental Policy Convergence: The Impact of International Harmonization, 
Transnational Communication, and Regulatory Competition’ 2008 International Organization 62:4, 553-587, 556. 
See also Boyd DR The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the 
Environment (UBC Press Vancouver 2011), 108. As Yang and Percival note, integration links national legal systems 
and harmonisation concerns the adjusting and conforming of countries’ standards and requirements to a particular 
international system or to each other; Yang T and Percival RV “The Emergence of Global Environmental Law” 2009 
Ecology L.Q. 36, 615-664, 627.
891 Shaffer G and Bodansky D “Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law” 2012 Transnational 
Environmental Law 1:1, 31-41, 33.
892 See Article 31.
893 It is however not clear from the Bill whether states would be required to amend their constitutions to incorporate 
such rights. It could be assumed that upon the Bill becoming functional, ratification would operationalise the Bill in 
the same manner in which other rights are recognised (depending on whether a state follows a monist or dualist 
approach).
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As a caveat, it must be noted that 
where processes of integration and 
harmonization occur, it does not mean 
that the laws of states have become 
uniform or similar in every respect.894  Even 
though there might be concerted efforts to 
address a particular issue or even similar 
issues driving convergence, states will 
always have some leeway over the framing 
and implementation of laws within their 
jurisdictions.895 However, ‘[t]the very 
notion of harmonization across nations or 
peoples through law depends not simply 
on the identification of a common law for 
all subject to it, but on the assurance that 
the same law can have the same impact 
in its different settings’.896  Thus, while the 
provision of environmental rights might 
be different in various jurisdictions, the 
substance and the purpose of the laws are 
what resemble some degree of similarity; 
and it is from such substance and purpose 
that one can identify transnationalism. 
3.4 Networking
The creation, sharing and dissemination 
of ideas by networks of like-minded and 
influential individuals or groups are essential 
and significant to the development of TEL.897 
At a conceptual level, Benford prefers the 
term ‘transnational social movements’ to 
describe networks or groups of civil society 
that seek to impact the outcomes of 
global governance. Chirico and Larouche 
present a persuasive economic argument 
for networking. For them, ‘network effects’ 
occur when the value of certain products 
to individual users increases as the number 
of users also increases.898  They apply this 
theory to law where they first lay out a 
general proposition that the market for legal 
ideas is also subject to network effects.899 
The result is that ‘the more members of 
the legal epistemic community subscribe 
to a given opinion, the more attractive 
it becomes, sometimes irrespective of 
its inherent validity’.900 As such, these 
epistemic communities are also perceived 
to contribute to the development of TEL 
by facilitating the exchange of knowledge 
that could indirectly affect normative 
development.901  
When these non-state actor networks 
are actively involved in environmental 
issues, they are able to influence legal 
processes by being ‘transnational norm 
894 Fisher E “The Rise of Transnational Environmental Law and the Expertise of Environmental Lawyers” 2012 
Transnational Environmental Law 1:1, 43-52, 48.
895 Holzinger K, Knill C and Sommerer T ‘Environmental Policy Convergence: The Impact of International Harmonization, 
Transnational Communication, and Regulatory Competition’ 2008 International Organization 62:4, 553-587, 557.
896 Halpin A and Roeben V “Introduction” in Halpin A and Roeben V (eds) Theorising the Global Legal Order (Hart 
Publishing Portland 2009), 5.
897 Boyd DR The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment 
(UBC Press Vancouver 2011), 109; Kotzé LJ Global Environmental Governance: Law and Regulation for the 21st 
Century (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2012), 145.
898 Chirico F and Larouche P “Convergence and Divergence, in Law and Economics and Comparative Law” in Larouche P 
and Cserne P (eds) National Legal Systems and Globalization (T.M.C Asser Press The Hague 2013), 13.
899 ibid. 
900 ibid, 14.
901 Young OR International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Cornell University Press New 
York 1994), 96; Haas P “Epistemic Communities” in Bodansky D, Brunnee J & Hey E (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007), 792.
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entrepreneurs’.902 A good example is 
the Permanent People’s Tribunal which 
functions as a public opinion tribunal 
because its judgments have no binding 
force. It has collaborated with the Global 
Network for the Study of Human Rights 
and the Environment to hold hearings 
on hydraulic fracturing and its impact 
on human rights and the environment.903 
Arguably, the activities and networks 
of these groups focus on practical 
and current matters, specific cases 
and concrete expressions of human 
solidarity. While they remain unable to 
participate fully in global environmental 
law making and diplomacy due to their 
lack of international legal personality, they 
increasingly influence the outcomes of the 
more formal global juridical processes, 
thereby indirectly contributing to the 
development of environmental norms and 
structures beyond the state.
3.5 Judicial comparative 
borrowing
Courts and arbitral bodies also play 
an important role in facilitating the 
transnationality of laws. While discussing 
global environmental constitutionalism, 
May and Daly argue that ‘by borrowing 
and learning from one another, courts 
are developing a rich and varied set 
of responses to the challenges of 
environmental protection’.904 With regard 
to process, Dupré notes that judicial 
reliance on foreign and comparative law 
has been referred to as cross-fertilization, 
judicial dialogue, constitutional borrowing, 
importation and migration.905 Clearly, the 
jurisprudence from other jurisdictions 
could be important to the extent that they 
can provide guidance to another court. 
For example, the broad interpretation 
of environmental rights in the Indian 
Constitution906 is reported to have 
influenced other courts like the Argentinian 
Supreme Court in shaping and interpreting 
the Argentinean environmental right.907  
It must be noted that transnationality 
through judicial work could also be 
enhanced by judicial networks and 
communities across borders.908 It has 
been argued that through such networks 
and communities, transnational dialogues 
flow more naturally because the ‘judges 
share common beliefs, values and a self-
perception and understanding of their 
role in the legal system and in society’.909 
902 Shaffer G and Bodansky D “Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law” 2012 Transnational 
Environmental Law 1:1, 31-41, 35.
903 Short D 2015 Media Release – Fracking Goes on Trial, https://www.tribunalonfracking.org/news/media-release/. 
904 May JR and Daly E Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press New York 2015), 10.
905 Dupre C “Globalisation and Judicial Reasoning: Building Blocks for a method of Interpretation” in Halpin A and 
Roeben V (eds) Theorising the Global Legal Order (Hart Publishing Portland 2009), 107.
906 Some of these cases as cited by Yang T and Percival RV “The Emergence of Global Environmental Law” 2009 
Ecology L.Q. 36, 615-664, 634 are S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India 
(Taj Trapezium Case), A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 734; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Municipalities), A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1115; M.C. 
Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram Gas Leak Case), A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 965
907 Yang T and Percival RV “The Emergence of Global Environmental Law” 2009 Ecology L.Q. 36, 615-664, 634.
908 Boyd DR The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment 
(UBC Press Vancouver 2011), 109.
909 De Visser M and Claes M “Judicial Networks” in Larouche P and Cserne P (eds) National Legal Systems and 
Globalization (T.M.C Asser Press The Hague 2013), 346.
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A recent gathering that exemplifies a 
move towards judicial networking is the 
establishment of the Global Judicial 
Institute for the Environment in Brazil by 
judges from 15 countries.910  These judges, 
along with environmental law experts 
prepared a Charter for the Global Judicial 
Institute for the Environment.911  Some of 
the Charter’s objectives include:
  Providing research, analysis and 
publications on various environment 
related matters;912 
  Strengthening the capacity of judges 
in adjudicating and administering 
environmental cases; and913
  Providing a forum for the creation 
of partnerships that would lead 
to collaborations and information 
exchange on environmental law 
issues.914 
Arguably then, courts have and continue 
to significantly contribute to the 
transnationalisation of environmental 
law in general. Through their work, legal 
systems can potentially mirror each other 
as a result of the extent to which different 
courts within different jurisdictions give 
content and meaning to legal principles.915 
To be sure, ‘[t]he increased citation of 
judgments and borrowing of legal doctrines 
from international and foreign courts by 
domestic judges is a concrete sign of a 
developing transnational legal culture.’916  
4. Conclusion
As a framework of analysis, TEL allows 
for the viewing of environmental law in 
liberating terms that are broader than the 
national and the international. It also allows 
for the globalization of environmental 
rights. Through the transnational juridical 
processes identified above, one could 
argue that environmental rights have 
indeed become transnational. Despite the 
absence of a global environmental rights 
treaty, it is evident that constitutional 
environmental rights have been 
progressively developing the world 
over. However, this global recognition 
of constitutional environmental rights 
is only one part of the equation, as 
interpretation and application demand 
more than just theoretical acceptance. 
The practical worth of these rights will be 
determined by how policy makers infuse 
environmental rights principles in their 
decision making and how judicial officers 
become environmentally conscious in 
their adjudication. 
910 IUCN ‘Judges Establish the Global Judicial Institute for the Environment’ 2016 available at https://www.iucn.org/
news/judges-establish-global-judicial-institute-environment. 
911 The Charter is available at http://welcongress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Charter-of-the-Global-Judicial-
Institute-Rio-de-Janeiro-29-April-2016-....pdf.  
912 Article III(a). 
913 Article III(b).
914 Article III(c). 
915 Kotzé LJ and Du Plessis AA “Some brief Observations on Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights Jurisprudence in 
South Africa” 2010 Journal of Court Innovation 157-176, 168. See also Fisher who describes this as ‘the overlap 
between different dispute resolution forums’, Fisher E “The Rise of Transnational Environmental Law and the 
Expertise of Environmental Lawyers” 2012 Transnational Environmental Law 1:1, 43-52, 46.
916 Ip EC “Globalization and the Future of the Law of the Sovereign State” 2010 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 8:3, 636-655, 644.
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1. Introduction
This chapter on a legal theory of transformative environmental constitutionalism is an 
attempt at progressive legal scholarship. It seeks to engage with the concerns of pressing 
social movements responding to environmental degradation in South Africa.917 It does so 
by introducing the concept of transformative environmental constitutionalism. The aim 
of the concept is to bridge a juridical and, as a result, practical, divide in legal discourse 
between environmental considerations on the one hand and social justice considerations 
on the other. It is trite that under environmental law, the concept of sustainable 
development, in theory, concerns the integration and balancing of environmental, social 
and economic considerations in environmental decision-making. That is not the focus 
of this chapter. Rather, this chapter considers how environmental law can contribute 
towards radical societal change and the attainment of socio-economic entitlements in 
an unequal and unjust society. This, change is demanded by South Africa’s project of 
transformative constitutionalism, discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
Transformative environmental constitutionalism proceeds off the premise that 
South Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism has not adequately 
engaged environmentalism as a concern for the protection of the environment that is 
interconnected to the pursuit of social justice for the people who live in them, particularly 
the poor and vulnerable. Although a heterogeneous concept, environmentalism at its 
most basic entails a concern for environmental integrity and the preservation of the 
environment. A key feature of South African environmentalism historically, consistent 
with apartheid policies more generally, is environmental racism, including in the form 
Introducing Transformative Environmental 
Constitutionalism in South Africa
Melanie Murcott
917 As called for by Tshepo Madlinlgozi, ‘Legal Academics and Progressive Politics in South Africa: Moving Beyond the 
Ivory Tower’ (2005) PULP Fictions 5, 6, who argues that:
 In  South Africa, progressive politics and social transformation have no meaning unless those who claim to be 
“progressives” connect with the struggle that is being waged by new social movements. In other words, progressive 
legal scholars need to take these struggles into account in their research. 
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of fortress conservation and exclusion,918 
forced removals, unequal access to water, 
sanitation, housing and waste removal 
services, and the citing of hazardous land 
uses near poor black communities.919 
Post-apartheid, the focus of those involved 
in environmental governance at the level 
of application of law or implementation 
of policy has been largely reduced to the 
granting of authorizations, permits and 
licences by answering technical questions 
about whether the impacts of activities 
will fall within ‘acceptable’ limits. This 
disconnects environmental governance 
from the social justice issues at stake. 
This chapter argues that South 
Africa’s project of transformative 
constitutionalism will be enhanced by 
a more thorough engagement with and 
transformation of environmentalism, 
through the development of a legal 
theory of transformative environmental 
constitutionalism. This chapter speaks 
first to the emerging phenomenon of 
environmental constitutionalism, in which 
South Africa is a leading light on paper, but 
less so in practice. Secondly, it explains the 
South African concept of transformative 
constitutionalism and attempts to link 
environmental constitutionalism to this 
concept. In doing so, this chapter describes 
some of the deplorable living conditions of 
South Africa’s poor so as to illustrate how 
our society measures up to the goal of 
transformative constitutionalism. It argues 
that these living conditions are a failure not 
only of transformative constitutionalism, 
but also of environmentalism, due to a 
limited vision of environmentalism in 
our legal discourse. Finally, this chapter 
proffers the vision of environmentalism 
that we need to respond to the plight of 
South Africa’s poor and render our project 
of transformative constitutionalism more 
effective. 
The chapter draws inspiration from, 
amongst others, the struggles of the 
Amadiba Crisis Committee, a community-
based organization representing the 
Amadiba residents of Xolobeni, in South 
Africa’s Wild Coast. The Committee has 
mobilized a strong social movement 
against open-cast titanium mining in the 
area, one of our country’s most beautiful 
stretches of coast line, by an Australian 
mining company, Mineral Commodities 
Ltd. It has been a difficult and controversial 
project, culminating in the 22 March 
2016 assassination of the Committee’s 
chairperson, Sikhosiphi Bazooka Rhadebe. 
In response, civil society organizations 
worldwide have condemned the 
intimidation and violence against those 
opposed mining in Amadiba.920 Struggles 
of this nature are about the intersection 
of the need to secure the protection of 
918 Jan A. Hough and Heidi E. Prozesky, ‘“But we don’t spoil it, we protect it”: Coleske residents’ conceptualisations of 
the Baviaanskloof  Nature Reserve and its protection’ South African Geographical Journal 92(2) December 2010 160, 
161.  
919 Melanie Murcott, ‘The role of environmental justice in socio-economic rights litigation’ (2015) 132(4) South African 
Law Journal 875, 885–889.
920 See for example Right to Know, ‘Statement: 193 Civil Society and International organisations condemn the 
assassination of Sikhosiphi Bazooka Rhadebe, chairperson of Amadiba Crisis Committee!’ <http://www.r2k.org.
za/2016/03/23/amadiba-assassination/  > (accessed 26 September 2016).
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environments, and justice for the people 
living them. They highlight the need to 
re-think the ways in which the law can 
be invoked to strengthen such struggles, 
using the normative framework that the 
Constitution offers to develop a legal 
theory of transformative environmental 
constitutionalism. 
2. Environmental 
constitutionalism 
Environmental constitutionalism is a 
relatively recent global phenomenon 
that essentially entails ‘the recognition 
that the environment is a proper subject 
for protection in constitutional texts 
and for vindication by constitutional 
courts worldwide’.921 Post-apartheid 
South Africa is arguably a pioneer of 
this phenomenon, at least on paper,922 
having constitutionalized environmental 
protection in both a thin and a thick 
sense.923  The Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 provides for thin 
environmental constitutionalism ‘as 
a means to determine, at the highest 
possible level, the ordering, composition 
and architecture of environmental 
governance’ because it contains 
provisions that ‘constitute, establish, 
legitimize and guide the day-to-day 
governance of environmental matters 
in South Africa’.924 It provides for thick 
environmental constitutionalism not least 
by incorporating ‘a rights-based approach 
to environmental governance’.925 
The Constitution provides for procedural 
rights to access to information926 and 
to administrative justice,927 including in 
relation to environmental decision-making. 
In South Africa these procedural rights 
have the capacity to ‘facilitate participative, 
representative and transparent 
environmental governance’,928 and they 
are frequently invoked in this manner. In 
addition, the Constitution includes not only 
a rich substantive environmental right that 
speaks to health, well-being, intra- and 
inter-generational equity, conservation, 
pollution control and ecologically 
sustainable development,929 but also a 
number of potentially interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing substantive rights. 
These include the rights to life,930 dignity,931 
921 James R. May and Erin Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
1.
922 Louis Kotzé, ‘The Conceptual Contours of Environmental Constitutionalism’ (2015) 21 187 Widener Law Review 194, 
196–198.
923 Kotzé (n 922) 194, 196–98.
924 Kotzé (n 922) 193–94. 
925 Kotzé (n 922) 197.
926 Section 32 of the Constitution.
927 Section 33 of the Constitution.
928 Kotzé (n 922) 197. See also James R. May, ‘Constitutional Directions in Procedural Environmental Rights’ (2013) 
Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 28.
929 Section 24 of the Constitution provides that ‘everyone has a right to an environment not harmful to health or 
wellbeing’ and ‘to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures’, including measures that ‘secure ecologically sustainable development 
and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development’.
930 Section 11 of the Constitution.
931 Section 10 of the Constitution.
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equality,932 water, food and sanitation,933 
and housing,934 all of which ‘have a direct 
bearing on the environment’.935 
The entrenchment of socio-economic 
rights and rights to dignity and 
equality, with the underlying goal of 
poverty alleviation, as well as the 
interconnectedness of all rights under the 
Constitution, means that on paper South 
African environmental constitutionalism 
offers the potential to pursue at least 
three important goals. First, it arguably 
pursues the protection of the environment 
as a necessity for the attainment of 
dignity, so that it is not harmful to health 
or well-being, particularly of poor South 
Africans. A second goal is intra- and inter-
generational equity in relation to the equal 
access to gifts of the environment. Thirdly, 
ecologically sustainable development and 
use of natural resources are called for, 
which is important given that basic needs 
to water, food and housing cannot be met 
without ecological sustainability. 
This chapter elaborates on these 
goals when it engages with the 
transformative potential of environmental 
constitutionalism in South Africa below. 
In doing so, this chapter does not seek to 
pursue an exclusively so-called brown or 
green agenda. Rather, it proceeds off the 
premise that these agendas are mutually 
supportive of, rather than opposed to 
each other.936  For instance, human health, 
a so-called brown agenda issue, cannot 
be secured without ecosystem health, a 
concern of the green agenda. Similarly, 
nature cannot serve human needs as a 
goal of the brown agenda, unless it is 
protected as a goal of the green agenda.937 
It is necessary to explore this potential 
because, in practice, the environmental 
right remains under-utilized,938 and 
environmental constitutionalism is rarely 
regarded as a concern for environmental 
protection as interrelated with and 
mutually reinforcing of other socio-
economic rights in struggles for social 
justice for South Africa’s poor. Nor are 
other socio-economic rights regarded as 
interrelated with and mutually reinforcing 
of the environmental right. The aim of 
this chapter is to illustrate the potential 
of environmental constitutionalism as a 
transformative tool that can respond to 
conditions of poverty in South Africa by 
connecting the concept of transformative 
932 Section 9 of the Constitution.
933 Section 27 of the Constitution.
934 Section 26 of the Constitution.
935 Kotzé (n 922) 198. On the relationship between dignity rights and environmental rights see Erin Daly and James May, 
‘Bridging Constitutional Dignity and Environmental Rights Jurisprudence’ Forthcoming in Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment Widener University Delaware Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 16-09 May 
2016.
936 See Peter S. Wenz, ‘Does Environmentalism Promote Injustice for the Poor?’ in Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C. 
Pezzullo (eds) Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental 
Movement (2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 57, 64–78. 
937 In this sense I find accounts that dichotimise these agendas to be of limited value. For such an account see for 
instance AA Du Plessis, ‘The “Brown Environmental Agenda and the Constitutional Duties of Local Government in 
South Africa: A Conceptual Introduction’ (2015) 18(5) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1846, 1851.
938 Loretta Feris, ‘Constitutional environmental rights: An under-utilised resource’ (2008) 24 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 29.
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constitutionalism to environmentalism. 
Next, this chapter considers the concept 
of transformative constitutionalism. 
3. Transformative 
constitutionalism
As David Boyd points out, since the mid-
1970s there has been a ‘remarkable 
shift toward constitutional democracy 
across the globe’.939 In countries in 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
Africa, constitution-making has entailed 
responding to ‘tragic legacies of fascism, 
colonialism and communism’,940 to 
contribute toward radical societal change. 
South Africa’s Constitution is a notable 
example of this trend. It has been found 
to demand ‘a decisive break from, and a 
ringing rejection of, that part of the past 
which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, 
insular, and repressive’.941 It is overtly 
transformative in nature, in the sense 
that because of our apartheid past, it 
demands radical reform in our country in 
the pursuit of social justice and equality.942 
Thus, Karl Klare asserted in 1998 that 
South Africa must embark upon a project 
of transformative constitutionalism, 
requiring:
constitutional enactment, 
interpretation and enforcement 
committed…to transforming [our] 
country’s political and social 
institutions and power relationships 
in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction inducing large-
scale social change through processes 
grounded in law. 
Although the term ‘transformative 
constitutionalism’ does not appear 
anywhere in the Constitution, it has been 
recognized as a key feature.943  Accordingly, 
in 2006, the late former Constitutional Court 
Chief Justice Pius Langa asserted that: 
The provision of services to all and 
the leveling of the economic playing 
fields that were so drastically skewed 
by the apartheid system must be 
absolutely central to any concept of 
transformative constitutionalism.944  
Though there is no agreement on what 
the term means,945 in South Africa 
transformative constitutionalism should 
entail, at a minimum, improving the living 
conditions of the poor in the pursuit 
of social justice.946 Transformative 
939 David R. Boyd, ‘The Environmental Rights Revolution’ (UCB Press, Vancouver, 2012) 4.
940 Boyd (n 939) 4.
941 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 para 262.  
942 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 8; Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) para 142.
943 Karl Klare, ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 
146, 150.
944 Justice Pius Langa, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 17(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 351, 352.
945 Langa (n 944) 351.
946 See for example more the recent accounts of transformative constitutionalism of Sanele Sibanda ‘Not purpose-
made! Transformative constitutionalism, post-independence constitutionalism and the struggle to eradicate 
poverty’ (2011) 22(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 482; Tim Fish Hodgson, ‘Bridging the gap between people and the 
law: Transformative constitutionalism and the right to constitutional literacy’ (2015) Acta Juridica: Transformative 
Justice: Essays in Honour of Pius Langa 189; Jason Brickhill and Yana Van Leeve, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism 
– Guiding Light or Empty Slogan?’ (2015) Acta Juridica: Transformative Justice: Essays in Honour of Pius Langa 141.
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constitutionalism viewed in this way is not 
merely a theoretical concept. It ‘envisages 
a meaningful improvement in the material 
conditions of people’s lives together 
with real change in legal culture’.947 
It has been argued that the ‘content 
and implementation of transformative 
constitutionalism… cannot be considered 
in the abstract, but must be informed by 
actual socio-economic conditions’.948 The 
focus of those concerned with the study 
and implementation of transformative 
constitutionalism has been socio-
economic conditions as disconnected 
from the environment. This chapter 
asserts that environmental considerations 
must also be considered in addressing the 
plight of South Africa’s poor. This is so, 
because evidently, those who lack access 
to food, water, sanitation, housing and 
health-care, also live in environments that 
are harmful to their health and well-being. 
This means environments that are 
inherently unjust and unequal, and that 
violate the dignity of the people existing 
within them. As David Scholsberg argues, 
‘[t]he environment and nature create the 
conditions for social justice’.949 By way 
of elaboration, this chapter offers two 
illustrations of the intersection between 
socio-economic and environmental 
struggles of poor South Africans. These 
illustrations reveal that our society 
has a long way to go in its project of 
transformative constitutionalism, and 
expose the potential for transformative 
environmental constitutionalism.950 
Water is a gift of the earth essential for 
sustaining all life. When people do not have 
piped water and flush toilets, their rights to 
dignity, to access to water and sanitation 
are implicated. In addition, they are 
exposed to environments that are harmful 
to their health and well-being. Many people 
in South Africa are deprived of a just share 
of the country’s water supply, however. 
Mining communities are particularly 
hard hit.951  For instance, impoverished 
communities living on the outskirts of 
Randfontein have limited access to clean 
water. Informal settlements in this area, 
such as the one pictured below, are the 
result of ‘[a]varice and opportunism rather 
than careful planning with an eye to long-
term sustainability’, influenced by mining 
activities.952 
According to Statistics South Africa, as 
at 2011 only 79,3% of the population of 
Randfontein had access to flush toilets 
947 Brickhill and Van Leeve (n 946) 143.
948 Brickhill and Van Leeve (n 946) 143.
949 David Schlosberg, ‘Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse’ (2013) 22(1) 
Environmental Politics 37, 38.
950 John Gaventa and Carin Runciman, ‘12. Untangling economic and political inequality: the case of South Africa’ 
in ISSC, IDS and UNESCO World Social Science Report 2016, Challenging inequalities: Pathways to a Just World 
UNESCO Publishing, Paris 70–73.
951 See for example Tracy-Lynn Humby, ‘Environmental justice and human rights on the mining wastelands of the 
Witwatersrand goldfields’ (2013) 43 Revue générale de droit 65.
952 J.F. Durand, ‘The impact of gold mining on the Witwatersrand on the rivers and karst system of Gauteng and North 
West Province, South Africa’ (2012) 68 Journal of African Earth Sciences 24, 25
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connected to sewerage, and 61,9% had 
piped water inside their dwelling.953 In 
addition, the manner in which water is 
distributed is unequal. As Jacklyn Cock 
observed in 2010, more than half of South 
Africa’s domestic water consumption 
‘goes to the largely white, affluent suburbs 
with their gardens, swimming pools and 
golf courses’,954 whilst many vulnerable 
people lack adequate access to clean 
water. This unjust distribution implicates 
the right to equality. 
It is easy to forget that when we are in our 
homes, we exist in an environment. Those 
who live in shacks in informal settlements 
and lack access to housing are not only 
deprived of their right to housing and 
to dignity, but also live in environments 
harmful to their health and well-being. 
This is illustrated by Melani and Others v 
City of Johannesburg and Others, a case 
concerning 10,000 residents living in an 
informal settlement in Johannesburg, 
Slovo Park, who sought to enforce their 
rights to housing.955 Finding in favor of 
the residents, the court remarked upon 
the ‘deplorable’ living conditions of Slovo 
Park, including the lack of access to 
electricity and resultant, often fatal, shack 
fires occurring once every two months.956 
Further, because roads are not formally 
demarcated in Slovo Park, and do not 
appear on a map, ambulances refuse 
to fetch the sick.957 Living conditions of 
this kind represent a failure not only of 
constitutional rights to housing, dignity 
and equality, but also of the environmental 
right and of environmentalism, which 
ought to be regarded as part of our project 
of transformative constitutionalism. 
As a result of lived realities of this kind, we 
have become known as ‘the protest capital 
of the world’ as South Africans who face 
intolerable living conditions in townships 
and informal settlements protest and 
look to the courts for relief in relation to 
violations of their rights access to water, 
sanitation, housing and electricity.958 
953 See Statistics South Africa <www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=993&id=randfontein-municipality > (accessed 26 
September 2016). 
954 Jacklyn Cock ‘“Green Capitalism” or Environmental Justice? A Critique of the Sustainability Discourse’ (2010) Paper 
presented at the XVI SASA Congress, University of Fort Hare, June 13, 2010 47.
955 2016 (5) SA 67 (GJ).
956 Melani (n 955) para 3.
957 Melani (n 955) para 3.
958 Gaventa and Runciman (n 950) 72.
Informal settlement in the West Rand of 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
Photo credit: © Melanie Murcott
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If transformative constitutionalism entails 
responding to these socio-economic 
hardships through legal means, grounded 
in the Constitution, transformative 
environmental constitutionalism entails 
recognizing that these hardships are 
also environmental issues, to which 
environmentalism must respond. It has 
not yet effectively done so, however. 
The focus of those implementing 
environmental legislation and policy is 
largely on permitting or allowing industry 
to grow or to be maintained. Accordingly, 
an industry friendly environmentalism 
emerges whose focus is economically 
sustainable development. This type of 
environmentalism is inconsistent with 
what our Constitution requires: it is not 
grounded in social justice considerations 
and the preservation of a clean and healthy 
environment as a prerequisite to meet, at 
least, the basic needs of the poor, and to 
aspire to enabling all people to flourish. 
For instance, in 2015 the Department of 
Environmental Affairs decided to grant 
applications postponing the application of 
time frames for compliance with Minimum 
Emission Standards prescribed by the 
National Environmental Management 
Air Quality Act 39 of 2004. Amongst the 
applicants were major polluters in the 
Witbank area, an area that is reported to 
have the worst air quality in the world.959 
Unsurprisingly, the incidence of respiratory 
illness of the poor and vulnerable people 
who live there is reported to be very high.960 
In response to opposition about her 
ministry’s decision to grant postponement 
applications, Environmental Affairs 
Minister Edna Molewa contended that she 
was simply acting within her mandate of 
securing sustainable development in the 
country.961 The Minister’s response seems 
to treat environmental deterioration as 
disconnected from the lived realities of 
South Africa’s poor. Moreover, the views 
of the Minister represent the weakness of 
grounding environmentalism in the notion 
of sustainable development, a concept 
the heart of our environmental legislation. 
Because sustainable development is such 
a flexible concept: 
for those advocating economic 
growth, the emphasis would fall 
on the economic growth value of 
sustainable development. As such 
sustainable development could 
mean “lasting economic growth”, 
with the aim being to sustain 
economic growth.962 
Commenting on Fuel Retailers 
Association of Southern Africa v Director-
General: Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation 
and Environment, Mpumalanga 
959 groundWork ‘The Health Impact of Coal’ (2014) <www.groundwork.org.za/specialreports/groundWork%20The%20
Health%20Impact%20of%20Coal%20final%2020%20May%202014.pdf>.
960 ibid.
961 Al Jazeera English, ‘Polluted air affecting health of South Africans’ <www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUPI_9iORL0 >, 2 
April 2015 (accessed 10 December 2015). 
962 Loretta Feris, ‘Sustainable development in practice: Fuel Retailers Association of South Africa v Director-General 
Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province’ 2008 
(1) Constitutional Court Review 235, 250.
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Province & others,963 South Africa’s only 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence about 
meaning of sustainable development, 
Tumai Murombo warned that this case:
may unwittingly send the wrong 
message to industrialists who 
perceive the concept as being aimed 
at making “development” sustainable 
and not to achieve integrated 
sustainability in the radical sense 
of scrutinizing activities that are not 
sustainable socially, economically 
and environmentally.
Unfortunately, Murombo’s warning 
was not heeded, and this approach to 
sustainable development appears to have 
permeated mainstream environmentalism 
in South Africa. This is because, as Loretta 
Feris points out, ‘[o]n its own, the concept 
fails to address practical and normative 
considerations’.964  
The problematic approach to the 
constitutionally entrenched notion of 
sustainable development raises the 
question of whether and, if so, how, it can 
be recast. A legal theory of transformative 
environmental constitutionalism can 
assist in reframing environmentalism 
in South Africa. Transformative 
environmental constitutionalism would 
entail steeping sustainable development in 
normative considerations consistent with 
South Africa’s project of transformative 
constitutionalism. In other words, it would 
mean that sustainable development in 
South Africa is aimed at addressing the 
plight of the poor and overcoming social 
injustice, whilst remembering that these 
struggles are intrinsically connected with 
and dependent upon, the preservation 
of the environment. The next part of this 
chapter seeks to illustrate this connection.
4. Transformative 
environmental 
constitutionalism
A legal theory of transformative 
environmental constitutionalism 
facilitates a much-needed value-laden 
approach to environmentalism that 
breathes transformative content into the 
concept of sustainable development. It 
does so because it calls for a rights-based 
approach to environmentalism, grounded 
in our transformative Constitution that 
has the potential to protect ‘[a]ll of our 
environments – from urban to wilderness 
areas – that are being stressed, polluted 
and commodified while corporations 
and government agencies increasingly 
are challenging the general public and 
local communities for control over 
them’.965 This approach demands a 
progressive, social-justice oriented 
vision of environmentalism attached 
963 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) (Fuel Retailers).
964 Feris (n 962) 253.
965 Phaedra C. Pezzullo and Ronald Sandler, ‘Revisiting the Environmental Justice Challenge to Environmentalism’ in 
Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C. Pezzullo (eds) Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice 
Challenge to the Environmental Movement (2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 1.
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to a set of normative considerations 
for those involved in environmental 
governance, at the level of policy making 
and the implementation of environmental 
legislation, for those concerned with the 
resolution of environmental disputes, 
and for those engaged in environmental 
scholarship, education and activism.
In South Africa the relevant normative 
considerations emerge from the 
Constitution as well as the principles of 
our framework environmental legislation, 
the National Environmental Management 
Act 108 of 1997 (NEMA).966  At least three 
of environmental constitutionalism’s 
goals are (as articulated above) first, 
the protection of the environment as a 
necessity for the attainment of dignity, so 
that it is not harmful to health or well-being, 
second, intra- and inter-generational equity 
in relation to the environment, and third, 
ecologically sustainable development and 
use of natural resources. This part of the 
chapter comments briefly upon these goals 
so as to expose the transformative potential 
of environmental constitutionalism in 
South Africa. 
The protection of the environment as a 
necessity for the attainment of dignity 
As Erin Daly and James May argue, ‘[h]
uman dignity is inextricably linked to a 
quality environment, and vice versa’.  They 
point out further that:
Many threats to the environment 
are at least as harmful to human life 
and health and to people’s ability to 
fully develop as privacy, education, 
association and other interests 
pertinent to human dignity: exposure 
to lead in water can stunt intellectual 
growth; air pollution causes 
respiratory illnesses that reduce 
life expectancy and productivity; 
deforestation diminishes protection 
from storms, threatening homes 
and communities and reducing soil 
fertility—which in turn increases 
farmers’ dependence on global 
markets for their own subsistence; 
reduced access to water and food in 
turn means that people (especially 
women) spend more time securing 
food for themselves and their families 
and less time on education or on 
income-producing work, diminishing 
their life choices and making them 
more vulnerable to further human 
and environmental threats.968 
In South Africa, all of these threats 
impact the poor and vulnerable – those 
with limited access to resources to meet 
their basic needs – the most. Because 
the Constitution protects both a right 
to dignity and a right to an environment 
not harmful to health or well-being as 
mutually reinforcing and interrelated 
rights, environmental constitutionalism 
in South Africa invites legal responses 
966 See section 2(4) of NEMA.
967 Daly and May (n 935) 1.
968 Daly and May (n 935) 10.
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to conditions of poverty that invoke both 
rights so as to respond to social injustice. 
Intra- and inter-generational equity 
The South African environmental right 
provides for the protection of environment 
‘for the benefit of present and future 
generations’. How should this benefit 
accrue? If South Africa is to be a just 
and equal society as its constitutional 
values and right to equality demand, 
the manner in which present and future 
generations ought to ‘benefit’ from the 
protection of the environment must also 
be equitable both amongst present and 
future generations, and within present 
generations. As Harding explains, inter-
generational equity means that ‘the 
present generation should ensure that the 
health, diversity and productivity of the 
environment is maintained or enhanced 
for the benefit of future generations’, whilst 
intra-generational equity focuses on 
equity within a single generation.969 Tracy-
Lynn Field explains how equity ought to 
be regarded as central to sustainable 
development in the South African context. 
She argues:
At the very core of the notion of 
sustainable development is the 
moral choice to pursue equity in the 
light of a certain consciousness of 
the linkages between human and 
natural systems in the context of 
past and continuing unsustainable 
practices. Equity, not environmental 
protection, is the absolute core 
of sustainable development, 
notwithstanding the concept’s origin 
in texts aimed at environmental 
protection. But equity requires, 
more than ever before, an enhanced 
understanding, consideration and 
respect for our precarious and finite 
natural environment, and the desire 
to transform our human systems 
so as to be in harmony with that 
environment.970  
She goes on to contend that:
If equity — defined in terms of 
meeting basic needs both now and 
in the future — is kept in sight as the 
goal [of sustainable development] 
toward which we are moving, there is 
a good likelihood that we will eschew 
economic activities that overexploit 
the finite resource base on which we 
all depend.971 
Placing equity at the heart of sustainable 
development entails, both within the 
current generation, and for the benefit 
of future generations, the pursuit of 
environmental justice. Environmental 
justice is a transformative concept that has 
the potential to respond to environmental 
racism and other forms of social injustice. 
Environmental justice requires the just 
969 R Harding, ‘Ecologically sustainable development: Origins, implementation and challenges’ 2006 (187) 229, 235–36.
970 Tracy-Lynn Field, ‘Sustainable Development Versus Environmentalism: Competing Paradigms for the South African 
EIA Regime’ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 409, 417.
971 Field (n 970) 419.
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distribution of environmental endowments 
such as water, food, housing, and of 
environmental harms such as pollution 
and degradation.972 It further calls for 
participation of all affected by decision-
making about the environment and the 
recognition of the basic needs of all people 
in environmental decision making.973 
Finally, a capabilities approach to justice 
demands ‘institutions, resources, social 
and physical environments, and behaviors 
that permit individuals to flourish’.974 This 
idea of flourishing can be connected to the 
constitutional entitlement to well-being 
under section 24 of the Constitution. 
Closely connected to environmental 
justice, is the notion of public trusteeship. 
It denotes government stewardship 
over the earth’s ecological gifts in the 
public interest.975 When the government 
adopts the role of steward, it must do 
so in a just and equitable manner. Taken 
together, environmental justice and public 
trusteeship help us to see water, food and 
housing, all of which come from the earth 
and are essential for our survival, not merely 
as commodities to be regulated by ‘neutral’ 
market forces, but as environmental 
endowments held in trust by government 
for the people, to be distributed equitably 
pursuant to participatory processes, 
so as to progressively realize access to 
them. Both concepts are provided for 
in our environmental law and are linked 
to the rights to equality, dignity and the 
environment.976 Their potential as legal 
constructs in struggles for social justice 
abounds. 
Ecologically sustainable development 
In South Africa, the environmental right 
provides that the environment must be 
protected for the benefit of present and 
future generations through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that ‘secure 
ecologically sustainable development…
while promoting justifiable economic and 
social development’. This chapter argues 
above that it is implicit in the Constitution 
that this benefit must be secured equitably. 
Explicitly, the benefit focuses on ecological, 
rather than economic sustainability. 
Ecological sustainable development 
is also a term used in Australia, where 
in 1990, when the concept was being 
debated by the Australian government:
environmental groups, concerned 
that the sustainable development 
discussion process would be 
hijacked by business and industry 
972 Murcott (n 919) 876.
973 Schlosberg (n 949) 44.
974 Julian Agyeman, ‘Introducing Just Sustainabilities’ (Zed Books, London, 2013).
975 See Elmarie van der Schyff, ‘Stewardship Doctrines of Public Trust: Has the Eagle of Public Trusteeship Landed on 
South African Soil?’ 2013 130 South African Law Journal 369; E van der Schyff and G Viljoen, ‘Water and the Public 
Trust Doctrine – a South African perspective’ 2008 4(2) The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern 
Africa 339–354.
976 See Murcott (n 99) 889-892 on the recognition of environmental justice in South African environmental law. See E 
van der Schyff, ‘Unpacking the Public Trust Doctrine: A Journey into Foreign Territory’ 2010 (13)5 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 122, 122–123 on the recognition of public trusteeship in South African environmental law. 
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and interpreted as just economically 
sustainable development, 
successfully fought for inclusion of 
the [term] ecologically, in the official 
definition.977 
As a result of the ecological focus of 
sustainable development in Australia, 
a number of key principles emerged for 
environmental decision-making, including 
inter- and intra-generational equity, 
precaution, conservation of biological 
diversity and ecological integrity.978 
These principles are also reflected in 
South African environmental law.979  As 
in Australia, ecologically sustainable 
development in South Africa can be 
understood to require ‘using, conserving 
and enhancing the community’s resources 
so that ecological processes, on which life 
depends, are maintained, and the total 
quality of life, now and in the future, can 
be increased’.980  
This approach to sustainable development 
requires the systematic acknowledgement 
of environmental concerns, 
‘conceptualized as a set of interconnected 
ecological pressures that required a 
similarly interconnected economic, social 
and political response’.981  In South Africa 
this response must address the most 
pressing needs of the poor and struggles 
against social injustice. This is because 
environmental harm is exacerbated, and 
the potential to conserve the environment 
is undermined by conditions of poverty. 
As Agyeman argues, ‘environmental 
limits result in unfair distribution of 
environmental “goods”, thus exacerbating 
the effects of unfair distribution of 
environmental “bads”’.982  In South Africa, 
in order to achieve a more just an equitable 
society, environmental constitutionalism 
must recognize ecological limits as 
connected to limits to human flourishing. 
5. Conclusion
This chapter has argued that 
environmental constitutionalism can 
meaningfully contribute towards South 
Africa’s project of transformative 
constitutionalism and struggles for social 
justice. It has offered some tentative ideas 
about how legal constructs emerging 
from environmental constitutionalism can 
be invoked to do so. The first step is to 
view environmental constitutionalism not 
merely as concerned with the enactment 
of environmental rights, but as entailing 
a broader rights-based approach to 
environmental protection that serves the 
environment and the people dependent 
upon it for their survival. Environmental 
constitutionalism thus entails a holistic 
and interconnected understanding of 
multiple rights that can work together to 
977 Harding (n 969) 233.
978 Harding (n 969) 235.
979 See section 2(4) of NEMA.
980 See Giorel Curran & Robyn Hollander, ’25 years of Ecologically Sustainable Development in Australia: paradigm shift 
or business as usual?’ 2015 (22) 1 Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 2, 3. 
981 Curran and Hollander (n 980) 3.
982 Agyeman (n 974).
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serve the environment and thus create the 
conditions for social justice. 
In this way, the links between a right to 
an environment not harmful to health 
or wellbeing and rights to dignity and 
equality rights, and rights to housing, 
water, sanitation and food come into 
focus – they are interrelated to and 
mutually reinforcing of one another. This 
focus in turn reveals some of the key goals 
of environmental constitutionalism: the 
protection the environment as a necessity 
for the attainment of dignity, so that it is 
not harmful to health or well-being; intra- 
and inter-generational equity in relation 
to the environment; and ecologically 
sustainable development and use of 
natural resources. 
This chapter has argued that these 
goals can be invoked in legal discourse 
so as to lend transformative force to 
environmental constitutionalism. They 
embody normative considerations – 
environmental justice, public trusteeship, 
that facilitate the pursuit of equality and 
dignity in decision-making concerned 
with the environment, and thus enable 
environmentalism meaningfully to 
contribute towards South Africa’s project 
of transformative constitutionalism: 
towards transformative environmental 
constitutionalism.  
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1. Introduction
Climate change and environmental devastation are arguably the biggest threats facing 
humanity in the Anthropocene. This is the result of unsustainable production and 
consumption. Unfortunately, global environmental governance appears unable to control 
or ameliorate these problems – primarily due to the dominance of neoliberal orthodoxies 
and the predominance of “soft” international environmental law. History suggests that 
the deepening ecological and climate crises cannot be resolved through business as 
usual or law as usual. As Naomi Klein cogently argues, the epistemologies of mastery 
that have brought us to this critical juncture cannot provide solutions to the problems 
they have caused.983 Since it is beyond question that endless economic growth is not 
possible on a finite planet, business as usual merely deepens the climate and ecological 
problems that confront us. And since credit, debt, interest and growth are hardwired 
into legal systems, environmental problems cannot be adequately addressed through 
law as usual.984 It follows that sustainable development, which is predicated upon the 
illusion that it is possible to simultaneously achieve economic growth, social justice and 
environmental protection is equally problematic because it is an oxymoron; sustainable 
development should not be confused with genuine sustainability.
2. Sustainable Development
Sustainable development emerged at the 1988 World Conference on Environment 
and Development in the famous Brundtland definition: “Sustainable development is 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
Rethinking Global Environmental Governance
Sam Adelman
983 Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (Allen Lane 2014). Sam Adelman, ‘Epistemologies 
of mastery’ in Anna Grear and Louis Kotzé (eds) Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward 
Elgar 2015).
984 Stephen Turner argues that architecture of international facilitates environmental degradation. Stephen Turner, A 
Global Environmental Right (Routledge 2013).
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future generations to meet their own 
needs”. This called for development to 
be aimed at meeting the human needs 
of current and future generations.985 It 
accepted the existence of limits to growth, 
both insuperable limits such as the 
finitude of resources and the capacity of 
ecosystems, and flexible limits dependent 
upon economic, political and social 
choices. But it ultimately comes down 
in favor of development as economic 
growth, for which the conservation of 
natural resources is a precondition. At a 
stroke, the report promises to reconcile 
the irreconcilable: the simultaneous 
achievement of endless growth, social 
justice and environmental protection – as 
if capitalism were non-existent. 
Gudynas notes that environmental 
warnings emerged as early as 1972 
in Limits to Growth, which questioned 
the possibility of perpetual growth, 
the central element in hegemonic 
development discourse.986  Bosselmann 
notes the unresolved tensions between 
growth and sustainability but appears 
to view this is a misfortune that can be 
corrected rather than a problem intrinsic 
to economic activity. He argues that 
sustainability should be the underpinning 
or Grundnorm of global environmental 
constitutionalism and in favor of a right 
to sustainability. This is because there 
is currently “no global consensus on the 
importance of sustainability similarly 
to constitutionalized values such as 
human rights, democracy, or peace…
Promoting an overarching sustainability 
objective should be at the heart of global 
environmental constitutionalism.”987 
Stephen Gill argues that global 
constitutionalism is a form of disciplinary 
neoliberalism.988 “New constitutionalism 
is the political-juridical counterpart 
to ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’” which 
promotes the power of capital by seeking 
to naturalize and spread market values 
and disciplines into every aspect of 
social life and environmental governance. 
Everything can be priced because nothing 
has value. New global constitutionalism 
“is the political/juridical form specific to 
neoliberal processes of accumulation and 
to market civilization.”989 In the twenty-
first century global constitutionalism is 
underpinned by trade pacts such as the 
Trans-Pacific Trade Pact, which harmonize 
standards at the lowest possible level and 
exclude dispute settlement from national, 
public courts. 
In a process of de facto constitutionalism 
under the aegis of the international 
economic institutions, which are 
985 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press 1987) 34.
986 Donatella H Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens, The Limits to Growth: A Report 
for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Universal Books 1972). Eduardo Gudynas, ‘Debates 
on development and its alternatives in Latin America: a brief heterodox guide’ (2013) in Miriam Lang et al. (eds) 
Beyond Development: Alternative Visions from Latin America (Transnational Institute 2013).
987 Klaus Bosselman, ‘Global Environmental Constitutionalism: Mapping the Terrain’ (2015) Widener Law Review 21179.
988 Stephen Gill, ‘Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations’ (2002) International Studies Review 4(2) 
47.
989 ibid, 48 (emphasis in original).
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undemocratic and unaccountable, 
global constitutionalism promotes 
neoliberal orthodoxies at the expense of 
environmental protection.990 The contrast 
between the hard law of the World Trade 
Organization and the soft law in the 2015 
Paris Agreement is stark. The problem is 
that all legislation and constitutions, no 
matter how progressive, can be subverted 
by the rule of markets. Against law’s 
self-presentation as neutral, impartial 
and objective, law should instead be 
understood as constitutive of market 
civilization in which corporations have 
what Upendra Baxi has termed trade-
related, market-friendly human rights.991 
As Bosselmann acknowledges, “the 
omnipresence of free market ideology 
has certainly undermined efficiency and 
enforceability of environmental rights.”992 
3. Global environmental 
governance
Global environmental governance is 
dysfunctional because it does not prevent 
climate change and environmental 
degradation due to ceaseless 
extractivism and the breaching of 
planetary boundaries.993 Gill argues that 
contemporary global governance reflects 
“an impasse shaped by the degenerative 
structures and processes associated with 
disciplinary neoliberalism, with no clear 
or generalized progressive solution yet in 
sight, and, indeed, with the potential for 
authoritarianism to prevail in the context 
of intensifying global competition for 
resources and food and the emerging 
politics of austerity.” In his view, solutions 
are obstructed by the underlying 
assumption that “material progress can 
continue regardless of ecological and 
environmental constraints.”994 
If, as Kotzé argues, global governance 
is designed to attend to the ecological 
crisis confronting us, “evidence suggests 
that it is failing to solve pervasive global 
environmental problems such as climate 
change, biodiversity loss, and the 
destruction of the biosphere.”995 Amongst 
the problems he identifies are the lack 
of corporate liability, core ecological 
and ethical values, and the absence of 
fundamental, enforceable and universal 
environmental rights.996 Kotzé is one of 
several writers who highlight the difficulty 
of addressing environmental problems in a 
period in which neoliberalism is dominant 
and market solutions are promoted 
despite conclusive evidence that the 
commodification and monetization of the 
environment rarely enhance the protection 
of ecosystems.997 For example, green 
capitalism, heavily promoted by the United 
990 Gill, 2002 48.
991 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2013).
992 177.
993 Will Steffen et al, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet’ (2015) Science 347.
994 Stephen Gill, ‘Organic crisis, global leadership and progressive alternatives’ in Stephen Gill (ed), Global Crises and the 
Crisis of Global Leadership (Cambridge University Press 2012) 237.
995 Louis Kotzé, ‘Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism’ (2012) 1 Transnational Environmental Law 199, 200.
996 Ibid 203.
997 See Sam Adelman, ‘Rio+20: sustainable injustice in a time of crises’ (2013) Journal of Human Rights and the 
Environment 4(1).
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Nations Environment Programme and the 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation Plus (REDD+) 
framework is suffused with terms such 
as natural capital and payment for 
environmental services in language that 
implicitly assumes that nature is an 
endless set of resources existing only 
to satisfy insatiable consumption. As 
Death writes, “The ‘green economy’ is 
the latest repackaging of long-running 
debates, programmes and discourses 
ostensibly seeking to reconcile economic 
growth and capitalist development with 
ecological sustainability.” Whereas 
proponents of the green economy present 
it as an unquestionable good, critics 
view the discourse as “contradictory, 
distracting or politically dangerous, 
legitimating new forms of expropriation 
and accumulation.”998 
Environmental justice cannot be achieved 
without addressing current levels of 
inequality. This in turn is not possible 
without distributive, climate, gender and 
global justice. From one perspective, 
the intertwined climate, ecological and 
economic crises present daunting ethical, 
political and governance problems 
difficult to address simultaneously, but 
from another viewpoint they constitute 
an unprecedented opportunity because 
they cannot be solved separately.999 
Murcott describes how neoliberalism 
has undermined transformative 
constitutionalism in South Africa 
because environmental justice has been 
subordinated to the spurious discourse 
of sustainable development.1000 She 
highlights the difficulties that arise from 
bolting together different concepts in 
ways that militate against a coherent, 
holistic approach to the ecological crisis.
A large part of the problem lies in resolutely 
anthropocentric law. Anthropocentrism 
“has fundamentally informed not only the 
way modern law constructs, categorizes 
and orders nature, but also the manner in 
which law protects nature” primarily for 
the benefit of people and not for the sake of 
the environment itself.1001  Anthropocentric 
law, based upon instrumentalist rationality 
and possessive individualism, turns 
nature into property and subjects it to 
exploitation as of right.1002  The “image 
of nature that emerges … is that of a 
lifeless, inert machine that exists to 
satisfy the needs, desires (and greed) of 
human beings.”1003 New forms of law are 
gradually emerging that seek to address 
998 Carl Death, ‘Four discourses of the green economy in the global South’ (2015) Third World Quarterly 36(12) 2207.
999 “As part of the project of getting our emissions down to the levels many scientists recommend, we once again have 
the chance to advance policies that dramatically improve lives, close the gap between rich and poor, create huge 
numbers of good jobs, and reinvigorate democracy from the ground up.” Klein n 1 10.
1000 Melanie Murcott, ‘The role of environmental justice in socio-economic rights litigation’ (2015) South African Law 
Journal 132(4).
1001 Vito de Lucia, ‘Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem Approach in International 
Environmental Law’ 2015 Journal of Environmental Law (27) 95.
1002 Mariachiara Tallacchini ‘Human Right to the Environment or Rights of Nature?’ in Rex Martin and Gerhard Sprenger 
(eds) Rights: Proceedings of the 17th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and 
Social Philosophy Volume I (Franz Steiner Verlag 1997) 126. 
1003 Peter Burdon ‘The Earth Community and Ecological Jurisprudence’ 2013 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 3(5) 818.
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this problem, primarily by giving rights to 
nature - albeit in a contradictory manner 
that creates a tension between human 
rights and the rights of nature. 
Innovative and imaginative juridical and 
political responses are required to ensure 
that global environmental governance 
protects human rights, as well as those 
of other species and Mother Earth 
(Pachamama) itself. However, as Friends 
of the Earth argue, there are numerous 
barriers to effective governance, including 
“development politics, lack of trust, 
widespread discounting of the future, 
excessive or incoherent fragmentation, 
challenges of scale, the dominance of 
economic interests in multilateral relations, 
and the ambition for a grand plan together 
with ‘bandwagoning’.”1004 Friends of the 
Earth identify two basic approaches. The 
first is the reform of governance institutions 
by addressing their relative weakness in 
relation to economic forces. The second 
involves alternative approaches that view 
environmental problems as “wicked” and 
address broader contextual and structural 
issues.
May and Erin discern four rapidly 
developing concepts in global 
environmental governance: the rights 
of nature, sustainability, public trust, 
and climate change. They maintain that 
constitutionalizing the rights of nature 
is “part of a growing global movement 
highlighting the importance of the natural 
environment for its own sake and as a 
whole, rather than as an aggregation of 
resources to be harnessed by humans for 
various purposes.”1005 They view it as one 
of the most promising forms of governance 
because it addresses the inadequacies 
in Western conceptions of development 
based upon the dominance of nature by 
human beings, the exploitation of private 
property rights, and a false notion of 
sustainability.
4. The Need for Alternative 
Conceptions of Global 
Economic Governance
Kotzé argues that the current global 
environmental governance regime 
requires urgent reform.1006 In The 
Conceptual Contours of Environmental 
Constitutionalism he analyses the ways 
in which constitutional features may 
be “thin,” operating as a framework for 
governance, or “thick” and value-laden, 
and provide the components necessary 
for rights-based constitutionalism.1007 
Environmental constitutionalism exhibits 
both thin and thick features, but is most 
1004 Friends of the Earth, ‘A synthesis of literature regarding the governance of the commons together with the 
identification of interventions to increase the likelihood of sustainable management of the global commons’ 4 </
www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/protecting_the_global_commons.pdf> accessed 1 August 2016.
1005 James May and Erin Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2014) 255. See 
Christopher Stone’s seminal work Should Trees Have Standing: Law, Morality, and the Environment (Oxford University 
Press 2010). On the possibility of a global environmental right, see Stephen Turner, n 2 and his chapter in this 
volume.
1006 Louis Kotzé, ‘Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism’ (2012) Transnational Environmental Law (1)1 200. See 
also Louis Kotzé, Global Environmental Governance: Law and Regulation for the 21st Century (Edward Elgar 2012).
1007 Louis Kotzé, ‘The Conceptual Contours of Environmental Constitutionalism’ (2015) Widener Law Review 21 187.
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effective when it provides a “thick” right 
to a healthy environment. He argues that 
global environmental constitutionalism is 
a means of incorporating its normative 
aspects “into existing domestic and 
global regulatory arrangements that 
seek to mediate the human-environment 
interface.” It embodies a “transformative 
approach that relies on constitutions 
to provide for the architecture of 
environmental governance, whereupon 
it then acts to improve environmental 
protection through various constitutional 
features such as fundamental rights 
and duties, principles of environmental 
governance, the rule of law and endearing 
aspirational values.” Edenhofer et al. view 
the problem of global climate policy as the 
transformation of the governance of the 
atmosphere from an open-access into a 
global commons regime.1008 
Earth jurisprudence and wild law are 
emergent legal theories that seek to 
redefine the legal relationship between 
human and non-human entities and 
to develop biocentric law capable of 
protecting the integrity and health 
of ecosystems. The goal of Earth 
jurisprudence is a “non-anthropocentric” 
earth justice in which the rights of nature 
are given equal, if not more, weight than 
human rights. It is predicated upon the 
view that human beings have an ethical 
responsibility as stewards to prevent 
activities which harm the planet and the 
idea that there is an intimate connection in 
nature between all animate and inanimate 
entities that determines physical laws 
and therefore underpins positive laws as 
well. Earth jurisprudence seeks to realign 
human governance systems by developing 
coherent new theories or philosophies. In 
Cullinan’s view, this follows from the fact 
that people are an integral part of the Earth 
system, and this existential unity means 
that we are embedded in and influenced 
by the larger Earth community. The way 
we govern ourselves must therefore of 
necessity have as its “purpose to ensure 
that the pursuit of human well-being does 
not undermine the integrity of the Earth, 
which is the source of our well-being” Only 
by creating a jurisprudence that reflects 
this reality, he argues, “will we be able to 
begin a comprehensive transformation of 
our societies and legal systems.” To this 
end, it is necessary to establish “wild” 
laws that foster rather than stifle creativity 
and the human connection to nature.1009 
The most well-known alternative to 
Western forms of global environmental 
governance has emerged from Latin 
America. “Buen Vivir” - living well - is based 
upon Andean cosmovisions that provide 
an alternative conception of development. 
It eschews anthropocentrism, the society/
nature dualism, and ideas of linear progress 
central to Western epistemologies, and 
1008 Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Flachsland, Michael Jakob, and Kai Lessmann, ‘The Atmosphere as a Global Commons 
– Challenges for International Cooperation and Governance’ Discussion Paper 2013-58 (Harvard Project on Climate 
Agreements, August 2013).
1009 Cormac Cullinan, ‘A History of Wild Law’ in Peter Burdon (ed) Exploring Wild Law: The Philosophy of Earth 
Jurisprudence (Wakefield Press 2011) 170-171. On the essential wildness of nature and the environment, see Steven 
Vogel, Thinking Like a Mall: Environmental Philosophy After the End of Nature (MIT Press 2015).
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focuses instead on the well-being of people 
and nature through co-dependency. It 
privileges traditional forms of knowledge 
without being limited to them, and 
draws on progressive thought that is 
critical of modernity such as biocentric 
environmentalism and ecofeminism. 
“Buen Vivir is a set of attempts to build 
other social and economic orders that 
break free of the bounds imposed by 
Modernity.”1010 The aim of buen vivir is to 
move beyond the antagonistic relationship 
between human beings and nature in 
which the former seek to subordinate the 
latter without any regard for its intrinsic 
value for the purposes of capitalist 
consumption and extractive development.
An ecocentric conception of global 
environmental governance is outlined in the 
People’s Agreement of Cochabamba, which 
calls for a paradigm shift leading to Mother 
Earth (Pachamama) being recognized 
as the source of life for a new system of 
global environmental governance based 
inter alia on the principles of harmony 
and balance among all and with all things; 
complementarity, solidarity, and equality; 
people in harmony with nature; and the 
recognition of human beings for what they 
are, not what they own.1011 The Preamble 
reads:
We confront the terminal crisis of a 
civilizing model that is patriarchal 
and based on the submission and 
destruction of human beings and 
nature that accelerated since the 
industrial revolution.
The capitalist system has imposed 
on us a logic of competition, progress 
and limitless growth. This regime of 
production and consumption seeks 
profit without limits, separating 
human beings from nature and 
imposing a logic of domination upon 
nature, transforming everything 
into commodities: water, earth, the 
human genome, ancestral cultures, 
biodiversity, justice, ethics, the rights 
of peoples, and life itself.1012
Under capitalism, Mother Earth is 
converted into a source of raw materials, 
and human beings into consumers and a 
means of production, into people that are 
seen as valuable only for what they own, 
and not for what they are. 
Several constitutions, including those 
of Germany and Lithuania, contain 
provisions protecting nature but do not 
confer rights on it. In contrast, biocentric 
environmental constitutionalism that 
recognizes the rights of nature has 
emerged in Latin America. Bolivia has a 
1010 Gudynas n 4 35.
1011 People’s Agreement of Cochabamba, World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, 
22 April, Cochabamba, Bolivia.
1012 Bodansky points out that multilateral environmental agreements do not possess a global constitutional nature and 
that the distinctive features of international environmental law “do not amount to a constitution in any meaningful 
sense of the term.” Daniel Bodansky, ‘Is there an International Environmental Constitution?’ (2009) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 16 579.
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framework law recognizing the rights of 
nature and Ecuador’s constitution states: 
“Nature, or Pachamama, where life is 
reproduced and created, has the right 
to integral respect for her existence, her 
maintenance, and for the regeneration of 
her vital cycles, structure, functions, and 
evolutionary processes.”1013 In a chapter 
devoted exclusively to the rights of nature, 
the constitution grants public authority 
to each “person, community, people, or 
nationality” to exercise public authority to 
enforce the right.1014  Wheeler c. Director de 
la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja 
was the first case anywhere to vindicate 
the Rights of Nature. The suit was filed 
in 2011 for permitting a road expansion 
project that narrowed the width of the 
Rio Vilcabamba and doubled its speed 
due to the dumping of debris. The project 
went ahead without an environmental 
impact assessment or the consent of 
the local community. Two local residents 
claimed that the rights of the river had 
been violated rather than conventional 
property rights. In setting an important 
precedent, the court confirmed that the 
burden of proof lay on the defendant to 
prove that no damage had been caused to 
nature and held that “the rights of nature 
trump other constitutional rights because 
in its view a ‘healthy’ environment is more 
important, and more pervasive, than any 
other constitutional right” (para. 5).
Unlike in Bolivia, where it functions more 
as an ethical principle, Buen Vivir was 
incorporated into the new Constitution 
of Ecuador in 2008 as a set of rights to 
health, shelter, education, and food as well 
as the innovative inclusion of the rights 
of Nature “that should be fulfilled in an 
intercultural framework, respecting their 
diversity, and in a harmonious coexistence 
with Nature.”1015 
The Bolivian formulation offers more 
options for cultural diversity than the 
Ecuadorian, but does not include Buen 
Vivir as a right. The Ecuadorian text clearly 
stated that development in line with Buen 
Vivir is required to fulfil the rights of Nature 
or Pachamama (with a biocentric posture 
that recognizes intrinsic values in the 
environment). The Bolivian text does not 
recognize intrinsic values in Nature, and the 
environment is presented within the classical 
third generation human rights (quality of life 
and protection of the environment).1016 
The Preamble of the Constitution refers 
to a “new form of social coexistence 
that respects diversity and is in harmony 
with nature in order to attain good living, 
the sumak kawsay.” Nature becomes 
a legal subject rather than an object of 
exploitation. Article 71 states that nature or 
“Pachamama, where life is reproduced and 
occurs, has the right to integral respect for 
its existence and for the maintenance and 
regeneration of its life cycles, structure, 
1013 Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador, title II, ch. 7, arts. 71-74.
1014 Article 71. On Ecuadorian case law arising from chapter 7 of the constitution, see May and Daly n 22 257-260.
1015 Gudynas, E. ‘Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow’ (2011) Development 54(4) 443.
1016 ibid.
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functions and evolutionary processes”. 
Article 72 asserts that “nature has the 
right to restoration” and article 83 states 
that Ecuadorians have a constitutional 
obligation to respect the rights of nature.
Attempting to use the rights of nature has 
inevitably proved to be contradictory due to 
the tension between economic growth and 
environmental protection at the centre of 
all conceptions of development. Manzano 
argues that, far from a paradigm shift away 
from Western-style developmentalism, 
environmental governance has not been 
strengthened, and equating the “rights of 
nature” with the “rights of man” invariably 
results in the subordination of the former 
to economic rights. He illustrates this claim 
by analyzing numerous cases through 
which, he argues; the judiciary has provided 
a veneer of environmental protection 
while protecting people rather than 
ecosystems.1017 As Manzano observes:
Ecuador cannot escape from taking 
part in the process of capitalist 
accumulation, because it requires 
foreign investment and foreign 
consumption of its raw materials 
to provide economic opportunity 
for Ecuadorans. In this way the 
Constitution reinforces extractive 
development and economic 
dependence.1018 
Manzano argues that enshrining the rights 
of nature in the constitution is misguided 
because it threatens to disconnect 
human beings from their responsibility of 
stewardship towards the nation. Instead, 
he argues, we should limit human rights 
according to the availability and vulnerability 
of natural resources. He concludes that the 
rights-based approach in the Ecuadorian 
Constitution has failed, and that:
the paradigm of care, responsibility 
and stewardship demands something 
more than placing nature’s rights on 
a par with the multitude of human 
rights. In fact, if respect for nature 
is to limit human behavior, then 
a holistic transformation of the 
perspective on the place of human 
beings within nature must take place 
so that the goals of humanity cease 
to be absolute and all other things 
are no longer regarded as existing 
solely to meet human needs.1019 
Iorns Magallanes believes that protecting 
indigenous rights, both constitutionally 
and in other ways, is a precondition for 
protecting the environment, and that 
upholding indigenous rights is a way of 
protecting the human rights of everyone 
as well as the environment.1020 She 
shows that it is possible for Western legal 
systems to confer and protect the rights of 
1017 Jordi Jaria I Manzano, ‘The rights of nature in Ecuador: an opportunity to reflect on society, law and environment’ in 
Robert V. Percival, Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds) Global Environmental Law at a Crossroads (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2014).
1018 Manzano n 35 54.
1019 Manzano n 35 61-62.
1020 Catherin Iorns Magallanes, ‘Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: Protecting the Cosmology that Protects 
the Environment’ (2015) Widener Law Review 21.
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nature through innovative and imaginative 
approaches that incorporate the onto-
epistemologies of indigenous peoples. 
She highlights the differences between 
anthropocentric Western thinking, which 
emphasizes the separation of human 
beings and nature, endless growth, 
consumption, possessive individualism 
and progress, and indigenous Maori 
cosmology, which views people as 
an interdependent part of nature. She 
describes how a kind of constitutional 
cosmology has informed New Zealand 
legislation about natural resources 
affecting Maori in special arrangements 
that have “recognized in law the Maori 
view that the natural environment should 
be treated more as a person - indeed, as a 
relative - rather than simply as a resource.” 
She argues that these “illustrate ways in 
which the law can be used to implement 
and incorporate indigenous cosmologies 
with a Western society and legal system 
and better protect the natural environment 
in the process,” resulting in a healthier 
environment for everyone. She believes 
that courts in New Zealand have shown 
just how constitutionalism can promote 
environmental norms and protection by 
advancing indigenous rights.1021 These 
legal changes have occurred to protect 
human rights rather than the environment 
(but for the Maori these are inextricably 
linked) and “do not fit squarely within 
the standard environmental protection 
paradigm, whereby nature is protected 
apart from people.” Instead, they reflect 
“the indigenous cosmological view of 
people as part of nature, not separate 
nor above it. Indeed, the legal recognition 
of personality in these examples also 
recognizes the Maori cosmology of 
ancestral nature and the indivisibility of 
the physical and metaphysical elements 
of the natural world.”
Weston and Bollier also propose 
an alternative conception of global 
environmental governance. They argue 
that effective and just environmental 
protection can be achieved through 
commons- and rights-based ecological 
governance, which they call green 
governance.1022 Human rights and the 
rights of nature are, they argue, implicit 
in ecological commons governance. The 
centerpiece of their green governance is the 
rigorous application of a reconceptualized 
human right to a clean and healthy 
environment (or a right to environment) 
designed to promote environmental well-
being while meeting the basic needs of 
all people. Like Bosselmann, they call 
for a shift from anthropocentrism to 
biocentrism, for an end to self-defeating 
and counterproductive growth fetishism, 
and a move away from the neoliberal 
alliance between State and Market 
(‘State/Market’) primarily responsible for 
the current, failed paradigm of ecological 
1021 Iorns Magallanes uses the examples of the judicial recognition of agreements that recognise the legal personalities 
of the Whanganui River and Te Urewera forest: “A fundamental — though perhaps less obvious — aspect underlying 
these examples is the importance placed on the intrinsic value of nature itself.”
1022 Burns H. Weston and David Bollier, Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the Law of the 
Commons (Cambridge University Press 2013). They cite the work of Elinor Ostrom, who identified principles of 
effective commons governance at 147ff.
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governance. This will occur through the 
emergence of Vernacular Law in the form 
of organic rule, norms and sanctions. This 
is an approach that could productively be 
extended to all ecosystems. One example 
is Weston and Bollier’s argument that 
commons offer an alternative form of 
environmental governance favorable 
to both human rights and the rights of 
nature if both State and Vernacular law 
and practice are remodeled to mutually 
reinforce each other.1023 They propose a 
Universal Covenant Affirming a Human 
Right to Commons- and Rights-based 
Governance of Earth’s Natural Wealth and 
Resources.
Another possibility is a dedicated treaty 
on sustainability and the rights of nature, 
although the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights and the Environment, John 
Knox, opposes it at this stage because 
although “a declaration could certainly 
have the benefits its proponents describe, 
it would also become a central point of 
attention for the period of its negotiation, 
which might distract from the continuing 
development of the norms at the national, 
regional and international levels … [a]t this 
point in their evolution, some issues might 
better be resolved through their continued 
consideration by a variety of human 
rights bodies, rather than be addressed 
in an intergovernmental negotiation.”1024 
Knox argues that it is preferable that 
states should continue constitutionalizing 
the right to a healthy environment or 
at least “strong environmental laws 
ensuring, among other things, rights to 
information, participation and remedy” 
and establishing dedicated environmental 
courts. The implementation of the 
Sustainable Development Goals is “highly 
important to the promotion of human 
rights and environmental protection.”1026 
The problem with this approach is twofold. 
First, despite the fact that environmental 
rights are protected in more than 165 of 
the 193 states in the UN through articles 
promoting environmental stewardship, 
the right to a safe or clean and healthy 
environment or by ensuring some level 
of public participation in environmental 
decision making, environmental 
degradation and ecosystem destruction 
continues unabated.1027  
Environmental rights and values are more 
widespread than the protections they 
envisage. Second, such a right is not the 
best way of dealing with environmental 
pollution from greenhouse gases and is 
therefore inappropriate as a means of 
dealing with climate change.
These alternative conceptions of global 
environmental governance, which are 
gaining strength in Latin America, New 
1023 Weston and Bollier n 40 179.
1024 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, (A/HRC/31/53, 28 December 2015) 4.
1025 Ibid. 12.
1026 Ibid. 13.
1027 James R May, ‘Introduction: Symposium on Global Environmental Constitutionalism: An Introduction and Overview 
Widener Law Review Symposium Issue 2015’ (2015) Widener Law Review 21 139.
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Zealand and elsewhere, demonstrate 
that it is possible to use environmental 
law to protect ecosystems. However, this 
is possible only if the law is matched by 
sufficient political will to subordinate 
economic imperatives to the needs of 
nature in pursuit of genuine sustainability 
rather than sustainable development, 
which merely fosters the illusion of 
endless growth on a finite planet.
Bosselman correctly argues that global 
environmental constitutionalism has 
a coherence lacking in international 
environmental law but accepts that it 
is not yet clear whether it is capable of 
protecting the environment and human 
rights. International comparison shows 
that:
the process of “greening” of national 
constitutions and international 
law is slow, incomplete, sketchy, 
and not following an overarching 
objective. There is, as of now, no 
global consensus on the importance 
of sustainability similarly to 
constitutionalized values such as 
human rights, democracy, or peace. 
Likewise, policy objectives tend to 
focus on economic prosperity and 
largely ignore its dependence on 
sustainability.1028 
Facing planetary environmental 
and climate crises, effective global 
environmental governance is urgent but 
some way off and time is fast running 
out. It is far from hyperbolic to argue that 
humanity’s future depends on our ability 
to govern the environment effectively in 
the interests of all species and the planet 
itself.
1028 Bosselman n 5 179.
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1. Introduction
At first blush, the relationship between sustainability and environmental constitutionalism 
seems strained if not strange. Environmental sustainability represents a there-and-then 
perspective that promotes the idea that present lives in being should consume natural 
resources at a rate and in a way so as to preserve comparable opportunities for future 
generations; in other words, the Native American proverb that “We do not inherit the 
Earth from our ancestors: we borrow it from our children.”1029 
‘Sustainability’1030  has witnessed an astonishing pattern of development. Since the 
concept was first promoted as a single-sentence principle of international law at the 
Stockholm Conference in 1972, it is now a common if not ubiquitous feature in legal 
expressions at the international, national and subnational levels, culminating in 17 
Sustainable Development Goals the United Nations (UN) established in 2015, to achieve 
by 2030.1031  
Sustainability is a central feature in international and domestic relations. It has long served 
as a principle of international environmental law, including as an interpretive principle 
in international accords1032 and with international tribunals resolving environmental 
disputes.1033 
Sustainability and Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism
James R. May
1029 This proverb, along with some close variants, is attributed to several sources, including Chief Seattle, Antoine de St. 
Exupery, Jane Goodall, Ralph Waldo Emerson and David Bower, among others. See Giga Quotes. Earth. <http://www.
giga-usa.com/quotes/topics/earth_t001.htm.>  
1030 This essay treats ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ as synonyms.
1031 See generally, May, James R. & Kelly, J. Patrick, The Environment and International Society: Issues, Concepts, and 
Context, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Shawkat Alam, Jahid Hossain 
Bhuiyan, Tareq M.R. Chowdhury and Erika J. Techera, Eds, Oxford, 2012).
1032 See, e.g., R.K.L. Panjabi. The Earth Summit at Rio: Politics, Economics, and the Environment. New England: 
Northeastern Univ. Press, 1997, 17  (describing how the Earth Summit in Rio led to a new global consciousness of 
sustainability in treaty making).
1033 See Roslyn Higgins, Natural Resources in the Case Law of the International Court, in International Law and 
Sustainable Development 87, 111 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone, eds., 1999) (using the International Court of Justice 
to highlight environmental sustainability in international courts and other arenas).
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Environmental constitutionalism, on the 
other hand, for the most part, addresses 
the here and now, the challenges that 
human beings and the environment face 
on a daily basis, including access to 
environmental dignity and quality, natural 
resources, fresh water, and to information, 
participation and justice in pressing 
environmental matters, in the ways 
explored elsewhere1034 and throughout 
this book.1035  
Much like sustainability, environmental 
constitutionalism has taken on a life of 
its own, and is now a common feature 
in most national constitutional systems. 
The vast majority of the nations in the 
world have national constitutions that 
address environmental matters.1036 About 
one-half of the world’s constitutions 
guarantee a substantive right to a 
clean or quality or healthy environment 
explicitly or implicitly, and about half of 
those also guarantee procedural rights 
to information, participation or access to 
justice in environmental matters.  Nearly 
70 constitutions specify that individuals 
have responsibilities or duties to protect 
the environment and others include 
directive principles of state policy.1037 
Other constitutions address specific 
environmental endowments including 
water, flora, and fauna, while others define 
the environment in certain ways, including 
as a public trust.1038 Moreover, some 
state constitutions in federal systems 
– including Germany, Brazil, and the 
United States – include environmental 
1034 See generally, James R. May & Erin Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge Press 2015); James 
R. May & Erin Daly, Environmental Constitutionalism: A Research Compendium (Edward Elgar 2016); Symposium 
on Global Environmental Constitutionalism: An Introduction and Overview, 21 Widener L. Rev. 139 (2015); Kotze, 
Louis J. The Conceptual Contours of Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 Widener L. Rev. 187 (2015); James R. 
May & Erin Daly, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania: A Model for Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 Widener L. 
Rev. 151 (2015); Erin Daly & James R. May, Comparative Environmental Constitutionalism, Jindal Global Law Review 
(Special issue on Environmental Law and Governance – Indian and International Perspectives) (2015); Constitutional 
Directions in Procedural Environmental Rights, 28 Jrnl. Envtl. L. & Lit. 101 (2014); James R. May & Erin Daly, 
Environmental Rights and Liabilities, 3 Eur. J. Env. Lia. 75 (2012); James R. May & Erin Daly, New Directions in Earth 
Rights, Environmental Rights and Human Rights: Six Facets of Constitutionally Embedded Environmental Rights 
Worldwide, IUCN Academy of Environmental Law  E-Journal, vol. 1, 2011, posted Feb. 22, 2011. See also, Boyd, David 
R. The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution. UBC Press, 2012: 65.  See also Hiskes, 
Richard P. The Human Right to a Green Future: Environmental Rights and Intergenerational Justice. Cambridge 
University Press 2008; Hayward, Tim. Constitutional Environmental Rights. Oxford University Press, 2005.
1035 See generally, Global Environmental Constitutionalism. 
1036 See generally, James R. May & Erin Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge Press 2015); James 
R. May & Erin Daly, Environmental Constitutionalism: A Research Compendium (Edward Elgar 2016); Symposium 
on Global Environmental Constitutionalism: An Introduction and Overview, 21 Widener L. Rev. 139 (2015); James R. 
May & Erin Daly, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania: A Model for Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 Widener L. 
Rev. 151 (2015); Erin Daly & James R. May, Comparative Environmental Constitutionalism, Jindal Global Law Review 
(Special issue on Environmental Law and Governance – Indian and International Perspectives) (2015); Constitutional 
Directions in Procedural Environmental Rights, 28 Jrnl. Envtl. L. & Lit. 101 (2014); James R. May & Erin Daly, 
Environmental Rights and Liabilities, 3 Eur. J. Env. Lia. 75 (2012); James R. May & Erin Daly, New Directions in Earth 
Rights, Environmental Rights and Human Rights: Six Facets of Constitutionally Embedded Environmental Rights 
Worldwide, IUCN Academy of Environmental Law  E-Journal, vol. 1, 2011, posted Feb. 22, 2011. See also, Boyd, David 
R. The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution. UBC Press, 2012: 65.  See also Hiskes, 
Richard P. The Human Right to a Green Future: Environmental Rights and Intergenerational Justice. Cambridge 
University Press 2008; Hayward, Tim. Constitutional Environmental Rights. Oxford University Press, 2005.
1037 See e.g. Benin Constitution Art 27: “Every person has the right to a healthy, satisfying, and lasting environment, 
and has the duty to defend it.” Cameroon Constitution, Art. 55: “Everyone is obliged to preserve nature and prevent 
damages, as well as to be careful with removing natural riches.” India Constitution, Art. 51A(g): “It shall be the duty 
of every citizen of India … to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, 
and to have compassion for living creatures.” 
1038 Global Environmental Constitutionalism, Chs. 7-10.
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provisions, some of which are even more 
elaborate than their counterparts at the 
national level.1039 
Sustainability and environmental 
constitutionalism share a past, present and 
future. Like sustainability, environmental 
constitutionalism was arguably born 
at the Stockholm Conference in 1972, 
and has experienced a comparable 
if not divergent growth pattern.1040 
Surprisingly, sustainability has infiltrated 
constitutionalism around the globe. 
Presently, more than three-dozen 
countries incorporate sustainability in their 
constitutions by advancing ‘sustainable 
development,’ the interests of ‘future 
generations,’ or some combination of these 
themes.1041 These include Belgium (“pursue 
the objectives of sustainable development 
in its social, economic and environmental 
aspects”); Dominican Republic 
(“nonrenewable natural resources, can only 
be explored and exploited by individuals, 
under sustainable environmental criteria 
. . .” and provides for the protection of the 
environment “for the benefit of the present 
and future generations …”); France (“Care 
must be taken to safeguard the environment 
along with other fundamental interests of 
the Nation. In order to ensure sustainable 
development, choices designed to meet the 
needs of the present generation should not 
jeopardize the ability of future generations 
and other peoples to meet their own needs 
…”); Nepal (“provision shall be made for 
the protection of the forest, vegetation and 
biodiversity, its sustainable use and for 
equitable distribution of the benefit derived 
from it”); and, Uganda (“Parliament shall, 
by law, provide for measures intended—to 
manage the environment for sustainable 
development”). These constitutional 
provisions help bridge the gap left by 
international and domestic laws, even 
given the array of sustainability provisions 
already in existence.1042 
Sustainability and environmental 
constitutionalism also share a future 
in advancing environmental, social 
and economic equity in a variety of 
contexts, including dignity,1043 human 
rights,1044 climate change, access to and 
1039 ibid, Ch. 8.
1040 ibid.
1041 See May and Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge, 2015), Appendix E and associated text May, 
James R. and Daly, Erin, Global Environmental Constitutionalism (2015, Cambridge) (denoting role of sustainability in 
the development of international and national law, and analyzing constitutional provisions that embed sustainability 
from around the world); May, James R. ‘The North American Symposium on the Judiciary and Environmental Law: 
Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide.” Pace Environmental Law Review 23 (2005/2006): 113, 
Appendix B (listing countries that have constitutionally entrenched environmental policies as a governing principles, 
some including sustainability).
1042 Ansari, Lekha Laxman and Abdul Haseeb. “The interface between TRIPS and CBD: efforts towards harmonization.”  
Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 11 (2012): 108-132.
1043 Daly & May, Bridging Environmental and Dignity Rights, 7.2 JHRE 160 (2016).
1044 See Knox J, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a 
safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, A/HRC/28/61 (3 February 2015) at 11-12.
1045 May, James R. “Of Development, daVinci and Domestic Legislation: The Prospects for Sustainable Development in 
Asia and its Untapped Potential in the United States.” Widener Law Symposium Journal 3 (1998): 197
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availability of fresh water,1045 shale gas 
development,1046 corporate practices, and 
higher education.1047  
This chapter examines the extent to which 
countries have incorporated sustainability 
constitutionally. Part One provides 
a brief taxonomy of sustainability in 
constitutionalism, and surveys provisions 
from the three-dozen or so countries that 
constitutionally incorporate sustainability 
and related concepts. Part Two discusses 
the potential that sustainability in 
constitutionalism has for advancing 
positive environmental outcomes.
2. The Taxonomy 
of Sustainability 
Constitutionalism
The concept of sustainability recently 
entered its fifth decade. In 1972, the 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment was the first international 
instrument to recognize a principle of 
sustainability.1048 Fifteen years later, the 
World Commission on Environment and 
Development released its pioneering 
study, Our Common Future,1049 which 
defines ‘sustainable development’ as 
‘development . . . that . . . meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.’1050 
In 1992, the Earth Summit’s Rio 
Declaration provided that sustainable 
development must ‘respect the interests 
of all and protect the integrity of the 
global environmental and developmental 
system.’1051 The Rio Declaration’s 
blueprint document, Agenda 21, provides 
that “integration of environment and 
development concerns . . . will lead to the 
fulfilment of basic needs, improved living 
standards for all, better protected and 
managed ecosystems and a safer, more 
prosperous future.”1052  Parties at the Earth 
Summit’s 20th anniversary in 2012 (Rio 
+20) released a follow-up document, The 
Future We Want, which underscored the 
import of sustainability to promote peace 
and prosperity, and alleviate poverty.1053 
Most recently in September 2015, more 
than 190 nations of the UN General 
Assembly issued the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, which 
describes sustainability’s role as one to 
“Promote peaceful and inclusive societies 
for sustainable development, provide 
1046 Dernbach, John C., and May, James R., Shale Gas and the Future of Energy: Law and Policy for Sustainability (2016, 
Edward Elgar) (suggesting laws and policies needed to ensure that shale gas development fosters transition to 
sustainability). Available at http://www.e-elgar.com/shop/shale-gas-and-the-future-of-energy.
1047 Dernbach
1048 “Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.” 11 ILM 1416. 1972.
1049 World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987.
1050 ibid at para. 8.
1051 “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.” 31 ILM 874. 1992.
1052 UN Conference on Environment and Development, Annex II. “Agenda 21: A Programme for Action for Sustainable 
Development.” UN Doc A./Conf. 151/26. August 12, 1992. (‘Agenda 21’).
1053 UN Conference on Sustainable Development. ‘The Future We Want, A/CONF.216/L.1*.’ June 20-22, 2012.
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access to justice for all and build effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions at 
all levels.”1054 Effective January 1, 2016, 
the 2030 Agenda incorporates the UN’s 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
including reflecting human dignity; 
adapting to climate change; ensuring 
clean water, air and soil; reducing poverty; 
promoting gender equity; and respecting 
sovereignty, among other ambitious 
objectives, by 2030.1055  
Resort to sustainability as a governing 
norm has grown exponentially since the 
Earth Summit.1056  Since then, sustainability 
has been regularly acknowledged by 
international accords,1057 by the laws and 
regulations of nations,1058 in local building 
codes,1059 and in corporate mission 
statements and practices worldwide,1060 
as well as by some courts,1061  although 
not in the United States.1062 
Sustainability has also found footing in a 
growing number of national constitutions, 
either by advancing ‘sustainable 
development,’ ‘future generations,’ or 
some variation of these themes, outlined 
below.
A. ‘Sustainable Development’
Nearly 20 countries expressly recognize 
a constitutional goal of ‘sustainability’ or 
‘sustainable development’, though most of 
these are in sections of the constitutions 
or written in language that indicates 
that they are not amenable to judicial 
enforcement.1063  For example, Albania’s 
constitution proclaims that the state 
“aims to supplement private initiative and 
responsibility with: Rational exploitation of 
forests, waters, pastures and other natural 
resources on the basis of the principle 
of sustainable development.” Belgium’s 
1054 See generally, <www.ceres.org> (detailing corporate sustainability practices worldwide).
1055 See <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics> (last visited September 6, 2016).
1056 Dernbach, John C.  Agenda for a Sustainable America.  Washington, D.C: ELI Press, Environmental Law Institute, 
2009, 2-3.
1057 See, e.g., R.K.L. Panjabi. The Earth Summit at Rio: Politics, Economics, and the Environment. New England: 
Northeastern Univ. Press, 1997, 17  (describing how the Earth Summit in Rio led to a new global consciousness of 
sustainability in treaty making).
1058 See, e.g., Nelson, Antria. ‘Steering Sustainability: What, When, and Why’, in A. Nelson (ed.) Steering Sustainability in 
an Urbanizing World: Policy Practice and Performance. Ashgate Publishing Inc., 2007, 1, 2-3 (explaining the national 
policy and reform considerations behind urban sustainability); May, James R. ‘The North American Symposium 
on the Judiciary and Environmental Law: Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide.” Pace 
Environmental Law Review 23 (2005/2006): 113, Appendix B (listing countries that have constitutionally entrenched 
environmental policies as a governing principles, some including sustainability).
1059 See, e.g., MacLaren, V. et al. “Engaging Local Communities in Environmental Protection with Competitiveness: 
Community Advisory Panels in Canada and the United States.” In Sustainability, Civil Society and International 
Governance, by J.J. Kirton and Peter Hajnal. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006, 31, 36. (examining examples of 
Community Advisory Panels in the United States and Canada and how they affect sustainability in the communities).
1060 See, e.g., Biagiotti, Isabelle. “Emerging Corporate Actors in Environment and Trade Governance: New Vision and 
Challenge for Norm-setting Processes.” In Participation for Sustainability in Trade, by S. Thoyer and B. Martimort-
Asso. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007, 121, 122 (describing how global corporations are focusing more on 
environmental sustainability).
1061 Higgins, Rosalyn. “Natural Resources in the Case Law of the International Court.” In International Law and 
Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, by Alan Boyle and David Freestone. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 87, 111 (using the International Court of Justice to highlight environmental 
sustainability in international courts and other arenas).
1062 May, James R. “Not at All: Environmental Sustainability in the Supreme Court.” Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 10 (2009): 
20.
1063 See Global Environmental Constitutionalism, Ch. 9, Appendix E.
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constitution bespeaks a commitment 
to “pursue the objectives of sustainable 
development in its social, economic 
and environmental aspects.” Bolivia’s 
constitution states that “the Natural 
assets are of public importance and of 
strategic character for the sustainable 
development of the country.” Colombia’s 
constitution requires policy makers to 
“plan the handling and use of natural 
resources in order to guarantee their 
sustainable development…” Montenegro’s 
Preamble outlines its “conviction that the 
state is responsible for the preservation of 
nature, sound environment, sustainable 
development, [and] balanced development 
of all its region.” Nepal’s constitution 
provides that “provision shall be made 
for the protection of the forest, vegetation 
and biodiversity, its sustainable use and 
for equitable distribution of the benefit 
derived from it.” The constitution of 
Seychelles provides that the state will 
“ensure a sustainable socio-economic 
development of Seychelles by a judicious 
use and management of the resources 
of Seychelles.” Somalia’s constitution 
provides that “Land shall be held, used 
and managed in an equitable, efficient, 
productive, and sustainable manner.” 
Switzerland’s constitution contains a 
specific section entitled “Sustainable 
Development,” which provides that 
“The Confederation and the Cantons 
shall endeavor to achieve a balanced 
and sustainable relationship between 
nature and its capacity to renew itself 
and the demands placed on it by the 
population.” The Ugandan constitution 
states that “Parliament shall, by law, 
provide for measures intended—to 
manage the environment for sustainable 
development.” The constitutions of Greece, 
Mozambique, Poland, Serbia, and Thailand 
also expressly require that environmental 
policy be developed in accordance with 
‘sustainable development.’
B. ‘Future Generations’
Sustainability recognizes responsibilities 
owed to those who follow. The constitutions 
from about a dozen countries give at least 
a passing nod to ‘future generations.’1064 
For example, Andorra’s constitution 
directs policy makers to protect natural 
resources “for the sake of future 
generations.” Argentina’s constitution 
directs the state to manage resources 
for “a healthy and balanced environment 
fit for human development in order that 
productive activities shall meet present 
needs without endangering those of future 
generations…” Armenia’s constitution 
requires that the state “pursue the 
environmental security policy for present 
and future generations.” Brazil’s declares 
that “The Government and the community 
have a duty to defend and to preserve 
the environment for present and future 
generations.” Ethiopia’s constitution 
provides that its natural resources are 
“a sacred trust for the benefit of present 
and succeeding generations.” Papua 
New Guinea’s constitution requires the 
state to hold environmental resources 
1064 See Global Environmental Constitutionalism, Ch. 9, Appendix E.
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“in trust for future generations” and “for 
the benefit of future generations.” The 
constitutions of both Niger and Vanuatu 
provide for protection of the environment 
in the “interests of future generations.” 
Germany’s constitution expresses “its 
responsibility toward future generations.” 
Norway’s constitution directs that natural 
resources be “safeguarded for future 
generations.” The constitution of Iran 
provides for the “preservation of the 
environment, in which the present as well 
as the future generations have a right to 
flourishing social existence.” Lesotho’s 
lists a duty of the state to protect the 
environment “for the benefit of both 
present and future generations.”
C. ‘Sustainable Development’ 
and ‘Future Generations’
The strongest embodiment of 
environmental sustainability would seem 
to stem from those constitutions that 
promote sustainable development for the 
purpose of protecting the interests of future 
generations. The constitutions from about 
a dozen and one-half countries contain 
this sort of hybrid pronouncement.1065 For 
example, Albania’s constitution bespeaks 
a “healthy and ecologically adequate 
environment for the present and future 
generations.” Mozambique’s requires 
the state, “[w]ith a view to guaranteeing 
the right to the environment within the 
framework of sustainable development…
shall adopt policies aimed at guaranteeing 
the rational utilization of natural resources 
and the safeguarding of their capacity to 
regenerate, ecological stability and the 
rights of future generations.” France’s 
amended constitution proclaims that 
“Care must be taken to safeguard the 
environment along with other fundamental 
interests of the Nation…In order to ensure 
sustainable development, choices 
designed to meet the needs of the present 
generation should not jeopardize the ability 
of future generations and other peoples to 
meet their own needs…“ Eritrea’s provides 
for state management of natural resources 
in a “sustainable manner” for “present and 
future generations.” The constitutions of 
Namibia and Swaziland provide for the 
protection of the environment and natural 
resources “on a sustainable basis” for the 
benefit of “present and future” citizens 
and generations. Qatar’s provides for 
protection of the environment “so as to 
achieve sustainable development for the 
generations to come.” The constitution 
of South Sudan provides that “Every 
person shall have the right to have the 
environment protected for the benefit of 
present and future generations, through 
appropriate legislative action and other 
measures that…secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of 
natural resources…” Uganda’s provides 
that “The State shall promote sustainable 
development and public awareness of 
the need to manage land, air and water 
resources in a balanced and sustainable 
manner for the present and future 
generations.” In addition, the constitutions 
of Angola, Bhutan, Georgia, Guyana, 
1065 ibid.
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Malawi, Maldives, Sweden, East Timor, 
and Zambia provide for the “sustainable 
development” of environmental resources 
in the interests of “future generations.” 
One might also include South Africa’s 
here. 
The constitutions of some countries 
require that specific resources be 
developed with future generations in mind. 
For example, the Dominican Republic 
provides that “nonrenewable natural 
resources, can only be explored and 
exploited by individuals, under sustainable 
environmental criteria…” and provides 
for the protection of the environment 
“for the benefit of the present and future 
generations.” The Dominican Republic 
is the only country on the planet with a 
constitution to address sustainability, 
future generations, and climate change.  
3. The Potential of 
Sustainability 
Constitutionalism 
The incorporation of sustainability 
into domestic constitutions has great 
potential to advance both sustainability 
and constitutionalism. Ansari, for one, 
has examined the relationship among 
sustainable management, the utilization 
of the environment, and the constitutional 
safeguards of environmental rights. He 
notes how constitutional provisions 
help bridge the gap left by international 
and domestic laws, even given the array 
of sustainability provisions already in 
existence.1066 Even though the vast majority 
of these provisions create no judicially 
enforceable rights, they nonetheless 
affirm national values of environmental 
sustainability to which courts and others 
may advert.
The principal strength – and some would 
say weakness – of ‘sustainability’ is its 
wide applicability. It can mean many 
different things in many different contexts. 
Sustainability principles are shape-
shifters, adaptive to most environmental 
decision making, including water and air 
quality, species conservation, and national 
environmental policy in the United States 
and around the globe.1067 But when used 
appropriately, Dernbach posits that 
sustainability can advance passing along 
an environment that is as suitable for 
existence as what was inherited; a promise 
to future generations of opportunity, wealth, 
satisfaction, or peace; optimal sustained 
yields of agriculture, animals or resources; 
continued employment or employability; 
or economic development.1068  
Sustainability constitutionalism can still 
serve to advance normative objectives in 
specific ways, even in countries lacking 
express constitutional incorporation. For 
1066 Ansari, Lekha Laxman and Abdul Haseeb. “The interface between TRIPS and CBD: efforts towards harmonization.”  
Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 11 (2012): 108-132.
1067 See generally, Ibid. James R. May, Of Development, daVinci and Domestic Legislation: The Prospects for Sustainable 
Development in Asia and its Untapped Potential in the United States, 3 Widener L. Symp. J. 197 (1998).
1068 Dernbach, John. Stumbling Toward Sustainability. Environmental Law Institute, 2003.
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example, laws requiring environmental 
impact assessments (EIA) come closest 
to advancing sustainability as a legal 
prerogative. An EIA is the process whereby 
an agency evaluates the environmental 
impacts of a proposed action, determines 
which impacts are unavoidable, and then 
provides for planning to avoid, mitigate 
or compensate for them. In the United 
States for example, EIAs are required 
for certain types of federal and state 
actions. At the federal level, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1069 is 
intended to “encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his 
environment; to promote efforts which 
will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate 
the health and welfare of man; to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems 
and natural resources important to the 
Nation.” NEPA has promoted sustainability 
in wide and vast, if often overlooked, ways. 
EIA is not solely a phenomenon at the 
federal level in the United States as 
embodied in NEPA. In fact, a half-dozen 
states – including New York and New 
Jersey – have adopted what are known 
as “little NEPAs” to address state agency 
actions that may affect sustainability. 
Moreover, federal and pollution control 
laws – such as the Clean Air Act, Clean 
Water Act, and Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act – and their state analogues, 
advance many sustainability goals.
The elasticity of the concept of 
sustainability can frustrate implementation 
and enforcement as a legal construct. But 
because it contains no limiting principle 
or metrics, its potential application 
across and even within judicial cultures 
may be varied and even inconsistent. 
There is very little jurisprudence applying 
constitutionally embedded provisions 
regarding sustainability and related 
provisions. For example, more than 
four decades removed from Stockholm, 
the United States Supreme Court—and 
no member of it—has yet to recognize 
or even acknowledge the concept of 
sustainability. Since Stockholm, the United 
States Supreme Court has decided more 
than 4,000 cases, including more than 
300 involving environmental matters.1070 
Yet the word “sustainability” appears not 
at all before the Court in any majority, 
concurring or dissenting opinion.1071  
Sustainability stands very little chance 
of being taken seriously by the current 
Supreme Court. Sustainability is a 
guiding principle, not a constitutionally 
enshrined doctrine, and it is not readily 
shaped into a traditional legal case 
1069 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., (‘NEPA’).
1070 See Lazarus, Richard J. “Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court.” 
UCLA L. Rev. 47 (2000): 703, 708 (estimating the Court decided more that 240 environmental law cases between 
1969 and 2000); see also, May, James R. “The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Environmental Litigation.” 
In Environmental Litigation: Law and Strategy, by Cary R. Perlman. ABA, 2009, 359 (number approaching 300); 
Glicksman, James R. May and Robert L. “Justice Rehnquist and the Dismantling of Environmental Law” Envtl. L. Rep. 
36 (2006): 10585 (2006) (number approaching 300). 
1071 May, James R. “Not at All: Environmental Sustainability in the Supreme Court.” Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 10 (2009): 
20.
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or controversy. No United States law 
requires or even recognizes sustainability, 
and the United States has not ratified an 
international treaty that does so either. 
Moreover, no member of the Court 
studied environmental law. None of them 
has much if any practical experience 
with environmental law in general, and 
sustainability in particular. Few Supreme 
Court justices have held elected political 
office, and few have regulatory experience 
that would sensitize them to environmental 
concerns and the complexities and 
challenges of sustainability. Indeed, most 
of the current Court’s legal experience 
has been predominantly on the business 
or “development” side of the sustainable 
development equation. Surprisingly, 
sustainability—even as a governing 
principle—has not managed to capture the 
imagination of litigants, who seldom if ever 
invoke sustainability in pleadings, briefs, 
and oral arguments.1072 The experience 
in the United States is typical: lacking 
constitutional recognition, sustainability 
has not yet triggered juridical engagement.
While South Africa’s constitution embraced 
sustainable development in 1996, the 
provision has had little practical effect.1073 
Likewise, while Section 225 of the Brazilian 
constitution requires that governmental 
policies promote ecologically sustainable 
development, apex courts there rarely 
enforce this provision.1074 On the other 
hand, sustainability has earned a foothold 
with some international tribunals.1075 Yet, 
these novel provisions hardly seem to 
register in everyday decision making in 
environmental matters. Two decades 
after the end of apartheid, the provision’s 
constitutional or normative status is 
unclear. Social striation, economic 
disparity, and despoliation of natural 
resources in South Africa accentuate the 
difficulty of breathing life into the concept 
of sustainable development. As Kotzé 
reports, the country’s Constitutional Court 
hasn’t engaged the provision so as to 
define what it means, who can enforce 
it, to whom it applies, what remedies 
might redress infractions, or what role 
sustainable development could play in the 
broader environmental constitutionalism 
paradigm.1076 The passing of President 
Mandela and the rise of corrupt elements 
in the present government will undoubtedly 
serve to place additional strain on the 
1072 Based on a search of cases, briefs and transcripts of the search terms “sustainability,” “sustainable development,” 
“ecologically sustainable development,” on Westlaw (last searched September 12, 2016), and on the U.S. Supreme 
Court data base, <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/> (last visited September 12, 2016).
1073 See Kotzé, Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism 2012 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law 199-233; 
Kotzé Sustainable Development and the Rule of Law for Nature: A Constitutional Reading in Voight C (ed) Rule of Law 
for Nature: New Dimensions and Ideas in Environmental Law (CUP, 2013).
1074 E.g., Associação Nacional do Transporte de Cargas e Logística v. Governador do Estado de São Paulo, S.T.F., ADPF 
234 MC/DF, DJe 06.02.12 (Rel. Min. Marco Aurélio) (Braz.) (case brought by asbestos transporters against a state 
law on constitutional grounds).
1075 Higgins, Rosalyn. “Natural Resources in the Case Law of the International Court.” In International Law and 
Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, by Alan Boyle and David Freestone. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 87, 111 (using the International Court of Justice to highlight environmental 
sustainability in international courts and other arenas).
1076 See Kotzé, Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism 2012 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law 199-233; 
Kotzé Sustainable Development and the Rule of Law for Nature: A Constitutional Reading in Voight C (ed) Rule of Law 
for Nature: New Dimensions and Ideas in Environmental Law (CUP, 2013).
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1077 E.g., Associação Nacional do Transporte de Cargas e Logística v. Governador do Estado de São Paulo, S.T.F., ADPF 
234 MC/DF, DJe 06.02.12 (Rel. Min. Marco Aurélio) (Braz.) (case brought by asbestos transporters against a state 
law on constitutional grounds).
1078 See Lazarus, Richard J. “Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court.” 
UCLA L. Rev. 47 (2000): 703, 708 (estimating the Court decided more that 240 environmental law cases between 
1969 and 2000); see also, May, James R. “The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Environmental Litigation.” 
In Environmental Litigation: Law and Strategy, by Cary R. Perlman. ABA, 2009, 359 (number approaching 300); 
Glicksman, James R. May and Robert L. “Justice Rehnquist and the Dismantling of Environmental Law” Envtl. L. Rep. 
36 (2006): 10585 (2006) (number approaching 300).
1079 May, James R. “Not at All: Environmental Sustainability in the Supreme Court.” Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 10 (2009): 
20.
implementation of cultural, social and 
economic rights, including environmental 
constitutionalism, in South Africa. 
And while Section 225 of the Brazilian 
constitution requires that governmental 
policies promote ecologically sustainable 
development, apex courts there rarely 
enforce this provision.1077   
Another leading (by way of lagging) 
example is the United States Supreme 
Court. More than four decades removed 
from Stockholm, the Court—and no 
member of it—has yet to recognize or even 
acknowledge the concept of sustainability. 
Since Stockholm, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has decided more than 4,000 
cases, including more than 300 involving 
environmental matters.1078 Yet the word 
“sustainability” appears not at all before 
the Court in any majority, concurring or 
dissenting opinion.1079  
4. Conclusion
Sustainability and environmental 
constitutionalism emerged at roughly 
the same time, and have each 
experienced wide distribution in legal 
orders throughout the world. About 30 
countries have incorporated sustainability 
constitutionally. The influence that these 
relatively young provisions will have, 
remains to be seen, although they hold 
potential for advancing both concepts and 
improving environmental outcomes. 
Sustainable Argan Oil Women’s Cooperative, 
Morocco. Photo credit: © James R. May
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1. Introduction
The African Union (AU) is a continental union consisting of 54 member states with the 
common goal of fostering regional economic integration by means of regional cooperation 
on matters of common concern.1080  Climate change is identified by the New Partnership 
for Africa Development (NEPAD) (2001) as one such matter of common concern, and 
further mandates regional action on mitigating the effects thereof.1081  In its 2007 report, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes the vulnerability of the 
African continent by listing the various sectors which show specific sensitivity to climate 
change. These sectors include water, health, agriculture, ecosystems, and human 
settlements and infrastructure.1082  
While the aggregate AU contribution to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is among 
the lowest globally, individual member states’ levels of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 
vary extensively.1083  South Africa, for instance, is the 13th highest GHG contributor 
globally with an output of 476 metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) or equivalent (MtCO2) 
while the Central African Republic only emits 0.3MtCO2.
1084  Considering the discrepancy 
in the extent to which these two AU member states contribute to climate change, it 
stands to reason that their actions in mitigating the effects of climate change must differ 
proportionally. The foregoing statement speaks directly to the international environmental 
law principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities (CBDR-RC). 
Climate change mitigation in the African Union - 
differentiated responsibilities in the progressive 
realisation of human rights
Michelle Barnard 
1080 The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (1992), article 4(1) and the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union (2000), article 3(j) - (l).
1081 New Partnership for Africa Development (2001), Paras 113, 114, 138 and 176.
1082 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (2007) 436 – 440.
1083 Terry Barker, and others ‘Technical Summary’ in Bert Metz and others (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York 2007) 31.
1084 For more information on the national ghg emission levels of the global community visit http://www.
globalcarbonatlas.org/?q=en/emissions.
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This chapter discusses the following 
themes: the CBDR-RC principle in 
international law, and specifically the 
international climate change regime; 
climate change as an environmental 
and developmental challenge in the 
AU, and the content of the AU’s climate 
change mitigation mandate; and the 
progressive realisation of human rights via 
differentiated mitigation responsibilities of 
AU member states.
Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Capabilities:  
A definition
The CBDR-RC principle, as originally 
stated in the text of the Rio Declaration 
(1992), reads:
“In view of the different contributions 
to global environmental degradation, 
States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that 
they bear in the international pursuit 
of sustainable development in view 
of the pressures their societies place 
on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they 
command.”
Relying on this original definition of 
the CBDR-RC principle one sees that it 
includes two fundamental elements. The 
first concerns the common responsibility 
of States for the protection of the 
environment, or parts of it. The second 
concerns the need to take into account 
each State’s contribution to the evolution 
of a particular environmental challenge 
and its ability to prevent, reduce and 
control the threat. States therefore have 
common responsibilities to protect 
the environment, but the level of their 
responsibility in remedying a specific 
environmental challenge hinges upon the 
level to which they are responsible for said 
problem. The principle, therefore, provides 
for asymmetrical rights and obligations 
in relation to environmental rights and 
standards.
The impacts of climate change poses 
one of, if not the major challenge to 
the realisation of the African human 
rights to an adequate environment and 
development, as contained in articles 24 
and 22 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (1986). Mitigating 
these impacts via the progressive 
realisation of the above-mentioned rights 
places a continuing obligation on States 
to work towards the realisation of each 
right, as well as minimum core obligations 
imposed by the attempt at realisation. The 
foregoing leads to the following central 
assumption underpinning this research, 
namely the different contributions (GHG 
emissions) of countries to the global 
environmental challenge of climate 
change stands in direct correlation to the 
extent of their respective responsibilities 
to mitigate. 
Two inter-related hypotheses linked to the 
stated assumption are: 
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a. The different contributions (GHG 
emissions) of AU member states to 
climate change should stand in direct 
correlation to the extent to which 
each member state is responsible to 
mitigate; and
b. Different mitigation obligations of AU 
member states should be seen to 
embody the content of each member 
states’ minimum core obligation in 
progressively realizing the rights to 
development and environment
In expounding these hypotheses, this 
chapter discusses the following themes: 
the CBDR-RC principle in international 
law, and specifically the international 
climate change regime; climate change 
as an environmental and developmental 
challenge in the AU, and the content 
of the AU’s climate change mitigation 
mandate; and the progressive realisation of 
human rights via differentiated mitigation 
responsibilities of AU member states.
Linking responsibility with contribution: a 
closer look at the normative development 
of the CBDR-RC principle within global 
climate change law
The normative content of the CBDR-RC 
principle can only truly be understood by 
considering the definitions afforded to it 
during its legal historical evolution. The 
mention of the CBDR-RC principle can be 
identified through the textual interpretation 
of various multi-national treaties and 
instruments.1085 It was accepted as an 
international environmental norm in 1992, 
with the drafting of the three binding 
international law instruments to result 
from the Rio Earth Summit.  Undoubtedly 
one of the best examples of the CBDR-RC 
principle in action is in the global climate 
change legal regime. In the text of the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 1992 (UNFCCC), it is 
stated that parties should act to protect the 
climate system “on the basis of equality 
and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.” Similar language 
exists in the text of the Kyoto Protocol 
(1997) which clearly distinguishes 
between proposed goals for climate 
change mitigation for Annex I and non-
Annex I countries. The bases for these 
distinctions being that developed States 
are better able to mitigate climate change, 
and also because of the levels of their 
contribution to climate change. 
The UNFCCC seeks to address the 
disproportionality in terms of global 
‘climate change liability’ (contribution to 
the environmental challenge of climate 
change) with regard to mitigation by 
noting that industrialized countries are 
the source of most past and current GHG 
emissions. It then lists the countries 
in Annex I to the UNFCCC and makes 
specific mention of the fact that these 
countries should therefore be expected to 
1085 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1992); and the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992).
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do the most to cut emissions domestically 
(and, by implication, internationally). 
The UNFCCC therefore places the 
responsibility for global climate change 
mitigation squarely on the shoulders of 
the Annexed countries, and furthermore 
obliges them to financially assist non-
Annexed countries in mitigation efforts. In 
the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I party countries 
are obligated to take on binding emission 
reduction targets in the form of Quantified 
Emission Limitation or Reduction 
Objectives (QUELROs) with 1990 emission 
levels being used as the baseline. During 
the first commitment period (2008 – 2012) 
the goal is to reduce GHG emissions to 
5% under 1990 levels and, in the second 
commitment period (2013 – 2020), to 
reduce to 18% under 1990 level.  The 
Protocol also prescribes three market 
based mitigation mechanisms, namely: 
Emissions Trading; Joint Implementation 
and the Clean Development Mechanism 
from which Annex I parties are obliged 
to choose. Non-Annex I countries are not 
obliged to implement national mitigation 
mechanisms; but if they voluntarily do so, 
it should take place in accordance with 
their economic, technical and scientific 
capabilities.
A particularly important aspect of the 
CBDR-RC principle is international 
assistance, including financial aid and 
technology transfer. As developed 
countries have played the greatest role 
in creating most global environmental 
problems, and have superior ability to 
address them, they are expected to 
take the lead on tackling environmental 
problems. In addition to moving toward 
sustainable development on their own, 
developed countries are expected to 
provide financial, technological, and other 
assistance to help developing countries 
fulfil their international responsibilities. 
This aspect of the principle is highlighted 
by the Paris Agreement drafted at the 21st 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
UNFCCC held in Paris in 2015. 
Article 2 of the Agreement states: “This 
Agreement will be implemented to reflect 
equity and the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of 
different national circumstances.” The 
construction of the Paris Agreement 
definition of the CBDR-RC principle 
deviates to some extent from the Kyoto 
definition in the sense that the 1997 
instrument refers to a list of Annexed or 
non-Annexed countries, while the 2015 
Agreement instead refers to developed 
and developing nations. Another point 
of dissention is that the Kyoto Protocol 
placed mitigation responsibilities 
on only the Annex I (industrialized) 
countries, the Paris Agreement is very 
clear on the fact that both developed 
and developing countries have global 
mitigation responsibilities. The Paris 
Agreement therefore establishes global 
climate change mitigation as a common 
responsibility but, with reference to the 
differentiation between the two groups of 
countries, focuses strongly on the topic of 
climate financing. The Agreement is very 
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clear that differentiated responsibilities 
must be placed on developed countries to 
financially assist developing countries in 
reaching global and individual mitigation 
goals. 
Climate change; mitigation and the 
principle of CBDR-RC in the AU - a 
cursory glance
From a cursory glance of the data on 
greenhouse gases, it is evident that 
Africa is virtually at the receiving end of 
global climate change and the impacts 
it is set to have, despite its relatively 
infinitesimal contribution to the world’s 
greatest externality. The people of the 
continent are therefore veritable victims 
of the anthropogenic excesses of the 
historic emitters who, in temporal and 
spatial terms, are largely responsible for 
precipitating such an ominous state of 
affairs globally.1087 Scientific evidence 
and scenarios projected by global climate 
experts acknowledge that Africa will 
bear the greatest brunt and suffer the 
most devastation caused by the world’s 
largest externality, climate change. The 
natural resource based sectors (most 
notably agriculture, forestry and hydro-
electric power), upon which most of 
the economies of African countries are 
dependent, are extremely vulnerable 
to climate change. Estimates are that 
the region will suffer a wide range of 
detrimental environmental, social, and 
economic climate-related impacts. 
Climate change is already bringing about 
extreme weather events such as drought, 
floods, sea-level rise, storm surges, and 
others. The impacts generally foreseen 
include, but are not restricted to, reduced 
agricultural production, reduced fresh 
water availability, loss of biodiversity, 
increased food insecurity, increased health 
problems and increased migration.1088  
A fundamental issue of equity relating to 
climate change and Africa is that those 
least responsible for the problem of global 
climate change are most vulnerable 
to its impacts.1089 Figure 1 below sets 
out in graphic detail the extent of the 
disproportionality characterizing global 
contribution (responsibility) to climate 
change versus the impacts felt.
It is very clear from the image above that 
those countries least responsible for 
climate change will in most instances 
carry the heaviest burden when it 
comes to the impacts of climate change 
- with Africa being one of the most 
prominent examples. The global image 
must, however, not be considered in 
isolation when applying the CBDR-RC 
principle to climate change mitigation. 
If this was to be the case, the classic 
application of the principle would lead 
to the recommendation that the most 
1086 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
1087 Draft AU Strategy on climate change (2014) 8.
1088 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (2007); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change Fifth Assessment Report (2011) and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report 
(2012). 
1089 International Energy Agency Key World Energy Statistics from the IEA (Paris, France 2012)
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responsible states should be held to a 
proportional mitigation responsibility or 
should contribute proportionally more to 
global climate finance. In essence this 
would mean that all AU member states 
are eligible for the same “discount” on 
global climate change mitigation, and the 
same access to global climate finance. 
This would not speak to the notion of 
CBDR-RC - especially considering the 
disproportionality at the regional level 
of AU members’ national contributions 
to global climate change as per Figure 2 
below.
Within the AU legal regime, the CBDR-RC 
principle is mentioned in three climate 
change instruments, namely: the Algiers 
Declaration on Climate Change (2009); 
the African common position on climate 
change (2009); and the Draft AU Strategy 
on climate change (2014). All three 
instruments note the difference between 
developed and developing countries, and 
furthermore establish that developed 
states have mitigation commitments 
while developing states have voluntary 
mitigation actions. It must, however, be 
stated that the developed and developing 
states referred to in these documents 
1090 Jason Samson, and others ‘Geographic disparities and moral hazards in the predicted impacts of climate change on 
human populations” (2011) Global Ecology and Biogeography 20 538.
Figure 1: Global emission levels against levels of climate vulnerability1090 
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pertain to the global distinction (as per 
the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris 
Agreement) and not the regional level. 
AU member states differ substantially 
in terms of their respective contribution 
to climate change - a situation which 
correlates directly to the level of industrial 
Figure 2: National CO2 emission levels of African states
1091 
1091 http://afrographique.tumblr.com/post/85612160539/infographic-depicting-the-largest-co2-emitting
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development in different member states. 
Coupled with this, AU member states 
also differ substantially in terms of their 
economic and institutional capabilities in 
mitigating climate change. South Africa 
is by far the largest contributor to climate 
change and should therefore (in terms 
of the CBDR-RC) shoulder the heaviest 
responsibility for driving mitigation 
action at the continental level. From the 
foregoing it is clear that AU member 
states are disproportionally responsible 
in terms of their contributions to global 
(and indeed regional) climate change - 
both in relation to one another as well as 
the global community. However small AU 
member states’ contributions are, their 
mitigation responsibilities and its linkages 
with realizing human rights are clearly set 
out by a number of regional instruments. 
These will be discussed in the section 
below. 
Common but differentiated climate 
change mitigation responsibilities and 
the progressive realisation of human 
rights in the AU
With regard to the topic of climate change 
mitigation as common responsibility and 
the realisation of African human rights, 
the text of African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) 
Resolution on Climate Change and Human 
Rights and the Need to Study its Impact 
on Africa (2009) states that:
“the lack of human rights safeguards 
in various draft texts of the 
conventions under negotiation could 
put at risk the life, physical integrity 
and livelihood of the most vulnerable 
members of society notably isolated 
indigenous and local communities, 
women, and other vulnerable social 
groups.” 
The African Commission refers to the 
right to development and the right to a 
satisfactory environment favorable to 
development contained in articles 22 and 
24 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1986) (Banjul Charter) as 
legal bases for concerted efforts towards 
addressing climate change at the AU level. 
Article 22 (Right to Development) reads:
(1) All peoples shall have the right to 
their economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their 
freedom and identity and in the equal 
enjoyment of the common heritage of 
mankind. 
(2) States shall have the duty, individually 
or collectively, to ensure the exercise 
of the right to development. 
Article 24 (Environmental Right) of the 
Banjul Charter holds that “All peoples shall 
have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favorable to their 
development. In terms of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) (1966), progressive 
realisation entails that states:
327
“take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic 
and technical, to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.”
Further, the principle of progressive 
realisation (as contained in the ICESCR) 
imposes both a continuing obligation on 
states to work towards the realisation 
of each right, as well as minimum core 
obligations imposed by the attempt at 
realisation. A lack of resources cannot 
justify inaction or indefinite postponement 
of measures to implement these rights. 
States must demonstrate that they 
are making every effort to improve the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights, even when resources are scarce. 
For example, irrespective of the resources 
available to it, a State should, as a matter 
of priority, seek to ensure that everyone 
has access to, at the very least, minimum 
levels of rights, and target programmes 
to protect the poor, the marginalized and 
the disadvantaged. Alston argues that 
each right must give rise to an absolute 
minimum entitlement, in the absence of 
which a state party is to be considered to 
be in violation of [its] obligations.1092  
The primary impetus for the development 
of the ‘minimum core’ concept was 
to respond to the problem created by 
progressive realisation in relation to 
resources.1093 Scholarly debate over how 
the core is intended to function has been 
mapped closely the shifting function 
ascribed to the core in international 
human rights law. These debates coalesce 
around whether the core refers to absolute 
or relative content (in relation to resources 
and national needs), or to state obligations 
in relation to such content. And if it refers 
to obligations, should these be of result or 
of conduct?1094  
For the purposes of the current 
discussion, the author takes minimum 
core obligations to refer to the resources 
available and national needs. The 
progressive realisation of fundamental 
rights at the AU level is restricted to the 
minimum core approach in terms of article 
29(6) of the Banjul Charter which holds 
that “States parties have an obligation 
to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, the minimum essential levels of 
each of the economic, social and cultural 
rights contained in the Banjul Charter.” 
There is therefore a duty that rests upon 
AU member states to progressively realize 
1092 Phillip Alston, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) Human Rights Quarterly 9 352–3.
1093 Lisa Forman, and others ‘Conceptualising minimum core obligations under the right to health: How should we define 
and implement the ‘morality of the depths’ (2016) The International Journal of Human Rights 5.
1094 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (1990) para. 1.
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the right to an adequate environment 
and development via climate change 
mitigation. Moreover, the CBDR-RC 
principle is directly applicable in this 
context. The extent to which each AU 
member state has contributed (by 
way of national GHG emissions) to 
climate change directly correlates to the 
minimum obligation (mitigation action), 
resting upon said states, to realize the 
rights to development and an adequate 
environment.
Conclusion
The disproportional contributions of AU 
member states to the environmental 
challenges posed by climate change 
should serve as directory which should 
direct their respective responsibilities 
in mitigating these environmental 
challenges. In this regard, the CBDR-RC 
principle should be applied to ascertain 
every AU member states’ minimum core 
obligation when it comes to climate 
change mitigation. In practical terms this 
means that existing scientific data on 
actual GHG emissions should be used to 
“rank” AU member states in order of their 
level of responsibility to mitigate. The 
application of the CBDR-RC principle in this 
manner should reflect its interpretation 
in the text of the Paris Agreement. This 
means that climate change mitigation is 
seen as a common duty resting on all AU 
member states - irrespective of level of 
responsibility or capability. However, the 
onus rests firmly on the more developed 
African member states to lead the way in 
mitigation by establishing national goals 
for emission reduction, and contributing 
financially and on a technology transfer 
level to the mitigation efforts of their less 
developed African neighbors. Reaching 
the common goal of realizing inalienable 
human rights via climate change 
mitigation in the AU rests equally upon 
the shoulders of all member states - how 
this goal is to be reached, however, is a 
burden divided along the lines of different 
capabilities.
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